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Abstract 
In recent decades, regional pressures for stronger autonomy have encouraged 
a number of central and federal governments around the world to devolve powers and 
resources downwards to the regional level. The contemporary revival of regionalist 
movements and the simultaneous tendency towards greater government 
decentralisation have received considerable academic attention. Most of these 
contributions present detailed accounts of the processes of regional mobilisation and 
devolution in a specific region or set of regions. Although these analytical stories tell us 
a lot about the distinctive aspects of a particular case, they do not, in general, present a 
coherent theoretical account that would allow us to study the origins of these two 
interrelated but distinctive trends in a structured way. This thesis aims to make a 
contribution towards such an account. Building on the literature on political legitimacy 
and social movements, this study develops a tripartite typology of regionalisms which 
allows us to analyse and compare the origins of regional autonomy movements across 
different contexts. In addition, it seeks to show that an actor-based rational choice 
approach to the process of regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation can 
help us gain a better understanding of the mechanisms through which such demands 
influence the shape of the government system. The usefulness of the resulting 
theoretical framework is demonstrated by applying it to the contemporary history of 
regionalism and devolution in mainland Britain.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1970s, academic literatures across a range of social science 
disciplines have been awash with claims that the centrality of the state is increasingly 
being challenged by “new forms of political mobilization, conflict, and struggle...that 
cross cut, bypass, or transcend inherited geographies of the national state”(Brenner, 
Jessop, Jones, & MacLeod, 2003: 11). One of these trends has been the contemporary 
revival of regionalist and secessionist movements in established democratic societies. 
The response of the central or federal state to these developments has varied; while 
some political elites have sought to ignore or suppress calls for regional autonomy, 
others have proved significantly more accommodating.  
Although these trends have been widely noted, the origins of the regionalist 
revival and the political and institutional factors that shape the response of central and 
federal powers to such developments remain heavily debated. This study seeks to 
make a contribution to the literature by developing a theoretically grounded framework 
of analysis that will allow us to position the existing literatures within a broader context, 
and strengthen our ability to empirically test the validity of the underlying propositions 
and hypotheses. The analytical focus of this thesis is thus rather broad. It not only 
seeks to explain the emergence of popular demands for greater autonomy, but also 
examines under which conditions such demands are likely to lead to change of 
constitutional importance. In order to answer these questions, the theoretical chapter 
develops a tripartite typology of regionalisms alongside an actor-based rational choice 
approach to regionalist accommodation. The usefulness of these theoretical constructs 
is demonstrated through an in-depth case study of the patterns of regionalism and 
regionalist accommodation in post-war mainland Britain.        
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1.1. Main arguments 
 This study advances two core arguments. First of all, it will be proposed that 
regionalism should be seen as a re-scaling of political legitimacy from the centre 
towards the regional level, rather than an assertion of regional difference or national 
consciousness per se. Secondly, I aim to show that a rational choice approach can 
help us to gain a fuller understanding of the processes of regionalist accommodation 
and non-accommodation in different contexts. At face value, neither of these two 
arguments may seem particularly contentious. Taken together, they do however 
represent a significant departure from the approach generally taken within the existing 
literature on regionalism, devolution, and secession. To illustrate this, I shall elaborate 
on each of these two core arguments and show how the proposed approach 
challenges and qualifies elements of the conventional wisdom.  
 Before I delve more deeply into the concept of regionalism as the re-scaling of 
political legitimacy and the response of political elites to such developments, it is 
however necessary to briefly discuss the rationale behind the terminology used within 
this study. The language one chooses to employ to describe popular demands for 
greater autonomy is a point of considerable contention. While some authors choose to 
speak of ‘stateless nations’ or ‘nationalisms’ (see for example Keating, 2001b), others 
refer to similar territories and processes of mobilisation as ‘regions’ and ‘sub-national 
activism’ (van Houten, 2007). I would contend that such choices are rarely incidental 
and often reflect the personal background of the author and the general tenor of the 
work. I therefore feel that it is important to explicitly acknowledge the considerations 
that motivated the terminology used in this study.     
The question “Who is Sylvia Tijmstra?” is addressed in some detail within the 
acknowledgements. All that needs to be said here is that I personally do not feel a 
strong connection to any particular nation or region and that the level of importance 
attached to such imagined communities by others continues to surprise me. 
Academically, this study departs from the perspective that legitimacy is multi-faceted 
and increasingly multi-scalar in nature.  
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In line with this perspective, I see regional demands of greater autonomy as a partial 
re-scaling of political legitimacy from the central or federal state towards a smaller 
territorial unit within this territorial state. This smaller unit may be referred to as a 
region, a country, a state, or a nation for a variety of historical, cultural or political 
reasons. In line with my general perspective on the subject, this study deliberately 
seeks to avoid the use of the term ‘nation’ when referring to either the state or the 
smaller territorial unit within it. Similarly, I have tried to minimise the use of the term 
‘nationalism’ to refer to feelings of belonging directed to either of these two scales.  
Apart from these arguably normative choices, the choice of terminology was 
primarily guided by a desire to make this study as accessible to a non-specialist 
audience as possible. In this context, Sharpe’s (1993) more neutral but less intuitive 
concept of ‘meso government’ was considered but rejected in favour of the arguably 
more normatively-laden but readily understandable term ‘region’. Popular demands for 
greater regional autonomy or full secession are in turn referred to as ‘regionalism’ and 
‘regionalist’. When discussing a particular case, I at times refer to a region or a 
regionalist movement by the name commonly employed within the context at hand. 
Similarly, I talk about the nationalisation and regionalisation of the party system, as this 
is the vocabulary normally used in the academic literature on this subject. It is 
important to stress that the choice of words in such instances reflects a convention 
rather than a normative judgement regarding the nature of a particular community or 
scale of government.  
Having established the rationale behind the terminology used throughout this 
thesis, I will now move on to the substantive arguments. 
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1.1.1. Regionalism as the re-scaling of political legitimacy 
One of the primary arguments I seek to advance in this study is that we need to 
devote equal attention to central and regional factors in order to understand the origins 
of popular demands for greater regional autonomy. This is by no means a new 
contention; the famous work by Rokkan and Urwin (1982) put forward a very similar 
argument. The continuing pre-occupation with regional factors and realities that 
characterises so much of the contemporary literature however suggests that this 
critique remains as valid today as it was in the early 1980s (Bradbury, 2006). By re-
defining regionalism as the re-scaling of political legitimacy from central or federal level 
to the regional scale, I seek to redress this lack of attention for the state-level trends 
and development that create the opportunities for regionalist mobilisation.  
The literature on social movements has long argued that, in order for 
mobilisation to occur, “people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their 
lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem” (McAdam, 
McCarthy, & Zald, 1996: 5). Applying this intuition to the case at hand would suggest 
that popular demands for greater regional autonomy can only emerge if the legitimacy 
of the centre is challenged in some way and the region is perceived as a more viable or 
legitimacy tier of government in this respect. From within this perspective, a rise in 
popular support for decentralisation can have two origins. First of all, new challenges to 
the legitimacy of the centre may encourage a regionalist revival in areas that have 
traditionally enjoyed a high degree of regional legitimacy. Secondly, an increase in the 
legitimacy of the region as an alternative scale of government can create support for 
decentralisation in areas where the legitimacy of the central state has traditionally been 
compromised. These two rationales are not mutually exclusive. In other words, 
improvements in the perceived legitimacy of the region may coincide with the 
appearance of new grievances at the central level to produce dual incentives towards 
regionalist mobilisation. The point I am trying to make is instead that we need to 
acknowledge that grievances with the centre interact with sources of legitimacy at the 
regional level to create calls for devolution and secession.   
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In order to gain a better understanding of this dynamic, I argue that we should 
base our empirical enquiries more firmly on the rich theoretical literature on political 
legitimacy, rather than relying primarily on the tentative hypotheses emerging from 
empirical observations. Building on the work of Weber (1978), Easton (1965) and 
Scharpf (1999), I develop a multi-faceted concept of what makes power legitimate in 
democratic contexts. Combining this concept with the proposition that regionalism is 
unlikely to emerge unless people feel both aggrieved by some aspect of the current 
system and confident that decentralisation or secession would help redress this issue, 
we can distinguish three ideal types of regionalism. First of all, popular support for 
greater regional autonomy may be based on grievances with the perceived output 
produced by the centre, coupled with the perception that decentralisation would 
improve the economic situation of the region and/or allow residents to enjoy the same 
public goods and services at a lower cost. I dub this type of support for greater regional 
autonomy (1) economic regionalism. Secondly, salient spaces of regionalism may 
emerge when the central government system is seen as inadequately responsive to the 
needs and wants of the population and decentralisation is perceived as a viable 
solution to this democratic deficit. I call this type of support for devolution (2) 
democratic regionalism. Finally, a rescaling of legitimacy may occur when the imagined 
community at the centre is seen as irreconcilable, or in some way at odds, with the 
imagined regional community. I will refer to this as (3) identity-based regionalism. 
The typology of regionalisms outlined above will no doubt be readily 
recognisable to those who take an interest in the substantive subject matter at hand. In 
fact, I deliberately draw on the language most commonly employed in this context, 
instead of using more precise but less intuitive terms such as “specific” and “diffuse” 
support (Easton, 1965) or “output-oriented” and “input-oriented” legitimacy (Scharpf, 
1999). What is different about the approach adopted here is that it is argued that 
regional sources of legitimacy should only be seen as a direct cause of regionalism if 
they match perceived legitimacy deficits at the centre.  
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By contrast, I argue that economic, democratic and identity-based sources of regional 
legitimacy that are not mirrored by similar grievances at the central level enable, rather 
than cause, regionalist mobilisation.  
To illustrate how the proposed framework helps us to qualify and specify 
existing perspectives on the origins of popular demands for greater regional autonomy, 
the empirical part of this thesis will re-analyse the waxing and waning of spaces of 
regionalism in post-war mainland Britain. Initially I will focus on the contemporary 
history of regionalism between 1945 and 1997. The United Kingdom is, as the name 
suggests, a product of the unification of several formerly independent territorial spaces. 
For much of the twentieth century, this history however did not produce highly salient 
spaces of regionalism outside of Ireland. Although cultural and linguistic differences 
existed and institutional reminders of independence remained, mainland Britain was 
widely seen as a textbook example of successful integration (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982). 
The re-emergence of the ‘home-rule’ issue in the post-war period therefore took many 
by surprise. The wealth of literature that has since emerged on the subject focuses 
strongly on regional factors and realities in order to explain this trend. This study seeks 
to complement and challenge these accounts by showing that the waxing and waning 
of popular support for greater autonomy should in fact be seen as one of several 
possible responses to the more general challenges to the legitimacy of the British state 
during this period.  
The relatively recent secession of much of Ireland, coupled with the 
concentration of popular demands for greater autonomy in Scotland and Wales, invites 
a conceptualisation of the post-war regionalist revival as the re-assertion of national 
rights surrendered in an uneven process of unification. This would however be an 
oversimplification both of the sources of support for autonomy in Scotland and Wales, 
and of the history of unification and identity formation. The ideology of nationalism, 
understood as the idea that the nation and the state should be coextensive, is widely 
accepted to be a nineteenth century invention (Gellner, 2006; Hobsbawm, 1992; 
Kedourie, 1993).  
19 | P a g e  
 
Largely the product of the French Revolution, it emerged at a time when Wales and 
England had already been formally unified for more than 200 years. Although the 
memory of independence was arguably more vivid in Scotland, it too had been part of 
Britain for nearly a century by that time. As a result, the imagined Scottish and Welsh 
communities that partially underpin the contemporary spaces of regionalism in these 
two countries developed very much in tandem with, as well as in opposition to, an 
overarching sense of Britishness.  
Throughout the history of the Union, the relative importance attached to 
regional and British feelings of belonging has waxed and waned for a variety of 
reasons. While the Anglicising tendencies in the nineteenth century may well have 
produced identity-based regionalisms in parts of Scotland and Wales, I argue that the 
contemporary re-ordering of identities should instead be understood as a more 
mundane response to the weakening of the British identity. In the 1950s and 60s, the 
secularisation of British society, the demise of the Empire, and the experience of 
relative and absolute economic decline jointly undermined some of the most central 
pillars of the imagined British community. This in turn created opportunities for regional 
identities to gain in importance relative to central attachments. I will argue that the 
perceived sources of conflict between the regional ‘us’ and the British ‘other’ were 
however too limited and stable over time to explain the regionalist revival during this 
period. Instead, I assert that the formal and informal mobilisation structures that tend to 
accompany historically-grounded spatial identities facilitated the mobilisation of 
economic and democratic grievances with the centre along territorial lines in Scotland 
and Wales.  
In the 1960s and 70s, the worsening of the economic situation across Britain, 
alongside the re-emergence of the North-South divide, created generic as well as 
spatially-concentrated economic grievances with the centre. Across the UK, these 
economic woes were accompanied by a growing discontent with the performance of 
the main contenders for office at the central level. The popular response to such 
grievances differed from area to area.  
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In England, voters predominantly expressed their discontent by shunning the Labour 
Party and the Conservatives in favour of the Liberals. By contrast, the challenges to the 
legitimacy of the centre provoked a rise in support for greater regional autonomy in 
Scotland. At the time it was widely assumed that a similar, if perhaps less prominent, 
shift in popular opinion occurred in parts of Wales. In the absence of reliable survey 
evidence, this contention was primarily based on what, with the benefit of hindsight, 
can be seen as a misinterpretation of the origins of the sudden rise in support for Plaid 
Cymru in the late 1960s. While the thawing of the two-party system may have exposed 
a regionalist core in some parts of Wales, persistent economic grievances and the 
related decline in support for the Labour Party primarily resulted in an increase in 
support for the Liberals and calls for change at the central level. I will therefore argue 
that the Welsh response to the emerging challenges to the legitimacy of the centre 
bares a greater resemblance to the trends in England than the regionalist revival in 
Scotland.  
In line with the conventional wisdom, I primarily attribute the stronger regionalist 
response in Scotland to the 1970 discovery of North Sea oil. What makes my 
explanation subtly different is that I argue that the related shift in the perceived 
economic legitimacy of the region had such a profound effect on support for 
independence and devolution precisely because it matched the primary source of 
grievance with the centre at that time. The spatial pattern of the second regionalist 
revival in the 1980s and 90s lends further support to this hypothesis. While there were 
also economic sources of discontent, I will argue that the second regionalist revival 
primarily coincided with the emergence of new democratic grievances with the centre. 
The voting patterns in both Scotland and Wales in turn suggested that decentralisation 
could at least partially redress these democratic deficits. As the framework proposed in 
this study would predict, this resulted in a much more homogeneous rise in popular 
support for decentralisation across both countries.  
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Having re-analysed the contemporary history of regionalism in mainland Britain, 
I turn to the emerging trends in the post-devolution era. The influence of devolution on 
the salience of pre-existing spaces of regionalism has been heavily debated; while 
some argue that the partial accommodation of regionalist demands can help to stem 
calls for further autonomy (Elazar, 1995; Gurr, 1994; Lijphart, 1977; Stepan, 2001), 
others content that decentralisation is likely to have the opposite effect (for example 
see Dikshit, 1975; Kymlicka, 1998; Lustik, Miodownik, & Eidelson, 2004; Roeder, 
1991). So far, the immediate effects of devolution on the demand for greater 
decentralisation in Scotland and Wales have been relatively modest. While popular 
support for a return to a fully centralised system has declined, demand for full 
secession has remained fairly stable. Surveys however do tend to find that popular 
support for more extensive forms of decentralisation has increased. Simultaneously, 
the experience of devolution elsewhere seems to be increasingly associated with 
support for the establishment of a directly elected country-level body in England. Using 
the typology of regionalisms developed in the theoretical part of this thesis I analyse 
the origins of these emerging trends in more depth.   
In particular I argue that, although devolution has altered the way some people 
choose to articulate feelings of belonging, this effect has been too minimal to produce a 
real propensity towards purely identity-driven regionalism. Similarly, the perceived 
failure of the devolved institutions to significantly improve the economic situation in 
Scotland and Wales has dampened the influence of the New Regionalism discourse on 
popular support for decentralisation. By contrast, opinion polls suggest that the 
establishment of directly elected regional bodies has done little to redress the 
perceived democratic deficits that underpinned the regionalist revival in the 1980s and 
90s. Simultaneously, the anomalies in the current asymmetric system of devolution are 
creating increasingly salient democratic grievances in the non-devolved areas. In this 
context, I argue that the recent rise in the regionalisation of the British party system is 
likely to strengthen democratic regionalism across mainland Britain.  
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In addition, the perceived ability of Scottish elites to use the devolved institutions in 
order to protect the region’s relatively favourable public resource position is producing 
increasingly salient comparative grievances in England and Wales. This perceived 
fiscal dividend of devolution is in turn proving an increasingly potent source of 
economic regionalism.  Taken together, this analysis suggests that the recent shift of 
power at the centre and the related austerity policies may be accompanied by a 
strengthening of popular demands for further decentralisation in devolved and non-
devolved areas alike.      
1.1.2. Regionalist accommodation as a veto game 
 This thesis not only seeks to examine to origins of spaces of regionalism, but 
also aims to explore under which circumstances such popular demands for greater 
regional autonomy are likely to lead to an actual rescaling of powers and resources 
from the central or federal level to the regional scale. While the re-emergence of 
demands for greater regional autonomy has led to changes of constitutional importance 
in some contexts and time periods, the response has been considerably more muted in 
others. Although this heterogeneity has been widely noted, there have been few 
attempts to develop a coherent theoretical account that can explain differences in 
regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation in a structured way. In this 
context, I argue that a carefully developed veto player (VP) approach can help us to 
develop a better understanding of the prevailing patterns of policy stability and change 
in the face of bottom-up pressures towards devolution and secession.  
 Veto player approaches are increasingly being employed by qualitative 
researchers to examine legislative processes and policy outcomes across a variety of 
substantive policy areas and country contexts. While the language used in such studies 
may be distinctive, the explanations offered are generally compatible with those 
developed by studies adopting different methods. What is distinctive about the VP 
approach is that the researcher both explicitly identifies the actors that are assumed to 
possess veto powers within the analytical narrative and takes great care to justify the 
beliefs and preferences she attribute to these actors.  
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This approach not only allows for a more structured comparison between different 
cases, but also produces explanations that can be more readily tested and challenged 
empirically.   
The empirical usefulness of this approach is again demonstrated by applying it to 
the contemporary history of regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation in 
post-war mainland Britain. It can be argued that the British case is not particularly well-
suited to the VP approach, as powers tend to be strongly concentrated in the hands of 
a single partisan veto player; the party in government at the centre. As a result, the 
decision-making processes at the central level rarely produce the highly visible 
bargaining situations upon which this type of analysis tends to rely. The empirical 
sections of this study however aim to show that the VP approach can nonetheless help 
us to gain a better understanding of the decisions and non-decisions under 
consideration here.      
Contrary to the usual pattern described above, the first regionalist revival under 
consideration in this study occurred during a rare period of minority government at the 
central level. In addition party discipline within the governing party was at an historic 
low during the mid to late-1970s. As a result a number of groups within the House of 
Commons gained potential veto powers. On this occasion, the number of veto players 
within the system and the difference in their policy preferences prevented actual 
change from occurring.  By contrast, the second surge in popular support for greater 
autonomy in Scotland and Wales did eventually result in the asymmetric devolution of 
powers and resources to directly elected regional bodies.  
This change was initiated by a government that enjoyed the largest seat majority since 
the Second World War. Coupled with low levels of backbench dissent, this firmly 
concentrated the agenda-setting and decision-making powers in the hands of the 
newly-elected prime minister and his cabinet. In this context, the views of other groups 
within the system were largely immaterial to the overall outcome of the decision-making 
process.  
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While these differences are widely acknowledged within the existing literature, 
most of these studies do not examine which of the many observable disparities 
between the two decision-making moments are necessary or indeed sufficient to 
explain the difference in the overall outcome. This thesis aims to show that an actor-
based rational choice approach can help us to compare and contrast these periods in 
more detail. In particular, I argue that the primary agenda-setting powers remained 
strongly concentrated in the hands of the party leadership of the governing party during 
both periods. In order to understand the differences in the processes of regionalist 
accommodation during these two periods, we therefore first and foremost need to 
understand why the main contenders for office at the central level would choose to 
place the devolution issue on the parliamentary agenda at all.     
The formal policies and informal practices through which the preferences of 
individual party members are aggregated into a single policy position differ from party 
to party. The process however tends to have a strongly hierarchical element, in the 
sense that the internal agenda-setting and decision-making powers are concentrated in 
the hands of the party leadership (Grofman, 2004). In order to gain a better 
understanding of the factors that guide the formal party response to the emergence of 
salient spaces of regionalism, we therefore need to start by analysing the incentives 
faced by the party leadership. As Blau (2008) has argued with respect to electoral 
reform, it is important to distinguish act-based reasons to support or oppose a change 
in the existing government system from outcome-based incentives. The act-based 
incentives faced by the party leadership can in turn be divided into intra-party 
consideration and external electoral and political concerns. The resulting typology of 
incentives towards regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation is summarised 
in Table 1.1. By distinguishing between these different types of incentives and 
acknowledging that they may at times prove conflicting we can in turn gain a better 
understanding of the behaviour of political elites in the face of bottom-up demands 
towards decentralisation.    
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Table 1.1 Incentives towards regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation 
Type of incentive Explanation 
 
Outcome-based  
 
The outcome of supporting or opposing devolution is 
beneficial. 
 
 
Party-interest  
 
Devolution is likely to enhance or decrease the power and 
influence of the party. 
 
 
Ideological  
 
 
Devolution or centralisation is seen as normatively justified or 
likely to lead to the most preferable outcome in the long-run. 
 
 
Act-based  
 
The act of support or opposing devolution is beneficial. 
 
 
Internal  
 
The act of supporting or opposing devolution is likely to help the 
party leader gain or retain internal support. 
 
 
Electoral  
 
 
The act of support or opposing devolution is likely to increase the 
party’s vote or seat share 
 
 
Political  
 
The act of supporting or opposing devolution will help the party 
gain or retain veto powers 
 
 
In particular, I qualify and challenge the common proposition that the divisiveness 
of the devolution issue within the Parliamentary Labour Party, coupled with the Party’s 
narrow and fast disappearing parliamentary majority, presented the main obstacle to 
devolution in the late 1970s. Instead I argue that the tight electoral competition at the 
centre, coupled with the low salience attached to the devolution issue in England, 
allowed the preferences of a regionalist minority to have an atypically large effect on 
the electoral incentives faced by the main contenders for office at the centre. The party 
leadership was in turn in a strong position to respond to such incentives because the 
‘home rule’ issue had re-emerged relatively recently and there were considerable intra-
party divisions regarding the proper response to this trend. In other words, I argue that 
the factors that are often identified as the main obstacles to change should instead be 
seen as the unusual circumstances that allowed regionalist demands to penetrate the 
Parliamentary agenda at all.  
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Given the motivations behind the devolution agenda of the 1974-1979 Labour 
government, the internal divisions that emerged during the decision-making process 
seem hardly surprising. A structured veto player analysis however shows that the sheer 
scale of backbench dissent was not just driven by the divisive nature of the devolution 
issue, but also in part by the general decline in party discipline that marked the 1970s. 
Such an analysis furthermore reveals that the House of Commons retains the final 
veto, even if a consultative popular referendum is introduced. This in turn challenges 
the perspective that the repeal of the 1978 Scotland Act was the direct result of the so-
called Cunningham amendment. Instead I will argue that it was not the ‘40 percent of 
the electorate’ threshold, but rather the limited appetite for devolution amongst the 
Scottish population, coupled with the weak position of the minority Labour Government, 
that ultimately led to the failure of the legislation.  
While popular opinion shifted notably in the 1980s and 90s, it would be overly 
simplistic to present the eventual change in the government system in the late 1990s 
as the expression of the settled will of the Scottish and Welsh people. Instead I will 
argue that the gradual absorption of the devolution dimension within the existing party 
system was instrumental in ensuring that the Labour Party maintained its commitment 
to Scottish and Welsh devolution when its fortunes changed at the central level. In 
particular, I seek to show that Labour leader, Tony Blair, had a personal outcome 
preference for the status quo and faced few electoral incentives to accommodate the 
views of the regionalist groups in Scotland and Wales. Rather it would seem that his 
choice to honour his Party’s longstanding commitment to devolution in the 1997 
election manifesto was guided by internal act-based incentives. I argue that the 
existence of conflicting act and outcome-based incentives in turn encouraged the 
Labour leader to devise a mixed policy strategy, which allowed him to reap the internal 
benefits of formally supporting devolution, while creating a barrier to change in the form 
regional referendums. While Blair may have misjudged the level of popular support for 
fiscal devolution in Scotland, the results of the Welsh referendum illustrate that this 
strategy could have paid off.     
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Having re-examined the contemporary history of devolution decisions and non-
decisions prior to 1997, I move on to examine the dynamics of regionalist 
accommodation in the post-devolution era. In the British context, it has been widely 
suggested that the initial decentralisation of powers and resources to a directly elected 
regional body is likely to unleash further waves of reform (Hazell, 2007; Keating, 2009). 
While this general assertion fits the contemporary developments in Scotland, Wales, 
and Greater London, I argue that there is a need examine the origins of these trends in 
more detail. Analysing the distribution of agenda-setting and decision-making powers 
from a veto player perspective can again be a useful first step in this respect. Such an 
analysis reveals that, although the British government system has been profoundly 
changed by devolution, this has not significantly altered the formal distribution of 
powers over issues of constitutional importance. The logical consequence of this 
finding is that the effect of devolution on the dynamics of regionalist accommodation 
must operate primarily through the ability of regional elites to use their new-found 
powers in order to change the act and outcome-based incentives faced by veto players 
at the central level.  
I will argue that devolution can change the incentives faced by central level parties 
in two ways. Most directly, devolution can increase the credibility of the threat of 
secession by providing regionalist parties with new mobilisation structures. Secondly, 
the benefits derived from simultaneous office holding at the central and regional level 
enhance the internal bargaining powers of the regional affiliates of the party in office at 
the central level. While the first dynamic dominates in Scotland, the accommodation of 
bottom-up demands for further decentralisation in Wales and Greater London operate 
primarily through internal party politics. As a result, I argue that central veto players 
with an outcome-based preference for maintaining the Union face stronger incentives 
to accommodate Scottish preferences for greater regional autonomy in the post-
devolution era. This has in turn dampened the influence of the electoral geography of 
the UK on central party positions. By contrast, the dynamics of devolution in Wales and 
Greater London strongly hinge on party politics.  
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At times when there is no formal partisan connection between the regional and the 
central government, the incentives towards regionalist accommodation faced by the 
centre therefore remain similar to the pre-devolution situation.  
The devolution of powers and resources to Scotland, Wales and Greater London 
has thus produced regional institutions with very different degrees of bargaining power. 
Simultaneously, the lack of devolution to the rest of England has meant that the 
majority of the electorate in mainland Britain does not enjoy any form of regional 
representation. As a result, English sources of discontent with the current system of 
asymmetric devolution do not easily find political expression. This in turn allows political 
elites at the central level to ignore English demands for constitutional changes that 
would be unpopular in the devolved areas or politically disadvantageous for the party 
itself. This situation seems unlikely to change unless grievances with the asymmetric 
system of devolution become salient enough to significantly affect the behaviour of 
English voters in general elections.     
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 will firstly develop the theoretical frameworks that underpin the analysis. 
This chapter will also outline the methodological approach in the empirical sections of 
this study and rational behind the case selection. The next three chapters will re-
analyse the contemporary history of regionalism and regionalist accommodation using 
the tools developed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 focuses on the origins of popular demands 
for greater regional autonomy between 1945 and 1997. Chapter 4 in turn examines 
how spatially concentrated demands for decentralisation affect the formal policy 
position of the main contenders for office at the central level. Based on this analysis, 
chapter 5 shows how a veto player approach can help us to understand the outcome of 
the main decision-making moments during this period. The subsequent two chapters 
employ the same theoretical concepts to the post-devolution period. Chapter 6 
examines to what extent the asymmetric devolution of powers and resources to 
Scotland, Wales and Greater London has changed the propensity towards different 
types of regionalism in mainland Britain.  
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Chapter 7 in turn analyses how the establishment of  directly elected regional bodies in 
some but not all regions has affected the distribution of veto powers in the system and 
the way the occupants of these veto position form their preferences. Finally, chapter 8 
draws conclusions and presents a number of interesting avenues for further research.   
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2. Devolution in theoretical perspective 
    The contemporary revival of regionalist movements and the simultaneous 
tendency towards greater government decentralisation have received considerable 
attention across a range of academic disciplines. To date, none of these literatures has 
however produced a coherent theoretical framework that would allow us to study the 
origins of these two interrelated but distinctive trends in a structured way. This study 
will seek to make a contribution to this debate in two ways. Building on the literature on 
political legitimacy and social movements, I firstly propose a tripartite typology of 
regionalisms. This typology in turn allows us to develop a number of theoretically-
grounded hypotheses regarding the origins of popular demands for greater regional 
autonomy. The observable implications of these hypotheses will guide the empirical 
analysis in chapters 3 and 6 respectively. Secondly, I develop an actor-based rational 
choice approach to the process of regionalist accommodation and non-
accommodation. Chapters 4, 5 and 7 of this thesis will demonstrate that this approach 
helps us to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms through which spatially-
concentrated demands for greater autonomy influence the shape of the government 
system.     
The final section of this chapter will discuss the methodology and the rationale 
behind the case selection. While this empirical part of this study effectively consists of 
qualitative case studies, it does not adopt the relativistic approach that tends to 
characterise much of the existing literature in this field. Instead the empirical analysis is 
guided by the theoretically-grounded constructs and hypotheses developed in this 
chapter. In line with this methodological choice, the cases under examination have 
been explicitly selected with a view to maximise variance on the dependent variables 
within a single country context. This stands in stark contrast to the prevailing tendency 
to focus on one or more relatively extreme regional cases with little or no reference to 
popular opinion in other parts of the country.         
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2.1. Popular demands for greater regional autonomy 
From a variety of academic perspectives, it has been argued that the present 
age of globalisation and international integration is characterised by a strengthening of 
the regional scale as a locus of identity, level of democratic representation, and engine 
of economic growth and prosperity (Keating, 1998a; Scott, 1998; Storper, 1997). While 
these diverse strands of the literature do build upon and reinforce each other, Jones 
and MacLeod (2004) are right to stress that we need to distinguish those contributions 
that argue that globalisation has been accompanied by the emergence of regional 
spaces of innovation and economic competitiveness from those that examine the 
production and re-production of contemporary spaces of regionalism. The former 
literature argues that the present wave of economic globalisation has resulted in an 
important rescaling of the economic geography of the world (Scott, 1998; Storper, 
1997). By contrast, the latter is primarily concerned with the re-emergence of popular 
demands for greater regional autonomy or full independence (Jolly, 2007; Keating, 
2001a, 2001b; van Houten, 2007). While regionalist and nationalist movements are 
increasingly incorporating economic arguments in their discourses (Rodríguez-Pose & 
Sandall, 2008), such bottom-up pressures towards decentralisation tend to be based 
on a more general rescaling of political legitimacy. In order to understand such trends, 
we therefore need to draw on the wider human geography and political science 
literature, alongside the ideas proposed in economics and economic geography.   
The current literatures on regionalist mobilisation have been strongly dominated 
by detailed qualitative case studies into origins of the contemporary regionalist revival 
in a select number of relatively extreme regional cases, such as Quebec, Catalonia, the 
Basque Country, Flanders and Scotland. In these contexts, bottom-up calls for greater 
autonomy have been linked to a myriad of region-specific historical, cultural, economic 
and political factors (for examples see Conversi, 1997; Keating, 2001a; MacLeod, 
1998b; B. Taylor & Thomson, 1999).  
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While it is widely acknowledged that regional claims of difference are generally framed 
in opposition to the centre (Keating, 1998a; Newman, 1996), the legitimacy of the 
sovereign state itself is rarely discussed in great detail. In addition, most of these 
studies tend to conceptualise the regional production of politicised space as a unique 
process that requires a tailored explanation. As a result, there has been a notable 
reluctance to derive testable hypotheses and more generic typologies from the 
empirical evidence (for exceptions see Lecours, 2004; Moreno, 2001). This approach 
has produced numerous interesting analytical narratives. In my view, it however does 
not supply us with all the conceptual tools we need to analyse and contrast the origins 
of regionalist mobilisation across a wider universe of cases.   
More recently, attempts have been made to partially address this gap in the 
literature by testing some of the inferences most commonly found in qualitative case 
studies through quantitative methods. In line with the qualitative literature upon which 
they are based, most of these quantitative studies primarily seek to explain variations in 
the popular demand for devolution and independence through a range of economic, 
cultural and historical sources of difference (Fearon & van Houten, 2002; Tronconi, 
2006; van Houten, 2007). In addition, there have been some attempts to link the re-
emergence of politicised regionalism to globalisation in general and the European 
integration process in particular (Dardanelli, 2005; Jolly, 2007). Based primarily on the 
work of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), such accounts assert that international 
integration has been associated with a rise in regionalist mobilisation as these 
processes have increased the economic and political viability of small states.  
While these quantitative studies make a valuable contribution to the literature, 
they primarily test the tentative inductive hypotheses that have emerged from 
qualitative case studies. As a result, they may challenge elements of the conventional 
wisdom, but do not generally produce novel theoretical insights. This study aims to 
show that a stronger focus on deductive reasoning will allow us to arrive at a 
theoretically-grounded typology of regionalisms that can both qualify and specify the 
existing hypotheses and produce new insights and avenues of enquiry.   
33 | P a g e  
 
2.1.1. The rescaling of legitimacy  
The typology of regionalisms I develop in this study is in its essence based on 
the proposition that we need to think of regionalism as a rescaling of political 
legitimacy. From within this perspective, popular support for greater regional autonomy 
can only emerge when (1) the legitimacy of the centre is challenged in some way and 
(2) the regional scale is seen as a more legitimate or capable representative of the 
people in this respect. If we accept this proposition, a sudden rise in popular support for 
decentralisation can have two origins. First of all, new challenges to the legitimacy of 
the centre may encourage a regionalist revival in areas that have traditionally enjoyed a 
high degree of regional legitimacy (path 1). Secondly, an increase in the legitimacy of 
the region as an alternative scale of government can create support for decentralisation 
in areas where the legitimacy of the central state has traditionally been compromised 
(path 2). These two rationales are not mutually exclusive. In other words, 
improvements in the perceived legitimacy of the region may coincide with the 
appearance of new grievances at the central level to produce dual incentives towards 
regionalist mobilisation (path 3). Figure 2.1 captures these assertions in the form of a 
matrix. 
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 Figure 2.1 The perceived legitimacy of geographical scales and the potential for regionalism  
 
 
This general framework is useful in that it proposes a potential explanation for 
seemingly defiant cases like the success of the Northern League in Italy or the 
apparent lack of politicised regionalism in the Dutch province of Friesland. In particular, 
it could be argued that the persistent and unresolved legitimacy grievances with the 
Italian state provided an opportunity for moderate changes in the perceived legitimacy 
of the region to create relatively strong popular support for greater regional autonomy. 
Similarly, the absence of deep-felt grievances with the Dutch state may have prevented 
the emergence of more salient spaces of regionalism in an identity-rich area like 
Friesland. The validity of these very general propositions can however not be 
empirically examined in the absence of a clear operationalisation of the concept of 
political legitimacy at different geographical scales.  
 
Legitimacy region
Legitimacy territorial 
state
high low
high A: Unlikely B: Impossible
low C: Likely D: Unlikely
Path 1: new challenges to the legitimacy of the centre create opportunities 
for regionalism in areas that historically enjoy high levels of legitimacy
Path 2: Persistent grievances with the centre create opportunities for moderate 
changes in the legitimacy of the region to create salient spaces of regionalism 
Path 3: Simultaneous changes in the perceived legitimacy of both scales 
create opportunities for regionalist mobilisation.  
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2.1.2. Legitimacy as a theoretical concept 
Although the legitimacy of institutions, policies and governments is a highly 
debated subject, it frequently remains unclear what the concept entails. The myriad of 
often conflicting definitions offered by different groups of scholars from a variety of 
academic backgrounds go to show that creating a universally accepted definition of 
what makes power legitimate is not possible (Beetham, 1991). This study will approach 
the issue from a descriptive rather than a prescriptive point of view. In other words, it 
will leave aside normative discussions on the forms of government that ought to be 
seen as legitimate and instead seeks to explore to what extent people perceive 
different levels of government as legitimate platforms for collective action.  To this end, 
I will take Max Weber’s (1978) definition of political legitimacy as the belief in legitimacy 
as a starting point. At first glance, this definition seems to condemn us to 
retrospectively gauging the perceived legitimacy of alternative scales of government 
through opinion polls and surveys. However, if we accept that a “given power 
relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it 
can be justified in terms of their beliefs” (Beetham, 1991: 11), this opens up new 
avenues of enquiry. 
To illustrate this point, let us consider the 2000 presidential elections in the 
United States of America.  In the US system, the president is appointed through the 
Electoral College System. The intricacies of this system are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. What is important in this context is that “the net effect [of this system] is to give 
the [presidential] candidate who wins the statewide popular vote all of that state's 
electoral votes”(Hoffman, 1996). In 2000, the way this system aggregates state-wide 
results into Electoral College votes resulted in a peculiar situation; while the Republican 
candidate George W. Bush won the Electoral College vote, the Democratic candidate 
Albert Gore Jr. gained the largest share of the popular vote.  
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The wave of popular discontent that followed the subsequent inauguration of George W 
Bush cannot be explained by a sudden change in the beliefs people hold about political 
legitimacy. Instead this popular backlash occurred because a particular distribution of 
the vote drew popular attention to the fact that the electoral system was capable of 
delivering results that contrasted with the, by no means recent, belief in the 
representative purpose of elections (Yates & Whitford, 2002).  
By analysing the origins of popular beliefs in legitimacy, it would have been 
possible to predict the grievances that followed the inauguration of George W. Bush in 
2000. Such an analysis would also have revealed that the distorting effect of the 
Electoral College system only becomes highly visible to the general public under a very 
specific set of circumstances. As a result, grievances may at set times emerge, but 
they are unlikely to persist from one presidential election to the next. We can therefore 
conclude that the potential for sustained popular mobilisation around the issue of 
electoral reform is relatively limited under the prevailing circumstances. An analysis of 
the origins of beliefs in legitimacy at different geographical scales can similarly provide 
new insights into the potential for regionalism under different conditions.  
2.1.3. Legitimacy beyond the nation-state 
Much of the theoretical literature on political legitimacy was developed with one 
particular power relationship in mind: that of the nation-state and its citizens. The (re-
)emergence of salient spaces of regionalism, alongside the increasing prevalence of 
far-reaching processes of international integration, however challenges the centrality of 
this concept within the contemporary world. Especially in Europe, decision-making 
powers are increasingly spread over multiple scales of government. The process of 
European integration presents social scientists with an example of political and 
economic sovereignty-sharing that is unprecedented in modern history. 
Simultaneously, many European states have experienced significant pressures 
towards decentralisation. In some cases, this has resulted in the fully-fledged 
federalisation of a formerly unitary sovereign state. In other instances, more moderate 
and/or asymmetrical forms of devolved government have emerged.  
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In the face of such growing institutional complex, there is a pressing need to rethink the 
meaning of political legitimacy at different geographical scales. 
Writing on European integration, Scharpf (1999) has argued that a particular 
scale of government may derive at least part of its legitimacy from the belief that it is or 
would be particularly well-placed to solve problems that require collective solutions. 
The author refers to this type of legitimacy as ‘output-oriented’. The concept however 
shows considerable overlap with what Easton (1965) referred to as specific support 
more than three decades earlier. In essence, both argue that the legitimacy of a 
governmental tier will to some extent depend upon its perceived ability to produce 
outputs that meet, or can be expected to meet, the demands of enough of the 
members of the political community within some reasonable timeframe. In much of 
Western Europe, the immediate post-war era was characterised by a strong belief in 
the ability of the sovereign state to manage and resolve most problems requiring 
collective action (Jessop, 2002). The dominance of the Keynesian paradigm in 
particular awarded the state a central role in managing the economy. To the extent that 
local, regional, and international institutions were seen as relevant, they were generally 
perceived as entities through which the state fulfilled its objectives, rather than places 
of policy-making that needed to be legitimised in their own right.  
The end of the post-war boom, and the mounting economic and social problems 
that accompanied it, however rapidly undermined this belief in the state’s ability to 
foster economic growth and ensure a degree of social and spatial justice. In the 
decades that followed, the continued globalisation of economic activity, coupled with 
the growing concern for environmental and social issues that transcend national 
boundaries, have continued to erode the perceived ability of the state to address some 
of the most pressing problems facing its citizens today (Jessop, 2002). According to 
some, these processes have encouraged an upwards rescaling of legitimacy towards 
supranational entities (Held, 1995).  
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Simultaneously, the proponents of the so-called New Regionalism have argued that the 
regional scale is increasingly establishing itself as an important motor for economic 
growth and prosperity in the contemporary era of capitalism (Amin & Thrift, 1994; M  
Jones & MacLeod, 1999; Keating, 1998a; Storper, 1997).  
Although the belief that collective action at different geographical scale could 
produce more favourable outcomes may create popular support for decentralisation 
and international integration alike, a government system will rarely be able to maintain 
its legitimacy on the basis of this type of support alone (Easton, 1965; Scharpf, 1999). 
Long-term collective action invariably requires individuals to forgo some of their 
personal needs and wants in order to make partial fulfilment possible for the community 
as a whole. In order to retain its legitimacy, a government system will therefore need to 
be able to rely on a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to 
accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as 
damaging to their wants” (Easton, 1965: 273). This “reservoir of favourable attitudes”, 
or diffuse support as Easton (1965 ) calls it, can in turn be based on a variety of 
factors.  
At the most general level, support for the legitimating ideology that underpins a 
government system can produce diffuse support for the actions of the authority figures 
within that system, even if such actions conflict with the personal wants and needs of 
parts of the population (Easton, 1965). In the context of democratic societies, this 
would suggest that authority figures and their actions are perceived as legitimate “if and 
because they reflect the ‘will of the people’- that is, if they can be derived from the 
authentic preferences of the members of a community” (Scharpf, 1999: 6). Scharpf 
(1999) calls this type of diffuse support ‘input-oriented’ legitimacy. In my view, 
‘democratic legitimacy’ would however be a more appropriate and readily-
understandable term. In this context, any perceived or real failings in the democratic 
system could potentially reduce the legitimacy of the regime itself and the authority 
figures elected under it.  
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Such failings can range from outright vote-fixing to much more benign grievances, such 
as those previously discussed in relation to the 2000 US presidential election. Where 
grievances with the functioning of the democratic system are profound and persistent, 
this may in turn be accompanied by a long-term decline in the perceived legitimacy of 
the governmental system itself.  
The concept of democratic legitimacy naturally leads us towards our final 
source of legitimacy; a sense of community or shared identity. The democratic ideology 
essentially rests on the assumption that the welfare of the community bound together 
within a democratic system is a part of the preference function of each individual within 
that community (Scharpf, 1999). In other words, individuals must be willing to 
“substitute for their own private or particular wants, a new or different one, that of a 
higher entity or ideal called the common good” (Easton, 1965: 314-315). While the 
belief in a common economic interest may be sufficient to produce this type of 
behaviour, most established democracies draw on a wider sense of ‘sameness’ 
generally referred to as a common identity or national consciousness. In a world 
dominated by the concept of the nation-state, the existence of such a widespread 
sense of community may in turn provide an independent source of diffuse support for a 
particular scale of government. 
In primordial accounts of regional or national attachments, territorial identities 
are seen as historically-determined ‘givens’ of social existence, based on kinship and 
religious, linguistic and cultural ties (Geertz, 1963). Like most of the contemporary 
literature on regionalism and nationalism, this study will however takes a constructivist 
approach to identity. From within this perspective, territorially-defined feelings of 
belonging are seen as social constructs that are created around a range of ethnic and 
civic markers. As a result, regional and national identities are “neither determined 
rigidly by the past or by rooted social values, nor entirely open for invention and 
manipulation in the present” (Keating, Loughlin, & Deschouwer, 2003: 35). Furthermore 
it is important to stress that these ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991) need not 
be mutually exclusive.  
40 | P a g e  
 
In a variety of contexts, research has shown that feelings of belonging to one particular 
community can and do often coincide with identities directed to different territories and 
geographical scale (for example Curtice, 2006; Dardanelli, 2005; Guibernau, 2006; 
Moreno, 1988, 2001).  
2.1.4. A typology of regionalisms 
 If we combine the concept of political legitimacy outlined in the previous section 
with the hypotheses summarised in Figure 2.1, we can identify three theoretical ideal-
types of regionalism. First of all, regionalism may be based on grievances with the 
perceived output produced by the centre, coupled with the perception that 
decentralisation would improve the economic situation of the region and/or allow 
residents to enjoy the same public goods and services at a lower cost. We will dub this 
type of support for greater regional autonomy (1) economic regionalism. Secondly, 
salient spaces of regionalism may emerge when the central government system is 
seen as inadequately responsive to the needs and wants of the population and 
decentralisation is perceived as a viable solution to this democratic deficit. We will call 
this type of support for devolution (2) democratic regionalism. Finally, a rescaling of 
legitimacy may occur when the imagined community at the centre is seen as 
irreconcilable, or in some way at odds, with the imagined regional community. We will 
refer to this as (3) identity-based regionalism. 
The tripartite typology of regionalisms described above will no doubt seem 
highly familiar to those who take an interest in popular demands for devolution or 
secession. In fact, Rodriguéz-Pose and Sandall (2008) make a very similar distinction 
when analysing the evolution of the decentralisation discourse. The framework 
proposed here however seeks to qualify and specify such existing accounts by drawing 
our attention to the interaction between the nature of the grievances with the centre 
and the perceived sources of legitimacy at the regional level. In particular, it is 
contended that regional sources of legitimacy should only be seen as a direct cause of 
regionalism if they match the perceived deficits at the centre.  
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The literature on social movements has long argued that, in order for successful 
mobilisation to occur, “people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their 
lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem” (McAdam, et 
al., 1996: 5). From within this perspective, bottom-up pressures towards 
decentralisation cannot emerge in the absence of significant legitimacy deficits at the 
centre. Similarly, the perceived legitimacy of a region as a locus of identity, economic 
space, or scale of government should not be seen as a direct cause of popular demand 
for greater autonomy unless it is accompanied by grievances with the centre in the 
same field.  
In my view, it would therefore be incorrect to speak of identity-based 
regionalism in instances where the needs and wants of the imagined regional ‘us’ are 
not in some way perceived as irreconcilable or at odds with the needs and wants of the 
imagined community at the centre. This is not to say that the existence of a collective 
identity does not play a role in regionalist mobilisation in such instances. As noted, the 
existence of a strong sense of community can be a powerful source of diffuse support. 
In addition, these imagined communities are often based on historical, religious, 
cultural, and linguistic realities that are accompanied by marked institutional footprints 
in the form of regional media, church communities and educational systems. These 
institutions can in turn form valuable mobilising structures through which economic and 
democratic grievances with the centre can be framed and vocalised. All I am seeking to 
convey is it that, where there is no notable source of conflict between the feelings of 
belonging directed to the region and the country at large, the existence of a regional 
identity and the mobilisation structures that tend accompany it should be presented as 
enabling factors, rather than direct causes of popular demand for greater autonomy.   
A similar argument can be made with respect to economic regionalism. Much of 
the debate in this area focuses on whether this type of regionalism is more likely to 
emerge in relatively poor or relatively rich areas (Bolton & Roland, 1997; Bookman, 
1992; Gourevitch, 1979; Hechter, 1975; Newhouse, 1997; Rokkan & Urwin, 1983). The 
framework proposed in this study puts this discussion in a new perspective.  
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Instead of focussing on regional factors, it contends that we should start by examining 
the nature of the grievances with the central performance. From a rational choice 
perspective, popular discontent with the spatial redistribution of resources caused by 
central policies is for example likely to be concentrated in areas that contribute more to 
the public purse than they receive in public spending. The relatively strong tax-base of 
such regions in turn creates opportunities to mobilise such grievances along territorial 
lines. The Northern region of Italy would be a prime example of this type of economic 
regionalism.  By contrast, grievances with the effects of macro-economic policies can 
emerge in relatively poor and relatively rich regions alike. In this context, the contention 
that the region is increasingly becoming a key driver of growth and prosperity in the 
present age of globalisation has the theoretical potential to foster popular support for 
decentralisation, regardless of the relative wealth of the region.  
Quantitative studies tend to find that “[r]egions with a high relative income per 
capita are more likely to exhibit regional autonomy demands than regions with a lower 
relative income per capita” (van Houten, 2007: 559). Valuable as these studies are, we 
need to be careful not to misinterpret these results. In particular, I would argue that 
such studies measure the overall propensity towards regionalism in different types of 
regions, rather than the likelihood of economic regionalism per se. As in the case of 
identity-rich regions, it seems highly plausible that areas with a relatively favourable 
economic and fiscal position are more prone to regionalism than regions that do not 
enjoy the same degree of legitimacy as a semi-autonomous economic unit. This may in 
turn make it less likely that general grievances with the effects of macro-economic 
policies will lead to confident demands for greater autonomy in relatively poor regions. 
As a result, the most visible incidences of economic regionalism may indeed be 
concentrated in relatively rich rather than relatively poor regions. We cannot however 
infer this from the mere fact that quantitative studies tend to find a significant 
relationship between popular demands for autonomy on the one hand and a region’s 
relative income per capita position on the other.  
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While the re-conceptualisation of regionalism proposed here may seem like a 
very subtle theoretical adjustment, the empirical chapters of this thesis will demonstrate 
that conceptualising regional demands for greater autonomy as a region-specific 
response to central grievances has a significant impact; both on our research practices 
and the type of explanations we develop. In addition, the proposed typology of 
regionalisms sheds new light on the potential effects of regionalist accommodation on 
popular demands for further autonomy.  
2.1.5. Regionalism after devolution 
Decentralisation and federalisation are frequently presented as strategies 
towards maintaining the unity of the state in the face of salient regionalist movements 
(Elazar, 1995; Gurr, 1994; Lijphart, 1977; Stepan, 2001). Using Hirschman’s concepts 
of voice and exit, the main thrust of this literature would be that devolution creates 
regional opportunities for voice, thereby reducing the incentives towards exit (Lustick, 
Miodownik, & Eidelson, 2004). In other words, decentralisation is argued to dampen 
grievances with the centre by giving regional electorates the opportunity to have some 
of their preferences heard and met through a directly elected regional institution. As a 
result, popular demand for further decentralisation or full secession is anticipated to 
decrease. Stepan (2001) calls this holding-together federalism, in order to distinguish it 
from federations that are the result of the coming-together of formerly sovereign states. 
If the mechanisms proposed in this literature indeed materialise in practice, devolution 
should have the observable implication of simultaneously decreasing the democratic 
grievances with the centre and reducing popular demand for further decentralisation.  
By contrast, it has been argued that devolution may in fact increase, rather than 
decrease, the likelihood of further decentralisation and eventual secession. This 
literature tend to focus strongly on identity-based factors and the importance of formal 
and informal mobilising structures in creating and re-creating feelings of belonging (for 
example see Dikshit, 1975; Kymlicka, 1998; Lustik, et al., 2004; Roeder, 1991).  
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From within this perspective, decentralisation acknowledges and institutionalises the 
legitimacy of the region as a semi-autonomous polity, while simultaneously 
undermining a sense of shared interest at the central level. This may in turn reduce the 
willingness to sacrifice personal needs and wants for the common good of the country 
at large and therefore increase the likelihood of economic and democratic grievances 
with the centre. The direct observable implication of this hypothesis would be that 
devolution is associated with an increase in the relative importance attached to the 
regional identity and a simultaneous rise in popular demand for further decentralisation.    
Figure 2.2 displays the two main arguments advanced within the existing 
literature as path 1 and 2. The framework advanced in this chapter helps us to qualify 
and specify these hypotheses in several ways. First of all, the proposed typology of 
regionalism draws our attention to the fact that the opponents and proponents of the 
statement that devolution alleviates regionalist tensions are inclined to employ different 
concepts of legitimacy. By acknowledging that one of the discourses focuses primarily 
on identity factors while the other hinges strongly on democratic representation and 
government efficiency, we are better able to contrast and potentially reconcile the two 
arguments. Secondly, the main literatures on decentralisation, regionalism, and 
secession tend to ignore the economic effects of devolution. As noted, there is however 
a growing literature that suggests that decentralisation may also produce an economic 
dividend. If this is indeed found to be the case, this may increase the economic 
legitimacy of the region scale and lead to demands for further decentralisation on 
economic grounds.     
Finally, the matrix of support for greater autonomy advanced in this chapter 
suggests an alternative post-devolution path that is largely ignored within the current 
literature; the reality of devolution may weaken, rather than strengthen, the legitimacy 
of the regional level. This could in turn reduce demand for further decentralisation or 
even lead to popular calls for re-centralisation (path 3). The empirical literature on 
decentralisation suggests that path 3 is by no means a purely hypothetical option.  
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It has been widely suggested that devolution frequently fails to deliver the anticipated 
economic and democratic benefits due to a lack of capacity at the regional level and/or 
incidences of corruption at this scale (Keefer & Knack, 1995; Oates, 1993; 
Prud’homme, 1995). Others have argued that devolved administrations rarely receive 
the power and resources needed to truly address local issues and the effects of 
decentralisation are therefore often disappointing in practice (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 
2003). Taken together, this suggests that the reality of devolution may well reduce the 
perceived democratic and economic legitimacy of the region, whilst simultaneously 
increasing popular support for the central or federal level provision of public goods and 
services.    
Figure 2.2 The effect of devolution on the likelihood of demands for regional autonomy  
    
So far we have primarily considered the effects of devolution on the 
reproduction of existing spaces of regionalism. It has however been argued that the 
asymmetric devolution of powers and resources in particular can also give rise to 
demands for greater autonomy in regions that have traditionally not harboured strong 
regionalist movements (Curtice, 2010; Lecours, 2004; Moreno, 2001).  
 
Legitimacy region
Legitimacy territorial 
state
high low
high A: Unlikely B: Impossible
low C: Likely D: Unlikely
Path 1: reduces regionalism by increasing the legitimacy of the central of federal level 
Path 2: encourages regionalism by increasing the relative legitimacy of region
Path 3: reduces regionalism by decreasing the legitimacy of the region
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Again our framework produces a testable hypothesis; it suggests that spaces of 
regionalism are unlikely to emerge as a direct result of devolution unless the practices 
of asymmetric devolution simultaneously challenge the legitimacy of the centre in some 
way and increase the perceived legitimacy of the region along the same dimension. 
The observable implication of this hypothesis would be that grievances with the 
functioning of the central level after devolution would in isolation be insufficient to 
create new spaces of regionalism. Only where the grievances with the existing system 
of asymmetric devolution match the perceived areas of legitimacy of the region would 
we anticipate to find an increase in popular demand for great autonomy. 
2.2. Regionalism and the rescaling of government 
This study not only seeks to examine the origins of popular demands for greater 
autonomy, but also aims to explore under which circumstances those demands are 
likely to lead to an actual rescaling of powers and resources from the central level to 
the regional scale. Countries across Western Europe and North-America have 
witnessed a regionalist revival in the past decades. In some cases, this trend has been 
accompanied by a decentralisation of powers and resources to the regional tier. In 
other contexts, the rescaling of political legitimacy in some parts of the country has not 
resulted in a similarly substantial change to the government system itself. Within the 
existing literature, such differences have been attributed to a variety of factors, ranging 
from the relative strength of regionalist movements to the decision-making rules 
governing constitutional change. There have however been few attempts to draw these 
diverse strands of the literature together in a coherent way. This thesis aims to further 
our understanding of the prevailing patterns of policy stability and change by re-
examining the mechanisms that guide regionalist accommodation from a veto player 
perspective.  
Veto player (VP) approaches have been widely employed to examine legislative 
processes and policy outcomes across a variety of substantive policy areas and 
country contexts. The basic implications of such approaches are relatively 
commonsensical.  
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From a VP perspective, all political systems contain a number of identifiable 
“individuals or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the 
status quo” (Tsebelis, 2002: 19). These so-called veto players are in turn assumed to 
use their powers in order to further their own interests (Ganghof, 2003). Under these 
assumptions, the likelihood of policy change will depend on the identity of the agenda 
setter and preferences of the relevant veto players. Players with agenda setting powers 
are in a distinct advantage, as they can present the initial proposal. In order to change 
the status quo, these proposals however have to be acceptable to the other players as 
well. As a result, policy stability will tend to increase as the number of VPs rises and 
their interests and preferences become more diverse (Tsebelis, 2002).  
The basic implication of this argument for the case at hand would be that devolution 
only occurs when the agenda setter prefers it to the status-quo and the other veto 
players within the system also support the policy. While this proposition is far from 
earth-shattering, examining the rescaling of government through this lens can help us 
to further our understanding of the mechanics of regionalist accommodation and non-
accommodation in different institutional settings. Much of the existing literature on 
devolution already implicitly develops veto point or player arguments. Most of these 
analytical narratives however fail to explicitly state the underlying web of assumptions 
and causal inferences. Applying a more formal VP approach forces us to identify the 
institutions and actors that are assumed to have veto powers within our analytical 
narratives and justify the beliefs and preferences we attribute to them. This not only 
allows for a more structured comparison between different cases, but also produces 
explanations that can be more readily tested and challenged empirically.   
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2.2.1. Identifying the relevant veto players.  
While identifying the relevant veto players within a system may sound 
straightforward, establishing which institutions and political actors can effectively 
prevent change from occurring is not without its difficulties (Ganghof, 2003). Generally, 
the constitution of a country formally assigns veto powers to a number of institutions. In 
practice, some of the individual or collective players may however not be able to 
realistically exercise these formal rights. For example, Britain’s famously unwritten 
constitution awards formal veto powers to the Monarch. The Crown has however not 
used the right to veto bills passed by the House of Commons since the Union between 
Scotland and England in 1707 (Bogdanor, 1997). Similarly, some bicameral systems 
are what Lijphart (1984) refers to as asymmetric, in the sense that one of the two 
chambers is considerably more powerful than the other.  As a result, the effective 
distribution of veto powers may not match the formal provisions.  
Despite these complications, a careful analysis of the formal decision-making 
rules and informal conventions generally allows us to identify the relevant institutional 
veto players within a government system with a reasonable degree of certainty. The 
political game in turn produces partisan veto players within these institutions. In some 
circumstances, the partisan groups that enjoy effective veto powers can be identified 
with relative ease. The Westminster parliamentary system for example tends to return 
a single-party majority government. Provided that the members of this party share 
similar preferences or are otherwise persuaded to toe the party line, this constellation 
of powers effectively means, while the parliament formally hold a collective veto, the 
governing party is the only real veto player within this institution. Similarly, if several 
internally cohesive parties form a minimum-winning coalition, in the sense that the 
agreement of each of the coalition partners is necessary in order to change the status 
quo, the division of veto powers will be relatively straightforward.  
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The situation becomes more complicated if party unity is low or the government 
consists of more or less then the number of parties required to achieve the necessary 
majority. For example, some have argued that opposition parties usually do not gain 
effective veto powers when the government does not control a majority of the seats or 
is subjected to significant backbench dissent (Tsebelis, 2002), while others assert that 
these groups should be seen as potential veto players in many instances (Laver & 
Shepsle, 1991). Similar questions have been raised with respect to oversized coalitions 
that include one or more parties whose agreement is not strictly necessary to change 
the status quo (Ganghof, 2003). Especially under such circumstances, the validity of 
our analytical narratives may hinge strongly on our ability to justify the assumed 
distribution of veto powers that underpins them.   
 Examining the formal distribution of veto powers within a government system 
may furthermore be relevant to the study of regionalist accommodation and non-
accommodation, as it can give us an indication regarding the general propensity to 
policy change. Ceteris Paribus, veto player theory would predict that policy stability 
tends to increase as the number of institutional and partisan veto players within a 
system grows (Tsebelis, 2002). Applying these intuitions to a select number of federal 
and quasi-federal countries, Behnke and Benz (2009) have found that the formal 
distribution of veto powers indeed has an impact on the dynamics of constitutional 
change. In particular, they argue that far-reaching constitutional reforms tend to be 
more common in systems with relatively few veto players. Where constitutional 
amendment rules prove more stringent, grievances may instead be dealt with through a 
range of implicit changes, which alter the meaning and effect of the constitution without 
formally changing it. Despite the repeated failure of formal reform processes, the 
workings of the Canadian federal system have for example been significantly altered 
through numerous intergovernmental agreements over the past decades. Similarly, 
regional elites in Spain have been able to exploit the flexibility within the 1978 
Constitution to achieve a considerable decentralisation of powers and resources 
without the need for formal constitutional amendments.  
50 | P a g e  
 
 Although Behnke and Benz (2009) are primarily interested in the dynamics of 
constitutional reform, their findings are clearly relevant to the topic at hand in this study. 
Specifically, it suggests that popular demands for greater autonomy may be a priori 
more likely to lead to far-reaching reforms of constitutional importance if the number of 
individual and collective players holding effective veto powers over such a decision is 
relatively limited. Especially in formerly unitary countries, such reforms may in turn 
change the distribution of veto powers within the government system and with it the 
likely shape of the legislative response to future demands for greater autonomy. 
Identifying the institutional and partisan veto players within a system is therefore a 
useful first step towards understanding the prevailing patterns of regionalist 
accommodation and non-accommodation within a system. As Behnke and Benz (2009) 
rightfully stress, the existence of a wide range of regional and federal veto players 
primarily tends to hinder policy change because these veto players tend to have 
different beliefs and interests. In other words, it is the existence of numerous veto 
players with different policy preferences that creates the obstacle to change, rather 
than the distribution of veto powers per se. In order to understand the pattern of 
regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation, we will therefore need to examine 
how popular demands for greater autonomy are likely to influence the policy 
preferences of individual and collective veto players at different levels.    
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2.2.2. ‘Measuring’ the preferences of individual and collective veto players   
One of the primary difficulties in empirical veto player analysis is that we cannot 
directly measure the preferences of the actors that enjoy agenda-setting and decision-
making powers. Even in the case of individual veto players, like presidents, the beliefs 
and preference structures that underpin their actions will have to be at least partially 
inferred from the very behaviours that we are trying to explain. These problems are 
compounded when the members of a political party collectively hold veto power, as the 
potential diversity in individual preferences and the process through which those 
preferences are aggregated into a formal policy position significantly increase the 
number of potential explanations for observed behaviours (Ganghof, 2006). In order to 
construct a coherent analytical narrative, we will therefore have to make certain 
assumptions regarding the beliefs and preferences of political elites and ordinary party 
members alike. Based on these assumptions, we can in turn develop a set of 
alternative rationales that could explain the observed behaviours.   
The rational choice approach in general is frequently criticised for its reliance on 
particular assumptions regarding the beliefs and interests that guide the behaviour of 
individuals and collectives. While our inability to directly measure the preferences of 
veto players certainly presents a significant challenge, I would argue that this issue is 
equally present, if rarely acknowledged, in qualitative case studies applying different 
methodologies. In my reading, most narratives on regionalism and devolution for 
example seem to be based on the assumption that political elites at the central or 
federal level have an interest in preserving powers and resources at this scale. 
Whenever these actors do formally support devolution, this is usually seen as a 
strategic move motivated by electoral or political incentives. What makes the approach 
proposed in this study different from much of the existing literature is therefore not the 
fact that it is based on a particular set of assumptions about the preferences and 
beliefs structures of the main actors within the narrative. Rather the innovation comes 
from the insistence on the need to explicitly acknowledge these assumptions and the 
different rationales for regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation derived 
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from them. This in turn deliberately creates opportunities for others to challenge and 
falsify the proposed explanations.  
In democratic societies, veto powers tend to be strongly concentrated in the 
hands of actors who acquire their position of authority by means of what Schumpeter 
(1950: 269) famously referred to as the “competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. As 
a result, there is clearly a link between the formal policy positions advocated by the 
main veto players in democratic systems and the views and opinions of the general 
public. The way in which popular preferences influence the behaviour of 
democratically-elected political elites is however far from unambiguous. In keeping with 
the methodological approach to the decision-making process itself, this thesis will 
examine the mechanisms behind regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation 
from a rational choice perspective.  
The assumption that veto players behave as rational actors is a necessary 
element of the approach, as it helps us to reduce the number of potential explanations 
for observed behaviours. We must however be careful not to be too restrictive in our 
understanding of what constitutes rational behaviour. Much of the formal rational 
choice literature is for example based on the seminal work of Anthony Downs (1957). 
In line with this approach, partisan veto players are assumed to behave as 
opportunistic actors “whose sole motivation for engaging in politics is to enjoy the 
power and perquisites of officeholding” (Roemer, 2001:1). While this assumption 
clearly facilitates formal modelling, the proposition that, while voters care about 
policies, the occupants of partisan veto player positions are only interested in gaining 
office is empirically problematic. Perhaps because those standing for office are 
themselves citizens of the polity they seek to represent, such actors tend to have policy 
preferences of their own (Roemer, 2001). As a result, it can be argued that rational 
partisan veto players will, at least to some extent, seek to maximise their own policy 
utility, rather than just votes and seats (Wittman, 1973).  
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Even if we assume that political elites tend to behave as opportunist office-
seekers, these actors will usually have to balance their personal desire for electoral 
success with the need to acquire and maintain support within the political party they 
formally represent.  Even the occupants of individual veto positions, such as 
presidents, often acquire their position through a two-stage elections process 
(Grofman, 2004). In the first stage, a candidate is typically chosen based on the appeal 
her position has in the eyes of fellow party members and other groups that may be 
given a voice in the internal selection process. In the second stage, general elections 
offer the electorate a choice between the official party candidates and their respective 
policy packages. Especially in the face of extensive media coverage, the policy position 
a candidate adopts during the general elections campaign cannot differ too greatly from 
the strategy she employed in order to acquire the necessary internal support. As a 
result, the formal policy position of even the most opportunist individual partisan veto 
player will be influenced by a mix of internal considerations and electoral incentives.  
The constraining effect of the preferences of the wider party membership is 
arguably even greater where veto powers are formally held by a collective rather than 
an individual. Unlike her counterpart in a presidential system, the prime minister in a 
parliamentary system for example needs to rely on the support of her fellow party 
members in order to gain effective control of the collective veto power her party 
formally enjoys. If party discipline is high, in the sense that most party members are 
willing to toe the official party line irrespective of their personal preferences, this will not 
limit the autonomy of the party leader to a significant extent. If there is a credible threat 
of internal disobedience, the party leader may however face additional incentives to 
adjust her position to the internal preference distribution within the party in order to 
avoid backbench dissent and/or a successful internal leadership challenge.  
If we assume that the behaviour of instrumentally rational political elites need 
not be guided solely by office-seeking motivations, such actors may choose to 
accommodate or ignore regional demands for greater autonomy for a variety of 
reasons.  
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As Blau (2008) argues with respect to the reform of the electoral system, it is important 
to distinguish act-based reasons to support or oppose a change in the existing 
government system from outcome-based incentives. A partisan veto player may have 
reason to believe that the act of publicly supporting or opposing devolution will yield 
political or electoral benefits. Similarly, an actor may adopt a particular policy position 
because she believes that this will help her to achieve an outcome that she sees as 
desirable. Table 2.1 briefly summarises the act- and outcome-based motivations for 
supporting or opposing the accommodation of popular demands for greater regional 
autonomy. I will explore the rationale behind these motivations in more detail in the 
sections below, before turning to how they are likely to affect the behaviour of 
instrumentally rational VPs.  
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Table 2.1 Act- and outcome-based incentives towards devolution and centralisation.  
Type of incentive Explanation Example for devolution Example against devolution 
Act-based  The act of support/opposing devolution is seen as beneficial.  
Internal The act of supporting/opposing 
devolution is likely to help the party 
leader gain or retain internal 
support. 
 
Opposing devolution would 
decrease the likelihood of a 
candidate winning the internal 
leadership contest.   
Supporting devolution is likely to 
lead to considerable backbench 
dissent. 
Electoral The act of support/opposing 
devolution is likely to increase the 
party’s vote or seat share. 
 
Supporting devolution will help 
secure popular support in marginal 
seats.  
Supporting devolution could lead to 
vote-losses amongst core voters. 
Political The act of support/opposing 
devolution will help the party gain or 
retain veto powers. 
A formal commitment to devolution 
will help to secure the support of a 
crucial coalition partner. 
Supporting devolution would 
politically isolate the party and make 
participation in a governing coalition 
less likely.  
 
Outcome-based The outcome of supporting/opposing devolution is seen as beneficial. 
Party-interest Devolution is likely to enhance or 
decrease the power and influence of 
the party. 
The party performs better at the 
regional level than at the central 
scale and decentralisation would 
therefore increase its overall power 
and influence.   
Voting patterns suggest that the 
party would be unlikely to play a 
significant role in a directly elected 
regional body.   
Ideological Devolution/centralisation is seen as 
normatively justified or likely to lead 
to the most preferable outcome in 
the long-run. 
 
Stateless nations have a normative 
right to self-determination.  
 
Devolution is likely to reduce 
territorial conflict and the risk of 
secession. 
The unity of the sovereign state 
needs to be preserved and 
devolution is likely to encourage 
rather than decrease popular 
demands for regional self-
determination.  
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2.2.3. Act-based incentives  
The act of formally supporting or opposing a specific policy can be beneficial to an 
instrumentally rational actor for a variety of reasons. As noted above, political elites 
frequently gain their position of authority through what could be described as a two-stage 
election process. Once in office, the power enjoyed by these elites will continue to be 
influenced by their ability to elicit support within their own party. As a result of these twin 
pressures, the party leadership will face act-based incentives to consider the preference 
distribution within the party when determining their formal policy position. As in the 
electoral arena, the size of the pro and anti-devolution sections within the party and the 
salience attached to the issue by different groups will shape the strength of the internal 
incentives. Especially if the issue is perceived as highly salient and internal preferences 
are cohesive, supporting a policy that goes against the dominant view within the party may 
have serious internal consequences. Minority nationalist parties, like the SNP and the Bloc 
Quebecois, would be clear examples of cohesive collective players who attach great 
importance to the issue of secession and devolution. The salience attached to the issue 
and the cohesiveness of internal party preferences may however be considerably less 
pronounced within parties that were not specifically formed around this cleavage. Under 
such circumstances, the party leader may be in a stronger position to ignore the majority 
preference within the party.                  
The formal policy response may furthermore be guided by the anticipated electoral 
costs and benefits associated with regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation. 
As popular demands for greater regional autonomy tend to be spatially concentrated 
(Sorens, 2009), the direction and size of the electoral incentives faced by partisan veto 
players are often strongly dependent on the geographical context in which they compete 
for the popular vote.  
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In Quebec for example, popular support for provincial autonomy has long been so 
substantial that most parties competing at this level chose to stand on a regionalist 
platform, even if their federal namesakes did not2. The electoral geography of a country 
can however also produce strongly differentiated incentives towards regionalist 
accommodation for parties competing at the central or federal level.  
The Belgian case perhaps most strongly illustrates this dynamic. After the adoption 
of universal male suffrage in 1893, the catholic and socialist parties emerged as the two 
main groups within the Belgian party system (Hossay, 2003). From the onset, socialist 
support had been heavily concentrated in the highly industrialised French-speaking part of 
the country, while the Catholic vote predominantly originated from the Dutch-speaking 
regions. Especially since both linguistic groups represent around half of the total 
electorate, the re-emergence of politicised nationalism in Flanders and the popular 
response to this trend in Wallonia produced highly distinctive electoral incentives for the 
main parties within the system. Eventually this resulted in a complete reorganisation of the 
central party system along territorial lines (De Winter, Swyngedouw, & Dumont, 2006 ).  
While the influence of the pre-existing electoral geography on the pattern of 
regionalist accommodation has been noted in other contexts, the differentiation in the size 
and direction of the electoral incentives tends to be more limited for two reasons. First of 
all, the pre-existing level of regionalisation within the Belgian party system was both 
relatively high and broadly congruent with the emerging spaces of regionalism in Flanders 
and Wallonia. Where the party system is more strongly nationalised, in the sense that 
popular support for central level parties is more evenly spread across the different regions 
within the sovereign state, the electoral incentives faced by each party are likely to be 
more homogeneous.  
                                               
2 It will be interesting to see if the recent demise of the Bloc Quebecois in the 2011 federal election 
will change this dynamic.  
58 | P a g e  
 
Secondly, the incentive structure is likely to be influenced by the share of the electorate 
that lives in regions with a strong regionalist movements, or what Hossay (2003) calls the 
demographic geometry of regionalism. In this respect the Belgian experience is again 
exceptional, as the electorate is roughly equally divided across the two main language 
groups. In most other contexts, popular demands for greater regional autonomy have 
tended to emerge in territorial units that only represent a relatively small minority of the 
electorate within the sovereign state at large (Sorens, 2009). As a result, the electoral 
benefits associated with regionalist accommodation tend to depend greatly on the 
distribution of preference in the rest of the country.    
Unless the voters in other parts of the country also feel that the concerns of a 
regionalist minority need to be addressed, partisan actors who choose to partially 
accommodate the demands of a spatially concentrated minority risk alienating a large part 
of the electorate. Paradoxically, central or federal players competing in a relatively 
nationalised party system do at times choose to formally support devolution against the 
wishes of the majority of the voters in the rest of the country. As will be argued in chapter 
5, the pro-devolution stance adopted by Labour and the Conservative Party in the run-up 
to the October 1974 UK general election for example ran counter to the dominant 
preference in England at that time. As will be discussed below, the adoption of such a non-
majoritarian policy position may reflect an ideological or party-interest based commitment 
to the outcome of devolution. In the context of a multi-dimensional policy space, we can 
however also develop an act-based rationale for such behaviours.  
General elections are not like popular referendums, in the sense that they do not 
award the general public a direct veto along a single issue dimension. Instead, a range of 
topics are bundled into a single vote. Under these conditions, it has been shown that 
rational voters economise on information and vote on the basis of the two or three issues 
that they consider to be most important (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987).  
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This in turn means that political parties do not need to converge towards the median voter 
position along every policy dimension in order to maximise their share of the votes and 
seats (Roemer, 2001). As Besley and Coate (2000) have shown with reference to the 
issue of gun control in the US, it may even be electorally advantageous to accommodate 
the preferences of a minority for whom an issue is highly salient against the wishes of the 
majority that attaches less importance to the subject. Applying this intuition to the case at 
hand, central or federal players competing in a nationalised party system could be argued 
to face electoral incentives to accommodate the regionalist minority if (a) they have reason 
to believe that the party will lose seats or votes within the region as a result of non-
accommodation and (b) it would be plausible to assume that the issue is not salient 
enough in other parts of the country for such a move to result in substantial electoral 
losses elsewhere.  
  Once elected, a partisan actor may face further act based incentives to adjust her 
formal policy position for political reasons. Supporting or opposing devolution may for 
example allow a party to secure the support of a crucial coalition partner. In Italy, Forza 
Italia has for example proved willing to partially accommodate both the regionalist 
aspirations of the Lega Nord and the centrist sensibilities of the National Alliance and 
Union of Christian Democrats in order to gain power and remain in office. In addition, 
making concessions could allow minority governments to secure the external support they 
need in order to remain in office. Once it had lost its formal majority, the 1974-1979 Labour 
government for example faced political act-based incentives to accommodate the 
preferences of pro-devolution opposition parties in return for their support in no-confidence 
motions.  
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2.2.4. Outcome-based incentives 
The act-based incentives towards regionalist accommodation outlined above are 
accompanied by a distinctive set of outcome-based concerns. First of all, it we assume 
that partisan veto players have policy preferences of their own, they may support or 
oppose devolution for ideological reasons. Normative beliefs regarding the validity of 
regionalist claims and the right to self-determination, coupled with the importance attached 
to protecting the unity and sovereignty of the state, may produce a variety of outcome 
preferences. How these preferences influence the policy positions of different actors in 
turn partially depends on their beliefs regarding the effects of devolution on the demands 
for regional autonomy and the likelihood of secession. Partisan players with an outcome 
preference for maintaining the unity of the existing state may for example support 
devolution because they believe that the partial accommodation of regionalist demands 
will reduce territorial conflict and the associated risk of disintegration. By contrast, a self-
proclaimed minority nationalist group with a preference for secession may oppose 
devolution on similar grounds.  
Secondly, devolution may increase or decrease the power and influence a partisan 
player is likely to enjoy within a system. As with electoral concerns, we would anticipate 
that the direction of such incentives will be at least partially dependent on the geographical 
scale at which the actor currently operates. For central or federal level veto players, 
devolution in essence constitutes a loss of power and resources to the regional level. As a 
result parties competing at this scale may have an incentive to resist decentralisation, 
even in the face of widespread popular support for such a policy. By contrast, the main 
contenders for office at the regional level may be inclined to try to increase the influence 
and power of this governmental tier, even if popular support for further decentralisation is 
limited.  
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The rationales presented above concur with the common proposition that 
devolution tends to produce regional elites with a personal interest in maintaining and 
enhancing the level of decentralisation within the system (Agranoff & Gallarin, 1997;  
Brancati, 2006; Hazell, 2007; Swenden & Jans, 2006). Similarly they fit with the empirical 
findings of author’s like Moreno (2001) and Lecours (2004), who argue that central or 
federal governments usually display a level of centralist inertia when faced with popular 
demands for greater regional autonomy. From a rational choice perspective, the regional 
distribution of the vote may however also produce outcome-based incentives that point in 
the opposite direction. Devolution can for example increase the power and influence of a 
political party that persistently performs well at the regional level, whilst simultaneously 
having relatively poor prospects of forming part of the government at the centre (O’Neill, 
2003). Similarly, the regional branch of a party that performs well at the central level, but 
has little influence at the regional scale, may face incentives to oppose further 
decentralisation (Hopkin & Bradbury, 2006).  
2.2.5. Incentive structures and the behaviour of partisan veto players   
The sections above outlined a number of possible rationales for regionalist 
accommodation and non-accommodation. From a rational choice perspective, we would 
anticipate that actors facing cohesive act- and outcome-based incentives to accommodate 
regionalist demands will seek to use their agenda-setting and decision-making powers to 
maximise the likelihood of devolutionary change (cell A, Figure 2.3). Conversely, actors 
facing homogeneous incentives to favour a centralised system would be anticipated to use 
their powers to maintain the status quo or increase the level of centralisation (cell D, 
Figure 2.3). The policy preferences of partisan players become less predictable when the 
act- and outcome-based incentives do not pull in the same direction (cells B and C, Figure 
2.3).  
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Under such circumstances, instrumentally rational actors may either prioritise outcome 
preferences over act-based incentives or aim to capitalise on the benefits of formally 
supporting a particular position, despite the fact that this position runs counter to their 
outcome preferences.  
If the latter strategy is chosen, such players may subsequently seek to use their 
agenda-setting and decision-making powers to minimise and potentially prevent actual 
change from occurring. The recent referendum on the system used to elect members of 
parliament in the UK is an excellent example of such a strategy. The party that currently 
enjoys the plurality of the seats in the House of Commons faces clear outcome-based 
incentives to favour the existing first-past-the-post system over more proportional forms of 
representation. The failure to acquire an absolute majority in the 2010 general elections 
and the subsequent need to form a coalition government however created strong act-
based incentives for the dominant Conservative Party to make a concession to the 
preferences of the Liberal Democrats in this respect. By making a change in the voting 
system dependent on a popular vote, and subsequently campaigning vigorously against 
the proposed Alternative Vote System, the Party was able to secure the political benefits 
associated with forming a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats whilst 
simultaneously preventing actual change from occurring.       
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Figure 2.3 Anticipated strategies of instrumentally rational actors according to act- and outcome-based 
incentives  
 
The existence of strong act-based incentives to support devolution may elicit 
similar types of behaviours from partisan players with an outcome-based preference for 
centralisation. Conversely, actors with an outcome-based preference for devolution or 
secession may face incentives to downplay their aspirations for political or electoral 
reasons, while simultaneously using their agenda-setting and decision-making powers to 
further their personal agenda in the legislative arena. While some of these strategies may 
be readily recognisable, others are less overt. The decision to establish an independent 
commission into the need for devolution may for example be a delaying tactic as well as a 
genuine attempt to create a wider consensus in favour of reform. Similarly, the introduction 
of a popular referendum may be motivated by a desire to neutralise elite opposition to a 
popular policy or make the resulting policy change more difficult to reverse for subsequent 
central or federal administrations. Alternatively a popular veto can be introduced to 
minimise the likelihood of policy change.  
Act-based incentives
Outcome-
based
incentives
Centralisation Decentralisation
Centralisation A: Centralisation B: Mixed
Decentralisation C: Mixed D: Decentralisation
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Unless actors reveal their true outcome preferences through campaigning efforts or the 
evidence they give to an independent commission, we will have to at least partially infer 
the motives of the observed behaviours from the very actions we are trying to explain.        
Further complications may arise when we are seeking to explain the behaviour of 
collective, rather than individual, veto players. So far we have predominantly discussed the 
behaviour of political parties as if they were unified actors. In practice, party unity may be 
considerably less pronounced. Given the territorial nature of popular demands for greater 
autonomy, party members elected under a single-member district plurality system may for 
example face very different act-based electoral incentives. Similarly, normative 
perspectives on devolution and the effect it is likely to have on the future of the state may 
differ from individual to individual.  Even when party members do face similar act- and 
outcome-based incentives, they need not necessarily agree on the policy strategy that 
should be pursued under such circumstances. In particular, some sections of the party 
may be more willing to make outcome-based concessions in order to secure act-based 
electoral and political benefits than others. As a result, party cohesion, defined as the 
extent to which individual party members share the same policy preference, may at times 
be low.  
Under such circumstances, the beliefs and interests of the party leadership often 
plays a particularly crucial role in determining the official party line. The formal policies and 
informal practices through which the preferences of individual party members are 
aggregated into a single policy position will differ from party to party. The process however 
tends to have a hierarchical element, in the sense that the agenda-setting and decision-
making powers are quite strongly concentrated in the hands of the party leadership 
(Grofman, 2004). Once the formal position of the party has been announced, individual 
party members will in turn face considerable act-based incentives to publicly support the 
officially party line (Bowler, Farrell, & Katz, 1999). In general, outwards signs of internal 
conflict are likely to negatively influence the electoral performance of the party.  
65 | P a g e  
 
More directly, failing to conform to the formal policy position promoted by the party 
leadership can lead to internal sanctions.  
If party discipline is high, a lack of internal policy cohesion does not present a 
substantial problem, as the party would still behave as a unified actor in the legislative 
arena. A more fine-grained analysis of the incentives that shape the preferences and 
behaviours of collective veto players may be needed when individual party members prove 
less willing to toe the party line regardless of their personal policy preferences. As 
Ganghof (2006) rightly points out, it is difficult to empirically determine whether an outward 
display of party unity reflects the internal preference constellation within the party or the 
level of party discipline. By comparing the frequency and magnitude of backbench dissent 
across different governing periods, parties, and policy areas, we can however develop a 
fairly accurate feel for the general level of party discipline and the internal contentiousness 
of an issue. Such an analysis would in turn allow us to distinguish the effects of a general 
feature of the government system, i.e. the level of party discipline, from the substantive 
issue at hand, i.e. the degree of cohesion on the appropriate policy response to popular 
demands for greater regional autonomy.       
When faced with an issue that proves so divisive that it is no longer possible to 
elicit unified voting behaviour through the usual channels, the party leadership may pursue 
a number of different strategies. First of all, the distribution of powers and preferences may 
be such that the policy preferred by the party leader is likely to receive the support 
required to enact it despite the anticipated level of backbench dissent. Under such 
circumstances, an instrumentally rational party leader may choose to ignore the discontent 
within her party and continue to pursue the original policy strategy. The 1997-2001 Labour 
government for example enjoyed such a large seat majority that the party leadership was 
able to successfully guide the Welfare Reform and Pensions Bill through the legislative 
process, despite extensive internal opposition to the proposed change in incapacity 
benefits (Cowley & Stuart, 2003).  
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Alternatively, the party leadership may seek to avoid internal conflicts by trying to delay the 
decision or keep the issue off the political agenda altogether. As will be argued in chapter 
5, the failure of the Conservative Party leader, Edward Heath, to act upon his formal 
commitment to Scottish devolution during his time in office may well be an example of this 
strategy. Finally, political elites who are in a position to do so could try to encourage 
individual party members to toe the party line by making policy change dependent on the 
outcome of a popular referendum.  
As the former British Labour leader James Callaghan famously noted, the 
referendum instrument can be seen as a rubber life raft that a highly divided party is forced 
to climb into (Qvortrup, 2006). Placing the decision directly in the hands of the general 
public makes it more difficult for party members to oppose a change on the grounds that 
there would be no popular demand for it. If this restores party discipline to the required 
extent and the referendum subsequently produces a clear popular mandate for reform, this 
would enable the party leadership to achieve its policy objective (Blau, 2008). On the other 
hand, the popular poll may not produce the outcome favoured by the party leadership, 
resulting in a very public defeat. The use of the referendum instrument is therefore not 
without its risks.  
The possibility of conflicting act- and outcome-based incentives, coupled with the 
potential for internal divisions, means that the true motives behind the observed behaviour 
of partisan veto players can at times prove very difficult to determine. While this will not 
eliminate the risk of circularity, considering alternative explanations for observed 
behaviours, and justifying why our proposed set of inferred beliefs and preferences fits the 
available evidence better that the relevant alternatives, would seem not just 
methodologically prudent but central to developing a convincing argument in such 
instances.  
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2.3. Research design 
The remainder of this thesis will test the empirical validity and usefulness of the 
theoretical framework presented above through qualitative case studies. The 
methodological approach taken in this study however differs from much of the existing 
qualitative literature in two important ways.  First of all, the empirical enquiry is explicitly 
guided by a predefined set of proposes causal mechanisms with observable implications. 
By contrast, much of the existing case study literature either implicitly or explicitly adopts a 
relativistic approach, in that the proposed explanations are presented as highly contextual 
and intrinsically non-causal. While I fully accept that the processes under examination here 
are not governed by law-like regularities, I would also contend that producing testable 
generalisations is an essential part of developing our understanding of these phenomena. 
The approach taken here is thus one of causal realism, in the sense that it specifically 
aims to uncover “mechanisms and processes that derive from agents and institutions, and 
that in turn produce [phenomenal] regularities” (Little, 1993: 184)  
Secondly, the study is based on a comparative analysis of a small number of cases 
within a single country context. The case selection procedure was explicitly guided by the 
desire to maximise the observable variance on the dependent variables within the context 
of a single sovereign state. In this respect this study again differs from much of the existing 
literature, which tends to focus on one or more regions displaying relatively high level of 
popular support for greater autonomy. Partially, this difference in approach can be 
attributed to the desire to produce generalisable explanations and the related need to 
minimise selection bias (Collier & Mahoney, 1996). Even if we are solely interested in 
producing context-specific explanations of extreme cases, one could however argue that 
contrasting the experiences in these regions with negative cases in the same country is 
likely to prove informative. Perhaps surprisingly, this approach is scarcely employed within 
the existing literature.  
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Instead there has been a tendency to compare extreme regional cases across different 
country contexts. This in turn makes it more difficult to draw structured comparisons 
between different cases.  
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the existing literature by analysing 
variations in popular demand for greater autonomy and regionalist accommodation across 
a range of regions within a single state context. In order to maximize the variance on the 
dependent variables we firstly need to define the frame of comparison. This study seeks to 
address two related research questions. First of all, what explains the emergence or re-
emergence of spaces of regionalism? Secondly, under which conditions are regionalist 
demands for greater autonomy likely to lead to actual policy change of constitutional 
importance? In order to derive the appropriate frame of comparison from these questions, 
we need to define what Garfinkel (1981) calls the ‘contrast space’ of each question. In 
other words, we need to explicitly acknowledge that we are not asking “Why α”, but rather 
“Why α and not β?”. In order to find a satisfactory answer to such questions, we conversely 
need to define both β and α.   
In our case, the first question effectively needs to be split into two separate contrast 
spaces. Firstly, this thesis asks why there is a popular demand for greater regional 
autonomy in some regions, but not in others. Secondly, it seeks to explore why demands 
for greater autonomy within a specific region are more pronounced at certain points in time 
than at others. A similar distinction between regional and longitudinal variations can be 
discerned in the second question, in the sense that it effectively asks why demands for 
greater autonomy lead to actual decentralization in certain contexts and time periods but 
not in others. To examine the usefulness of the framework proposed above in answering 
this question, we therefore need to select a sovereign state context and time period that 
produces sufficient variation, both in terms of regionalist mobilization and in patterns of 
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Based on the criteria defined above, post-war mainland Britain was selected from 
within the universe of potential contexts and time periods for a number of reasons. First of 
all, mainland Britain has experienced a re-emergence of spaces of regionalism during the 
post-war period, but this trend has been far from universal. While popular support for 
greater autonomy has been relatively pronounced in Scotland and to a lesser extent 
Wales, regionalist demands have remained largely absent in the English regions. In 
addition, popular demand for greater autonomy within Scotland and Wales has waxed and 
waned over the past decades. As a result, the British context provides both the regional 
and the longitudinal variation needed to test the usefulness of the framework of 
regionalism proposed in the first section of this chapter. Northern Ireland has been 
deliberately excluded from the analysis. The inclusion of this region is not necessary in 
order to capture the full contrast space suggested by the research question. By contrast, 
broadening the scope of the comparison to include this highly unusual case would 
undoubtedly result in a significant rise in causal heterogeneity. In line with the 
methodological recommendation of Collier and Mahoney (1996), I therefore decided to 
limit the analysis to the smaller set of more homogeneous cases.         
With respect to the second research question, the selected case context and 
period again ensures the variance needed to effectively test the proposed approach. At the 
start of the period, the main contenders for office at the central level uniformly espoused 
centrist positions. The re-emergence of salient spaces of regionalism in the 1960s initially 
encouraged both parties to adjust their formal policy platforms, although they did not prove 
equally willing to accommodate Scottish and Welsh demands. Following a short period of 
non-decision, the first regionalist revival ultimately resulted in a decision to maintain the 
status quo in late 1970s. From that moment onwards the willingness of the main 
contenders for office to accommodate regionalist demands started to diverge more 
markedly.  
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Following a long period of non-decision under Conservative rule, the return to power of the 
Labour Party in 1997 resulted in a rapid succession of decision-making moments. As a 
result, Britain was transformed from a highly centralised system to a uniquely 
asymmetrical form of devolved government within the space of 3 years. The incremental 
changes to the initial settlements that have occurred since then in turn suggest that this 
change in the government system may have been accompanied by a shift in the dynamic 
of regionalist accommodation (Hazell, 2007; Keating, 2009). Taken together, the British 
case thus presents a number of intriguing historical and contemporary puzzles through 
which the validity and usefulness of the proposed veto player approach can be tested.  
While veto player approaches are increasingly acquiring a central place in policy 
analysis (Ganghof, 2003), the method has not been widely used to analyse British politics. 
Partially this may reflect a reluctance to engage with political economy approaches in 
much of British academia (Dowding, 2006). It can however also be related to the strong 
concentration of veto powers that tends to characterise the British system at the central 
level. Although the Crown and the House of Lords formally retain institutional veto powers, 
the primary agenda-setting and decision-making powers firmly rest with the House of 
Commons (McLean, 2001). The British electoral system in turn tends to produce a single-
party majority government within this House. As a result, the central system rarely 
produces the highly visible bargaining situations upon which this type of analysis tends to 
rely. Where bargaining does occur, this generally takes place “in the corridors of 
Westminster rather than more openly in the committee rooms and floor of the House” 
(Dowding, 2006: 27). This can in turn make it difficult to gather reliable empirical evidence 
with respect to such events. By testing the proposed approach within the British context, 
rather than analysing for instance Canada or Belgium, this thesis seeks to show that the 
empirical usefulness of the veto player approach is not restricted to particular institutional 
settings.  
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2.4. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to present the theoretical framework and 
methodological approach that will underpin the empirical analysis in the remainder of this 
thesis. By framing regionalism as a rescaling of political legitimacy form the central level to 
the regional scale, the proposed approach seeks to move away from the dominant pre-
occupation with regional factors and realities. Drawing on the rich literature on political 
legitimacy it in turn developed a typology of regionalisms which proposes that central 
grievances need to be accompanied by regional competencies in the same area in order 
to produce popular support for greater regional autonomy. Chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis 
will seek to show that this re-conceptualisation of the subject matter both challenges 
elements of the conventional wisdom regarding the history of regionalism in post-war 
mainland Britain and provides us with the tools to analyse the emerging trends after 
devolution in more depth.     
Popular demands for greater autonomy do not effortlessly translate into actual 
policy change. This chapter proposed that veto player analysis can help us to develop a 
better understanding of the processes of regionalist accommodation and non-
accommodation. Chapters 4, 5 and 7 will test this proposition in the British context. As 
noted, the British political system is not particularly amenable to this type of analysis. 
Nonetheless, the empirical chapters will show that the practice of identifying the institutions 
and actors that are assumed to have veto powers within our analytical narratives and 
justifying the beliefs and preferences we attribute to them can help us to produce more 
robust and readily testable explanations of contemporary trends.  
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3. The waxing and waning of regionalism in mainland Britain (1945-
1997) 
 
The previous chapter outlined the theoretical framework that underpins this study. 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate how the typology of regionalisms developed in chapter 
2 can help us to gain new insights into the history of regionalist mobilisation in mainland 
Britain. Prior to devolution, opinion polls into the level of popular support for 
decentralisation and secession and the possible origins of these demands have been 
almost exclusively focussed on the most visible spaces of regionalism. The resulting lack 
of data on popular opinion in England necessarily pushes the gravitas of the analysis 
towards developments in Scotland and Wales. At first glance, the available evidence 
suggests that shifts in popular opinion have tended to follow a similar pattern in both of 
these territories (see Figure 3.1). The first exception to this rule occurred in the early to 
mid-1970s. During this period, support for devolution and independence increased 
markedly in Scotland, while a similarly significant shift in popular opinion could not be 
discerned in Wales. Between the 1983 and 1987 general election the opposite trend 
occurred, with support for devolution increasing notably in Wales whilst it remained 
relatively stable in Scotland.  
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Figure 3.1 Support for greater regional autonomy in Scotland and Wales (1970-1997) 
Sources: Own elaboration based on  Crewe, Robertson, & Sarlvik (1977a, 1881), Crewe, 
et al., (1977b), Heath, Jowell, & Curtice (1983, 1993), Miller & Brand (1981), Social and 
Community Planning Research (1970), Balsom & Madgwick (1979), Brand & Mitchell, 
(1994), Heath, et al. (1999), Heath, Jowell, Curtice, Brand, & Mitchell (1993) and McCrone, 
et al. (1999) 
 
If we place these findings in the context of the framework presented in chapter 2, 
the available survey evidence is thus broadly compatible with the hypothesis that changes 
in the legitimacy of the centre lay at the heart of the waxing and waning of support for 
greater autonomy in Scotland and Wales. Region-specific explanations will however need 
to be developed to explain the divergent trends in the early to mid-1970s and mid to late-
1980s. In order to gain a better understanding of the origins of such general trends and 
regional variations, this chapter will firstly examine the observable evidence for all three of 
the ideal types of regionalism defined in the previous chapter. These sources will 
subsequently be drawn together to create a more comprehensive picture of the sources of 
regionalism and unionism during the period under consideration.     
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3.1. Identity-based regionalism 
Like much of the existing literature on devolution and secession, this chapter will 
start by examining the role of identity in producing the noted regional and longitudinal 
differences in demand for greater regional autonomy. The product of the joining together of 
England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland into one state, the history of the United Kingdom 
very much invites identity-based explanations of demands for greater autonomy. The 
Welsh assimilation into the English shire system has its origins in the Edwardian 
conquests of the thirteenth century and was formalised through the legislation of 1536-
1543. The 1707 Act of Union between England and Scotland formally created the British 
state. The 1800 Acts of Union united the Kingdom of Great Britain with the Kingdom of 
Ireland to form the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Powell, 2001). In this 
context, it seems reasonable to conceptualise Scottish and Welsh demands for greater 
autonomy as the re-assertion of national rights surrendered in an uneven process of 
unification. This would however be an oversimplification both of the sources of support for 
autonomy in Scotland and Wales and the history of unification and identity formation.  
3.1.1. The origins of and contemporary challenges to the British identity 
The ideology of nationalism, understood as the idea that the nation and the state 
should be coextensive, is widely accepted to be a nineteenth century invention (Gellner, 
2006; Hobsbawm, 1992; Kedourie, 1993). Largely the product of the French Revolution, it 
emerged at a time when Wales and England had already been formally unified for more 
than 200 years. Although the memory of independence was more vivid in Scotland, it too 
had been part of Britain for nearly a century. Only in the case of Ireland can the formal 
union be argued to coincide with the emergence of modern politicised nationalism. Even 
modernists would concede that nineteenth century nationalism builds on pre-existing 
national sentiments and cultural heritage. However, these sentiments were far less unified 
than the four ‘nations’ conceptualisation of the ‘Home Rule’ debate would suggest.   
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At the time of national awakening, Ireland was already heavily divided along religious lines, 
with Catholics, Anglicans and Presbyterians forming distinct communities (English, 2007). 
Within Wales and to a lesser extent England religious and linguistic differences also 
created a patchwork of cultural identities sharing differing degrees of similarity (Powell, 
2001). In Scotland, the key internal division was based on geography rather than religious 
difference, with the Highlands and Lowlands harbouring distinctive culture practices and 
identities (Devine, 1999).  
In all four countries of the United Kingdom, a more cohesive national identity thus 
emerged very much in the context of the British state rather than independently of it. At the 
time, centralising and Anglicising tendencies, as well as regionally-concentrated economic 
hardships, created important grievances in Ireland, Wales and Scotland. From the onset 
this created a sense of country identity which differentiated a collective ‘us’ from a primarily 
English ‘other’ in these areas. As the dominant partner in the Union, English grievances 
with the centre were far less pronounced. As a result, the country-level identity formation 
process remained relatively weak. With the emergence of nationalism in Ireland and to a 
lesser extent Scotland and Wales, the need to distinguish between England and Britain 
increased. This resulted in the emergence of a relatively weak sense of English identity 
based on a Saxon heritage and typically ‘English’ institutions like the Parliament and the 
monarchy (Kumar, 2003).  
With the notable exception of much of Ireland, the development of these regional 
senses of belonging occurred in the context of a parallel process of British identity 
formation. One of the earliest potential markers of British identity, as well as a main source 
of conflict, was religion. From the sixteenth century Reformation onwards, the dominance 
of Protestantism on much of the British Isles stood in stark contrast with the predominantly 
Catholic mainland of Europe. Between the 1707 Act of Union and the 1815 battle of 
Waterloo, the Protestant tradition, combined with the repeated wars with France, created 
and deepened images of a Protestant British self defined in contrast to a Catholic other.  
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Although religious zeal already started to diminish in the early nineteenth century, popular 
reactions to the 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act clearly showed that Protestantism was 
indeed an important marker of British identity and patriotism at that time (Colley, 2003). 
Simultaneously this religious heritage alienated large parts of the predominantly Catholic 
Irish population as well as the Catholic Scottish Highlanders. In addition the Protestant 
faith was far from unified. While the majority of the English population was Anglican, Wales 
was marked by strong Episcopalian and dissenting traditions and the Presbyterian Kirk 
was dominant in most of Scotland (Powell, 2001). These religious differences served as 
important identity markers in all of the four ‘nations’ (Machin, 1977).  
Alongside the simultaneously unifying and dividing force of religion, the rise of the 
overseas empire and the Industrial Revolution helped create a more diffuse sense of 
British pride and identity. Experiencing its main expansion after the 1707 Union, the age of 
empire is very much a British rather than an English experience. Though arguably itself the 
result of internal empire-building by the English (Hechter, 1975), overseas conquests gave 
rise to an imperial nationalism that defined the British as the ‘state-bearing’ peoples within 
the British empire (Kumar, 2003; Powell, 2001). This sense of a common purpose and 
place in history was based primarily on a belief in a shared destiny as a dominant world 
power and civilising force. The British Industrial Revolution and the resulting economic 
supremacy reinforced this sense of superiority. Simultaneously the uneven process of 
industrialisation gave rise to inequalities and lines of conflict that largely cut across country 
borders. Symbolically captured in the English North-South divide, the industrial regions of 
South Wales and Central Scotland were very much part of the industrialised North, while 
the non-industrialised areas of Scotland and Wales shared the concerns of the South of 
England. In addition, industrialisation produced a working class with shared interests that 
transcended national boundaries.  
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In the context of a ruling class that was already organised at the British level, this lead to 
the emergence of a British, rather than a Scottish, Welsh or English Labour movement 
(Kumar, 2003).  As a result social class became an important additional marker of British 
identity.  
Taken together, these identity markers resulted in a largely civic sense of 
Britishness. The lack of a clear ethnic component aside from Protestantism enabled the 
co-existence of this state-wide identity with other national feelings of belonging in much of 
mainland Britain (Coupland, 1954). Although the Irish struggles and eventual 
independence of Southern Ireland did inspire calls for Home Rule in Scotland and Wales, 
a relatively strong sense of British identity and loyalty to the British state made the 
emergence of widespread politicised nationalism and calls for independence seem unlikely 
during the interbellum and the immediate post-war period (Nairn, 1977). As in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, the shared experience of fighting an external ‘other’ 
deepened feelings of British unity (Colley, 2003; Davies, 1994). To the extent that national 
unity was in any way threatened during this period, this was caused by the economic and 
political differences between the prosperous south and the depressed areas in the north 
and west of Britain, rather than any form of widespread political nationalism in Scotland or 
Wales (Powell, 2001).  
In this context, we need to re-examine what allowed Scottish and Welsh feelings of 
belonging to regain prominence in the decades that followed. The framework proposed in 
this thesis suggests that such a rescaling of feelings of belonging is only likely to occur 
when the legitimacy of the central level identity is challenged in some way and regional 
factors allow for a successful transfer of feelings of belonging to this geographical scale. 
The available empirical evidence fits this hypothesis, in the sense that the strengthening of 
regional identities in the post-war period occurred in the context of significant challenges to 
a number of the key markers upon which the British identity has traditionally been based.  
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As the conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism lost much of its salience outside 
of Northern Ireland, religion gradually lost its potency as a marker of identity in mainland 
Britain. This trend was further augmented by the increasing secularisation of British 
society. As noted, religious zeal already started to diminish in the nineteenth century. The 
hardships endured during the First and Second World War encouraged a temporary 
religious revival. From the 1950s onwards, church membership and attendance however 
started to decline at an unprecedented rate (Brown, 2001).  By the 1970s what remained 
of Britain’s religious identity is at best described as a lingering and often non-religious 
sense of a Protestant or more generally Christian heritage (Miller, 1997).   
Simultaneously another key marker of British pride and identity, the country’s position 
as a dominant political and economic power, started to crumble. The dismantling of the 
overseas Empire was perhaps the most visible manifestation of this trend. Though cracks 
were already starting to appear in the pre-war era, the rapid and largely uncontrolled 
fashion in which the Empire collapsed between 1945 and 1970 had a profound effect on 
the popular culture of Empire. In two decades, the number of people under British Rule 
decreased from 700 million to 5 million (Jeffery, 1998). More importantly, the process was 
not marked by the harmonious transition to democratic self-government that many had 
hoped for and anticipated. The relative randomness of imperial borders led to numerous 
violent conflict and the inherited system of parliamentary democracy quickly disintegrated 
in many former colonies (Louis, 1998). Together with increasing attention for the excesses 
of imperial rule (Owen, 1998), these developments seriously challenged the image of 
Britain as a bearer of civilisation and democracy.  
At the same time, Britain was losing its position of economic dominance as well.  In 
1945, the UK was still one of the main economic powers in the world, second only to the 
Unites States. The immediate post war years were characterised by strong GDP growth, 
low unemployment and a general sense of achievement. Over the course of the 1950s and 
60s this initial optimism turned to dissatisfaction.  
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Although the real performance remained strong until the mid-1970, it became increasingly 
clear that many western European countries were growing significantly faster than the UK. 
Simultaneously the British share of the world export market rapidly declined (Supple, 
1994). The resulting weakness in the balance of payment position of the country, 
combined with large-scale speculation against the British pound, created repeated 
currency crises (Howson, 1994). In light of these developments, it became painfully clear 
that Britain’s reign as an economic world power was coming to an end.  
Taken together, these developments challenged the very essence of what it meant 
to be British. In the absence of strong alternative spaces of identity, it has been argued 
that these challenges primarily invited a redefinition of what it meant to be British in much 
of England (Miller, 1997). In Scotland and Wales, the same trend however created a clear 
opportunity for a rescaling of feelings of belonging from the central towards the country 
level. Simultaneously, many of the main identity markers at this scale however also lost 
part of their salience. In Scotland, the rapid decline of Kirk membership and communions 
challenged the religious foundations of Scottish identity during the immediate post war 
period. In Wales, secularisation was but one of many contemporary challenges to the 
country identity. Since the turn of the century, the Welsh language had also been in a 
permanent state of decline (see Table 3.1). Rural depopulation, outward migration to 
English regions and the spread of English language media intensified these pressures 
during the interbellum (J. Davies, 1999). From the 1950s onwards, the use of the Welsh 
language became more and more spatially concentrated. Rural areas of Wales 
experienced unprecedented levels of inward migration from England. Simultaneously, 
outward migration increased due to adverse economic conditions, particularly in the mining 
sector. This change in the industrial structure in turn represented a further challenge to 
Welsh identity, as the practices and values associated with mining and mining 
communities played an important role in the redefinition of  Welsh feelings of belonging 
during the industrial age (Jones, 1992) .   
80 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 3.1 The decline of the Welsh language (1901-1981) 
 1901 1911 1921 1931 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 
 
Share of respondents 
able to speak Welsh 
 
50% 
 
44% 
 
37% 
 
37% 
 
29% 
 
26% 
 
21% 
 
19% 
 
19% 
Source: Censuses, April 1901 to April 2001, Office for National Statistics.  
 
3.1.2. The link between regional identity and regionalism 
The preceding section suggests that the weakening of some of the primary 
markers upon which the British identity was based created opportunities for a 
reprioritisation of spatial identities in Scotland and Wales. To what extent this shift in 
identity-based legitimacy contributed to the rise in support for greater autonomy in 
Scotland and Wales is however far from evident. Taken at face value, survey evidence 
seems to suggest that a rescaling of feelings of belonging from the sovereign state 
towards the region facilitates regionalist mobilisation. Across the board, respondents who 
prioritise their country identity over British feelings of belonging in a forced question are 
found to be substantially more inclined to favour devolution or independence than those 
who primarily see themselves as British (see Table 3.2). In the 1970s, this effect was 
significantly stronger in Wales than in Scotland. Data from the 1990s suggest that this 
difference has since disappeared.  
 
Table 3.2 Share of respondents who support devolution or independence by forced choice identity 
group (1974-1997) 
 1974 1979 1992 1997 
 Scotland Wales Scotland Wales Scotland Wales Scotland Wales 
Region 71% NA 56% 32% 80% 62% 87% 73% 
British 59%  36% 13% 61% 45% 73% 67% 
Region/ 
British 
1.2  1.6 2.6 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Brand & Mitchell (1994),Crewe, et al.(1977b, 1881), 
Heath, Jowell, Curtice, et al. (1993), Heath, Jowell, Curtice, & Norris (1999), McCrone, et 
al. (1999) and Miller & Brand (1981) 
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The initial difference in the strength of the relationship between identity and support 
for devolution in Scotland and Wales has been linked to the origins of feelings of belonging 
in Wales in particular. Unlike in Scotland, Welsh feelings of belonging have historically 
been marked by a strong linguistic component. While this helped to mobilise support for 
greater autonomy in the Welsh-speaking heartlands of Dyfed and Gwynedd, it 
simultaneously had the potential to alienate non-Welsh speakers from the regionalist 
cause. Secondly, the location of Wales within the UK has meant that certain parts of the 
country have traditionally enjoyed much strong cultural and economic connections with 
England than others. This creates a further spatial division within the predominantly non-
Welsh-speaking parts of the country. In the border counties and Pembrokeshire, the 
continuous influx of English migrants and increasing exposure to English media 
strengthened the overarching British sense of identity. In addition, the strong economic ties 
with the rest of the Union undermined much of the economic rationale for devolution. In 
comparison, the communities around the south Wales coalfields were much less exposed 
to English influences. Here a strong sense of Welsh identity emerged out of the shared 
industrial experience in the mining communities of mid- and west-Glamorgan. The 
economic woes of the mining sector in the 1960s and 70s heightened both this sense of 
identity and the belief that economic policies designed for the UK as a whole were not 
benefitting Wales. Taken together this has been argued to have aided regionalist 
mobilisation in what Balsom has dubbed ‘Welsh Wales’ (Balsom, 1985).    
Balsom’s ‘three Wales model’ has long continued to inform studies on support for 
devolution in Wales (Osmond, 2002). At face value, the spatial voting patterns during the 
1997 devolution referendum indeed seems to suggest that the model remained broadly 
relevant in the late 1990’s (see Table 3.3). At the same time, the available survey evidence 
suggests that Welsh identity no longer played an exceptionally prominent role in creating 
support for devolution at that time (see Table 3.2).  
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During the 1980s and 90s, the regionalist discourse in Wales also shifted from a strong 
reliance on identity-based arguments towards the benefits in terms of democratic 
representation (see section on democratic regionalism for more detail). A focus on the shift 
in popular opinion between 1979 and 1997, rather than the absolute level of support for 
devolution at each point in time, helps us to marry these seemingly contradictory findings.  
As Table 3.3 shows, the increase in support for devolution between 1979 and 1997 has 
been remarkably similar across different parts of Wales. In addition, the difference in the 
level of support for devolution in the linguistic heartland on the one hand and British Wales 
on the other also diminished markedly. This suggest that, although the traditional patterns 
of support for devolution are still visible, the ‘three Wales’ model cannot explain the surge 
of support for devolution that occurred in the late 1980s and 90s. 
Table 3.3 Support for devolution in the two referendums and the ‘three Wales model’ (1979, 1997)
 3
 
 % voting yes  
Shift 1979-1997  1979 1997 
Welsh-speaking 
heartland 
30.6% 61.7% +31.0 
Welsh Wales 18.7% 48.5% +29.8 
British Wales 13.1% 40.8% +27.7 
Welsh-speaking 
heartland/British 
Wales 
2.3 1.5 -0.8 
 Source: Own elaboration based on Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
 
 
 
                                               
3 The 1979 results are based on Balsom’s original formulation. The Welsh-speaking 
heartland groups together the results in Dyfed and Gwynedd. Welsh Wales refers to Mid- 
and West Glamorgan. British Wales comprises of Clwyd, Gwent, Powysand South 
Glamorgan.  Due to changes in constituency boundaries, the 1997 groupings do not fully 
overlap with the original boundaries. The data for Welsh-speaking Wales is based on the 
results in Anglesey, Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion and Gwynedd. Welsh Wales refers to 
Blaenau Gwent, Bridgend, Caerphilly, Merthyr Tydfil, Neath Port Talbot, Rhondda Cynon 
Taff, Swansea, and Torfaen. Data for British Wales is calculated on the basis of the results 
in Cardiff, Conwy, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Monmouthshire, Newport, Pembrokeshire, 
Powys, Vale of Glamorgan and Wrexham. 
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Comparing survey evidence in Wales and Scotland furthermore highlights the need 
to carefully analyse the nature of the relationship between feelings of identity and support 
for greater autonomy. In 1979, the percentage of respondents who placed their country 
identity above the British identity in a forced choice question was almost identical in both 
countries (see Table 3.4). Nonetheless, support for greater autonomy was much more 
pronounced in Scotland than in Wales. Unfortunately comparable data is not available for 
the 1980s. When the identity question was reintroduced in the 1992 general election 
survey, support for greater autonomy had jumped up in both countries compared to the 
1979 situation. However, while this change was accompanied by a marked rise in the 
percentage of Scottish respondents willing to placing their country identity above the 
British identity in a forced choice question, a similar trend was not discernable in Wales. 
 
Table 3.4 Trends in support for greater regional autonomy and the articulation of identity in a forced 
choice question (Scotland and Wales, 1970-1997) 
 Scotland 
 1970 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 
Support 
devolution or 
independence 
 
47% 
 
66% 
 
48% 
 
45% 
 
48% 
 
75% 
 
73% 
Scottish 
identity in 
forced choice 
question 
  
 
66% 
 
 
56% 
   
 
72% 
 
 
74% 
 Wales 
 1970 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 
Support 
devolution or 
independence 
 
36% 
 
40% 
 
25% 
 
19% 
 
30% 
 
54% 
 
66% 
Welsh 
identity in 
forced choice 
question 
   
 
56% 
   
 
56% 
 
 
54% 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Crewe, et al., (1977a, 1977b, 1981), Heath, et al., 
(1983, 1999), Heath, Jowell, & Curtice (1993), Miller & Brand (1981), Social and 
Community Planning Research (1970), Balsom & Madgwick (1979), Brand & Mitchell 
(1994), Heath, Jowell, Curtice, et al.(1993) and McCrone, et al.(1999) 
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These findings suggest that the nature of the relationship between support for 
devolution and independence and the way people choose to articulate their identity differs 
from context to context. In Wales, the country-level identity has traditionally been based on 
cultural, linguistic and religious factors alongside a distinctive shared industrial past 
(Morgan, 1980). None of these factors are susceptible to rapid change. In this context we 
find that support for devolution can wax and wane without notable shifts in the share of the 
population who place their country identity above the British identify in a forced choice 
question. By contrast, Scottish identity is strongly anchored in a history of statehood. As a 
result, feelings of belonging and preferences in terms of regional autonomy are intimately 
linked. This link is most clearly illustrated by the notable decline in the share of 
respondents prioritising the country identity over the British identity in a forced choice 
question between 1974 and 1979 (see Table 3.4). This rapid change in the articulation of 
feelings of belonging cannot be explained by marked changes in either Scottish or British 
identity markers. Rather it would seem that the failed 1979 devolution referendum led to a 
decline in the perceived desirability and/or viability of a more autonomous Scotland, which 
in turn influenced the way respondents choose to articulate their feelings of belonging.  
This shows that we should not assume that identity is driving support for devolution 
just because trends in the articulation of feelings of belonging mirror those in the level of 
support for greater autonomy. Especially where a history of statehood forms an important 
identity marker, causality may in fact be running in the opposite direction to an important 
extent. The trends presented in Table 3.4 furthermore suggest that similar levels of 
national awareness can be accompanied by vastly differing degrees of support of greater 
regional autonomy, even within the same region. This in turn lends support to the 
contention that the existence of a regional identity alone is not sufficient to create support 
for devolution. Rather, the regional ‘us’ must be seen as in some way incompatible with 
the central ‘other’ or other types of grievances need to provide incentives towards 
regionalist mobilisation.  
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British opinion surveys have rarely included general questions regarding the 
personal attachments of respondents to different geographical scales. The introduction of 
the so-called Moreno question in the 1990s however suggests that the potential for purely 
identity based regionalism is fairly limited in mainland Britain. The Moreno question asks 
respondents to locate their personal feelings of belonging directed towards two 
geographical entities on a five-point scale, ranging from ‘country identity, not British’ to’ 
British, not country identity’. In both Scotland and Wales, the vast majority of respondents 
choose a point somewhere between these two extremes. This shows that regional feelings 
of belonging are not widely perceived as irreconcilable with the wider British identity in 
either of these countries. The high levels of support for greater autonomy can therefore not 
be argued to be purely identity-driven. Rather the existence of a regional identity seems to 
have facilitated the mobilisation of democratic and economic grievances in a territorial 
way. 
In a world dominated by the concept of the nation-state, historically-grounded 
feelings of belonging help to legitimise calls for greater autonomy, both at home and 
abroad. In addition, a sense of identity tends to be accompanied by stronger formal and 
informal institutions through which citizens can engage in collective action (Hechter, 1992; 
McAdam, et al., 1996; Treisman, 1997).  A history of difference frequently leaves a 
footprint in the form of formal institutions like regional newspapers and religious 
organisations (Keating, 2001a, 2001c). Feelings of identity also produce informal 
institutions like trust and a sense of common interest. These not only provide valuable 
framing opportunities to existing regionalist elites but may also be conducive to the 
creation of mobilising structures like regional political parties or interest groups (Bates, 
1983).   
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In Scotland, the institutional footprint of independence indeed clearly facilitated 
regionalist mobilisation. Despite the formal unification in 1707, Scotland has always 
maintained distinctive legal, educational and religious institutions. In 1885, the central 
government chose to further recognise the country’s special status through the creation of 
the Scottish Office. Despite the controversial nature of this institution, this provided 
Scotland with a ready-made platform to shape its concerns in a territorial way (Paterson & 
Jones, 1999).  Similarly, the continued independence of the Scottish Church created both 
an important identity marker and a valuable mobilisation structure (Highet, 1960). Unlike its 
English counterpart, the Kirk did not shy away from engaging in public debate and 
criticising central government policy. Publishing regular reports on the social and economic 
conditions in the country since the 1940s, it also provided an important source of regional 
information at a time when this was not widely available (Highet, 1960). This was further 
supplemented by the existence of Scottish newspapers and television and radio stations.  
Taken together, these institutions reinforced the idea of a distinctly Scottish cultural and 
economic reality. In the absence of an elected regional body, they also provided pro-
devolution groups with valuable platforms through which they could present their ideas to 
the general population (Denver, Mitchell, Pattie, & Bochel, 2000).   
This effect has arguably been less pronounced in Wales. Unlike Scotland, Wales 
did not retain its own legal, educational or indeed religious institutions during the process 
of unification. Despite a strong nonconformist presence and the disestablishment of the 
Anglican Church in Wales in 1920, religious institutions did not provide a unified platform 
for regionalism comparable to the Kirk (Pope, 2001). In addition, the centre long proved 
less willing to reinforce the country’s special status.  The Welsh Office was only created in 
the mid-1960s and initially enjoyed a much more limited remit and budget than its more 
established Scottish counterpart. During the 1979 to 1997 Conservative rule, its role 
increased markedly. Simultaneously, the number of quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organisations (quangos) focussing exclusively on Welsh issues grew rapidly.  
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Although the Welsh Office and the quangos have been severely criticised for their lack of 
direct democratic accountability, it can be argued that this development nonetheless 
strengthened the mobilising structures at the country level (Snicker, 1998). This is certainly 
true if we compare the situation in Wales to that of the English regions, where formal 
mobilising structures have been largely missing throughout the period under consideration 
here.  
3.2. Economic regionalism 
The previous section has argued that the demise of a number of key British identity 
markers encouraged a re-prioritisation of feelings of belonging during the 1950s and 60s. 
In Scotland and Wales, this process resulted in a partial rescaling of identity from the 
central to the regional level. Despite this trend, feelings of belonging to the wider British 
polity remain widespread in both countries. As a result, it cannot be argued that the re-
emergence of spaces of regionalism was purely or even primarily identity driven. Instead, 
the existence of a relatively strong sense of belonging at the regional level seems to have 
facilitated the mobilisation of other grievances into support for greater regional autonomy. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the waxing and waning of support for 
decentralisation in Scotland and Wales, we will therefore need to look beyond identity 
factors. This section will examine to what extent economic grievances created 
opportunities for regionalist mobilisation during the period under consideration. The next 
section will subsequently analyse the role played by shifts in democratic legitimacy. 
3.2.1. The economic legitimacy of the centre in the 1960s and 70s 
In Britain, as in much of Western Europe, the immediate post-war era was 
characterised by a strong belief in the ability of the sovereign state to manage and resolve 
most problems requiring collective action (Jessop, 2002). The dominance of the Keynesian 
paradigm in particular awarded the state a central role in managing economic growth and 
social welfare. At a time of strong GDP growth and low unemployment, this initially granted 
a substantial degree of economic legitimacy to the central state.   
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As has been noted in the previous section, this general sense of achievement quickly 
turned to dissatisfaction over the course of the 1950s and 60s. The experience of relative 
economic decline, poor export performance, and repeated currency crises slowly started to 
undermine popular belief in the centre’s ability to effectively manage the economy during 
what was arguably a golden age in terms of employment, growth and prosperity(Howson, 
1994; Supple, 1994).  
During the 1970s, the rapid deterioration of the real performance of the British 
economy created more direct and increasingly salient sources of popular discontent. 
During this period, increasing inflation was accompanied by a slowdown in growth and a 
rise in unemployment (Feinstein, 1994). Especially against the backdrop of the rapid 
increases in living standards experienced during the previous two decades, this created 
substantial economic grievances across the country. In addition, the inability of successive 
central governments of different political persuasions to turn the economic tide gradually 
undermined popular belief in the ability of the government to effectively manage the 
economy and ensure a degree of social justice. The resulting disillusionment with the two 
main competitors for office at the central level found expression through a marked rise in 
third party voting across Britain (see next section for details). Taken together, these 
general trends created fertile ground for the emergence of new lines of conflict.  
The potential to mobilise the general economic grievances with the centre along 
territorial lines was augmented by the re-emergence of the so called North-South divide 
(Hall, 2002; Massey, 1986; Von Tunzelmann, 1981). This spatial pattern of inequality first 
emerged during the economic troubles of the 1920 and 30s. At that time, recurrent 
recessions, restrictive economic policies, and a worsening trade position had meant that 
unemployment reached record heights across the UK. Due to its focus on depressed 
export-based industries like shipbuilding, coalmining and textiles, the industrial north was 
particularly hard hit by these trends. By contrast, the South-East and the Midlands had 
traditionally been less reliant on such sectors.  
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Higher population densities accompanied by a stronger domestic and business demand 
meant that these areas also proved better able to sustain new growth industries, like 
business machinery, consumer durables and motor vehicles (Phillips, 2008). Taken 
together, these trends reversed the internal economic geography that had marked Britain 
during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth century.  
In the face of increasing trade protection, rearmament and the subsequent post 
war boom, the salience of the North-South divide temporarily declined. Although important 
regional differences continued to exist, the achievement of near full employment, coupled 
with rapidly rising living standards, considerably dampened the resulting potential for 
territorial grievances in the immediate post war period. In the late 1950s, the issue 
however re-emerged as a result of the declining role of coal in transport and heating and 
the related drop in demand for this resource (Feinstein, 1994). Pits closed in fast 
succession, creating mass unemployment in the Northern mining communities. The 
subsequent moves towards trade liberalisation in the 1960s and 70s further exposed the 
uncompetitive nature of the industrial sectors in the north (Supple, 1994). As a result, 
unemployment rates rose rapidly. While the average unemployment in the UK remained 
well below 3 percent until 1971, unemployment in the North of England, Scotland and 
Wales had risen to 4 percent or more by 1970. In most cases this was accompanied by 
relatively high male inactivity rates, suggesting that actual unemployment differentials may 
have been substantially higher. The period of real economic decline and increasing 
unemployment that followed reinforced this pattern of inequality. In addition, the so-called 
‘North’ slowly expanded to include areas like the North West of England (See Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2 Unemployment rate in the UK and selected regions (1956-1976)  
Sources: Own elaboration based on Office for National Statistics (1966, 1996) 
The re-emergence of the regional problem encouraged the 1959-1964 
Conservative government to resume an active regional policy. This policy specifically 
aimed to reduce regional inequalities by redirecting industry into areas of high 
unemployment. Highly visible examples of such interventions include the establishment of 
steel strip mills in declining industrial areas in central Scotland and south Wales (Payne, 
1979). Despite these efforts, regional differences in unemployment rates however 
persisted. This can partly be related to the simultaneous pursuit of so-called ‘stop-go’ 
macro-economic policies (Tomlinson, 1994). Primarily aimed at curbing inflationary growth 
in the South-East and Midlands, the stop phase of this policy clearly disadvantaged the 
high unemployment areas in the North. Taken together, these policies did little to defuse 
the growing discontent with the economic record of the government in general or the 
potential for territorially-based grievances in particular.   
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The subsequent general election returned a Labour government and the party 
remained in power until the general election of 1970. Despite Labour’s reputation as the 
protector of the periphery, the change in government did little to redress the north-south 
divide. On the one hand, regional policies were applied much more consistently and 
government expenditure rose rapidly (Balchin, 1989). At the same time, the government 
however implemented deflationary policies, like the 1966 Prices and Incomes Act, which 
were largely inappropriate to the economic situation in the North. In the context of rising 
regional disparities, this created a distinct impression that the centre was inclined to 
prioritised curbing inflation in the South over the needs of workers in the North regardless 
of which party was in government at the time.   
Economic grievances with the centre deepened even further with the return of a 
Conservative government in 1970. Against the backdrop of worsening economic 
conditions and a looming EEC membership, this government tried to turn the economic 
tide through a move away from active supply-side interventions. As could be expected, this 
led to significant industrial closures and rising unemployment, particularly in the already 
ailing North of the country.  In 1971, the first test of the policy in Scotland’s Clydeside 
conurbation met with strong opposition (Evans & Taylor, 1996). The resulting work-in by 
the UCS shipbuilders created an outpouring of support amongst the general public as well 
as important parts of the business community. Though the then Prime Minister, Edward 
Heath, was initially unwilling to compromise, the level of popular resistance clearly played 
an important role in the subsequent policy U-turn (Foster & Woolfson, 1986). Working 
class discontent with the effect of central policy on job security and wage levels in the 
North acquired further expression through the 1972 and 1974 miners’ strikes. Again broad 
popular support for industrial action showed that substantial economic grievances existed 
amongst large sections of the population in the North.  
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3.2.2. The regional response to these grievances  
Taken together, the spatial concentration of economic woes combined with the 
perception that the economic policies developed by the centre were favouring the more 
dynamic regions in the South created a clear potential for economic regionalism (Hechter, 
1975; Horowitz, 1985; Rokkan & Urwin, 1983). In Scotland, the spatial distribution of the 
vote in the 1979 devolution referendum lends some support to the hypothesis that 
economic grievances with the centre indeed increased support for greater autonomy 
during the 1970s. In this country, the government’s decentralisation proposals received 
majority support in the industrialised central parts of the country as well as the traditionally 
less affluent highlands. By contrast the proposals failed to achieve majority support in most 
of the rural areas, which were less directly affected by the economic downturn. A similar 
pattern can however not be discerned in Wales. Here support for greater regional 
autonomy was primarily concentrated in the predominantly rural and Welsh speaking 
areas of Gwynedd and Dyfed. Support for decentralisation in British and Welsh Wales 
however remained very limited, despite a strong reliance on the declining traditional 
industries and coal mining (see Table 3.5).  
Table 3.5 Results of the 1979 devolution referendums in Scotland and Wales  
Scotland Wales 
Region % in favour Region % in favour 
Borders 40.3% Clwyd 21.60% 
Central 54.7% Dyfed 28.10% 
Dumfries and 
Galloway 
40.3% Gwent 12.10% 
Fife 53.7% Gwynedd 34.40% 
Grampian 48.3% Mid Glamorgan 20.20% 
Highland 51.0% Powys 18.50% 
Lothian 50.1% South Glamorgan 13.10% 
Orkney 27.9% West Glamorgan 18.70% 
Shetland 27.0%   
Strathclyde 54.0%   
Tayside 49.0%   
Western Isles 55.8%   
Scotland 51.6% Wales 20.30% 
Source, Own elaboration based on Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
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In the Northern regions of England, economic grievances did not lead to mass 
support for greater autonomy either. Notable differences in the response to the changing 
economic climate can nonetheless be discerned. In the North West, the economic 
grievances themselves and the re-emergence of political regionalism in Scotland and 
Wales did not even spark much of an elite level debate let alone a popular response. 
Based on disputed boundaries, the different constituent parts of the North West standard 
region contained highly distinctive local economies facing a variety of economic issues. 
The political scene was similarly fragmented, as the North West did not have a strong 
history of one-party predominance at that time. As a result no single political party could 
claim to be the ‘voice of the region’, locally or centrally. In addition the regional 
development organisations proved unable to unite local stakeholders behind a regional 
agenda (Dicken & Tickell, 1992). Taken together, this internal fragmentation limited 
regional mobilisation opportunities and ultimately curbed the region’s bargaining power at 
the central level (Bristow, 1987). 
By contrast, the Northern region developed a more cohesive regional response to 
relative economic decline. Unlike the North West, most areas in the Northern region faced 
similar issues and concern. Since the 1930, a succession of proactive regional 
development organisations managed to unite local authorities, business organisations and 
trade unions behind a common programme aimed at bettering the situation of their region 
as a whole (Dicken & Tickell, 1992).  The predominance of the Labour Party throughout 
the post-war period similarly ensured a more unified regional voice at the central level. In 
this context, the continued economic decline of the region, alongside the contemporary 
developments in Scotland and Wales, did prompt a lively elite discussion on the best way 
to protect the region’s interests in the future.  
In this context, a broad consensus emerged around the need to consolidate the 
existing regional organisations into one more powerful regional body. There was however 
considerable disagreement regarding the shape such a new institution should take.  
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A group of Labour MPs in the region favoured the creation of a regional development 
agency and ultimately an elected regional body aimed directly at economic development. 
The Planning Council amongst others however argued that such a move would jeopardise 
the region’s favoured position in the central system, especially if it created demands for 
similar institutions across England. The advocates of this view felt that the economic 
interest of the region would be better served by a strengthening of the existing structures 
of consultation and representation at the central level (Anderson, 1990 ). This lack of elite 
consensus clearly hindered the mobilisation of popular support for either of the two 
options.       
The diverse experiences in Scotland, Wales and the northern regions of England 
suggest that regional factors influence the degree to which economic grievances with the 
centre will lead to regionalist mobilisation. Where regional boundaries are perceived as 
random and a sense of a common interest at this scale is limited, the potential for 
regionalist mobilisation around central grievances is severely restricted. A sense of 
regional awareness alone is however not sufficient to create economic regionalism. The 
experiences in Wales in particular show that substantial economic grievances can coincide 
with a strong sense of regional identity without creating substantial support for greater 
autonomy. This draws attention to the role of the perceived legitimacy of the region as a 
relatively autonomous economic unit.   
In a centralised state like the UK, regional level data on public revenues and 
expenditure is notoriously scarce and unreliable. A rare study by Short (1981) provides 
estimates of public expenditure and tax revenue by region for the mid- to late 1970s. 
These figures in turn suggest that substantial interregional transfers took place over this 
period. As Figure 3.3 shows, Northern Ireland benefitted most this spatial redistribution. 
Scotland, Wales, the Northern Region and the South West of England were however also 
net beneficiaries of this system. By contrast, other regions contributed relatively more than 
they received.  
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Although these differences in regional public expenditure and tax revenue ratios were 
strongly correlated with regional differences in GDP per capita, Figure 3.3 shows that this 
association was not perfect. In particular, it is notable that East Anglia, Yorkshire and 
Humberside, and the East Midlands were net contributors to the system, despite having 
below average GDP per capita levels.  
Figure 3.3 The relationship between regional public expenditure/ tax revenue ratios by regional GDP 
per capita (1975-76)  
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Short (1981) and Office for National Statistics (1984).  
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Within the English regions, there is little evidence of significant elite or popular 
awareness of these differences in regional revenue and expenditure positions. The 
primary exception here is again the Northern region. In its 1976 report, the Northern 
Region Strategy Team drew attention to the similarities in the economic situation of the 
North and Scotland and the difference in the extent to which both benefitted from regional 
redistribution. The fear that devolution to Scotland and Wales would strengthen this 
relative disadvantage created both elite support for devolution to the North and substantial 
opposition to one-sided devolution to Scotland and Wales among Northern Labour MPs. 
This opposition in turn played an important role in the failure of the 1977 guillotine motion 
on the Scotland and Wales Bill (Guthrie & McLean, 1978). In response, the central 
government reconsider the process of expenditure allocation. The resulting needs 
assessment by the Treasury concluded that actual public expenditure indeed surpassed 
identifiable ‘need’ in Scotland and Northern Ireland (H. M. Treasury, 1979). In the end, this 
finding was not used to devise a more equitable system of expenditure allocation. It 
nonetheless shows that regional elite mobilisation and clear expressions of comparative 
grievances can result in greater central government attention to the plight of relatively 
disadvantaged regions.  
In Scotland and Wales, popular and elite awareness of regional revenues and 
public expenditures streams was much more pronounced. In Wales, it was widely 
acknowledged that the country was a net beneficiary of the system and that this situation 
was unlikely to change in the near future. This severely limited the economic rationale for 
full independence or extensive fiscal devolution. As discussed, the debate about the 
possible devolution of powers and resources to Scotland and Wales however did spark a 
re-examination of regional expenditure allocation by the treasury (H. M. Treasury, 1979). 
This exercise found that for Wales actual need outstripped public expenditure in the policy 
areas that would be devolved under the 1976 plans. The spending formula that was 
eventually adopted however did little to redress this problem.  
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Instead the mechanics of the Barnett formula were deliberately designed to encourage the 
convergence of expenditure levels towards the average English level (Heald, 1994). This 
outcome has been argued to reflect the limited bargaining power of the country vis-à-vis 
the central government at the time (McLean & McMillan, 2003). A stronger economic 
situation, coupled with a more credible threat of secession, might have produced different 
results.  
Prior to the discovery of North Sea oil, Scotland had been in a very similar position 
to Wales. The sudden wealth in natural resources however radically changed the 
dynamics. If we accept the argument that the tax revenue from this resource should be 
fully attributed to Scotland, the oil revenues had the potential to transform Scotland from a 
net beneficiary to one of the largest contributors to the public coffers in the UK. The 
Scottish National Party very effectively used this tax-based argument to build on its 
emerging success (Keating, 2001a; Rodríguez-Pose & Sandall, 2008). The 1973 SNP by-
election success in the traditional Labour safe seat of Govan can be seen as an early 
indication that the improved tax-base indeed aided the mobilisation of economic 
grievances in a regional way. Although the SNP candidate only achieved a marginal 
victory, the promise of a more prosperous future in an autonomous Scotland clearly 
appealed to voters in the seat at the centre of the UCS work-in. The spatial distribution of 
the 1979 referendum vote provide further evidence in support of the hypothesis that the 
discovery of oil greatly enhanced the potential for economic regionalism. 
During the 1970s, the revenue stream from oil was still quite limited. If we combine 
the data collected by Short (1981) with the oil revenues data, Scotland in fact remained a 
net beneficiary in 1977-1978. The extent to which the newfound wealth in natural 
resources would in the long run change Scotland’s revenue and expenditure position was 
much debated at the time.  
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While the government long tried to downplay the tax revenues generated by the North Sea 
exploration, the SNP categorically arrived at far more substantial tax benefits (McCrone, 
1974). In reality, both estimates were dwarfed by the actual returns (see Figure 3.4).   
Figure 3.4 North Sea oil revenues (financial years 1968-69 to 2006-07, in £million)  
Source: (HM Revenue & Customs, 2011) 
Recently  the SNP has argued that the 1974-1979 Labour government deliberately 
tried to hide the true value of North Sea oil in an attempt to stem the growing support for 
Scottish independence (Fraser, 30th of January 2006).  Though a report emphasising the 
potential value of North Sea oil was indeed withheld from the public domain at the time, 
the true consequences of complete independence would also have been more complex 
than the SNP would like to admit. First of all, the degree to which an independent Scotland 
would have benefitted from the full revenues related to North Sea explorations would 
depend on the delimitation of boundaries on the continental shelf (Brown, 1978). Even if 
the boundaries were to correspond to the 1968 Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) Order, the 
economic and social effects of full independence would have been mixed.  
As Figure 3.4 shows, the actual revenue stream related to North Sea oil would indeed 
have provided an independent Scotland with a very comfortable budgetary position and a 
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balance of payments surplus. However, the real appreciation of the exchange rate that 
accompanies substantial extraction of natural resources probably would have crowded out 
other tradable sectors in the economy.  
Originally coined the Dutch disease due to the adverse effects of the discovery of 
natural gas reserves on Dutch manufacturing in the 1960, this effect has since been 
discerned in a number of contexts (Sachs & Warner, 2001).  As the lesser-quoted part of 
McCrone’s 1974 re-examination of the case for Scottish Nationalism clearly conveys, 
similar problems could be anticipated in the case of Scottish independence (McCrone, 
1974). The substantial balance of payments surplus created by oil exports would almost 
certainly have encouraged an upward revaluation of the Scottish pound, in particular with 
relation to pound sterling. As a result, Scotland’s already ailing manufacturing industries 
would have found it increasingly difficult to compete both at home and abroad. Similarly, 
the tourism industry could suffer detrimental consequences and Scottish farmers might 
have experienced considerable reductions in CAP subsidies. Without careful management 
and considerable growth in new industries, Scottish independence could therefore have 
led to relative wealth combined with high levels of unemployment and outward migration 
(Harvie, 1994). The extent to which these more complex arguments would have been able 
to counter the more intuitive tax-base arguments presented by the SNP is however 
doubtful.  
 
 
 
 
3.2.3. The economic legitimacy of the centre in the 1980s and 90s 
The failure of the 1979 devolution referendums and the subsequent election of a 
Conservative government under Thatcher heralded a new era of economic and regional 
policy. Keynesian politics were resolutely replaced by a laissez-faire approach. Thatcher’s 
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Conservative predecessor, Edward Heath, had already tried to make this shift during his 
1970 to 1974 term in office. The new Prime Minister however pursued the agenda with 
much more resolve. In the context of a general recession, this resulted in rapid industrial 
restructuring, large scale firm closures, and mass redundancies. Though pockets of 
relative deprivation were visible across the country, the regions in the North of Britain were 
again disproportionately affected. The restrictive, deflationary monetary policies and 
streamlining of national industries encouraged an intense rationalisation of the 
manufacturing base of the North (Martin, 1988). The rapid growth in North Sea oil 
production and the related appreciation of Sterling accelerated this process. 
Simultaneously government spending on regional policy continued to decline in the context 
of growing national unemployment, severe fiscal constraints and the perception that 40 
years of active regional policies had done little to address the regional problem. By 
contrast government expenditure in depressed inner city areas increased. By 1985, this 
expenditure stream exceeded government spending on regional policy in England and 
Wales. Furthermore, much of this sub-regional spending was concentrated in the cities of 
the South rather than the North (Damesick, 1987).    
At the same time the so-called ‘North’ continued to expand. Alongside the 
‘traditional North’   and the North West, Yorkshire and the Humber and the West Midlands 
also emerged as areas of relative deprivation. At the same time, the South, now reduced 
to the South East, East Anglia, the South West and East Midlands, continued to flourish. 
Traditionally less reliant on the manufacturing industry, it proved better equipped to take 
advantage of the new opportunities. Thatcherite policies further aided the development of 
these new growth areas, particularly in the financial and service sectors (Balchin, 1989). 
Figure 3.5 graphically illustrates these trends through the development of regional 
claimants’ rates. These differences in economic fundamentals and unemployment levels 
were in turn accompanied by important disparities in terms of income, wealth and 
ultimately social welfare (Martin, 1988). Amidst a growing consensus that the government 
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was primarily concerned with the economic prosperity of the South, these growing 
disparities led to considerable grievances in the North. Changes in regional voting patterns 
during the 1980s clearly reflect the spatial distribution of the resulting popular discontent 
(Johnston, Pattie, & Allsopp, 1988).  While Thatcher continued to enjoy strong support in 
the southern regions, the Conservative share of the vote steadily declined in the North 
(see next section for details).  
 
Figure 3.5 Claimant rates in the UK and selected regions (1975-1997)  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Office for National Statistics time series data  
 
 
During the 1990s, the link between economic conditions and voting patterns gradually 
weakened. While the regionalisation of the vote continued to increase, the recession was 
accompanied by a degree of economic convergence. With the exception of the North East 
and Northern Ireland, regional claimant rates in most lagging regions moved towards the 
UK average during the early 1990s. When the economic situation improved, claimants’ 
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rates remained relatively close to the national average in these regions (see Figure 3.5). 
Some have rightfully argued that a focus on claimant rates alone overestimates the degree 
of regional convergence (Fothergill, 2001). As Table 3.6 shows, male inactivity rates 
indeed continued to hover well above the UK average in most of the regions in the 
extended North.  Development in terms of average regional earnings and Gross Value 
Added (GVA) per capita are also more mixed. While the relative position of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland improved between 1989 and 1997, other parts of the North remained 
stagnant or experienced further relative decline.   
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Table 3.6 Regional economic inactivity rates and GVA per head (1989-1997) 
 Male inactivity rate GVA per head (Index: UK = 100) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Northern 
Ireland 
18.4 20.2 20.1 19.5 18.4 73 73 75 76 78 78 79 79 79 
North East 19 18.9 19.8 19.1 20.9 84 83 84 84 83 83 83 82 80 
North West 16.5 17.2 18.3 18.9 18.2 91 91 91 91 91 91 90 89 89 
Yorkshire 
and the 
Humber 
14.5 15.4 15.6 16 17.7 90 89 90 89 89 88 89 89 89 
West 
Midlands 
14.3 14 14.7 14.1 14.8 92 92 91 91 91 92 92 92 92 
Wales 20.9 20.5 21.2 21.1 19.9 85 84 83 83 83 83 84 82 80 
Scotland 15.6 15.4 17.6 17.4 17.9 96 97 98 99 99 99 99 98 97 
United 
Kingdom 
14.2 14.6 15 15.2 15.4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Office for National Statistics (2009a, 2010)  
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3.2.4. The regional response to these grievances  
In England, the widening of economic differences in the 1980s again failed to 
created prominent spaces of regionalism. In the absence of regional mobilising 
structures, these grievances were instead absorbed within existing class cleavages 
and North-South divisions. In Scotland and Wales, formal and informal mobilising 
structures provided better opportunities for regionalist mobilisation around territorially-
concentrated economic grievances. The timing of the re-emergence of regionalism 
however suggests that economic grievances were a contributing factor to, rather than 
the main driver of, regionalism at this time.  
In both Scotland and Wales, support for greater autonomy remained relatively 
stable during the early and mid-1980s, before increasing rapidly in the late 1980s and 
early 90s (see Figure 3.1). The rise in support for devolution thus by and large 
coincides with a period when both countries were converging to the national average in 
terms of claimant rates. In Wales, relatively modest claimant rates were combined with 
persistently high male inactivity rates and continued relative deprivation in terms of 
GPD per capita. In Scotland on the other hand, average male inactivity rates were 
much more modest. In addition, the country experienced a distinct improvement in 
terms of relative GDP per head during this period. As both countries displayed similar 
increases in support for devolution during this time, it would therefore be hard to argue 
that this trend was primarily based on economic factors.  
To argue that the re-emergence of prominent spaces of regionalism during the 
late 1980s and 90s was not primarily linked to economic grievances, is not to say that 
the economic conditions under successive Conservative governments did not play a 
role in this trend. Without a doubt, the painful industrial restructuring of the 1980s 
coupled with the controversial economic policies pursued by the central government 
created considerable grievances in both Scotland and Wales. The timing of the 
resurgence of regionalism in Scotland and Wales however suggest that such economic 
factors primarily affected support for devolution through the mounting democratic 
grievances with the centre, rather than directly. 
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3.3. Democratic regionalism 
In the immediate post war period, the British party system could be seen as a 
textbook example of a stable two-party system centred around one dominant cleavage 
(Webb, 1999). Following the partial resolution of the Irish issue in the 1920s, social 
class gradually established itself as the main dimension of political conflict in post-war 
Britain. In line with Duverger’s Law (1951), the single-member district plurality electoral 
system in turn favoured the emergence of a two-party system dominated by the 
working class Labour Party and the middle class Conservative Party. Taken together, 
the two main contenders for office at the central level attracted well over 90 percent of 
the British vote at every general election between 1945 and 1959. In addition the 
system was marked by a high degree of electoral balance, in the sense that the mean 
difference in the share of the vote attracted by the two main competitors for office was 
relatively small. As a result, there was a regular alternation of power at the centre. 
Although regional differences in voting patterns did exist, the party system also 
displayed a relatively high level of nationalisation throughout the period (Caramani, 
2004; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). From the mid-1960s onwards, these features of the 
British party system started to change. This section will argue that these shifts both 
undermined the legitimacy of the central system in important ways and created 
opportunities for regionalist mobilisation.    
3.3.1. The thawing of the British party system in the 1960s and 70s 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) famously argued that European party systems were 
the product of two revolutions: the National Revolution and Industrial Revolution. These 
in turn produced four basic cleavages: the center-periphery conflict, the church-state 
conflict, the Land-industry conflict and the capitalist-workers conflict. Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) contend that each of these political controversies continued into the 
contemporary world to some extent.  The continuing industrialisation of the economy, 
coupled with the extension of suffrage to all adult men, however magnified the 
importance of the social class dimension while simultaneously cutting across many of 
the other cleavages.  
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In the decades that followed, the class cleavage became institutionalised within the 
political system, leading to what is often referred to as the ‘freezing’ of cleavage 
alignments.  
As noted, the relative stability of the British party system during the immediate 
post-war period largely concurred with Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) propositions. From 
the mid-1960s onwards, the traditional pattern of class alignments has however started 
to thaw. In particular, the strength of the relationship between occupational class and 
the vote for one of the two main contenders for office started to decline markedly 
across mainland Britain. To visualise this development, Figure 3.6 reports the 
difference between the Conservative share of the two-party vote within the manual and 
nonmanual occupational strata between 1964 and 1997. In the 1960s, the 
Conservative share of the nonmanual vote was still 43 percentage points above the 
Party’s share of the manual vote. By 1979 this difference had been reduced to 26 
percentage points.  
Survey evidence suggests that the general decline in the political significance of 
social class occurred slightly earlier and was more pronounced in Scotland and Wales 
than in England (see Figure 3.6). In 1964, the Conservative share of the nonmanual 
vote in Scotland and Wales was 58 percentage points above the Party’s share of the 
manual vote. By the time of the 1966 general election, this difference had already been 
reduced to 47 percentage points. By 1970, the difference between the Conservative 
share of the manual and nonmanual vote had declined so much that it was now in line 
with the results amongst English respondents. During the 1970s, trends in Scotland 
and Wales were largely in line with those in the rest of Britain.   
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Figure 3.6 Percentage point difference in the Conservative share of the two-party vote within 
manual and nonmanual occupational strata (1964-1997)  
 
Sources: own elaboration based on Butler & Stokes (1979), Crewe, et al. (1977a, 
1981), Heath, et al. (1983), Heath, Jowell, & Curtice (1993), Heath, Jowell, Curtice, et 
al. (1993), Heath, et al. (1999) 
 
Whether the decline of the traditional class cleavage should be interpreted as 
class dealignment or rather a realignment of voting behaviour along more complex 
class lines is heavily debated (Manza, Hout, & Brooks, 1995). Whatever the true origins 
of the thawing of the two-class/two-party system, the process clearly helped to expose 
the growing discontent with both Labour and the Conservative Party across the UK.  As 
discussed in the previous section, the end of the post-war ‘golden age’ acutely exposed 
important spatial differences in economic fundamentals. Despite highly visible 
government efforts to rebalance these emerging spatial inequalities, voters in the 
declining manufacturing heartland and industrial periphery, as well as the major 
conurbations, increasingly shunned the incumbent Conservative government in favour 
of the Labour Party and the Liberals. The return of a Labour government in the mid 
1960s however did little to reverse the relative decline of these areas.  
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This inability of consecutive central governments of different political persuasion to turn 
the economic tide lead to grievances with central government output and ultimately a 
turn away from the main contenders for office (see Figure 3.7).  
Figure 3.7 Share of the vote attracted by the two main contenders for office (1955-1997) 
Source: own elaboration based on Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
Between 1955 and the February 1974, the percentage of the vote attracted by 
the two main contenders for office decreased from 97 per cent to 77 per cent of the 
vote in Great Britain. Scotland and Wales were very much part of this general trend 
towards third party voting. In Wales, Conservative support had traditionally been weak. 
In Scotland, the fortunes of the Conservative Party started to decline from the 1960s 
onwards. Initially, the Labour vote remained robust in both countries. Discontent with 
the actions of the Labour Party when it returned to office in 1964 however soon eroded 
this support base. When Labour replaced the Liberals as one of the two main 
contenders for office in the early twentieth century, it inherited its predecessor’s 
position as defender of the regions. As Labour had not been in office for much of the 
post-war period, maintaining this dual image had long been a cost-free exercise. The 
return to power however exposed the Labour Party as a primarily centralist working-
class party (Urwin, 1982). This was in turn associated with a marked decrease in 
Labour support in both Scotland and Wales.  
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Initially the main beneficiaries of this trend were the SNP and Plaid Cymru. The extent 
to which this early rise in regionalist voting should be seen as an expression of pre-
existing regionalist feelings or a signal of increasing popular support for greater 
autonomy is debatable. Figure 3.8 shows the share of the regional vote attracted by the 
SNP and Plaid Cymru in general elections between 1955 and 1997. From 1970 
onwards, it also reports survey evidence regarding the level of support for greater 
autonomy in each country. In Scotland, patterns of regionalist voting and support for 
greater autonomy show considerable overlap in the 1970s and 80s. This makes it 
seem highly probable that the rise in SNP support during the 1960s and 70s was also 
indicative of a more widespread rise in support for greater regional autonomy. In 
Wales, the share of the vote attracted by Plaid Cymru has been relatively stable from 
the 1970s onwards. Support for greater autonomy on the other hand proved much 
more volatile. Given this pattern, it seems probable that the disappointment with the 
1964-1966 Labour government, coupled with the demise of the traditional class 
cleavage, exposed a pre-existing regionalist core in Wales without a similarly strong 
rise in support for devolution.  
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Figure 3.8 Regionalist voting and support for greater autonomy (Scotland and Wales, 1955-1997)  
Sources: Own elaboration based on Balsom & Madgwick (1979),Brand & Mitchell, 
(1994),Crewe, et al. (1977a, 1977b), Crewe, et al (1981), Heath, et al. (1999, 1983), 
Heath, Jowell, & Curtice (1993), Heath, Jowell, Curtice, et al. (1993),McCrone, et al., 
(1999), Miller & Brand (1981), Rallings & Thrasher (2007), Social and Community 
Planning Research (1970) 
 
This interpretation is supported by the nature of third party voting in the 1974 
elections. In Wales, like in England, the decline in support for the main contenders for 
office predominantly benefitted the Liberals, while the share of the vote attracted by 
Plaid Cymru remained relatively stable between 1970 and 1974. It has been argued 
that the rise of the Liberal Party in Wales can be seen as an alternative re-assertion of 
Welsh values and identity (Madgwick & Balsom, 1974). Wales indeed has a strong 
Liberal tradition. In addition, the Party has traditionally been associated with a pro-
decentralisation stance. Nonetheless, the opinion polls leading up to the 1979 
referendum consistently showed that the level of support for devolution amongst Welsh 
Liberal identifiers was similar to or even below the Welsh average (Balsom & 
McAllister, 1979). This suggests that the rise in Liberal voting should be interpreted as 
a protest vote, rather than a rise in support for greater autonomy. In Scotland by 
contrast SNP voting and support for greater regional autonomy both increased 
markedly between 1970 and 1974.  
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This pattern is more consistent with rising support for regional autonomy in response to 
building grievances with the centralised system and its effects.  
Regardless of its origins, the emergence of relatively successful regionalist 
parties inspired the 1974-1979 Labour government to offer devolution to both Scotland 
and Wales (see chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of the motives behind this shift in 
policy position). Following a long and painful legislative process, the 1978 Scotland and 
Wales Acts were both subjected to popular referendums. In Wales, this resulted in a 
resounding defeat of the government’s proposals. In Scotland, a narrow majority voted 
in favour of the moderate package of devolution on offer at the time. This majority 
however fell short of the 40 per cent of the electorate threshold introduced during the 
committee stage of the bill. Without a strong popular mandate, the severely weakened 
Labour government proved unable to avoid the repeal of the Scotland and Wales Acts 
(see chapter 5 for details). In both countries, support for devolution and independence 
decreased markedly after this failure at the polls (see Figure 3.1).  
3.3.2. The regionalisation of the vote during the post-war period 
The existing academic literature on Scottish and Welsh devolution firmly links 
the subsequent re-emergence of demands for greater autonomy in the 1980s to the 
distinctive voting patterns in Scotland and Wales and the related grievances with a 
central government that never received majority support in either country (Brown, 
McCrone, & Paterson, 1998; Denver, et al., 2000; Devine, 1999; Keating, 2001a; Miller, 
2005). From within this perspective, the regionalisation of the vote can lead to feelings 
of non-representation and democratic grievances with centre. This is particularly true 
under a single member plurality electoral system, which tends to prioritise majority 
interests over minority views and tends to strongly concentrate power in the hands of a 
single governing party (Norris, 1997). Initially, the highly nationalised nature of the 
British party system minimised the potential for this type of grievance in mainland 
Britain. From the late 1950s onwards, regional voting patterns have however started to 
diverge.  
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Figure 3.9 traces the regionalisation of the party system in Britain and England from 
1955 until 1997. In line with Jones and Mainwaring (2003), the Gini coefficient of the 
share of the regional vote attracted by a party in each of the regions is used as a 
measure of the regionalisation of party support4. A Gini coefficient of 0 signifies that a 
party receives the same share of the vote across all regions, while a Gini coefficient of 
1 means that it relies solely on popular support within a single region. The 
regionalisation of the party system as a whole is calculated by multiplying the Gini 
coefficient of each party with the share of the national vote it received and summing 
these products for all parties. Like the Gini coefficient for party support, the party 
system regionalisation score can theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores 
indicating a more regionalised party system. The regionalisation score is calculated on 
the basis of voting data for Scotland, Wales, 7 English Standard Statistical Regions 
(SSR), Greater London, and the rest of the South East Standard Statistical Region5.  
Although movements towards both regionalisation and nationalisation can be 
discerned, the general trend that emerges throughout the post-war period is one of 
increasing regional differentiation in voting behaviour. Within the devolution literature, 
attention has primarily been focussed on the traditionally distinctive distribution of 
preferences in Wales and the increasing distinctiveness of voting patterns in Scotland. 
As Figure 3.9 shows, the regionalisation of the party system is indeed more 
pronounced when Scotland and Wales are included in the analysis. However, a trend 
towards regionalisation is also visible in the English party system. Between 1955 and 
1966 a tendency towards regionalisation can already be discerned. From 1966 until 
1974, the emergence of more distinctive voting patterns in Scotland and Wales is 
accompanied by a more modest regionalisation of the vote in England.    
                                               
4 For an overview of the limitations of the Gini please look at Jones and Mainwaring (2003). The 
authors use 1 minus the Gini coefficient as a measure for the nationalisation of the party 
system. As we are primarily interested in regionalisation, it does not make sense to include this 
transformation.  
5 The South East standard region is already divided into Greater London and the South East 
SSR excluding London in order to take account of Greater London’s current status as a 
separate Government Office region with an elected assembly. 
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From October 1974 until the 1983 general election the regionalisation of the English 
party system however continues, while voting patterns in Scotland in particular 
converge towards the British average. During the 1980s, a further regionalisation of the 
English and British party system can be discerned. During the 1990s the 
regionalisation of both party systems stabilised. Over the period as a whole, the 
regionalisation score has doubled in both England and Great Britain.  The 1997 scores 
still fall well below those found by Jones and Mainwaring (2003) for a highly 
regionalised country like Canada. On the other hand, they are similar in magnitude to 
those generally found in a large federal country like the United States of America.   
Figure 3.9 Regionalisation of the vote in Great Britain and England (1955-1997) 
Source: own elaboration based on Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
It is widely accepted that the way in which the single-member plurality electoral 
system translates votes into seats magnifies the regionalisation of the party system 
(Johnston, 2001). Our measure of regionalisation provides an excellent opportunity to 
quantify this distorting effect. Like the regionalisation of the vote, the regionalisation of 
party support in terms of seats can be expressed using the Gini coefficient, with a Gini 
of 1 representing complete regionalisation and a Gini of 0 indicating complete 
nationalisation.  
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The seats regionalisation of the British party system as a whole can then be calculated 
by multiplying the Gini coefficients of the seats for each party with the share of the 
British seats this party attracted and summing these products for all parties. Figure 
3.10 shows that the regionalisation of the British party system in terms of seats is 
indeed much more pronounced than the regionalisation of the vote. Dividing the 
regionalisation score in terms of seats by the regionalisation score of the vote shows 
that, during the period under consideration here, the electoral system on average more 
than doubled the regionalisation of the vote in the seats distribution.  
 
Figure 3.10 Regionalisation of votes and seats in Great Britain (1955-1997) 
Source: own elaboration based on Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
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This exaggeration of the voting pattern in the seats distribution has the potential 
to exacerbate the real and perceived underrepresentation of regions with highly 
distinctive voting patterns (see chapter 4 for more detail).  Not every region is however 
equally strongly affected by this trend. The Lee index (Hearl, Budge, & Pearson, 1996) 
provides an opportunity to examine how the distinctiveness of voting in Scotland and 
Wales compares to that found in English regions. The Lee index measures regional 
distinctiveness in voting patterns in the following way: 
Lee Index = ∑|dr-n|/2 
where ∑ is the summation and |dr-n| is the absolute difference between the regional and 
countrywide percentage of the vote a party attracts. By dividing the sum by 2, double 
counting is avoided. Figure 3.11 show the Lee index for Scotland, Wales and the 
previously defined English regions between 1955 and 1997.  
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Figure 3.11  Regional distinctiveness in English Regions, Scotland and Wales (Lee index, 1955-
1997) 
Source: Own elaboration based on  Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
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In Wales, voting behaviour has consistently diverged from the British average 
throughout the post war period. In Scotland the regional voting pattern was initially 
fairly similar to the British average. Between 1966 and 1974, the distinctiveness of 
political preferences increased rapidly. Peaking in October 1974, the Scottish Lee 
index has since hovered just above the index for Wales. Scotland was however not 
alone in experiencing a rise in regional distinctiveness. The South East, The South 
West and the Northern region already displayed relatively distinctive voting patterns in 
1955. Over the next two decades, regional preferences diverged from the British 
average even further. By 1997, the Lee index of South West was fairly similar to that of 
Wales. Voting patterns in the South East and Northern regions were less distinctive, 
but the Lee index still doubled between 1955 and 19976.  
The waxing and waning of support for greater regional autonomy in Wales does 
not coincide with changes in the distinctiveness of regional voting patterns.  In 
Scotland, changes in the Lee index are correlated with changes in support for 
devolution. Closer examination however reveals that this is a spurious relationship, as 
both the dependent and the independent variable are strongly correlated with SNP 
voting. It is well-known that regionalist voting disproportionately affects the Lee index 
(Hearl, Budge, & Pearson, 1996). Support for regionalist parties will usually be 
concentrated in one specific administrative region7.  As a result, the share of the 
regional vote such a party attracts within its core region will automatically be 
significantly larger than the percentage of the national vote. In Wales, this does not 
present a problem as Plaid Cymru voting is not significantly correlated with support for 
greater regional autonomy. In Scotland, the electoral success of the Scottish 
Nationalist Party is however significantly correlated with support for greater regional 
autonomy.  
                                               
6 In 1994, England was divided into Government Office regions. This change in boundaries did 
not affect the South West.  In the case of the Northern region the shift to Government Office 
regions removed Cumbria from this region. This change in boundaries accentuated the electoral 
distinctiveness of the region.  A similar effect can be discerned in the case of the South East. 
Reflecting the former South East SSR minus Berkshire, Hertfordshire and Essex, the South 
East GOR displays a more distinctive voting pattern than its predecessor. 
7 Some regionalist groups, like for instance the Italian Lega Nord, build wider platforms and 
draw support from a number of administrative regions.  
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 The issue can be avoided by limiting the analysis to differences in support for 
the two main contenders for office at the central level. This has the additional benefit of 
focussing attention on the main grievance that can result from the regionalisation of the 
vote under a plurality system: the lack of regional support for the party in office. In order 
to do this the following variation on the Lee index is proposed: 
Government Lee index = (|dCr-Cn| + |dLr-Ln|) / 2 
As in the original Lee score, this measure focuses on the absolute difference between 
the percentage of the vote received at the regional and the national level. Unlike the 
original, the Government Lee index only considers regional and national levels of 
support for the Conservatives (|dCr-Cn|) and the Labour Party (|dLr-Ln|), rather than 
summing the differences for all parties. To take account of this focus, the vote attracted 
by each party at each level is expressed as a share of the vote for the two main 
competitors for office. As in the original Lee score, the sum of absolute differences is 
divided by 2 to avoid double counting.  
 
Figure 3.12 Regional distinctiveness of Conservative and Labour support in English regions, 
Scotland and Wales (Government Lee index, 1955-1997) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on  Rallings & Thrasher (2007)  
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Again Wales stands out as the only region that has consistently displayed a 
highly distinctive preference structure in terms of support for the main contenders for 
office at the central level (see Figure 3.12). In Scotland such a pattern only emerged 
from mid-1970s onwards. Although the change is particularly dramatic in Scotland, the 
country is in not alone in this trend. The Northern, South East and South West regions 
already displayed moderately distinctive preference structures in the 1950s and also 
experienced a marked increase in distinctiveness over the course of the period. 
Between 1974 and 1987, a form of regional distinctiveness also develops in the North 
West, East Anglia, and to a lesser extent Yorkshire and Humberside. This trend 
however tapers off towards the end of the period. At the lower end of the scale, areas 
like the West and East Midlands and Greater London persistently display voting 
preferences close to the British average.  
3.3.3. The regional response to Conservative pre-dominance 
During the 1980s and 90s, the election of four consecutive Conservative 
governments, on the back of a support base that was increasingly spatially 
concentrated, definitely received considerable attention in England. However, instead 
of being seen as a regional issue, the emerging spatial pattern of support for the main 
contenders for office was primarily framed as a North-South divide (Johnston, et al., 
1988). In both Scotland and Wales, regional elites did use the regionalisation of the 
vote as an instrument to mobilise support for devolution. Much of the academic 
literature on devolution mirrors this discourse by relating the re-emergence of 
regionalism during the 1980s and 90s to the long period of Conservative rule in the 
face of a progressive majority in Scotland and Wales (Brown, et al., 1998; Keating, 
2001a; Mitchell, Denver, Pattie, & Bochel, 1998; Pattie, Denver, Mitchell, & Bochel, 
1998). While this situation was indeed new in Scotland, Wales faced similar conditions 
during the 1950s and early 1960. To fully understand the emergence of democratic 
regionalism in the 1980s, we therefore need to explain why previous periods of 
Conservative rule did not create an equally strong sense of democratic regionalism in 
Wales.  
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In part this difference can be attributed to changes in the level of political 
polarisation in the British party system. The immediate post war era was characterised 
by a high level of agreement across political parties on a large number of issues 
including the mixed economy, the welfare state and regional policy. This political 
consensus gradually broke down over the course of the 1970s. While Thatcher moved 
her party decisively to the right, Labour activists succeeded in strengthening the 
leftwing agenda in their Party (Kavanagh, 1990). As a result of these internal party 
politics, the political spectrum polarised and policy outputs were much more strongly 
influenced by which party was in government at the central level. During the long 
period of Conservative government that followed, the more extreme stance created 
very real output grievances in Scotland and Wales (see section on economic 
regionalism). In addition, regional elites in both countries were able to use this 
polarisation to emphasise the difference between a collectivist, social democratic and 
liberal ‘us’ and the English ‘other’ with very different socio-political values (McCrone, 
2001).   
Thatcherism thus clearly created conditions that were conducive to the rise of 
support for devolution in the 1980s and 1990s.  However, I would argue that the 
perception that the incongruence between the country vote and the outcome of the 
general election was a potentially permanent feature of the political system, rather than 
a temporary predicament, played a crucial role in converting such generally conducive 
circumstances into actual support for devolution. This hypothesis is consistent with the 
waxing and waning of support for devolution during the Thatcher years (see Figure 
3.1). During her first term in office, Thatcher arguably pursued some of the most radical 
elements of her policy agenda in the face of a general recession and worsening 
economic conditions (Kavanagh, 1990).  Nonetheless, support for devolution in Wales 
continued to fall between 1979 and 1983, while it remained relatively stable in 
Scotland.  Over the course of Thatcher’s second term, support for greater autonomy 
again did not change much in Scotland, although it did tentatively start to rise in Wales.  
121 | P a g e  
 
In both countries, the biggest surge in popular support occurred between 1987 and 
1992, despite the fact that Thatcher was replaced as party leader by the more 
moderate John Major in 1990. This suggests that a growing sense of potentially 
permanent political non-representation, rather than Thatcherism per se, is at the heart 
of the emergence of democratic regionalism in both areas.  
This growing sense of non-representation can in turn be linked to the 
emergence of an alternating predominant party system in England. Pinard (1973) 
rightfully argues that one-party predominance is to an extent a matter of perception. In 
order to use this concept empirically, we will however have to operationalise the 
concept into an objective structural feature of party competition. Loosely following 
Sartori’s (2005) suggestions, a predominant party system will in this context be defined 
as a system in which (i) a single party wins the absolute majority of the seats (ii) for at 
least three consecutive government  periods (iii) on the basis of a percentage of the 
seats that is at least 10 percentage points higher than that of the second most 
successful party. On the basis of this definition, the Welsh party system can be 
characterised as a predominant party system for the entire post war period.  With the 
exception of the 1983 election, Labour has attracted the absolute majority of the Welsh 
seats with more than 10 percentage points at every election. Therefore the 1983 
election can be seen as an unusual event within an otherwise stable party system. In 
Scotland, early signs of Labour predominance emerged in the 1960s. The success of 
the SNP in the two 1974 elections temporarily halted this development. The pattern 
from 1979 onwards however clear points towards Labour predominance. The English 
party system by contrast remained characterised by two-party competition until 1979. 
This was followed by nearly two decades of Conservative predominance.          
 A regional analysis of the changes in voting behaviour within England reveals 
that this shift in the party system was mainly due to the developments in the Midlands 
and Greater London. East Anglia, the South East and the South West have been 
characterised by Conservative predominance throughout the post war period.  
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The Labour Party traditionally enjoyed a similar predominance in the Northern region, 
Yorkshire and Humberside, and Wales. From the mid-1960s onwards Labour acquired 
a comparable position in Scotland and the North West of England. The pattern of 
relatively balanced electoral competition that characterised the British party system 
until 1979 was the result of a competitive two-party system in the Midlands and Greater 
London. From the late 1970s onwards, these areas however also started to display a 
Conservative predominance. Simple demographics meant that the resulting 
Conservative predominance across the south of England overshadowed the 
predominance of Labour in the north. We now know that the competitive two-party 
system that used to characterise the Midlands and Greater London was not 
permanently replaced by Conservative predominance in the 1980s. But especially 
without the benefit of this knowledge, this change in voting patterns clearly created the 
potential for territorially-concentrated grievances in the areas characterised by Labour 
predominance.       
Within England, the issues of political non-representation caused by the First-
Past-The-Post system in the context of parallel predominant party systems and 
significant levels of third party voting failed to capture the public imagination. 
Quantitative evidence of the level of support for electoral reform during the long period 
of Conservative rule is limited. The evidence that is available suggests that the wording 
of the question has an important effect on the level of support that is recorded for the 
various options (Dunleavy, Margetts, & Weir, 1993; Kellner, 1992; Weir, 1992). 
Furthermore, qualitative research shows that voters neither cared much nor indeed had 
a great understanding of voting systems and their ultimate effects on the distribution of 
seats (Farrell & and Gallagher, 1999). Partially this can be linked to the diversity of 
views amongst political elites. While the Conservatives favoured the status quo, the 
Liberals supported a shift towards the single transferable vote system.  
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The Labour Party on the other hand remained divided between a traditionalist bloc that 
continued to support the single member plurality system, moderate reformers 
championing a supplementary vote system and modernisers in favour of the additional 
member system (Norris, 1995). The persistence of elite disagreement, coupled with the 
myriad of complex alternatives developed by politicians and academics alike, did not 
aid the mobilisation of the issue into strong popular support for electoral reform.  
In Scotland and Wales, regionalist elites incorporated the emergence of parallel 
party systems into their discourse much more successfully. Here too complex new 
voting systems were suggested, but the issue was primarily mobilised through the 
more emotive discourses on regional identity and differences in values (R. Davies, 
1999; Keating, 2001a; Osmond, 1995). Although survey evidence tend to suggest that 
values do indeed differ from region to region, the differences are usually found to be 
too small to adequately explain the large disparities in voting behaviour (Curtice, 1988, 
1992, 1996). This is especially true if the results are corrected for regional variation in 
socio-structural factors (Brown, et al., 1998; Miller, Timpson, & Lessnoff, 1996). 
Regardless of the lack of empirical evidence, the conceptualisation of divergent 
regional voting patterns as evidence of distinctive norms and values clearly resonated 
with voters.  
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Table 3.7 Grievances with England’s dominant position in the electoral system and preferences for 
regional autonomy (1997)  
Scotland 
 Preferred system of governance by response to Q31: “Has it ever 
made you angry or not that it is English voters who mainly decide 
who runs Scotland?” 
 Yes 
very angry 
Yes 
somewhat angry 
No 
not angry 
Independent 
 
54% 29% 12% 
Devolution with 
fiscal powers 
35% 40% 28% 
Devolution 
without fiscal 
powers 
5% 15% 10% 
No elected body 
 
5% 16% 50% 
N 271 215 157 
Correlation  .483**   
Wales 
 Preferred system of governance by response to Q31: “Has it ever 
made you angry or not that it is English voters who mainly decide 
who runs Wales?” 
 Yes 
very angry 
Yes 
somewhat angry 
No 
not angry 
Independent 
 
30% 16% 7% 
Devolution  
with fiscal powers 
28% 28% 12% 
Devolution 
without fiscal 
powers 
26% 35% 25% 
No elected body 
 
15% 21% 56% 
N 123 147 365 
Correlation .407**   
Source: own elaboration based on Jowell, Heath, & Curtice (1998). ** significant at 
0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level (Pearson two-tailed) 
 
 
The available survey evidence seems to concur with the suggestion that the 
emergence of conflicting dominant party systems played an important role in creating 
popular demands for greater regional autonomy. The 1997 Scottish and Welsh 
Referendum studies asked respondents whether it ever made them angry that it is 
English voters who mainly decide who runs Scotland or Wales. As Table 3.7 shows, 
the response to this question was strongly correlated with support for greater regional 
autonomy in both countries.  
125 | P a g e  
 
Those who did at some point feel very or somewhat angry about England’s dominant 
position were significantly more likely to support devolution or independence than their 
counterparts who did not feel aggrieved by this. Unfortunately it is not possible to 
determine to what extent this grievance was also present during the 1970s and 80s, as 
the question was only introduced in the context of the 1997 referendum surveys.  The 
lack of attention to this grievance in the public debate during this period however 
suggests that similar concerns were not highly salient at that time.  
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the origins of waxing and waning of popular support for 
greater regional autonomy. It challenged the emphasis traditionally placed on region-
specific factors, by placing demands for greater autonomy in the context of wider 
challenges to the legitimacy of the central system. By acknowledging that the 
emergence of demands for devolution or even full independence are region-specific 
responses to grievances that are not necessarily regional in nature, we gain a better 
understanding of the true origins of such demands. By teasing out the different aspects 
of legitimacy at both the central and the regional level, this chapter developed a clear 
typology of the sources of regionalism. The use of this typology enables us to situate 
regionalism within wider trends and distinguish between the types of demands that 
emerge in different regions at different points in time. Applying this theoretical 
framework to the British case, draws attention to a number of factors that have played 
a role in the waxing and waning of support for regional autonomy. Due to the focus on 
the regional level, many of these factors have been underemphasised or misinterpreted 
in much of the current literature.  
 As most of the studies in this field, this chapter started by looking at identity-
based sources of regionalism. It is undisputedly true that regionalist movements are 
strongly concentrated in regions with a historically grounded sense of identity at that 
scale. The history of identity formation in the UK, as well as the more contemporary 
survey evidence, however shows that we should resist the temptation to conceptualise 
demands for greater autonomy as a simple re-assertion of pre-existing identities.  
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The coexistence of multiple scales of belonging has been a reality for many in Britain 
since the emergence of modern nationalism in the nineteenth century. Throughout the 
history of Britain the degree to which these different spatial identities have been seen 
as conflicting has waxed and waned. Partially, this can be linked to independent 
changes in feelings of identity. As discussed, British identity in particular has been 
profoundly challenged in the post war period. This creates opportunities for the re-
assertion of country or regional senses of belonging. Especially since country identities 
also faced important challenges during the post-war period, the direct changes in 
feelings of belonging alone are however not sufficient to explain the trends in support 
for devolution.      
Through a reanalysis of the available survey evidence, it was shown that the 
direct effect of identity on support for devolution was much more limited than the strong 
concentration of regionalist movements in identity-rich regions would suggest. This 
invites a re-conceptualisation of the role of identity in the emergence of popular support 
for devolution. What constitutes ‘us’ and the ‘other’ is not a primordial given. The 
degree to which a regional identity acquires political expression depends instead on the 
context within which it takes on meaning. A spatial identity only legitimises stronger 
autonomy at that level if the needs and wants of the regional ‘us’ are perceived as, at 
least in some way, irreconcilable or at odds with the needs and wants of the central 
‘other’, and a devolved system is believed to allow for a more satisfactory result. In the 
absence of widespread grievances with the British identity per se, regional feelings of 
belonging play a role in mobilising other legitimacy grievances along territorial lines, but 
it does not independently create calls for more autonomy.  
In this conceptualisation, the concentration of regionalist movements is at least 
partially linked to the formal and informal mobilisation structures that tend to 
accompany historically-grounded spatial identities. In a world dominated by the concept 
of nation-states, the existence of a historically-grounded and widely felt identity helps to 
establish a sense of polity. In addition, a history of statehood in particular frequently 
leaves a physical footprint in the form of formal institutions.  
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Regional level institutions, such as religious organisations, offices of state, political 
parties and even quangos, clearly aided the mobilisation of more general grievances 
along territorial lines in Scotland and Wales. Without the distinctive identity and history 
of these areas, most of these mobilising structures would not have existed. 
Experiences in the English regions show that it is difficult to create a coherent regional 
agenda in the absence of such institutions.       
Moving on to the trends that motivated the political re-assertion of the regional 
identity in Scotland and Wales, the analysis shows that such regionalism was for the 
most part a response to general grievances with the centre. In the 1960s and 70s, the 
general worsening of the economic situation, alongside the re-emergence of the north-
south divide created general as well as spatially-concentrated grievances with the 
centre. Especially in the context of central government policies that were widely seen to 
prioritise the needs of the South over the plight of the ailing North, this provided elites 
in the North with ample opportunity for popular mobilisation. A comparison between 
Scotland, Wales and the regions in the North of England primarily exposed the 
importance of formal and informal mobilisation structures in framing issues and 
mobilising popular support.  
In much of England, political elites either did not perceive the issues as regional 
or were unable to agree on the appropriate course of action for the region. In Scotland 
and to a lesser extent Wales, the existence of regionalist parties and institutions like 
the Scottish and Welsh Offices encouraged a regional interpretation of issues that were 
arguably related more generally to the industrial structure of much of the north of 
Britain. In Scotland, the discovery of North Sea oil and the related increased legitimacy 
of the region as a semi-autonomous economic unit resulted in a sudden rise in the 
potential for economic regionalism. In Wales, the lack of a similar improvement in the 
economic fundamentals of the country largely prevented the mobilisation of economic 
grievances with the centre along regionalist lines.  
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The framework presented in this chapter suggests that this difference in the perceived 
output-oriented legitimacy of the region was the primary cause of the different trends in 
popular support for greater autonomy in the two countries at that time.  
Across the UK, the mounting economic grievances were accompanied by a 
growing discontent with the performance of the main contenders for office. The 
resulting rise in third party voting benefitted the nationalist parties in Scotland and 
Wales. In Scotland, the rise in SNP support coincides with a similarly strong rise in 
support for greater autonomy. This suggests that the discontent with the way central 
governments of different political persuasions handled the pressing social-economic 
challenges increased support for greater autonomy in this country. In Wales, it is 
questionable whether the rise of Plaid Cymru support in the 1960s and 70s demarked a 
real increase in support for greater regional autonomy. Closer inspection of the 
available evidence suggests that the rapid demise in the influence of social class on 
voting behaviour instead exposed a pre-existing core of voters who supported greater 
autonomy for Wales.  
The failed devolution referendums in 1979 were accompanied by a marked 
decline in support for devolution and independence in both countries. The framework 
advanced in this thesis suggests that this is linked to a decline in the relative legitimacy 
of the region, following this very public victory of the Unionist camp. The subsequent 
re-emergence of politicised regionalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s has been 
widely related to the lack of support for consecutive Conservative Governments in 
Scotland and Wales. The analysis in this chapter confirmed that the waxing of popular 
support for greater autonomy during this period should be primarily related to 
democratic rather than economic grievances. However, it presented a subtle but 
significant reformulation of the origins of this perceived democratic deficit. While the 
existing literature focuses primarily on the nature of Thatcherism, this chapter has 
argued that the changes in the party system in England may have been equally if not 
more significant 
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During the immediate post war period the British Party system could be seen as 
a textbook example of a competitive two-party system. At the regional level, distinct 
patterns of predominance could already be discerned. The existence of more balanced 
systems in populous areas like the Midlands and Greater London however prevented 
the overall predominance of either of the two main contenders for office. This changed 
from the late 1970s onwards, with the emergence of Conservative predominance in 
these areas. The voting patterns from 1997 onwards suggest that these regions 
developed alternating predominant party systems. Without the benefit of hindsight, this 
trend however suggested that overall Conservative predominance could be a 
permanent feature of the British Party System. Particularly in Scotland, the timing of the 
rise of support for devolution suggests that this general trend, rather than Thatcherism 
per se, created fertile soil for the emergence of democratic regionalism.  
Similarly the timing of the rise in popular support for greater autonomy suggests 
that economic regionalism played a secondary role at this point in time. In both 
Scotland and Wales, the rise in support for devolution by and large coincides with a 
period when both countries were converging to the national average in terms of 
claimant rates. In Wales, the relative improvements in claimant rates were combined 
with persistently high male inactivity rates and continued relative deprivation in terms of 
GPD per capita. In Scotland on the other hand, male inactivity rates were much more 
moderate. In addition, the country experienced a distinct improvement in terms of 
relative GDP per head during this period. As both countries displayed similar increases 
in support for devolution during this time, it would therefore be hard to argue that this 
trend was primarily based on economic factors.  
Having re-examined the sources of regionalism in the 1970s, 80s and 90s, the 
next chapter will analyse under which circumstances popular support for greater 
regional autonomy is likely to influence the formal policy positions of central level 
parties.    
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4. The incentives towards regionalist accommodation (1945-
1997) 
 
The previous chapter examined the origins of the waxing and waning of popular 
support for greater regional autonomy in mainland Britain between 1945 and 1997. 
This chapter will investigate under which circumstances such regionally-concentrated 
preferences for devolution and secession influence the policy positions of political 
parties at the central level. In particular, it will focus on the preferences of the two main 
contenders for office at the central level; the Labour Party and its Conservative 
counterpart. As the next chapter will examine in more detail, one of these two parties 
has been the primary agenda setter within the British system throughout the period 
under consideration here. As a result, uncovering the incentives faced by these 
collective actors is crucial to further our understanding of the pathways towards 
regionalist accommodation in pre-devolution mainland Britain. 
This chapter will start by briefly outlining the formal policy positions of the two main 
contenders for office at the central level during the period under consideration here. 
This will reveal that the response of Labour and the Conservative Party to the 
regionalist revival in the 1960s and 1970s differed markedly from the pattern of 
regionalist accommodation during the 1980s and 90s. Using the typology of outcome 
and act-based incentives developed in chapter 2, this chapter seeks to further our 
understanding of this shift in the patterns of regionalist accommodation and non-
accommodation. Specifically it will be argued that the recent re-emergence of the 
territorial dimension, coupled with the considerable degree of internal conflict regarding 
the appropriate response to this trend, awarded a relatively high level of policy 
autonomy to the party leadership in the 1970s. In the context of exceptionally tight 
electoral competition at the central level, this in turn induced both party leaders to 
partially accommodate regionalist demands despite significant internal opposition to 
this policy. Over the course of the 1980s and 90s, the devolution issue was gradually 
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I argue that this rise in party cohesion along the territorial dimension in turn limited the 
ability of party leaders to radically change the party position in response to personal 
preferences or changes in external incentives.  
4.1. The formal policy positions of the main contenders for office. 
In the years immediately following the Second World War, the regional problem 
seemed to have all but disappeared in mainland Britain. When the home rule issue did 
re-emerge, the response of the main contenders for office to these developments was 
initially focussed on addressing such concerns within the existing system of 
government (Conservative Party, 1955, 1959, 1964, 1966). (Labour Party, 1955, 1959, 
1964, 1966). As regionalist pressures continued to build, the mainstream parties 
started to adjust their policy platforms. The Conservative Party under Edward Heath 
was the first to respond. Following the 1968 declaration of Perth, the 1970 election 
manifesto stated that a Conservative government would place before Parliament 
proposals for a Scottish Convention sitting in Edinburgh (Conservative Party, 1970). 
Devolution to Wales on the other hand was not mentioned. Meanwhile, the 1970 
Labour manifesto seemed to make a stronger commitment to devolution in Wales than 
in Scotland.  Although the prospect of a regional Parliament was strongly rejected in 
both cases, the manifesto stated that “evidence given by the Labour Party to the 
Commission on the Constitution includes plans for an elected council for Wales with 
extended powers” (Labour Party, 1970). For Scotland, no such commitments were 
included.  
 From the 1970s onwards, popular support for greater autonomy continued to 
wax and wane in both Scotland and Wales (see chapter 3). Likewise the main 
contenders for office at the central level have made several changes to their stance on 
devolution. These changes are however not mere reflections of the shifts in popular 
opinion in Scotland and Wales. In order to visualise the congruence between the party 
positions and popular preferences, Figure 4.1 graphically displays both the distribution 
of popular preferences and the perceived policy positions of the main contenders for 
office for the years where survey evidence is available.  
132 | P a g e  
 
Where survey evidence on perceived party positions is not available, the position of the 
political parties has been based on the commitments in the election manifesto. From 
these visualisations it is clear that the main contenders for office at the central level 
displayed varying degrees of responsiveness to country-level demands for greater 
autonomy at different points in time. 
Despite early signs of accommodation both the Labour Party and the 
Conservatives failed to mention the devolution issue in their February 1974 general 
election manifestos (Conservative Party, 1974a; Labour Party, 1974 February). In 
October of the same year, the issue did feature much more prominently. Just prior to 
the October election of the same year, the Labour Government published the white 
paper, "Democracy and Devolution: proposals for Scotland and Wales” (HMSO 1974), 
which outlined the government’s plans for devolution to both countries. In the 
subsequent general election manifesto, Labour reiterated its intentions to create an 
elected assembly in both Scotland and Wales (Labour Party, 1974 October). The 
Conservative Party also made a commitment to creating an elected assembly in 
Scotland. With respect to Wales, it merely proposed to increase the powers of existing 
institutions like the Secretary of State for Wales and the Welsh Council (Conservative 
Party, 1974b).  Despite the similarity in manifesto commitments with respect to 
Scotland, Labour was perceived to be more accommodating of Scottish demands than 
the Conservative Party at the time. In Wales, where manifesto commitments were 
substantially different, Labour was correctly perceived as more accommodating to 
Welsh demands than the Conservatives.  
Following the 1979 devolution referendums, Labour withdrew its commitment to 
Welsh devolution. With respect to Scotland, the election manifesto stated that “a 
majority voted for devolution”, and the Party would therefore remain committed to 
creating an elected Scottish Assembly (Labour Party, 1979). In both countries these 
positions were in line with popular opinion.  The Conservative Party manifesto stated its 
commitment to “discussions about the future government of Scotland, and ^ improved 
parliamentary control of administration in Wales” (Conservative Party, 1979).  
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Though this was in line with popular opinion in Wales, it fell well short of the average 
voter position in Scotland. 
In the 1980s, the Conservative election manifestos made no reference to 
devolution to either Scotland or Wales (Conservative Party, 1983, 1987). Within the 
Labour Party, policies for Wales and Scotland remained differentiated. Both in 1983 
and 1987, the Party devoted an entire section to its commitment to creating a directly 
elected Scottish Assembly (Labour Party, 1983, 1987). In 1983, Wales did not receive 
a special mention, while the 1987 manifesto focussed on small concessions within the 
existing government system. Again Labour’s position was largely in line with popular 
opinion in both Scotland and Wales, while the Conservatives were largely 
unresponsive to Scottish demands in particularly.  
In the 1990s, the official commitments of the two main contenders for office 
polarised more clearly. In its 1992 manifesto (1992), Labour made a clear commitment 
to the immediate establishment of an elected Parliament in Scotland and an elected 
Assembly for Wales. The Conservative Party on the other hand openly stated its 
support for the Union and its intention to oppose any form of devolution to Scotland or 
Wales (Conservative Party, 1992). By that time, devolution or full independence was 
supported by the vast majority of Scottish voters and about half of the Welsh 
electorate. While the Conservative position enjoyed considerable support in Wales, 
only about a quarter of Scottish voters supported the preservation of the status quo.  
By 1997, popular opinion in both countries shifted even more resolutely towards 
greater autonomy. Again the Conservatives failed to respond to these trends, while the 
Labour’s position closely resembled the position of the average voter in both countries 
(Conservative Party, 1997; Labour Party, 1997).  
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Figure 4.1 Popular preferences and party positions with regards to Scottish and Welsh autonomy 
(1974-1997)  
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Sources: own elaboration based on Balsom & Madgwick (1979), Brand & Mitchell 
(1994), Crewe, et al. (1977a, 1977b), Heath, et al. (1983),Heath, Jowell, & Curtice 
(1993), Heath, et al. (1999), McCrone, et al. (1999) and Miller & Brand (1981). MV 
indicates the mean voter position based on the survey evidence. 
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The general picture that emerges from this brief overview is that both of the main 
contenders for office were initially keen to be seen to accommodate Scottish demands 
for greater autonomy. In other words, the act of publicly supporting asymmetric 
devolution to Scotland was seen as beneficial by both (Blau, 2008). As will be 
discussed, the extent to which this act reflects a true preference for the outcome of 
devolution is more questionable. With regards to Wales, party positions were strongly 
differentiated; while the Labour Party appeared relatively responsive to Welsh 
demands, the Conservative Party openly opposed devolution for Wales. From the late 
1970s onwards, the extent to which the policy positions of the two main contenders for 
office reflected popular opinion in Scotland and Wales started to diverge more 
markedly. While the formal position of the Labour Party continued to broadly concur 
with popular preferences in both Scotland and Wales, its Conservative counterpart 
seemed increasingly out of touch with popular opinion in both countries. The remainder 
of this chapter will examine the origins of the distinctive patterns of regionalist 
accommodation during these two periods.   
4.2. Regionalist accommodation during the 1970s  
As noted, the re-emergence of the regional problem in the 1960s and 70s 
provoked a response from both of the main contenders for office at that time. While the 
Conservative Party was quick off the mark, it only chose to accommodate Scottish 
demands for greater autonomy. While the Labour Party did not formally change its 
position until after the first 1974 election, its proposals included commitments to greater 
regional autonomy for both Scotland and Wales. Much of the existing literature on 
devolution assumes that the accommodation of regionalist demands in the 1970s was 
primarily motivated by electoral incentives. In making this argument it however devotes 
little attention to the fact that Scottish and Welsh electorates are but a relatively small 
minority within the British polity. This section will refine the existing explanations by 
arguing that the spatial concentration of regionalist demands and the differences in 
issue salience amongst pro and anti-devolution voters played an important role in 
shaping the electoral act-based incentives faced by central level parties.  
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In addition, it will seek to show that the relatively recent re-emergence of the regional 
problem, coupled with the lack of internal cohesion on the issue, awarded the party 
leadership a high degree of policy autonomy in this area.      
4.2.1. The role of electoral act-based incentives  
Much of literature on British devolution tends to focus upon regional claims and 
realities, rather than the constellation of preferences in the wider polity. Within the 
resulting narratives, the central government is frequently presented as a coercive force 
that is very reluctant to respond to the legitimate demands of stateless nations within its 
territory (Bulpitt, 1983). When central level actors do offer to devolve powers and 
resources to the regional level, this is usually assumed to be a half-hearted ideological 
concession motivated by electoral considerations (for example see Keating, 2001b; 
Keating & Bleiman, 1979; Mitchell, 1990). By approaching the issue from a state-wide 
perspective, this study aims to radically change the entry point of the enquiry. This in 
turn allows us to develop and challenge the assumptions that underlie many of the 
existing discourses on regionalist accommodation during the 1970s and beyond.    
Scotland and Wales only represent around 15 per cent of the British population 
and 17 percent of the seats at Westminster. As a result, the asymmetric devolution 
offered by both the Labour Party and the Conservatives cannot reflect the median voter 
position within the wider polity, unless support for regionalist accommodation amongst 
English voters is substantial. Unfortunately, we have no survey data on English 
preferences with regards to asymmetric devolution during the early and mid-1970s. 
English respondents were however quizzed on their views on Scottish and Welsh 
devolution in the 1979 election survey. The results suggest that the overwhelming 
majority of English voters favoured the status quo or moderate changes within the 
current government system over devolution or independence for Scotland and Wales at 
that time (see Table 4.1). To what extent these results can be taken as a proxy for 
popular opinion at the time when the main contenders for office first introduced their 
manifesto commitments to asymmetric devolution is questionable.  
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In Scotland and Wales, the failed 1979 devolution referendums clearly diminished 
popular support for devolution (see chapter 3). If we assume that these events had a 
similarly strong effect on popular opinion in England, it still seems highly unlikely that 
asymmetric devolution to either Scotland or Wales enjoyed majority support amongst 
English voters during the early and mid-1970s.  
 
Table 4.1  Share of the English voters who favoured devolution or independence for Scotland and 
Wales (1979) 
 All Conservative Labour 
Scotland 19-23% 13-19% 23-26% 
Wales 14-18% 10-15% 15-23% 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Crewe, et al. (1981). 95% confidence interval.  
 
The available survey evidence thus suggests that the willingness of both of the 
main contenders for office to partially accommodate regionalist demands did not reflect 
the preferences of the English electorate at that time. There are however strong 
indications that differences in issue salience limited the electoral losses associated with 
offering asymmetric devolution. During the 1960s and 70s, the lack of autonomy under 
the existing centralised system clearly gained in salient in Scotland and to a lesser 
extent Wales (see chapter 3). By contrast, the public response to these trends in 
England remained fairly muted. This was exemplified by the 1979 devolution 
referendums. During the parliamentary debates a number of attempts were made to 
subject the 1979 Scotland and Wales Bills to a UK-wide referendum (see chapter 5). 
However, the eventual decision to limit public consultation to the directly affected 
regional electorates did not provoke much of a public reaction in England.  
This suggests that, although the majority of the English public did not support 
the moderate forms of devolution on offer to Scotland and Wales, the issue was not 
highly salient for most.  
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Especially in the context of growing economic woes and unemployment (see chapter 
3), it therefore seems unlikely that a significant share of English voters would have 
been inclined to prioritise devolution above bread-and-butter issues like the 
management of the economy or the future of the welfare system. As noted in chapter 2, 
accommodating the views of a minority for whom an issue is highly salient may under 
such circumstances be a seat-maximising strategy, even if this position does not enjoy 
majority support within the wider electorate (Besley & Coate, 2000). The observable 
implication of this hypothesis would be that the patterns of regionalist accommodation 
matched the anticipated electoral benefits. Specifically, we would expect to find that 
both parties faced strong act-based incentives to accommodate Scottish demands, 
while the Labour Party stood to gain substantially more from accommodating Welsh 
demands than its Conservative counterpart.  
The electoral geography of the late 1960s and early 1970s is broadly in line with 
these predictions. Scottish and Welsh seats only accounted for around 17 percent of all 
Westminster seats during the period under consideration. In addition, the single-
member plurality system tends to produce relatively comfortable single-party majorities 
at the central level. As a result, Scottish and Welsh seats are only pivotal to the 
outcome of the general election when mainstream competition in England is particularly 
fierce. Figure 4.2 plots the outcomes of the general election between 1945 and 1997 
and contrasts this with the hypothetical results in England and Northern Ireland alone. 
This shows that in 1964 and February 1974, a different party would have won the 
election if Scottish and Welsh seats had not been included. In October 1974, the same 
party would have won the largest share of the seats, but it would not have enjoyed an 
overall parliamentary majority.  
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Figure 4.2 Size of the government majority with and without Scottish and Welsh seats (1945-1997)  
Source: own elaboration based on  Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
 
Taken together, this suggests that the main contenders for office indeed faced 
unusually strong electoral incentives to consider Scottish and Welsh preferences 
during the 1960s and 70s. Furthermore, it can be argued that accommodating spatial-
concentrated preferences for greater autonomy represented a relatively efficient way of 
increasing a party’s seat share at that time.  Plurality electoral systems, like the one in 
the UK, are generally perceived to prioritise the effectiveness of government over 
minority representation (Norris, 1997). The way in which the ‘first-past-the-post’ system 
translates votes into seats however means that the potential seat gains associated with 
accommodating spatially-concentrated minority views are likely to be considerably 
larger than those related to addressing minority concerns without a spatial component.  
To illustrate this point, Table 4.2 lists the share of the vote and the seats won by 
each of the three main central parties and the SNP and Plaid Cymru between 1945 and 
1997. Due to the spatial concentration of their electoral base, the share of the UK vote 
attracted by the nationalist parties remained relatively limited throughout the period. In 
addition, the plurality system clearly penalises smaller parties.  
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As a result the share of the Westminster seats awarded to the SNP and Plaid Cymru 
consistently fell well below the share of the UK vote attracted by these parties. From 
the mid-1970s onwards, the nationalist seats to votes ratio however compares very 
favourably with the ratio achieved by their Liberal counterparts. Considering that the 
Liberals consistently attracted a much larger share of the UK vote, this strongly 
illustrates that parties addressing spatially-concentrated minority preferences can more 
easily challenge the dominant position of the two main contenders for office than third 
parties servicing spatially heterogeneous minority views.  
 
Table 4.2 Translation of votes into seats under the UK plurality system (1945-2005) 
 Share of vote (%) Seats won Seat-to-Votes Ratio 
 
 Con Lab Lib PC/ 
SNP 
Con Lab Lib PC/ 
SNP 
Con Lab Lib PC/ 
SNP 
 
1945 
 
39.7 
 
47.7 
 
9.0 
 
0.2 
 
210 
 
393 
 
12 
 
0 
 
0.83 
 
1.29 
 
0.21 
 
0.00 
 
1950 43.3 46.1 9.1 0.1 297 315 9 0 1.10 1.09 0.16 0.00 
 
1951 48.0 48.8 2.6 0.1 321 295 6 0 1.07 0.97 0.37 0.00 
 
1955 49.6 46.4 2.7 0.2 344 277 6 0 1.10 0.95 0.35 0.00 
 
1959 49.4 43.8 5.9 0.4 365 258 6 0 1.17 0.93 0.16 0.00 
 
1964 43.3 44.1 11.2 0.5 303 317 9 0 1.11 1.14 0.13 0.00 
 
1966 41.9 47.9 8.5 0.7 253 363 12 0 0.96 1.20 0.22 0.00 
 
1970 46.4 43.0 7.5 1.7 330 287 6 1 1.13 1.06 0.13 0.09 
 
1974a 37.8 37.2 19.3 2.6 297 301 14 9 1.24 1.27 0.11 0.55 
 
1974b 35.7 39.3 18.3 3.4 276 319 13 14 1.22 1.28 0.11 0.65 
 
1979 43.9 36.9 13.8 2.0 339 268 11 4 1.22 1.14 0.13 0.31 
 
1983 42.3 27.6 25.4 1.5 397 209 23 4 1.44 1.16 0.14 0.41 
 
1987 42.2 30.8 22.6 1.7 375 229 22 6 1.37 1.14 0.15 0.54 
 
1992 41.9 34.4 17.8 2.3 336 271 20 7 1.23 1.21 0.17 0.47 
 
1997 30.7 43.2 16.8 2.5 165 418 46 10 0.82 1.47 0.42 0.61 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
146 | P a g e  
 
  
In order to benefit from making concessions to spatially-concentrated 
preferences, a party does however need to be in contention in a substantial number of 
constituencies where these preferences play a role in voting behaviour. At the 
constituency level, the candidate that wins the contest rarely attracts less than 30 per 
cent of the vote. The share of the regional constituencies in which a party candidate 
captured 30 per cent or more of the local vote therefore gives us some indication of the 
potential seat gains associated with accommodating regional preferences (Norris, 
2004). Table 4.3 shows the share of country-level constituencies in which a Labour or 
Conservative candidate gained at least 30 per cent of the vote from 1966 until 1979.   
At the start of the period, the Conservatives were in contention around 70 per 
cent of the Scottish seats, while a Labour candidate gained more than 30 per cent of 
the vote in over 80 per cent of constituencies. When the home rule issue re-emerged in 
the 1960s and 70s, the potential gains associated with accommodating Scottish 
preferences were thus substantial for both Parties. Reflecting the historically weaker 
position of the Conservative Party in Wales, Conservative candidates failed to attract 
more than 30 per cent of the vote in over 60 per cent of Welsh constituencies in the 
1960s and 70s. Given the limited number of seats awarded to Wales at Westminster, 
this meant that the Conservative Party had very little to gain by accommodating Welsh 
demands. Labour support on the other hand has traditionally been strong in Wales. As 
a result, a Labour candidate was in contention in over 90 per cent of Welsh contests at 
the start of the period. The Labour Party therefore faced much stronger incentives to 
defend its position in Wales by accommodating spatially-concentrated preferences.  
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Table 4.3 Share of the country-level constituencies within which a Labour or Conservative 
candidate was in contention for the seat (1966-1979)
8
 
 Scotland Wales 
 Conservative Labour Conservative Labour 
1966 70% 85% 39% 94% 
1970 75% 79% 36% 92% 
1974F 56% 69% 36% 86% 
1974O  35% 68% 33% 94% 
1979 46% 76% 44% 81% 
Source: own elaboration based on data from http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/psr.htm.  
 
Even if a party is in contention in a substantial number of regional 
constituencies, a pro-devolution stance is unlikely to create significant electoral benefits 
unless the core regional electorate of a party supports greater autonomy and this issue 
is perceived as sufficiently salient to influences voting behaviour. In Scotland, there are 
clear indications that both of these conditions were met during the 1970s. Survey 
evidence suggests that the majority of the Scottish voters favoured greater regional 
autonomy. Significantly, this was found to be true both amongst those who indicated 
that they had voted Labour in 1970 and their Conservative counterparts (see Table 
4.4). The rapid rise of support for the SNP furthermore confirmed that such preferences 
were increasingly influencing voting behaviour. While this trend initially did not lead to 
substantial seat losses for the main contenders for office at the central level, this 
situation changed in the mid-1970s. In February 1974, the SNP won 7 seats on the 
basis of 22 per cent of the regional vote. As a result, Labour lost 2 Scottish seats while 
the Conservatives had to concede 4.  In the October election of the same year, SNP 
support increased to 30 percent of the regional vote.  
                                               
8 A party candidate was seen as in contention for a seat if he or she attracted over 30 
per cent of the popular vote. Contests were marked as marginal if the percentage of 
the vote attracted by the winner was within 10 percentage points of the share attracted 
by the runner-up.   
 
148 | P a g e  
 
While the remaining Scottish Labour MPs managed to withstand the SNP challenge 
this time around, the Conservative Party lost a further 4 seats in the second 1974 
election.  
Table 4.4 Share of the population that supports devolution or independence by party voted for in 
the previous election (1974, 1979) 
 Scotland Wales 
 All  Labour Conservative All  Labour Conservative 
1974 63-69% 57-67% 57-69% 31-48% 33-57% 5-33% 
1979 44-52% 44-56% 24-38% 22-28% 22-30% 6-15% 
Sources: Own elaboration based on  Balsom & Madgwick (1979), Crewe, et al. (1977a, 
1977b), Miller & Brand (1981). Table applies 95% confidence interval.  
 
In the context of exceptionally tight electoral competition at the central level, the 
direct seat losses to the SNP alone provided a considerable incentive to accommodate 
regionalist demands in Scotland. This effect was presumably heightened by the fact 
that SNP support was fast nearing the threshold at which the electoral system would 
start to work in its favour. McLean (2005) for instance calculated that, if the SNP had 
won 35 rather than 30 percent of the vote in October 1974, the Party’s seats total could 
have been 4 or 5 times as high. This would in turn have seriously compromised the 
ability of either of the main contenders for office to gain an overall majority at 
Westminster. Taken together this concurs with the hypothesis that the accommodation 
of Scottish demands in the 1970s can indeed be related to the direct electoral gains 
associated with this position under conditions of heterogeneous issue salience.  
At face value, the electoral rationale behind Labour’s commitment to Welsh 
devolution seems less compelling. The results of the February 1974 election survey 
suggest that the majority of Welsh voters did not support greater regional autonomy at 
that time. Although Labour voters seems substantially more inclined to support 
devolution or independence than their counterparts. Opinion remained strongly divided 
even amongst this group.  
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While this evidence was not yet available at the time, the Labour leadership would 
undoubtedly have been aware of the fact that popular demand for regional autonomy 
was substantially more limited in Wales than in Scotland. In 1970, a survey conducted 
in the context of the Royal Commission on the Constitution had shown that greater 
regional autonomy was only favoured by 36 percent of Welsh respondents (Social and 
Community Planning Research, 1970). This was nearly identical to the support for 
decentralisation recorded amongst English respondents, and 10 percentage points 
below the level in Scotland. In addition, Plaid Cymru support barely increased between 
the 1970 and February 1974 general elections, while SNP support more than doubled 
over the same period. As the next section will show, it is however equally difficult to 
argue that the Labour leadership faced compelling output-based or internal act-based 
incentives to accommodate the preferences of the pro-devolution minority in Wales. In 
this context, the spatial distribution of the constitutional preferences in Wales, coupled 
with the perceived salience attached to the issue by pro- and anti-devolution voters, 
may have played an important role.  
Table 4.5 The regionalist challenge to Labour candidates in Scotland and Wales (1966-1979) 
 Scotland  Wales  
 Share of the 
regional vote 
SNP 
Labour/SNP 
contests as 
share regional 
contests  
Share of the 
regional vote 
PC 
Labour/PC 
contests as 
share regional 
contests  
1966 5.0% 3% 4.3% 3% 
1970 11.4% 4% 11.5% 22% 
1974F 21.9% 18% 10.8% 25% 
1974O 30.4% 54% 10.8% 25% 
1979 17.3% 7% 8.1% 6% 
 Source: Own elaboration based on Rallings & Thrasher (2007) and 
http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/psr.htm. 
 
As noted in chapter 3, support for greater regional autonomy has traditionally 
been strongly concentrated in the Welsh-speaking heartlands of Dyfed and Gwynedd 
and the industrial mining communities of mid and west-Glamorgan. Under the single 
member plurality electoral system, this spatial concentration of preferences enabled 
Plaid Cymru to mount a considerable challenge to the Labour Party on the basis of a 
relatively modest vote share.  
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To illustrate this effect, Table 4.5 reports the share of the regional vote attracted by the 
nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales as well as share of the constituency level 
contests within which an SNP or Plaid Cymru candidate was the primary local rival of 
the Labour Party candidate.  This shows that the simultaneous rise of nationalist voting 
in Scotland and Wales between 1966 and 1970 produced a much stronger direct 
challenge to Labour’s position in Wales than in Scotland. We now know that this 
change in Plaid Cymru support did not reflect a similarly strong shift in popular opinion 
or issue salience (see chapter 3). Without the benefit of hindsight, it may however 
seem highly plausible that the marked rise in SNP voting in the February 1974 election 
could encourage a similar surge in Plaid Cymru support amongst a spatially 
concentrated minority of Welsh voters with a preference for greater regional autonomy. 
In this context, accommodating the views of these voters despite the lack of support for 
devolution in other parts of Wales could have been seen as a seats-maximising 
strategy within Wales.       
If we accept the explanation presented above, the perceived electoral benefits 
of regionalist accommodation can thus provide a plausible act-based explanation for 
the policy positions of the two main contenders for office in October 1974. Observable 
differences in the electoral incentives faced by both Parties however do not provide a 
plausible explanation for the fact that the Conservative Party was initially quicker to 
respond Scottish demands than its Labour counterpart. Similarly, the high level of 
internal opposition to devolution within both parties begs the question why internal act-
based incentives did not constrain the policy autonomy of the party leadership to a 
greater extent.  
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4.2.2. The influence of party cohesion   
Devolution has historically been a divisive issue within the British party system. 
In 1886 the issue even led to the break-up of one of the main contenders for office at 
the time, the Liberal Party (Douglas, 1971). The decision of the then party leader, 
William Gladstone, to support Irish Home Rule deeply divided his Party and led to the 
departure of most of the Liberal aristocracy and a group of non-aristocratic party 
members led by Joseph Chamberlain. Following this dramatic reorganisation of the 
party system, the issue temporarily seemed to be absorbed within the main lines of 
conflict. By the start of the First World War, the Conservative and Unionist Party 
supported the status quo, while devolution was seen as an integral part of the radical 
policy agenda within both the Liberal and the Labour Party. Towards the end of the 
1920s, the partial resolution of the Irish issue and the shift towards a more firmly class-
based understanding of political conflict reduced the salience of the Home Rule issue 
within the Labour Party (McLean & McMillan, 2005). Simultaneously, the Liberals 
became increasingly marginalised at the central level.  As a result, the issue of regional 
autonomy largely disappeared from the central policy agenda.  
When the territorial dimension remerged following the growing electoral 
success of the SNP and Plaid Cymru in the late 1960s, it once again did not fit 
comfortably within the main axis of conflict around which the post-Second World War 
party system was organised (Field, 1997; Katz & Mair, 1994). In this context, opinions 
on the significance of the regionalist challenge and the appropriate response to such 
developments varied widely within both parties. If we apply a veto player approach to 
the internal process of preference aggregation, we would anticipate that this lack of 
internal cohesion regarding the appropriate response to the regionalist challenge 
enhanced the policy autonomy of the party leadership (see chapter 2).  
 The available evidence indeed suggests that the beliefs and preferences of the 
party leadership played a strong role in developing the party line during the early years. 
This is particularly true in the case of the Conservative commitments to Scottish 
devolution.  
152 | P a g e  
 
Both the Conservative leader, Edward Heath, and his Labour counterpart, Harold 
Wilson, started their political career with a fairly Unionist outlook. When regionalist 
support began to rise in the 1960s, Edward Heath however adjusted his position much 
more rapidly than his counterpart. The resolution passed by the Conservative Scottish 
central council, calling for a review of the machinery of government in Scotland, 
certainly played a role in this change of heart (Kellas, 2005). Tellingly, the subsequent 
report by the committee established for this occasion under Sir William McEwen 
Younger was only discussed within the shadow cabinet. As a result, a large part of the 
Parliamentary Party seemed unaware of its contents and the subsequent Declaration 
of Perth took all but a very select group of MPs by surprise. At the time, this public 
commitment to Scottish devolution without prior consultation was widely seen as a 
move by the party leader to foist devolution on the Parliamentary Party in general and 
its Scottish members in particular. Following the announcement, about a third of 
Conservative MPs reportedly made their objection to the policy known to the 
parliamentary whips (Mitchell, 1990).  
It has been noted that the input of prominent pro-devolution Conservatives, like 
Sir William McEwen Younger and John Berridge, may have influenced Heath’s 
perspective on the issue (Kellas, 2005). The readiness with which he accepted their 
arguments however also suggest that he was personally convinced that the rise of the 
SNP posed a real and credible threat, not only to Conservative Party fortunes, but also 
to the Unity of Britain itself (Mitchell, 1990). Although Heath did not act upon his 
commitments to Scottish devolution during his time in office between 1970 and 1974 
(see chapter 5), his actions with respect to the devolution proposals of the 1974-1979 
Labour Government reveal the depth of this personal conviction.  
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During the Commons discussion on the White Paper on Our Changing Democracy, 
Devolution to Scotland and Wales (Command Paper No. 6348), Edward Heath stated “I 
believe that there is a settled conviction on the part of the Scottish and Welsh peoples. 
It needs a substantial political change within the United Kingdom to do justice to their 
views and to enable the Scots to do justice to themselves.” (Hansard (Commons) 
1975-1976, vol. 903, col.  963). Despite the fact that the Party officially opposed 
Labour’s proposals at the time, he continued to openly defend the creation of an 
elected assembly for Scotland throughout the 1970s and on several occasions defied 
the party whip by voting in favour of the policy (Norton, 1980).  
It seems highly unlikely that the Conservative Party would have proved equally 
responsive to Scottish demands if Reginald Maudling, rather than Edward Heath, had 
won the 1965 Conservative leadership election. This is in no respect a farfetched 
counterfactual. If Enoch Powell had chosen not to stand for leadership and a few of 
Heath’s supporters had stayed at home on the 28th July 1965, Maudling would have 
succeeded Alec Douglas-Home as party leader. Judging by his contribution to the 1976 
debates surrounding the second reading of the Scotland and Wales Bill, he was at best 
personally ambivalent about devolution (Hansard (Commons) 1976-1977, vol. 922 ,col. 
1279-1285). He openly questioned the need to debate the topic at all, arguing that 
devolution was important, but not urgent. As he viewed it, devolution was 
fundamentally a matter of degree and he seemed unconvinced of the need to 
substantially change the status quo.  With respect to Scotland, he argued “I cannot find 
adequate evidence of the real feeling of people in Scotland on this issue^some form 
of referendum is necessary.^ It is hard to find any other basis upon which to come to a 
conclusion on the real wishes of the people of Scotland.” (Hansard (Commons) 1976-
1977, vol. 922 ,col. 1283).  Given this stance, it seems unlikely that Maudling could 
have felt compelled to make the Declaration of Perth, although he may have changed 
his tune after following the surge in SNP support in the February 1974 general election.   
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Labour leader Harold Wilson seemed to share Maudling’s lack of passion for 
the devolution topic. In his autobiography, he referred to the subject as “boring and 
soporific” (Wilson, 1979: 46). Faced with a heavily divided Party and a relatively limited 
immediate threat, he initially devoted relatively little attention to the rising support for 
the SNP and Plaid Cymru. This lack of initiative reportedly frustrated senior 
government figures like Richard Crossman, who viewed it as a missed opportunity to 
nip the nationalist revival in the bud (Tanner, 2006). Wilson also faced considerable 
pressures to adjust the party line on decentralisation from sections of the Welsh Party. 
The Executive Committee of the Labour Party in Wales had formally supported the 
creation of an elected Council for Wales since 1965 (Osmond, 1978). In addition, a 
number of Welsh Cabinet members, junior Ministers and crucially the 1964-1966 and 
1966-1968 Secretaries of State for Wales, Jim Griffiths and Cledwyn Hughes, strongly 
favoured devolution (Morgan & Mungham, 2000a; Morgan, 1980). As late as April 
1967, Wilson nonetheless continued to fervently deny that separate Parliaments for 
Scotland and Wales were on the government agenda (Hansard (Commons) 1966-
1967, vol. 745, col. 151W). 
Partially, this reluctance to respond can be related to the strong anti-devolution 
sentiments within the Scottish Party. Contrary to its Welsh counterpart, the majority of 
the Scottish Executive firmly opposed any form of devolution, which it believed would 
encourage rather than stem nationalist sentiments and SNP support (Jones & Keating, 
1982). In addition, important figures with the Scottish arm of the Parliamentary Party, 
including the Scottish Secretary of State, openly opposed devolution (Tanner, 2006). 
As any accommodation of Welsh demands could be anticipated to create a popular 
reaction in Scotland, this internal difference in opinion clearly complicated matters. 
Wilson’s willingness to respond to by-election successes of the SNP and Plaid Cymru 
by setting up a Royal Commission on the Constitution, without the prior knowledge or 
consent of much of the rest of the Party, however suggest that he was willing to risk 
upsetting important sections of the party.  
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In his unpublished diary, Crossman reportedly noted “Once again it was felt that if the 
inner group under the PM had decided then the Cabinet could only accede” (Crossman 
as quoted in Tanner, 2006: 27)   
Wilson’s early concession was widely regarded as merely paying lip service to 
regionalist demands, as he showed little interest in the work of the Royal Commission 
between 1969 and 1973 (Hill, 2004). Similarly, the Conservative commitment to 
Scottish devolution seemed to falter when the spectacular rise in SNP support 
predicted by Heath failed to materialise in the 1970 general election. When the real 
potency of the nationalist threat did become visible in February 1974 this prompted a 
reaction from both party leaders. Edward Heath used the opportunity to revive the 
commitment to Scottish devolution that he had made in Perth on a mixture of 
ideological and electoral grounds. On his part, Harold Wilson responded by formally 
committing his party to devolution for Scotland and Wales. This rapid change in formal 
Party positions is consistent with the hypothesis that the party leadership was prepared 
and able to respond to electoral incentives, even in the face of substantial opposition 
from within the Party itself.   
4.3. Regionalist accommodation between 1979 and 1997  
As will be argued in chapter 5, the elite-driven nature of the Labour Party’s 
formal commitment to devolution, coupled with the anticipated lack of a strong 
government majority and the general decline in party discipline, created a legislative 
deadlock. The Labour government’s attempt to salvage the legislation by introducing a 
popular veto within the decision-making path in turn exposed both the limited level of 
support for devolution in Wales and the fact that popular opinion had not been firmly 
established in either country. Coupled with the preference constellation within the 
House of Commons, this prevented change from occurring. In the two decades that 
followed, the formal policy positions of the main contenders for office started to diverge 
more markedly.  
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As Figure 4.1 showed, the Labour Party’s formal manifesto commitments to devolution 
remained broadly in line with popular opinion in Scotland and Wales. The Conservative 
Party on the other hand returned to its traditionally Unionist stance, despite growing 
demand for devolution in Scotland and Wales.  
Within the existing literature on devolution, this divergence in the policy 
positions of the main contenders for office at the central level is often linked to the 
electoral geography of the UK. During the 1980s, the Conservative pre-dominance in 
large parts of England ensured that Scottish and Welsh seats were largely immaterial 
to the overall outcome of the elections (see Figure 4.2). In this context, it has been 
widely argued that the Conservative Party could afford to ignore Scottish and Welsh 
preferences (Keating, 1998b, 2001a; Kellas, 1994; Mitchell, 1990; Seawright, 1999). 
The Labour Party on the other hand developed an increasing strong dependency on 
Scottish and Welsh seats as its support base in large parts of England eroded. It is 
argued that this in turn created two types of incentives to support asymmetric 
devolution (Sorens, 2009). Firstly it has been proposed that Labour’s reliance on 
Scottish and Welsh seats meant that it faced strong electoral incentives to 
accommodate Scottish and Welsh preferences (Keating, 1998b, 2001a). Secondly, it 
has been argued that the continued strength of the Labour Party in Scotland and 
Wales, coupled with the enduring Conservative pre-dominance at the central level, 
increasingly gave the Labour Party an outcome-based reason to favour asymmetric 
devolution over the existing centralised system  (Keating, 2001a; Mitchell, 1998).  
While the two rationales outlined above can coincide, they have distinctive 
observable implications. If party policies are primarily motivated by the electoral gains 
associated with the act of offering devolution during general election campaigns, we 
would expect to find that party positions reflect both the electoral importance of a 
region and the distribution of popular preferences within that region.  
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By contrast, the observable implication of the second hypothesis would be that a party 
supports devolution to the regional level when it is both anticipated to perform well at 
the regional level and simultaneously has relatively poor prospects of forming part of 
the government at the centre (O’Neill, 2003). Crucially, this type of outcome-based 
incentive to support devolution may emerge even in the absence of clear popular 
support for decentralisation. Using this difference in observable implications, the next 
section will test to what extent the available evidence fits either of these hypotheses. 
Based on this analysis it will be argued that, although the policy of the Conservative 
Party broadly concurs with the conventional wisdom, Labour’s formal policy position 
suggests that we need to look more closely at the preferences of party leaders and the 
constraining effect of internal preference structures. 
4.3.1. The influence of the regionalisation of the British party system  
During the 1980s, the strength of Conservative support in much of England 
meant that the Party had a relatively low dependence on Scottish seats (see Figure 
4.3). In fact, the 1983-1987 and 1987-1992 Conservative governments enjoyed an 
overall majority at Westminster on the basis of English seats alone. As a consequence, 
the Party did not face strong electoral incentives to accommodate spatially-
concentrated preferences for greater autonomy in Scotland or Wales. Simultaneously, 
the weak position of the Conservative Party in both countries meant that the resulting 
directly elected regional bodies would most likely be dominated by the Labour Party, 
the SNP, and to a lesser extent the Liberals. Taken together, it was thus not in the 
Party’s immediate interest to accommodate Scottish and Welsh demands for greater 
autonomy.  
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Figure 4.3 Share of the Parliamentary Conservative and Labour Parties representing Scottish and 
Welsh constituencies (1945-1997)  
Source: Own elaboration based on Tetteh (2008) 
 
In the early 1990s, the Conservative Party started to lose considerable ground 
in many English regions. As a result, the electoral competition at the central level 
intensified (see Figure 4.2). The Conservative Party did not respond to this challenge 
by adjusting its position on devolution. It can be argued that this reflects the limited 
electoral benefits likely to be associated with regionalist accommodation at that time 
(Keating, 2001a). The Conservative Party was indeed no longer in contention in the 
vast majority of Scottish and Welsh seats by the time of the 1992 election (see Table 
4.5). In addition, the remaining Conservative support base in Scotland and Wales 
espoused relatively Unionist preferences compared to their non-Conservative 
counterparts (see Table 4.7). Especially in the context of years of inaction under 
consecutive Conservative governments, it therefore seems unlikely that the act of 
publicly supporting asymmetric devolution would have created substantial electoral 
gains in Scotland or Wales. 
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However, the Unionist position advocated by the Conservative Party not only 
ignores Scottish and Welsh public opinion but also seems out of touch with the 
emerging consensus amongst English voters. As Table 4.6 shows, English support for 
asymmetric devolution remained limited during the 1980s. By 1992, popular opinion 
had however shifted decidedly in favour of asymmetric devolution for Scotland. 
Although Conservative supporters remained more sceptical than their Labour 
counterparts, the results of the 1992 and 1997 election surveys suggest that the 
majority of those who voted Conservative in the previous election favoured greater 
autonomy for Scotland and Wales. The focus on regional realities and grievances has 
meant that the existing literature on devolution rarely explicitly mentions this fact. It is 
however crucial to our understanding of regionalist accommodation as it suggests that 
the Unionist stance taken by the Conservative Party was facilitated not only by the 
regionalisation of the British party system but also by the apparent lack of salience 
attached to the rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalism in England.  
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Table 4.6 English voters in favour of devolution or independence for Scotland and Wales (1987, 
1992, 1997) 
 All Conservative Labour 
1987 Scotland 22-25% 16-20% 27-34% 
1992 Scotland 67-71% 60-66% 69-76% 
1997 Scotland 73-76% 59-66% 78-83% 
1997 Wales 71-74% 57-65% 75-81% 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Heath, et al. (1999), Heath, Jowell, & Curtice 
(1993), Heath, Jowell, Curtice, et al. (1993). 95% confidence interval. 
 
Despite this qualification of the conventional wisdom, it can still be argued that 
the Unionist stance of the Conservative Party during the 1980s and 90s was primarily 
caused by the fact that the Party did not face prominent act or outcome-based 
incentives to accommodate regionalist demands. Explaining Labour’s position during 
this period in terms of the associated electoral gains at the central level or the relative 
benefits associated with regional office holding is however more difficult.  
During the 1980s, the erosion of Labour support in many English regions, 
coupled with the continued strong performance in Scotland and Wales, increased 
Labour’s dependency on Scottish and Welsh seats (see Figure 4.3). In both countries, 
the general election results suggest that the devolved institutions proposed in the 
1970s would have been Labour-dominated under plurality rule. If the anticipated 
benefits associated with regional office holding were guiding the position of the Labour 
Party at the time, we would expect to find symmetrical policies for Scotland and Wales. 
The Labour Party manifesto’s produced during the late 1970s and 80s however only 
formally supported devolution for Scotland (Labour Party, 1979, 1983, 1987). As Figure 
4.1 and Table 4.4 show, this difference in the approach to Scotland and Wales partially 
reflects a difference in popular opinion. Survey evidence from the late 1970s and early 
1980 however suggests that a strong popular consensus in favour of devolution did not 
exist in either of the two countries at that time.  
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Similarly SNP support plummeted during the 1979 and 1983 general elections. In this 
context, the direct electoral gains associated with accommodating regionalist demands 
for greater autonomy seem rather limited.  
Table 4.7 Share of the population that supports devolution or independence by party voted for in 
the previous election (1979-1997) 
 Scotland Wales 
 All  Labour Conservative All  Labour Conservative 
1979 44-52% 44-56% 24-38% 22-28% 22-30% 6-15% 
1983 40-50% 42-58% 12-29% 13-24% 10-25% 4-21% 
1987* 43-53% 49-68% 16-34% 23-37% 23-41% 6-29% 
1992 72-78% 81-89% 40-53% 46-62% 50-77% 31-83% 
1997 70-76% 79-87% 42-58% 59-73% 62-82% 25-56% 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Balsom & Madgwick (1979), Brand & Mitchell (1994), 
Heath, et al. (1983, 1999), Heath, Jowell, & Curtice (1993), Heath, Jowell, Curtice, et al. (1993),  
McCrone, et al. (1999) and Miller & Brand (1981). * In 1987 the vote in the 1987 election was 
used as respondents were not asked which party they had voted in previous election.    
 
Labour’s decision to include a formal commitment to Welsh devolution in its 1992 
election manifesto (Labour Party, 1992) does coincide with a shift in popular opinion in 
Wales (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.4). In this respect, it is consistent with the 
hypothesis that electoral gains at the central level provide the primary rationale for the 
accommodation of regionalist demands. By contrast, the inclusion of these 
commitments at a time when the Labour Party stood a real chance of gaining office at 
the central level for the first time in a over a decade seem to run counter to the second 
hypothesis. The improvement of the Party’s prospects of gaining office at the central 
level should theoretically reduce the benefits associated with regional office holding. As 
a result, we would expect that political parties face fewer incentives to accommodate 
regionalist demands once they have a real prospect of holding office at the central level 
(Hopkin, 2009).    
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By contrast, the continued commitments to Scottish and Welsh devolution in the 
1997 general election manifesto do not comfortably fit either of the two hypotheses. In 
the run-up to the 1997 general election, opinion polls rightfully predicted a Labour 
landslide (Crewe, 1997). Especially since the resulting seat losses in Scotland and 
Wales would have been unlikely to benefit the Conservative Party, accommodating 
Scottish and Welsh demands for greater autonomy was not pivotal to gaining office at 
the central level at this time. Simultaneously, the relative benefits derived from office 
holding at the regional level presumably declined even further as the Party’s chances 
of gaining office at the central level continued to improve. In this context, attributing the 
Labour Party’s strong and detailed manifesto commitments to either of these two 
hypotheses would appear to be an oversimplification. Instead I would argue that the 
emergence of more cohesive party positions during the 1980s shaped the pattern of 
regionalist accommodation during the 1990s by reducing the policy autonomy of the 
party leadership. 
4.3.2. The importance of elite preferences and internal act-based incentives  
As noted, the re-emerged of the home rule issue in the 1960s and 70s initially 
created considerable internal conflict within both the Conservative and the Labour 
Party. The failure of the 1979 devolution referendums, coupled with the strong 
performance in England, allowed the Conservative Party to formally return to its 
Unionist roots. While a small minority of pro-devolution MPs remained, the majority of 
the Party was happy to disregard the growing popular demand for greater autonomy in 
Scotland and Wales. After the 1987 general election reduced the number of Welsh and 
Scottish Conservative MPs from 35 to 18, the emergence of a distinct regional 
dimension to British politics could no longer be ignored. Internal pressures to 
accommodate demands for greater regional autonomy however remained very limited. 
With the notable exception of Alick Buchanan-Smith, the vast majority of the 
Conservative MPs who had supported the policy in the 1970s had either lost their seats 
in the recent shakeout in Scotland or returned to a Unionist stance (Mitchell, 1990; 
Torrance, 2006).   
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Within the Labour Party, the opposite shift in opinion occurred. As a result of the 
changing electoral geography of Britain, the share of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
representing a Scottish or Welsh constituency increased from around 20 percent in the 
mid-1970s, to over 30 per cent by the late 1980s.  Labour’s continued strong position in 
Scotland and Wales, coupled with its inability to gain office at Westminster, meant that 
the devolved system proposed in the 1970s would have had clear benefits for a 
substantial and growing share of the Parliamentary Labour Party(Mitchell, 1998; 
Morgan & Mungham, 2000b). Instead of spending years in opposition at Westminster, 
MPs representing Scottish and Welsh constituencies could have governed at the 
country-level.  This would have enhanced the personal career prospects of those MPs, 
as well as enabled the Party to partially insulate Scotland and Wales from the effects of 
Thatcherism.  
From 1992 onwards, a number of surveys allow us to examine the preferences 
structures within the Parliamentary Labour and Conservative Party in more detail. The 
1992 British Candidate Survey (Norris, 1992) shows that the majority of the 
Parliamentary Conservative Party favoured the constitutional status quo over 
devolution or independence for both Scotland and Wales, while the majority of Labour 
MPs favoured devolution to both countries over independence or the status quo (see 
Table 4.8). The 1997 British Representation Survey (Norris, 1997) unfortunately only 
asked MPs about their preference with regards to Scottish devolution. The available 
evidence suggests that party cohesion increased even further over the course of the 
1990s. Support for devolution or independence amongst Conservative all but 
disappeared, with over 90 percent of all MPs supporting the maintenance of the 
constitutional status quo. Simultaneously, devolution remained the preferred option of 
over 89 percent of Labour MPs.  
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Table 4.8 Devolution preferences within the Parliamentary Conservative and Labour Parties (1992- 
1997)
9
 
 Status quo Devolution Independence 
1992 (Scotland)    
Conservative 69-80% 16-27% 1-6% 
Labour 2-9% 85-95% 1-8% 
1992 (Wales)    
Conservative 79-89% 10-20% 0-2% 
Labour 8-20% 76-89% 0-7% 
1997 (Scotland)    
Conservative 92-100% 0-3% 0-6% 
Labour 0-5% 89-98% 0-7% 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Norris (1992, 1997). Table reports results with  
95% confidence interval. 
 
Applying a veto player perspective to the internal processes of preference 
formation would suggest that the emergence of more cohesive party positions 
increasingly limited the ability of the party leadership to adjust the formal position of the 
party. The observable implication of this hypothesis would be that the outcome and act-
based preferences of the party leadership had a more limited impact on the formal 
position of the party during the late 1980s and 90s. The persistently Unionist stance of 
the Conservative Party does not offer us an opportunity to test this hypothesis. As both 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major personally shared the Unionist perspective held by 
the majority within the Party (Jones, 1999a; Mitchell & Bennie, 1996), they had little 
reason to challenge the internal consensus on this issue. The Labour Party’s enduring 
willingness to accommodate regionalist demands in Scotland and Wales, despite the 
personal reservations of some party leaders, however creates a better opportunity to 
examine the explanatory power of this approach. 
                                               
9 The parliamentary party is defined as the members of the Conservative and Labour Party who 
were MPs during the government period immediately prior to the general election. Where 
percentages do not add up to a hundred this is due to rounding.  
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Compared to its Conservative counterpart, the Labour Party went through a 
relatively high number of leadership changes between 1979 and 1997.  The failure of 
the Party to regain office at the central level during the 1980s and early 1990s and the 
general disillusionment this created after each disappointing general election resulted 
in the resignation of three consecutive party leaders. In 1994, the sudden death of John 
Smith necessitated another leadership election. As party leaders traditionally enjoy a 
considerable amount of policy autonomy, the frequent change of leadership has the 
potential to lead to a more changeable policy agenda. However, with respect to 
devolution the Party line has been remarkably consistent from the mid-1970 onwards, 
especially in the case of Scotland. 
The continued commitment to Scottish devolution in the 1979 Labour election 
manifesto, despite the difficult legislative process and ultimate repeal of the 1978 
Scotland Act, can be related to the fact that a majority of the Scottish voters did vote in 
favour of the policy during the 1979 referendum. Having personally championed the 
proposal, the need to maintain credibility practically forced the incumbent Prime 
Minister, James Callaghan, to include a commitment to Scottish Devolution in the 1979 
Labour Manifesto (Labour Party, 1979). The 1979 general election defeat was followed 
by Callaghan’s resignation in 1980. His close rival in the 1976 leadership election, 
Michael Foot, succeeded him by beating Denis Healey in the second ballot.  
Unlike Wilson and Callaghan, Michael Foot was a passionate advocate of 
devolution. He was personally convinced that the policy represented both a just 
recognition of Scottish and Welsh nationhood and an enrichment of the democratic 
scene (Jones, 1994). After acquiring the deputy leadership in 1976, Foot had worked 
tirelessly and against significant internal opposition to try to ensure that the 
Government’s devolution proposals were enacted. Even after the 1979 referendums 
failed to return the required level of support for the policy, Foot attempted to save what 
could be saved. He reportedly put significant pressure on James Callaghan to 
circumvent the 40 per cent rule in the Scotland Act, by laying the order of repeal but 
urging the House to vote against it (Jones, 1994).  
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Labour’s formal commitment to Scottish devolution during the early 1980s, 
despite significant pockets of resistance to the policy within the Party and a divided 
public opinion in Scotland, is thus compatible with the hypothesis that the personal 
views of the party leader remained highly influential at that time. His main leadership 
rival, Denis Healey, would certainly have been less inclined to take a similar approach. 
Part of a group of anti-devolution Cabinet ministers that included Willie Ross and Tony 
Crosland, he played a key role in keeping devolution off the House of Commons 
agenda between 1974 and 1976 (Rosen, 1999). Given his personal scepticism, it 
seems more than likely that he would have chosen to keep a divisive issue like 
devolution off the party agenda.  
Following the disappointing results in the 1983 general election, Michael Foot 
resigned. Neil Kinnock confidently defeated his closest rival, Roy Hattersley, in the 
subsequent leadership contest held under the newly introduced Electoral College 
System. Despite growing discontent amongst Scottish and Welsh MPs, the devolution 
issue did not feature prominently during this internal contest (Mitchell, 1998). This may 
be related to the fact that both Hattersley and Kinnock were personally sceptical about 
the policy. Especially in the context of growing internal support for asymmetric 
devolution, neither may have felt the need to emphasise this dimension of conflict 
within the internal election process.   
Through his actions in the 1970s, Kinnock had shown that his personal 
opposition to devolution ran particularly deep. A prominent member of the ‘Gang of Six’ 
anti-devolution Welsh MPs, he had led the Welsh ‘Labour Vote No’ campaign in the run 
up to the 1979 referendum (Balsom & McAllister, 1979). Investing this much time and 
effort in defying a policy proposed by one’s own government shows a real dedication to 
a cause. In this context, Kinnock’s willingness to maintain the Party’s position on 
Scottish devolution and include a commitment to a Welsh Assembly in the 1992 
general election manifesto can be seen as surprising. As noted the Party faced 
considerable electoral incentives to accommodate Scottish and Welsh preferences 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
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This had however also been the case in the 1970s and at that time Kinnock had been 
utterly unconvinced that offering devolution was the appropriate response to such 
pressures. It is possible that Kinnock’s personal perspective on the benefits of office 
holding at the regional level slowly changed during a decade of opposition at the 
central level. The coincidence of the shift in policy towards Wales with the emergence 
of a clearer pro-devolution consensus within the Party is however also highly consistent 
with the hypothesis that the emergence of a more cohesive perspective within the party 
limited the policy autonomy of the party leader.  
When the 1992 general election failed to deliver the expected return to 
government, the Labour Party went through yet another leadership election. With only 
two candidates standing, the favourite, John Smith, won the election with over 90 per 
cent of the vote. Just as Neil Kinnock’s personal view on devolution was well known at 
the time of his election as party leader, so too was John Smith’s position.  Initially he 
had been sceptical, arguing that devolution ran counter to the primary aims of 
socialism. However, he slowly became convinced of its workability and was known as a 
keen advocate of devolution by the end of the 1970s (Stuart, 2005). Like his 
Conservative counterpart, he therefore had no incentive to challenge the majority 
opinion within the Party.  
On the 12th of May 1994, John Smith unexpectedly died as a result of a heart 
attack. Until the leadership election on the 21st of July 1994, the deputy party leader, 
Margaret Beckett, acted as party leader. Before his untimely death, Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown were widely seen as the two most likely candidates to succeed Smith as 
party leader. In the succession battle that followed, Tony Blair soon emerged as the 
favourite. By the end of May, Gordon Brown had formally announced that he would not 
stand. Thereafter it was almost certain that Tony Blair would be the next Labour party 
leader. In fact, when Bill Clinton visited the UK in the context of the 50th anniversary of 
the D-Day landings, the White House reportedly requested a meeting with Tony Blair 
rather than the acting party leader Margaret Beckett (Stuart, 2005). 
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In his recent autobiography, Blair admits that he “was never a passionate 
devolutionist” and felt that it was “a dangerous game to play” (Blair, 2010: 251). He 
nonetheless appeared eager to dispel any doubts about his stance on devolution 
during the leadership election campaign. Throughout he stressed his Scottish heritage 
and emphasised that he would carry on with “Smith’s torch of devolution” (Black, 4 
June 1994). In line with this position, he repeatedly pledged to introduce devolution 
legislation within the first year of a Labour government (Robertson, 5 June 1994, 10 
July 1994). Especially given the near certainty of the outcome of the leadership 
election, this can be seen as a strong indication that the cohesive pro-devolution 
stance within the Labour Party created strong incentives for prospective party leaders 
to adopt the majority position on this issue.   
Once he was elected party leader, it quickly became clear that Blair did not 
personally support the devolution policy in its existing form. He strongly felt that 
Scottish and Welsh devolution should be made dependent upon the outcome of pre-
legislative regional referendums. In addition, he was not convinced of the need for tax-
varying powers and primary legislative powers to be devolved to Scotland (Campbell, 
2010). Blair floated his personal views on the devolution policy during the Road to the 
Manifesto process. While the Shadow Secretary of State for Wales, Ron Davies, 
broadly supported the idea of a referendum, his Scottish counterpart, George 
Robertson, was at first fervently opposed to the suggestion (Blair, 2010). Similarly, the 
Scottish Labour executive initially perceived the move as a betrayal of trust (Campbell, 
2010). In the end, Tony Blair managed to convince Robertson and the majority of the 
Scottish executive of the need for a referendum by arguing that clear popular consent 
would be needed in order to successfully guide the legislation through the House of 
Lords (Campbell, 2010).  
Having been advised that removing the tax-varying and legislative powers 
foreseen for the Scottish Parliament altogether would result in a major internal 
backlash (Campbell, 2010), Blair made more moderate adjustments to the party line in 
this respect.  
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Under the new proposals, primary legislative powers would be devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament. Blair however emphasised that power devolved would be power retained 
and Westminster continued to be the ultimate constitutional authority. With respect to 
tax-varying powers, the 1997 election manifesto stipulated that a separate question on 
fiscal devolution would be introduced in Scottish pre-legislative devolution referendum. 
If a majority voted in favour, limited fiscal powers would be devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament.   
Taken together, the available evidence shows that Tony Blair’s personally views 
on devolution had a significant impact upon the position of the Labour Party. As 
Alastair Campbell states “It had been an interesting exercise in leadership. [Tony Blair] 
had been pretty determined, and without that it is unlikely we would have reached the 
position we did.” (Campbell, 2010: 480). The position that was reached in turn fits very 
well with the hypothesis that conflicting act- and outcome-based incentives can 
encourage a creative party leader to develop a mixed policy strategy. The formal 
manifesto commitment to devolution and the stipulation of a clear timeline for change 
proved sufficient to prevent a significant internal backlash. Simultaneously the 
referendum requirement in general and the separate question on the need for fiscal 
devolution in particular created new obstacles for actual policy change. Given the 
likelihood of a convincing Labour victory in the general elections and the levels of 
support for devolution within the Parliamentary Labour Party, Blair’s insistence on the 
need to define the decision-making path within election manifesto can be seen as a 
calculated attempt to curb the veto powers of his own backbench (see chapter 5 for 
further discussion). Particularly in Wales, the available survey evidence simultaneously 
suggested that popular support for devolution fell well below the levels recorded within 
the Parliamentary Labour Party. As a result, the policy clearly reduced the likelihood of 
policy change.  
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Given Gordon Brown’s reported reluctance to accept the need for referendums, 
it seems unlikely that the Labour Party would have entered the 1997 general elections 
with similar manifesto commitments if Brown had succeeded John Smith as party 
leader. This suggests that the personal views of the party leader were still influential.  
Nonetheless, it is notable that the changes to the Party’s stance on devolution are not 
as extensive as Tony Blair would have liked. Given the high level of popular support for 
greater autonomy in Scotland in particular, abandoning the devolution cause altogether 
would have undoubtedly created a popular backlash in this country. The continued 
commitment to Welsh devolution, coupled with the reluctance to significantly reduce 
the fiscal and legislative powers on offer for Scotland, however suggest that Blair’s 
policy options were equally, if not more strongly, constrained by internal party 
preferences. The empirical evidence therefore fits the hypothesis that the emergence 
of more cohesive party positions on devolution significantly limited the autonomy of the 
party leader along this dimension. This may in turn explain why Labour’s formal party 
position remained relatively stable, despite leadership changes and important shifts in 
the external act- and outcome-based incentives faced by the party.     
4.4. Conclusion 
The previous chapter showed that salient popular demands for regional 
autonomy have periodically re-emerged within Scotland and Wales. This chapter 
examined under which circumstances the main contenders for office at the central level 
were inclined to accommodate such spatially-concentrated demands for greater 
autonomy. Unlike much of the devolution literature, this chapter looked at regionalist 
accommodation by the main contenders for office from a British perspective. 
Approaching the issue from this perspective emphasises that both Labour and the 
Conservatives went against the wishes of the majority of the British electorate by 
offering asymmetric devolution in the mid-1970s. Over the course of the 1980s and 
90s, English voters became increasingly convinced of the need to partially 
accommodate Scottish and Welsh demands for greater autonomy.  
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By 1992, survey evidence in Scotland, Wales and England suggests that the average 
British voter favoured asymmetric devolution to Scotland and Wales over the status 
quo. While Labour’s pro-devolution stance matched British popular opinion in the 
1990s, the Conservative Party refused to accommodate demands for greater autonomy 
despite majority support for the policy.  
Partially, this pattern of regionalist accommodation by central level parties 
emerged as a result of differences in issue salience. Elections bundle together several 
issues into one single vote. Under these conditions, it has been shown that rational 
voters economise on information and vote on the basis of the two or three issues that 
they personally consider the most salient (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). This chapter has 
argued that voters in Scotland and Wales generally attach much greater importance to 
the issue of devolution than their English counterparts. As Besley and Coate (2000) 
have shown with reference to the issue of gun control in the United States, this 
difference in issue salience creates electoral incentives for parties competing at the 
central level to accommodate the views of the minority for whom the issue is highly 
salient.  
The empirical evidence largely fits the heterogeneous issue salience hypothesis 
in the mid-1970s. As a result of unusually tight electoral competition at the central level, 
Scottish and Welsh seats had the potential to be pivotal to the overall outcome of the 
general election at that time. In addition, the rise in the support for nationalist parties 
suggested that the issue of regional autonomy was gaining in salience within both 
countries. The electoral geography of Britain at that time meant that the Conservative 
Party faced strong incentives to accommodate Scottish preferences, while the electoral 
gains associated with a similar move in Wales were much more limited. By contrast the 
Labour Party faced clear incentives to defend its strong position in both countries. This 
difference in the electoral incentive structure was reflected in the formal party positions 
in October 1974. 
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Electoral incentives under heterogeneous issue salience also present a viable 
explanation for the Conservative Party’s reluctance to respond to shifts in English 
popular opinion during the late 1980s and early 1990s. While English support for 
asymmetric devolution remained limited during the 1980s, survey evidence shows that 
the majority of English voters in fact favoured the policy by the time of the 1992 general 
election. While Conservative supporters remained more sceptical than their Labour 
counterparts, the majority of those who voted Conservative in the previous election 
also favoured greater autonomy for Scotland and Wales. The focus on regional realities 
and grievances has meant that the existing literature on devolution rarely explicitly 
mentions this fact. It is however crucial to our understanding of regionalist 
accommodation as it suggests that the Unionist stance taken by the Conservative Party 
was facilitated, not only by the regionalisation of the British party system, but also by 
the apparent lack of salience attached to the rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalism in 
England.  
Within the existing literature, Labour’s inclination to be more responsive to 
regionalist demands is also frequently related to the direct electoral benefits associated 
with accommodating such regionally-concentrated preferences (Keating, 1998b, 
2001a). In addition, it is argued that the continued strength of the Labour Party in 
Scotland and Wales, coupled with the enduring Conservative pre-dominance at the 
central level, increasingly gave the Labour Party a outcome-based reason to favour 
asymmetric devolution over the existing centralised system (Keating, 2001a; Mitchell, 
1998). While this chapter acknowledges that these incentives played a role in shaping 
Labour’s position on devolution, it was argued that these external act- and outcome-
based incentives primarily influenced the formal party positions of the main contenders 
for office through the internal preference formation process. Specifically, it was shown 
that the initial lack of internal cohesion on the devolution issue awarded substantial 
policy autonomy to the party leadership.  
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As the incentives outlined above convinced a growing number of Labour Party 
members that asymmetric devolution would be beneficial, the internal cohesion along 
this dimension increased. As a veto player approach would predict, there are clear 
signs that this emerging pro-devolution consensus limited the policy autonomy of party 
leaders who were personally sceptical about the need for devolution. This suggests 
that the internal preference formation process played a key role in ensuring the 
enduring commitment to devolution, as both the direct electoral gains at the central 
level and the relative benefits of regional office holding declined.    
    The next chapter draws on this analysis of the origins of the formal policy 
preferences of the main contenders for office in order to re-examine the main periods 
of decision-making making during the post-war, pre-devolution period.      
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5. Veto player preferences and patterns of stability and change 
(1945-1997) 
 
 The previous chapter examined how various act- and outcome-based 
incentives to support or oppose devolution shaped the preferences and policy positions 
of the main contenders for office at the central level. This chapter will investigate under 
which circumstances the resulting formal commitments to devolution are likely to lead 
to actual policy change. In line with much of the existing literature on Scottish and 
Welsh devolution, I will primarily seek to uncover the origins of the decision to maintain 
the status quo in the late 1970s and the mechanics behind the eventual devolution of 
powers and resources in the late 1990s. Re-examining these well-known events 
through a carefully crafted veto player approach however allows us to challenge 
important elements of the conventional wisdom regarding the origins of the divergent 
outcomes of these two decision-making moments. As Ganghof (2003) rightfully argues, 
the challenge of qualitative veto player research lies not so much in showing that a veto 
player explanation can be developed. If we are flexible enough in our attribution of 
preferences to partisan players this is almost always the case. In fact many of the 
existing explanations of devolution decisions and non-decisions could easily be 
couched in veto player language. What I seek to do in this chapter is show that 
alternative explanations can be developed and some of these explanations actually fit 
the available evidence more comfortable that the dominant perspective.  
In particular, I qualify and challenge the common proposition that the 
divisiveness of the devolution issue within the Parliamentary Labour Party, coupled 
with the Party’s narrow and fast disappearing parliamentary majority, presented the 
main obstacle to change in the late 1970s. As argued in chapter 4, the tight competition 
at the central level significantly heightened the electoral incentives to accommodate the 
demands of the regionalist minority in Scotland and Wales. The relatively recent re-
emergence of the ‘home rule’ issue and the related lack of cohesive party positions in 
turn enabled party leaders to more strongly respond to these incentives than would 
otherwise have been possible.  
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From this perspective, the factors that are often identified as the main obstacles to 
change are also the very features that allowed regionalist demands to penetrate the 
Parliamentary agenda at all. In addition, I will argue that the general decline in party 
discipline that marked the 1970s was as instrumental in producing the string of 
government defeats over the devolution legislation as the lack of internal cohesion on 
the substantive issue. Finally, I will show that analysing the rules governing the use of 
the referendum instrument and explicitly identifying the various veto points in the range 
of decision-making paths available to the government radically changes our 
understanding of the role played by the so-called Cunningham amendment in the 
repeal of the 1978 Scotland Act. 
Similarly, I argue that it would be overly simplistic to present the eventual 
change in the government system in the late 1990s as the expression of the settled will 
of the Scottish and Welsh people. Chapter 4 showed that the Labour Party’s 1997 
manifesto commitment to devolution was primarily shaped by the distribution of internal 
party preferences rather than electoral considerations or the level of popular support for 
the policy in Scotland and Wales. It is in this context that a party leader with a personal 
outcome-based preference for the status quo reluctantly agreed to propose reforms of 
constitutional importance for both Scotland and Wales.  
In line with the model presented in chapter 2, the existence of conflicting act- 
and outcome-based incentives encouraged Tony Blair to devise a mixed policy 
strategy, which simultaneously sought to reap the benefits of formally supporting 
devolution and minimise the magnitude of the actual change to the status quo. By 
making devolution dependent on the outcome of pre-legislative referendums, he 
effectively transferred the veto powers from the Parliamentary Labour Party to the 
Scottish and Welsh electorates. In chapter 4 I argued that this strategy was at least 
partially inspired by the belief that the population might well look less favourably upon 
the devolution proposals than the Parliamentary Labour Party.  
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While the results of the 1997 referendums show that Tony Blair underestimated the 
popular appetite for fiscal devolution in Scotland, the narrow majority in favour of 
devolution in Wales suggest that he was not completely mistaken in this estimation.     
5.1. The distribution of agenda-setting and decision-making powers  
Before we turn to the specific decision-making moments under investigation 
here, I will briefly examine the formal distribution of agenda-setting and decision-
making powers within the British government system prior to devolution. The famously 
unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom awards formal veto powers to the House 
of Commons, the House of Lords and the Crown (McLean, 2001). When discussing 
devolution decisions and non-decisions, most observers however focus primarily on the 
proceedings in the House of Commons. While the Crown can indeed be confidently 
dismissed as an effective veto player in the contemporary era10, the powers retained by 
the House of Lords need to be discussed in a little more detail.   
At the start of the twentieth century, the second chamber still enjoyed an 
absolute veto over all bills. In fact, it was the Lords’ veto that defeated William 
Gladstone’s 1893 Irish Government Bill, known as the Second Home Rule Bill (O'Day, 
1998: 167). The 1911 Parliament Act however replaced the absolute veto power of the 
Lords with a suspensory veto (McLean, 2001). Under this provision, the House of Lords 
could only delay bills from turning into law for a maximum of two Parliamentary 
sessions. After this, the approval of the House of Lords would no longer be needed 
(Dymond & Deadman, 2006).  
                                               
10 Although the Crown formally has the right to veto any bill passed by the 
House of Commons, it has not exercised this right since the Union between Scotland 
and England in 1707 (Bogdanor, 1997: 126). The royal prerogative to dissolve 
Parliament was last used in 1834, when King William IV dismissed Lord Melbourne’s 
Whig administration (Loveland, 1996: 347).  Interestingly, the closest a Monarch came 
to using any of these powers since then was in relation to the 1914 Government of 
Ireland Bill, which proposed a form of Home Rule for the whole of Ireland. At the time, 
the Ulster Unionists indicated that they would resist devolution by force if necessary. As 
such, the proposed legislation had the potential to lead to civil war. In this context, King 
George V urged both sides to exercise restraint and tried to use the threat of reviving 
the royal prerogatives to broker a compromise. It has been suggested that this royal 
involvement may have played a role in enticing Prime Minister Asquith to propose a 
temporary opt-out for Ulster (Bogdanor, 1997: 128).  
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The 1945-1951 Labour government in turn used the provisions of the 1911 
Parliamentary Act to reduce the suspensory veto of the second chamber to just one 
Parliamentary session.  
As the period investigated here falls entirely in the period after the 1949 
Parliamentary Act, the House of Lords can be treated as an institutional player with 
suspensory veto power of up to a year. In effect this means that any government period 
can be split into two games; a post-election and a pre-election game (McLean, 2001: 
25). When a government is newly elected, the second chamber does not have the 
power to veto legislation. It can however significantly delay the legislative process and 
force the House of Commons to discuss and vote on particular elements of a proposed 
policy again (Loveland, 1996). When the government does not hold a strong majority or 
is internally divided over an issue, such interventions may still result in significant 
changes to the legislation. In the final session before a general election is due, the 
rules of the game change. During this period, a rejection in the House of Lord can 
potentially prevent change from occurring, as the election may lead to a change of 
government and this government may not choose to seek to overturn the Lords 
decision in the House of Commons.   
Of the two decision-making periods under consideration here, only the 1979 
devolution legislation was still under debate in the final year before the next general 
election. As Labour did not return to power in the subsequent election, the House of 
Lords formally had veto power during this period. Informally, these powers were 
however curtailed by the Salisbury Doctrine. This convention was adopted as part of an 
agreement reached during the 1945-1951 Labour Government. In recognition of the 
democratic legitimacy of the Commons, it states that members of the House of Lords 
should refrain from obstructing any legislation that was part of the party program of the 
governing party in the general elections (Loveland, 1996).   
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Although emergency bills have been introduced in relation to specific developments in 
Northern Ireland, bills concerning the decentralisation of power to British regions have 
consistently been based on specific manifesto commitments. As a result the absolute 
veto of the Lords has for all practical purposes been removed with regards to this 
issue.  
The developments in the 1970s clearly illustrate the constraining influence of 
the Salisbury Doctrine. The number of government defeats and amendments proposed 
by the House of Lords indicates that the policy did not enjoy majority support within the 
upper chamber. However, the government’s devolution proposals for Scotland and 
Wales were clearly based on explicit manifesto commitments (Labour Party, 1974 
October). As a result, most members of the House did not attempt to use the 
suspensory veto power to obstruct this legislation. The exception to this rule was Lord 
Wilson of Langside’s attempt to sideline the 1978 Scotland Bill by moving an 
amendment which would decline the bill a second reading. In response the other 
Lordships duly reminded him of his duty under the Salisbury doctrine. Despite his well-
known personal opposition to devolution, Lord Ferrers, the deputy leader of the 
opposition, stated that “It was in the Labour Party’s Manifesto and therefore, by 
convention, the Government are deemed to have a mandate for it. It is therefore not 
our duty to prevent its consideration.” (Hansard (Lords), 14th March 1978, vol. 389, 
cols. 1202). The next day, Lord Wilson withdrew the amendment.    
As the previous discussion shows, the House of Commons was the only 
institution that could effectively use its formal right to veto during the decision-making 
periods under consideration here. As noted in chapter 4, the electoral system and 
nature of the British party system mean that a single party usually controls a 
comfortable majority of the seats with the House. In addition party discipline is usually 
relatively high. As a result, the agenda-setting and decision-making powers are usually 
strongly concentrated in the hands of the Cabinet in general and the Prime Minister in 
particular.  
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On the rare occasions when the government does not control the majority of the seats 
or party unity is unusually low, several opposition parties tend to gain potential veto 
powers at the same time (McLean, et al., 2005). Under these circumstances, the 
government can thus choose which, if any, of these groups it wants to accommodate. 
As a result, the governing elite can be said to retain its agenda-setting powers, even 
under minority government conditions. 
 If it wishes to do so, the government can in turn use its agenda-setting powers 
to keep a particular subject off the parliamentary agenda altogether. Alternatively it can 
delay decision-making by asking an external commission to examine different policy 
options and make a recommendation. This form of pre-legislative consultation can be 
used to develop legislation in policy areas that are particularly contentious or 
technically demanding (Chapman & Royal Institute of Public Administration., 1973). 
The degree to which such commissions are truly independent from the government has 
been questioned (Dunleavy & Margetts, 2001). Nonetheless, any legislation directly 
resulting from commission recommendations may still enjoy greater legitimacy than a 
direct government proposal. From a more cynical perspective, governing elites can 
also use the instrument to postpone and possibly even prevent unwanted policy 
change. In other words, establishing a commission can be a symbolic gesture that aims 
to avoid rather than inform real policy change (Rein & White, 1977).   
When the government does decide to introduce legislation in parliament, it has 
a choice of three decision-making paths (Blau, 2008). Within the British system, there 
are no formal rules that distinguish changes of constitutional importance from other 
types of legislation. Devolution can therefore be enacted through the normal legislative 
process, despite the fact that it would profoundly change the system of government 
itself. Alternatively, the government may choose to award an informal veto to the 
general public through the use of a pre- or post-legislative referendum. Figure 5.1 
schematically summarises these options and the veto points within in each path. I will 
firstly discuss the normal legislative process before turning to the effects of adding an 
informal popular veto to the decision-making path. 
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Figure 5.1 Veto points in three alternative decision-making paths 
 
 Under the normal legislative process, the government will make an initial 
proposal in the form of a bill.  Once a bill has been formally introduced, known as the 
first reading, it will be subjected to a second reading. At this stage, the general 
principles of the government’s proposal are discussed on the floor of the House of 
Commons, after which the House votes on the second reading of the bill. The official 
Opposition frequently votes against the second reading of a government bill. In most 
cases, their voting power is however too limited to deny the bill a second reading. 
Failure at this stage is however possible when the government does not enjoy a strong 
majority and/or party unity is compromised. Once a bill is given a second reading, it is 
examined in a more detail during the committee stage.  
As a convention, bills of constitutional importance are considered in committee 
of the whole House (Burton & Drewry, 1979: 175). During this stage, any member of 
the House of Commons can propose amendments. If an amendment gains the support 
of the majority of the MPs present at the time of the division, the content of the bill will 
be adjusted accordingly. The government may use this opportunity to move relatively 
minor or technical amendments to its own initial proposal. More substantial 
government-initiated amendments only tend to occur in response to unexpected 
opposition to the initial proposals.  
Pre-legislative?
No
No
Yes
Yes
1. Commons veto on legislation
1. Commons veto on legislation
2. Informal popular veto on legislation 
3. Commons veto on enactment
1. Commons veto on referendum
2. Informal popular veto on principle
3. Commons veto on legislation
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In the context of uncertainty and imperfect information, the government may at times 
misjudge the mood in the House of Commons. As a result, the initial proposal may be 
inadvertently positioned outside of the winset of the status quo, in the sense that the 
proposed policy change is not preferred to the existing system by all of the relevant 
veto players. Under such circumstances, the government may attempt to salvage the 
legislation by making concessions.  
Aside from the governing elites, individual members of parliament can also 
move amendments to the government’s proposals. As a result, both members of the 
opposition and the government’s own backbench gain secondary agenda-setting power 
at this stage. If it wishes to do so, the governing elite can attempt to curtail the powers 
of ordinary MPs during the committee stage by using an allocation of time or ‘guillotine’ 
motion. Provided that such a motion is agreed upon by a majority in the House, this 
sets a limit to the time allocated for debate. Once this limit is reached, the Speaker will 
ask the House to vote on a bill, even if some of its clauses have not been discussed yet 
(House of Commons Information Office, 2004). This not only speeds up the legislative 
process, but also limits the ability of ordinary MPs to challenge and potentially change 
the Cabinet’s initial proposal.  
If it sees this as desirable, the government can add a pre- or post-legislative 
referendum to the normal legislative process. In the British system referendums are by 
definition facultative in nature, in the sense that the constitution does not stipulate that 
specific types of policy changes can only take effect following a mandatory popular 
referendum (Suksi, 1993). Instead, a popular vote can be triggered through the normal 
legislative process. In the case of a post-legislative referendum, the government 
introduces a fully-fledged policy proposal with a referendum requirement. Once this bill 
is agreed upon, the legislation as a whole is put to a popular vote. On the basis of the 
referendum result, the House then decides whether or not the agreed legislation should 
be enacted. In the case of a pre-legislative referendum, the government firstly 
introduces a referendum bill.  
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If elite agreement can be reached about the need for a popular vote, the public is then 
consulted on the general principle of the proposed reform. If the referendum result is 
deemed to provide a popular mandate for change, the government will subsequently 
introduce a fully-fledged bill, which then passes through the normal legislative process.  
 In both cases, the bill that triggers the popular vote also sets out the 
referendum question(s), the decision-making rules and the ‘referendorate’ (i.e. who is 
eligible to vote) (Luke & Johnson, 1976). The outcome of the subsequent vote is 
consultative rather than decisive, as the House formally has the power to enact 
legislation even if the percentage in favour of the proposal at the polls falls below the 
threshold previously agreed in the bill. In practice, enacting a bill that was opposed by 
the majority of those who cast their vote in a referendum will raise serious legitimacy 
issues. The House does however hold a credible final veto if the proposal was 
endorsed by a simple majority, but failed to surpass a more stringent threshold set out 
within the bill. As a result, the pre and post-legislative referendum paths theoretically 
include three rather than two veto points.    
 So far, we have looked at the general distribution of agenda-setting and 
decision-making powers within the British system. The remainder of this chapter will 
seek to show that re-analysing the main decision-making moments through this 
perspective allows us to qualify and challenge elements of the conventional wisdom 
regarding the dynamics of regionalist accommodation in pre-devolution mainland 
Britain.   
5.2. The decision to maintain of the status quo in the 1970s 
As was discussed in chapter 4, the re-emergence of spaces of regionalism in 
the 1950s and 60s initially met with a relatively muted response from the main 
contenders for office. The success of the SNP and Plaid Cymru in the 1968 by-
elections encouraged the then Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, to establish a Royal 
Commission to enquire into constitutional matters in general and the need for 
devolution to Scotland and Wales in particular (Wilson, 1979).  
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Especially since the Labour leader subsequently showed little interest in the work of the 
Commission, this move was widely seen as mere paying lip service to regionalist 
demands (Hill, 2004). While the Conservative leader, Edward Heath, proved largely 
immune to Welsh demands, his infamous 1968 Declaration of Perth did make a clear 
commitment to a moderate form of Home Rule for Scotland. While this pledge was duly 
included in the 1970 election manifesto (Conservative Party, 1970), the promised 
proposals for a Scottish Convention sitting in Edinburgh were never placed before 
Parliament when the Party did return to office.  
The inactivity on the part of the 1970-1974 government under Edward Heath is 
frequently taken as evidence that the Conservative Party’s manifesto commitment to 
devolution was purely based on electoral incentives (Gamble, 2006; Mitchell, 1990). 
Such an explanation clearly runs the risk of circularity; the argument made is in effect 
that where public statements and manifesto commitments do not match the 
government’s actions, ‘true’ preferences must have been different from the stated aims. 
In addition, the conduct of Edward Heath during the mid to late 1970s does not fit this 
explanation well. As discussed in the chapter 4, Heath personally continued to support 
Scottish devolution, despite the increasingly unionist stance taken by his Party under 
his successor, Margaret Thatcher. This strongly suggests that Heath’s personal 
preference for devolution may not have been purely based on the perceived electoral 
gains associated with the act of publicly supporting the policy. Rather it would seems 
that Heath’s commitment to moderate devolution was partially based on the belief that 
this would be the best way to safeguard the future of the Union in the face of growing 
popular demands for greater autonomy in Scotland. In light of this evidence, I would 
argue that Heath’s reluctance to act on his manifesto pledge should be related to the 
preference constellation within the rest of the parliamentary party, rather than the 
feebleness of his own convictions.  
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When Heath made his Declaration of Perth in 1968, the Conservative Party 
faced clear electoral incentives to accommodate Scottish demands for greater 
autonomy. Nonetheless, the Parliamentary Party was strongly divided over the policy. 
When the SNP did not attract the expected level of support in the 1970 general 
election, internal opposition to devolution became more pronounced (Mitchell, 2006). In 
this context, Heath’s apparent decision to pursue the less controversial elements of his 
agenda first seems prudent. The slow progress of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, created by the previous Labour administration, initially provided an 
excellent guise for such a strategy. When the Commission finally did produce its report, 
this did not provide the clear and unified defence of moderate devolution that Heath 
might have been hoping for. As such it was of little help in convincing the many 
sceptics within his party of the need for Scottish devolution. Against the backdrop of 
rising unemployment rates, disruptive industrial action, and the 1973 oil crisis, it 
therefore seems hardly surprising that the Prime Minister chose to sidetrack the 
internally divisive issue of Scottish Home Rule in favour of less controversial and 
perhaps more immediately pressing issues.  
Whatever the true origins of the relative inaction during the early years of the 
regionalist revival, it is clear that the sharp rise in third party voting that marked the 
February 1974 general election radically changed the dynamics of regionalist 
accommodation in the 1970s. While much of the devolution literature focuses on the 
surprisingly strong showing of the SNP, chapter 4 demonstrated that the shifts in voting 
patterns elsewhere were equally important. Specifically, it was argued that the electoral 
incentives to accommodate the regionalist minority in Scotland and to a lesser extent 
Wales were significantly amplified by the exceptionally tight electoral competition in 
England. Under these circumstances, Scottish and Welsh constituencies had a real 
potential to be pivotal to the overall outcome of the election. As a result, the potential 
benefits associated with offering moderate devolution were unusually large. Despite 
internal reservations, both the Conservative and the Labour Party leader proved 
susceptible to these electoral incentives.  
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The relative autonomy enjoyed by the leadership of both Parties, combined with the 
lack of a well-defined internal consensus on the appropriate response to the regionalist 
revival, in turn allowed both Edward Heath and Harold Wilson to foist their personal 
views upon their respective Parties.   
As could have been anticipated, the nature of the electoral competition at the 
central level and the lack of internal cohesion on the devolution subject both allowed 
regionalist concerns to penetrate the parliamentary agenda and  made policy change 
more difficult to achieve. Having emerged from the second 1974 election with a slender 
majority of the seats, the incumbent Labour government initially seemed reluctant to 
deal with the divisive issue of Home Rule. The intention to introduce devolution 
legislation in due course was however clear in the government’s dealing with related 
issues, such as the development agency Bills for Scotland and Wales and the three 
Bills related to petroleum development and oil taxation introduced in the 1974-75 
session (Burton & Drewry, 1977). In January 1976, shortly after the publication of the 
White Paper on devolution to Scotland and Wales (HMSO, 1975), the government set 
aside four days for debate. This discussion exposed significant opposition across the 
House, with Labour backbenchers joining opposition parties in their critique of the 
government’s proposals (Hansard (Commons), 13th- 19th of January 1976, vol. 903 cols 
207-344, cols 398-546, cols 590-742 and cols 925-1076).  
Although the government was aware of the likelihood of some dissent, the 
sheer scale of backbench opposition seemed to take the Labour leadership by 
surprise. Simultaneously, the governing party was gradually losing its slim overall 
majority as a result of by-elections and MPs crossing the floor. Taken together, this 
meant that several groups within the House acquired potential veto powers. As 
discussed in chapter 2, the degree to which the emergence of additional veto players 
presents a real obstacle to change very much depends on the policy preference of 
these players. Tsebelis (2002) argues that a one-party minority government is usually 
able to achieve its preferred policy position, as the preferences of this type of 
government tend to be fairly centrally located within the policy space.  
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Figure 5.2 schematically depicts the preference constellation in the House of Commons 
on the devolution issue in November 1976. The precise location of party preferences 
and the size of dissenting tendencies within each party are debatable. In the absence 
of comprehensive survey evidence, we have no other option than to, at least partially, 
base party preferences on actual voting behaviour. Figure 5.2  should thus be seen as 
descriptive rather than explanatory. 
  
Figure 5.2 Preference constellation in the House of Commons (November 1976, majority=318 votes) 
Source: own estimation based on Wood & Jacoby (1984) 
 
By the end of 1976, the Labour government’s share of the seats was reduced 
from 319 to 314, leaving the government 4 seats short of an overall majority. Formally, 
the governing party favoured devolution to both Scotland and Wales. During the 
decision-making process, the lack of party unity on the issue however soon became 
apparent. The devolution literature tends to see this behaviour as symptomatic of the 
lack of internal cohesion on the devolution topic (Jones & Keating, 1982; Keating & 
Bleiman, 1979). As chapter 4 argued, the Labour Party’s formal policy position on 
devolution was strongly elite-driven. From the outset, it was clear that many Labour 
MPs did not support devolution on ideological grounds and were significantly less 
willing to prioritise short-term electoral gains over their long-term outcome preferences. 
As a result, it can be argued that subject-specific backbench rebellions were to be 
foreseen from the outset. Cohesion in terms of preferences is however only one 
element of party unity.  
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Discipline, understood as the ability of the leadership to persuade party members to 
vote in accordance with the official party line regardless of their personal preferences, 
also plays an important role. General trends in party discipline can provide us with a 
fuller understanding of the causes of the lack of unity that frustrated the government’s 
attempts to change the status quo in the 1970s.  
Within the UK, party unity has traditionally been high. As late as 1969, a 
prominent political scientist claimed that party loyalty was indeed so close to a hundred 
per cent that there was no need to measure the level of backbench dissent (Beer, 
1969). As a result, parties could for all practical purposes be treated as unitary actors 
during this period. The 1970-1974 Conservative government however marked a distinct 
change in MP behaviour. During its lifespan, Edward Heath’s government faced 
unprecedented levels of dissent from its own backbench. Not only did the number of 
divisions witnessing dissent increase markedly, so did the number of dissenters per 
division. In total, backbench rebellions caused six government defeats between 1970 
and 1974. Significantly, three of these defeats occurred despite a three-line whip, the 
breach of which can lead to effective expulsion from the party (Norton, 1997).  
This pattern of behaviour continued when Labour came to power in 1974. As 
Table 5.1 shows, both the governing party and the formal opposition faced 
considerable backbench dissent between October 1974 and May 1979. In the case of 
the Conservative Party, the percentage of devolution-related divisions witnessing 
dissent was only slightly higher than the share of general divisions that befell the same 
fate. Within the Labour Party, the divisiveness of the Party’s formal stance on 
devolution meant that the government was particularly vulnerable to backbench 
rebellions on this issue. However, the Labour leadership also faced dissent in around 
20 per cent of the whipped divisions on other topics. This suggests that this general 
trend towards lower party discipline was at least partially to blame for the lack of party 
unity with respect to devolution.  
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Table 5.1 Number of divisions witnessing dissent as a percentage of all divisions during the 1974- 
1979 Parliament 
11
 
 General divisions Devolution-related 
divisions 
Conservative  16% 19% 
Labour 20% 42% 
Source: Own calculation based on Norton (1980)  
 
 It is difficult to determine the size of a dissenting tendency within a political 
party. Based on voting behaviour in 16 major devolution divisions, Wood and Jacoby 
(1984) find that around 7 per cent of Labour MPs behaved in a way that would suggest 
a cohesive anti-devolution stance. A further 12 to 13 percent behaved in a centrist way. 
Given the relatively low level of party discipline, these centrist MP could be seen as at 
risk of dissenting. Based on these calculations, the Labour leadership could count on 
around 253 of its 314 MP to toe the party line on devolution. A further 39 were likely to 
support the leadership on some but not all occasions. As a result the government 
needed to secure the support of at least 26 non-Labour MPs in order to change the 
status quo. Jointly, the Liberals, the SNP and Plaid Cymru represented 27 seats in the 
House. Even if the Labour leadership was able to effectively enforce party discipline 
amongst moderately centrist Labour MPs, the support of these pro-devolution parties 
would thus only be sufficient to create the slenderest majority in favour of devolution.  
The October 1974 Conservative election manifesto (Conservative Party, 1974b) 
formally endorsed devolution to Scotland, but not to Wales. After Edward Heath lost his 
position as party leader to Margaret Thatcher in February 1975, the Conservative 
position became increasingly Unionist. Most of the Parliamentary Party was happy to 
conform to this shift, while a small number of Conservative MPs remained dedicated to 
Scottish devolution.  
                                               
11 In order to ensure comparability with the data on general divisions, all 
dissenting votes on devolution-related divisions were included to calculate the 
percentage of such divisions that witnessed dissent.  
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Based on Wood and Jacoby’s (1984) analysis, just under 2 per cent of Conservative 
MPs displayed consistent pro-devolution tendencies in their voting behaviour. As a 
result, the government could count on a limited level of Conservative support for its 
plans in Scotland. With respect to Wales, the willingness to dissent from the party line 
was even more limited.   
With the benefit of hindsight, it is therefore clear that achieving devolution 
through the normal legislative process was always going to be very difficult.  While the 
governing elite may not have been fully aware of this when it first introduced the 
legislation, the lack of progress made by the initial devolution bill soon made it apparent 
that considerable concessions would have to be made in order for the legislation to 
survive. Simultaneously, the loss of an overall majority created additional political act-
based incentives not to abandon the devolution issue altogether. The by-election 
losses and defections suffered by the Labour Party formally awarded potential veto 
powers to a range of pro- and anti-devolution opposition parties (McLean, et al., 2005). 
Given the fact that the government had already introduced the devolution legislation by 
the time it lost its majority, pro-devolution groups however faced much stronger output-
based incentives to keep the Labour Party in power while this legislation was still being 
debated.  
In this context, the Labour party leadership attempted to salvage the Scotland 
and Wales Bill by bringing its own backbench back into line. To this effect, it conceded 
that “referenda should be held in Scotland and Wales before the respective schemes 
can be put into effect” (Hansard (Commons), 16th of December 1976, vol. 922, col. 
1736). As discussed in chapter 2, the introduction of a popular veto can help to restore 
party discipline by appealing to the democratic sensibilities of party members. I would 
argue that the unifying effect of the instrument was further heightened in this case by 
the precarious position of the government at that time. Given its minority status, a 
defeat on a key issue could easily trigger a no-confidence motion.  
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To survive such an attempt to dethrone it, the minority Labour government would in 
turn have to rely quite strongly on the support of pro-devolution opposition parties, like 
the Liberals, the SNP and Plaid Cymru (Bogdanor, 1980). Simultaneously, by-election 
results and opinion polls suggested that Labour could suffer substantial losses in the 
event of early elections. As a result, Labour MPs faced considerable act-based 
incentives not to obstruct the devolution legislation.  
Under these circumstances, the inclusion of a popular veto did initially seem to 
have the desired effect and the second reading of the Scotland and Wales Bill was 
carried by 292 votes to 247 (Hansard (Commons), 16th of December 1976, vol. 922, 
col.1874). Even with the referendum concession, 10 Labour MPs however voted 
against the second reading of the Bill. A further 31 Labour MPs chose to abstain. 
Opposition to the government’s proposal continued during the committee stage. After 
10 days of heated debates, less than 4 clauses had been debated. The government 
attempted to curb the powers of ordinary MPs and opposition parties through the use of 
an allocation of time motion. Moved by the Leader of the House of Commons in 
February 1977, the motion was defeated 312 to 283 (Hansard (Commons), 22nd of 
February 1977, vol. 926, cols.1234-1367). Significantly, 22 Labour MPs and 11 Liberals 
joined the Opposition in voting against the government. A further 21 Labour MPs chose 
to abstain. This remains the only time a government has been defeated on a guillotine 
motion during the post war period.  
The defeat of the government’s guillotine motion led to the withdrawal of the 
original bill and the introduction of two separate bills for Scotland and Wales. 
Government papers recently released by the National Archives show that the Cabinet 
took a calculated risk in separating the two proposals. It was argued that “the Scottish 
National Party and the Plaid Cymru could hardly fail to support the Government in key 
votes” (Cabinet Office, 1977:6). In addition, the pact between the Labour government 
and the Liberals, formed in the context of the no-confidence motion tabled in March 
1977, meant that “the Liberal support was also assured” (Cabinet Office, 1977:6).  
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In this context, the Cabinet’s main challenge would therefore be to control its own 
backbench. As uncertainty about the level of popular demand for devolution was 
frequently advanced as a reason for opposing Welsh Home Rule, it was hoped that the 
concession of a popular referendum would pacify the resistance of more moderate 
Labour backbenchers. In addition, the Cabinet anticipated that good progress on the 
Scotland Bill would aid agreement on a similar policy for Wales. In the end, this political 
manoeuvring indeed proved sufficient to secure a convincing majority on the second 
reading and allocation of time motions of both bills (Hansard (Commons) 14-16th of 
November 1977, vol 939, cols. 51-213, cols. 357-511, cols. 579-654 and cols. 655-
726).  
Despite the fact that both bills were successfully guillotined, opposition parties 
as well as Labour backbenchers were able to use their agenda-setting powers to make 
a number of amendments during the committee stage. To fully understand the 
behaviour of MPs during this phase, policy preferences need to be clearly distinguished 
from output preferences (Ganghof, 2003). As the legislation would be subjected to an 
informal popular veto, the committee stage was dominated by strategic calculations 
about which policy would be most likely to lead to the desired outcome. In this context, 
specific clauses were considered not only in terms of their substantive merit, but also 
on the basis of their likely influence on popular opinion. For example, a number of anti-
devolutionists voted against the inclusion of a clause which declared that devolution 
would not affect the unity of the Kingdom (Hansard (Commons), 22nd of November 
1977, vol. 939, cols. 1323-1409). Were devolution to occur, the substance of the clause 
proposed by the government would be clearly in accordance with the outcome 
preferences of Unionist MPs. Strategically the removal of this clause could however aid 
the campaign efforts of the No-camp, as it would make it easier to argue that 
devolution would inevitably lead to the break-up of Britain ( Mitchell, 1996: 161). This in 
turn would increase the chance of the government’s proposals failing at the polls and 
the status quo being maintained. 
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Other efforts to maintain the status quo focussed on changing the decision-
making rules that would govern the informal popular veto. When the Government was 
forced to concede to a popular referendum, it had deliberately limited the referendorate 
to those living in Scotland and Wales at the time of the poll. As Chapter 4 showed, the 
English population was far from convinced of the need for devolution to either Scotland 
or Wales at that time. Securing a majority in favour of the government’s proposals 
would therefore be practically impossible if English voters were to be directly consulted 
on the matter. By defining the referendorate more narrowly, the government greatly 
diminished the stabilising effect of the referendum instrument. Recently released 
papers show that the government expected this definition of the referendorate to be 
challenged during the Parliamentary debates (Privy Council Office, 1977). During the 
debate surrounding the Scotland Bill, Labour MP William Hamilton indeed tried in vain 
to make devolution dependent on a UK-wide referendum.  On this rare occasion, pro-
devolution Conservative dissent outweighed anti-devolution Labour dissent and the 
proposal was defeated by 186 votes to 122 (Hansard (Commons), 25th of January 
1978, vol. 942, cols.1424-1459).  
The proposals of two of Hamilton’s backbench colleagues fared considerably 
better. As discussed earlier, any referendum in Britain is consultative in nature and the 
decision-making rule is determined within the relating bill. By default, one would 
assume that the simple majority rule is employed, meaning that a proposal is said to 
enjoy a popular mandate if it is supported by over 50 per cent of those who voted in the 
referendum. The fact that this rule can be changed through the normal decision-making 
procedure however provides those who oppose a policy with an additional opportunity 
to increase policy stability. The Eurosceptic Conservative MP, Peter Emery, first tried to 
employ this strategy in relation to the 1975 European Community Referendum Bill.  
However, his proposal for qualified majority voting did not even make it to a vote in the 
House. By contrast, anti-devolution Labour backbenchers did succeed in dividing the 
House and securing a majority in favour of a more restrictive voting system.    
193 | P a g e  
 
Primarily this opportunity was created by the preference constellation in the 
House. The 1975 Referendum Bill clearly enjoyed majority support at the time. It was 
given a second reading by 312 to 248 votes (Hansard (Commons), 10th of April 1975, 
vol. 889, cols. 1543-1548). Significantly, none of the Labour MPs defied the party whip 
and less than a handful chose to abstain. This stand in stark contrast with the level of 
backbench opposition recorded in respect to the devolution legislation. The fact that the 
amendments were moved by Labour’s own backbench, combined with the cleverly 
chosen wording of the threshold, may have also played an important role. The first 
amendment moved by Labour MP Bruce Douglas-Mann called for the Scotland Act to 
be repealed if less than one-third of the persons entitled to vote on the referendum 
voted ‘Yes’. Another Labour MP, George Cunningham, subsequently moved an 
amendment to this amendment which replaced one-third of the electorate by 40 per 
cent. By stipulating a share of the eligible electorate, rather than those who voted, the 
rebels were able to set thresholds that seemed fairly modest. This in turn made it 
easier to argue that these levels could be easily reached, if support for devolution was 
indeed as widespread as the government claimed ( Mitchell, 1996: 162-163).  
Given the preference constellation of the House, this cunning strategy proved 
sufficient to ensure that the main amendment, as amended, was passed by 168 votes 
to 142. At the time, 37 Labour MPs defied the party whip to support Cunningham’s 
proposal (Hansard (Commons), 25th of January 1978, vol. 942, cols. 1546-1547). 
During the third reading of the Scotland Bill, the government to no avail tried to overturn 
the amendment or reduce the threshold (Hansard (Commons), 15th of February 1978, 
vol. 944, cols. 533-607). This change in the decision-making rule is widely credited with 
the ultimate failure of the devolution legislation in Scotland (Keating, 1998b; MacLeod, 
1998a). Although it clearly played an important role, a structured veto point analysis 
shows that the distribution of preferences within Scotland and the divisiveness of the 
issue within the Labour Party were at least as important.   
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Where a referendum is mandatory, the failure to obtain the approval of a pre-
defined share of the electorate inevitably results in the failure of the legislation. This 
famously occurred in the 1939 Danish referendum on the reform of the Upper House. 
Even though over 90 per cent of those who cast a vote were in favour of the reform, 
low turnout rates meant that the level of support fell just short of the 45 per cent of the 
electorate threshold (Qvortrup, 2005). As a result, the status quo was maintained. The 
1979 devolution referendums in Scotland and Wales were however consultative in 
nature. In the event of insufficient popular support, the government was merely 
required to lay before Parliament the draft of an Order in Council for repeal of the policy 
(Bogdanor, 1994). The Parliament however retained the formal right to vote down this 
draft order (see Figure 5.1). If it had chosen to do this, the devolution legislation could 
still have been enacted in its original form.  
The conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held on the morning of the 
devolution referendums indicate that the party leadership had little appetite to rescue 
the 1978 Wales Act in the event of a failure at the polls. In fact, James Callaghan noted 
that “a clear vote against devolution might be received with some relief in Wales” 
(Cabinet Office, 1979a: 1). In this respect, the Prime Minister received what he had 
hoped for, as the Welsh referendum indeed returned the clearest possible rejection of 
devolution. Even in the regionalist heartland of Gwynedd, support for the policy failed to 
surpass 35 per cent of the vote (see Table 5.2). Given these decisive results, asking 
Parliament to vote down the draft order would not have been feasible, even if the 
political will to do so had existed. Instead, the Cabinet decided it would try to secure an 
inter-party agreement on “administrative arrangements which could provide some 
measure of devolution to Wales”(Cabinet Office, 1979b).   
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Table 5.2 Referendum vote by region (Wales 1979) 
Region Percentage in favour of devolution 
Clwyd 21.6% 
Dyfed 28.1% 
Gwent 12.1% 
Gwynedd 34.4% 
Mid Glamorgan 20.2% 
Powys 18.5% 
South Glamorgan 13.1% 
West Glamorgan 18.7% 
Total (as a percentage of the votes) 20.3% 
Total (as a percentage of the electorate) 11.8% 
Source: Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
With respect to the Scottish proposals, the referendum results were more 
problematic. In the run up to the referendum, the Labour leadership was clearly 
preparing itself for the scenario where a majority voted in favour of devolution, but the 
turnout was insufficient to clear the 40 per cent threshold. Here, the minutes of the 
Cabinet meeting show that the Labour leadership was willing to ask the parliament to 
vote down the repeal order (Cabinet Office, 1979a). As Cunningham himself had 
argued (Hansard (Commons), 25th of January 1978, vol. 942, col. 1472), the 
Parliament could have justifiably taken this course of action if the majority in favour of 
the proposals was deemed sufficiently convincing. In reality, the Scottish referendum 
only returned a very slender overall majority in favour of devolution. On a turnout of 63 
per cent, this fell well short of the 40 per cent threshold. In addition, support for 
devolution was highly spatially uneven (see Table 5.3); of the 12 Scottish regions, only 
6 returning a majority in favour of the government’s proposals.  
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Table 5.3 Referendum vote by region (Scotland 1979) 
Region Percentage in favour of devolution 
Borders 40.3% 
Central 54.7% 
Dumfries and Galloway 40.3% 
Fife 53.7% 
Grampian 48.3% 
Highland 51.0% 
Lothian 50.1% 
Orkney 27.9% 
Shetland 27.0% 
Strathclyde 54.0% 
Tayside 49.0% 
Western Isles 55.8% 
Total (as a percentage of the votes) 51.6% 
Total (as a percentage of the electorate) 32.9% 
Source: Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
At the best of times, this result would have made it difficult for the government 
to legitimately insist on the enactment of the original Bill (Bogdanor, 1994).  In the 
context of a minority government in an exceptionally weak position, the outcome 
presented the Prime Minister with a real dilemma. Given the strong opposition to 
devolution within the Labour Party, asking Parliament to vote down the repeal order for 
the Scotland Act despite the lack of a clear popular mandate would have seriously 
jeopardised the unity of the Party. In addition such a move stood little chance of 
success, given the preference constellation in the House. Labour no longer controlled 
the majority of the seats at Westminster. In addition, enquiries by the Government 
Whips indicated that even on a whipped vote 40 or so Labour MPs would be willing to 
ignore the request to vote down the repeal order (Wilson, 1979). Under these 
circumstances, the Scotland Act would be repealed, even if Callaghan managed to 
secure the full support of the Liberals, the SNP and Plaid Cymru.   
On its part, the Scottish National Party however insisted that the referendum 
result did create a popular mandate for devolution. It therefore demanded that the 
government lay the draft order before Parliament and committed itself fully to the 
rejection of the repeal (Cabinet Office, 1979c).  
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Especially since the Lib-Lab Pact was formally terminated in the summer of 1978, the 
decision to ignore these demands and the withdrawal of SNP support such a move was 
likely to trigger would leave the Labour government vulnerable to defeat within a no-
confidence motion. The minutes of the first Cabinet meeting after the referendum show 
that Callaghan was acutely aware of this risk (Cabinet Office, 1979b). In a desperate 
attempt to pacify the situation, he called for inter-party talks on the future of Scotland to 
be held prior to the debate on the repeal of the Scotland Act (Hansard (Commons), 
22nd of March 1979, vol. 964, cols. 1692-1705). The SNP responded to this suggestion 
by tabling a motion condemning this course of action. The Conservatives sensed an 
opportunity and, after consultation with the Liberals, they put down a motion of no-
confidence.  
During the days that followed, the Labour leadership frantically tried the secure 
the support of other opposition parties. In the end, the reluctance to ‘buy’ Ulster votes 
in return for in exchange for a deal on a gas pipeline for Northern Ireland (Butler & 
Kavanagh, 2000) and the absence of a Labour backbencher due to illness allowed the 
Opposition to secure a 1 vote majority in favour of the motion (Hansard (Commons) 
28th of March 1979, vol. 965 col. 583-590). The resulting general election produced the 
widely anticipated Conservative landslide. Shortly afterwards, the draft repeal orders 
laid before the House by the previous government were approved, with the House 
dividing Ayes 301 and Noes 206 in the case of Scotland Act (Hansard (Commons), 20th 
of June 1979, vol. 968 cols. 1327-1462) and Ayes 191 and Noes 8 in the case of the 
Wales Act (Hansard (Commons), 26th of June 1979, vol. 969 cols. 300-359). 
5.3. Regionalist accommodation in the late 1990s  
During the 18 years of Conservative rule that followed, regionalist demands 
scarcely penetrated the parliamentary agenda at all. As chapter 3 showed, this 
prolonged period of Conservative predominance, despite the lack of support for Party 
in Scotland and Wales, proved a potent source of democratic regionalism in both 
countries.  
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Simultaneously, Labour’s strong performance at the regional level, combined with its 
seeming inability to gain office at the centre, slowly produced a more cohesive pro-
devolution stance within the Party itself. In chapter 4, I have argued that it was this shift 
in the internal preference structure in general, and the salience attached to the issue by 
the Scottish and Welsh sections of the Party in particular, that ultimately convinced the 
then party leader, Tony Blair, to retain the Party’s longstanding commitment to 
devolution. As a result the 1997 Labour Manifesto pledged to “meet the demand for 
decentralisation of power to Scotland and Wales, once established in 
referendums.”(Labour Party, 1997)         
When the 1997 indeed resulted in the long-anticipated return to power for the 
Labour Party, this opened up a window for change. This time around, the government 
was in a very strong position to reach elite agreement on its preferred type of 
devolution. While its 1970s predecessor had been part of that rare breed of minority 
governments in the UK, the 1997-2001 Labour government made history by securing 
the largest seats majority since the Second World War. With the Party controlling over 
60 per cent of the seats at Westminster, the leadership could theoretically absorb 
backbench rebellions of up to 88 MPs. As a result it was able to avoid defeat on highly 
divisive and salient issues like the 1999 Welfare Reform and Pensions Bill and the 
2000 Transport Bill. The autonomy of the party leadership was further aided by the 
relatively high level of party discipline (Cowley & Stuart, 2003). Throughout its lifetime, 
the 1997-2001 Labour government only faced 96 incidences of backbench dissent; less 
than any full term government since the 1960s. By contrast, the 1974-1979 Labour 
government faced 309 backbench rebellions during its lifetime; the largest number 
faced by any government during the post war period.  
 Under these circumstances, it would have been possible to secure elite 
agreement, even if the devolution issue had continued to be relatively divisive within 
the Parliamentary Labour Party. As noted, the preference constellation within the Party 
had however become considerably more cohesive during its time in opposition.  
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The British Representation Study (Norris, 1997) shows that by 1997 over 90 percent of 
Labour MPs supported either devolution or full independence for Scotland. 
Unfortunately, MPs were not asked about their views on devolution to Wales. The 1992 
British Candidate Study (Norris, 1992) however suggests that the level of support for 
greater autonomy for Wales was only moderately lower. As a result, significant 
backbench dissent could be practically ruled out.  
 The legislative process indeed conformed to this prediction. The Referendums 
(Scotland and Wales) Act was the first bill to be introduced by the new Labour 
government. On the 3rd of June, the time for debate was successfully limited to two 
days. Not a single Labour MP dissented from the party line. In addition every present 
Liberal Democrat, Plaid Cymru and SNP MP also voted in favour of the government’s 
timetable motion. The attending MPs from the Conservative Party and the Ulster 
Unionist Party all voted against. Taken together this meant that the House divided: 
Ayes 420, Noes 154 (Hansard (Commons), 3rd of June 1997, vol. 295, col. 240). 
Attempts to make amendments to the government’s proposals during the committee 
stage on the floor of the House of Commons all failed (Hansard (Commons), 3rd- 4th of 
June, vol. 295, cols. 247-306 and 398-528). The only substantial amendment proposed 
by the Lords befell the same fate. The attempt to force the government to hold the 
referendums in Scotland and Wales on the same day was defeated by 349 to 134 
(Hansard (Commons), 30th of July 1997, vol. 299, col. 405). Again the House was 
perfectly divided according to party lines, with all attending Conservatives MPs voting 
in favour of the Lords’ amendment and Labour, Liberal Democrat, PC and SNP MPs 
voting against. 
The government’s strong position at Westminster however did not mean that 
the Labour leadership could unilaterally enact its ideal position. Instead, the Prime 
Minister was bound by the commitments made within the 1997 Labour election 
manifesto (Labour Party, 1997).  
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The result of an extensive internal bargaining process, this manifesto essentially 
represents a compromise between a sceptical party leader and an influential group of 
party members with a strong preference for devolution (see chapter 4). By making an 
explicit commitment to devolution and setting out an ambitious time line for the 
legislative process, the document sought to dispel fear that the party leadership would 
use its control over the parliamentary agenda to delay and possibly prevent a decision 
from occurring at all. Simultaneously, Tony Blair used his internal agenda-setting and 
decision-making powers to introduce additional veto players in the system. In Wales, 
the government would ask voters for the mandate to create an elected Welsh 
Assembly. Scottish voters would in turn be presented with a two-question pre-
legislative referendum on the merits of an elected Scottish Parliament and the need for 
tax-varying powers. As the Labour Party looked set to comfortable win the elections at 
the time, pro-devolution sections within the Labour Party firmly opposed the 
introduction of a referendum requirement. In their view, an informal popular veto should 
only be introduced if the election results necessitated such a concession (Denver, et 
al., 2000; Morgan & Mungham, 2000a). In addition, the separate question of the need 
for fiscal devolution to Scotland was widely seen as an attempt by Blair to prevent this 
change from occurring.  
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Table 5.4 Vote in the 1997 devolution referendums by country and region  
Scotland 
Region % in favour Scottish 
Parliament 
% in favour tax-varying 
powers 
Aberdeen 71.8% 60.3% 
Aberdeenshire 63.9% 52.3% 
Angus 64.7% 53.4% 
Argyll & Bute 67.3% 57.0% 
Clackmannan 80.0% 68.7% 
Dumfries and Galloway 60.7% 48.8% 
Dundee 76.0% 65.5% 
East Ayrshire 81.1% 70.5% 
East Dunbartonshire 69.8% 59.1% 
East Lothian 74.2% 62.7% 
East Renfrewshire 61.7% 51.6% 
Edinburgh 71.9% 62.0% 
Falkirk 80.0% 69.2% 
Fife 76.1% 64.7% 
Glasgow 83.6% 75.0% 
Highland 72.6% 62.1% 
Inverclyde 78.0% 67.2% 
Midlothian 79.9% 67.7% 
Moray 67.2% 52.7% 
North Ayrshire 76.3% 65.7% 
North Labarkshire 82.6% 72.2% 
Orkney 57.3% 47.4% 
Perthshire and Kinross 61.7% 51.3% 
Renfrewshire 79.0% 63.6% 
Scottish Borders 62.8% 50.7% 
Shetland 62.4% 51.6% 
South Ayrshire 66.9% 56.2% 
South Lanarkshire 77.8% 67.6% 
Stirling 68.5% 58.9% 
West Dunbartinshire 84.7% 74.7% 
West Lothian 79.6% 67.3% 
West Isles 79.4% 68.4% 
Aberdeen 71.8% 60.3% 
Total 74.3% 63.5% 
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Wales 
Region % in favour Welsh 
Assembly 
 
Anglesey 50.9%  
Blaenau Gwent 56.1%  
Bridgend 54.4%  
Caerphilly 54.7%  
Cardiff 44.4%  
Carmarthenshire 65.3%  
Ceredigion 59.2%  
Conwy 40.9%  
Denbighshire 40.8%  
Flintshire 38.2%  
Gwynedd 64.1%  
Merthyr Tydfil 58.2%  
Monmouthshire 32.1%  
Neath Port Talbot 66.5%  
Newport 37.4%  
Pembrokeshire 42.8%  
Powys 42.7%  
Rhondda Cynon Taf 58.5%  
Swansea 52.0%  
Torfaen 49.8%  
Vale of Glamorgan 36.7%  
Wrexham 45.3%  
Total 50.3%  
Source: Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
In the Scottish case, the proponents of devolution need not have worried, as the 
referendum produced a strong popular mandate for reform (see Table 5.4). The 
establishment of a Scottish Parliament was endorsed by the clear majority of voters 
across all Scottish regions. The tax-varying powers were endorsed by 63.5 per cent of 
those who voted, with the proposal receiving majority support in all but 2 of the 32 
regions. Although small amendments were made in the subsequent legislative process, 
the resulting devolution of powers and resources to a directly elected Scottish 
Parliament greatly resembled the provisions set out within the initial white paper. In 
Wales, the results were far less convincing. On a turn-out of barely 50 per cent, the 
government’s proposal was carried by the slenderest of margins. In addition, 11 out of 
the 22 Welsh regions voted against the establishment of an elected Assembly. In 1979, 
Scotland had been denied an elected regional body on the basis of eerily similar 
results.  
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This time around, the election manifesto had already made clear that a simple majority 
of those voting would provide a sufficiently strong popular mandate for change. In 
addition, the Labour Party still enjoyed an overwhelming majority and party discipline 
was high. In this context, the result proved sufficient to allow the Welsh devolution 
project to go ahead.  
5.4. The popular veto: A calculated risk or a jump into the unknown?     
As the previous sections have shown, the referendum instrument can be 
introduced with a view to achieve a variety of strategic objectives. On the other hand, 
the introduction of an informal popular veto point may not always lead to the outcome 
envisioned by the actor who triggers it. Generally, partisan players will possess some 
information about the preferences of the general public prior when they decide whether 
or not to introduce an informal popular veto within the decision-making path. Public 
opinion can however prove notoriously fickle at times. As a result, referendums 
regularly return results that differ substantially from the predictions on the basis of initial 
opinion polls. This final section will examine to what extent the actor who triggered the 
referendum was able to predict the ultimate effects of this decision.  
In the two decision-making periods under consideration here, the a priori 
likelihood that a popular veto on devolution would prevent policy change from occurring 
differs considerably from country to country and period to period. In both Scotland and 
Wales, popular support for devolution and independence was more limited in the 1970s 
then in the 1990s. In addition, the Welsh electorate has consistently been less certain 
of the need for greater regional autonomy than its Scottish counterpart (see chapter 3 
for a full discussion). Taken together, this suggests that the popular veto was a priori 
more likely to increase policy stability (i) in 1979 than in 1997 and (ii) in Wales than in 
Scotland. However, the outcome also strongly depends on the position of the 
referendum proposal. A modest proposal may be able to attract majority support 
despite public reservations. Similarly an electorate that overwhelmingly supports 
devolution may still veto more far-reaching forms of regional autonomy. 
204 | P a g e  
 
As the popular veto points were positioned at different stages of the decision-
making process, the questions put to the public in the two periods were inherently 
different. In 1979, voters were asked to give their verdict on two fully-fledged pieces of 
legislation in post-legislative regional referendums. Both bills offered a modest 
devolution of powers to elected regional bodies. In 1997, the referendums were pre-
legislative. In the absence of concrete legislation, the public was asked to give its 
opinion on the need for an elected regional body in general. In Scotland, voters were 
also able to indicate whether or not they felt that such body should have tax-varying 
powers. Despite these differences, election surveys can provide an insight into the 
level of support such proposals would have been likely to receive at the time when the 
formal commitments to devolution were made.  
Figure 5.3 graphically depicts the popular preference distribution at the time of 
the general election and the location of the subsequent referendum proposal in the 
1970s and 90s. As the sample sizes in some of the surveys are relatively small, the 
revealed preferences are presented using 95 percent confidence intervals.     
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Figure 5.3 Referendum offers and the policy space at the previous election (1974-79, 1997) 
1974
5-16% 17-33%
Status Quo
21-37% 27-44%
Better understoodMore decisions
Run own affairs
1997
6-15% 27-41%
Status Quo
28-43% 14-26%
Elected body, 
no taxation
Elected body, 
with taxationIndependent
Referendum
offer 1979
Referendum
offer 1997
1974
19-24% 6-10%
Status Quo
41-48% 23-29%
Better understoodMore decisions
Run own affairs
1997
24-30% 16-21%
Status Quo
41-48% 8-12%
Elected body, 
no taxation
Elected body, 
with taxationIndependent
Referendum
offer 1979
Referendum
offer 2 1997
Referendum
offer 1 1997
Scotland Wales
Sources: own elaboration based on  Crewe, Robertson, & Sarlvik (1977a, 1977b), Heath, Jowell, Curtice, & Norris (1999),McCrone, Brown, 
Surridge, & Thomson (1999) 
206 | P a g e  
 
At both decision-making moments, Labour’s manifesto commitment to Scottish 
devolution seemed to be well within the expected winset of the status quo at the time of 
the general election. The 1974 election survey suggests that at least 60 per cent of the 
Scottish electorate favoured greater autonomy over the status quo at that time. By 
1997, this percentage had increased to over 70 percent. The government’s formal 
position of a Scottish Parliament with limited tax-varying power was supported by at 
least 65 per cent of the electorate.  
In Wales, the situation is less straightforward. The 1974 election survey found 
that greater regional autonomy was only favoured by 40 percent of the respondents 
who had formed an opinion on the subject. As the sample size was fairly small, it is 
questionable to what extent the outcome of this poll accurately reflects the distribution 
of preferences in the wider electorate at the time. If we apply a 95 percent confidence 
interval, the available evidence suggests that between 26 and 53 percent of the Welsh 
electorate shared Labour’s commitment to devolution.  
Although support for devolution increased markedly between 1979 and 1997, 
polls in the lead-up to the 1997 election again showed that a referendum would not 
necessarily return a majority in favour of devolution in Wales. The 1997 election survey 
found that 66 per cent of Welsh respondents would favour greater regional autonomy 
over the status quo. Given the small sample size, this result was in itself insufficient to 
rule out a referendum defeat. In addition, other opinion polls conducted around the time 
of the 1997 election produced mixed results; while some predicted that the 
government’s proposals would find majority support, others predicted a narrow defeat 
(Broughton, 1998). This suggests that Tony Blair’s insistence on the need for clear 
manifesto commitments to pre-legislative referendums had the real potential to prevent 
actual change from occurring in Wales. 
  In 1997, the incumbent Labour government wasted no time in calling the 
referendums on devolution. As a result, polls at the time of the election relatively 
closely mirror the public mood just before the official start of the referendum campaign 
(see Table 5.5).  
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In the 1970s by contrast, the government only conceded the need for post-legislative 
referendums after a long and difficult legislative process. As a result, polls at the time 
when the referendum commitment was announced may provide a better insight into the 
a priori likelihood of a defeat. The government announced its intention to making 
devolution dependent on the outcome of a referendum on the 16th of December 1976 
(Hansard (Commons), 16th of December 1976, vol. 922, col. 1736). In line with the 
results of the 1974 election survey, an opinion poll taken just a few days before this 
announcement found that devolution was not supported by the majority of respondents 
in Wales (Balsom & McAllister, 1979). By contrast, a similar poll in Scotland suggested 
that support for greater autonomy in this country remained substantial and might even 
have increased somewhat since October 1974 (Balsom & McAllister, 1979). Given 
these findings, the government’s decision to break the elite impasse by conceding a 
popular veto can indeed be seen as a credible attempt to salvage the Scottish 
legislation at the possible expense of devolution in Wales.  
Once a referendum is called, opponents and proponents alike may attempt to 
influence the outcome of the popular vote. The extent to which public opinion is 
influenced by general media reports and explicit campaign messages will tend to differ 
from context to context and subject to subject.  When the referendum consults the 
general public on a well-known issue that has been a prominent part of political 
debates from a long time, voters are likely to hold strong predispositions (Zaller, 1992). 
Under these circumstances, public opinion rarely changes radically over the course of 
the campaign. On the other hand, if the referendum concerns a topic that has only 
recently emerged on the political agenda and is not easily absorbed within the 
dominant partisan and ideological cleavages, voting behaviour can become much less 
predictable (LeDuc, 2002).     
The two sovereignty referendums in Quebec nicely illustrate these points. At the 
time of the first referendum in 1980, the status of Quebec within Canada had only 
recently re-emerged as a key issue on the political agenda (LeDuc, 1977).  
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When the provincial government decided to call a referendum on the subject, it had 
carefully phrased the question in terms of sovereign-association, rather than outright 
independence. Based on the public opinion polls around the announcement of the 
referendum, this proposal should have been well within the public’s winset of the status 
quo (Pammett, Clarke, Jenson, & LeDuc, 1983). The subsequent debate however 
showed that public opinion was not firmly established yet. In this context, the federal 
government managed to radically shift the terms of the debate. A no vote, it argued, 
would result in renewed federalism, rather than the maintenance of the status quo. At 
the time, this rhetoric allowed a generally popular federal government to secure a 
decisive rejection of the provincial proposal.  
The long period of debate that followed however did not deliver the promised 
change within the federal system (Gagnon & Iacovino, 2007). Following 15 years of 
failed initiatives, the provincial government once again called a referendum on 
sovereignty. This time around, the electorate was well aware of the issue and partisan 
positions had been long established (Pammett & LeDuc, 2001). In this context, the 
campaigning efforts mainly focussed on swaying the small minority of voters who had 
not made up their minds yet. Prior to the vote, polls suggested that the referendum 
proposals would be narrowly defeated. This time around, the outcome was very much 
in line with expectations, with 49 percent voting in favour of sovereignty (LeDuc, 2002).        
If we apply these findings to the British context, we would expect to find that 
public opinion was more fickle in 1979 than in 1997. In the 1970s, the devolution issue 
had only recently re-emerged on the political agenda. In addition, it proved to be an 
issue that could not easily be absorbed within the dominant ideological and partisan 
cleavages at the time. Following the failure of the devolution proposals in 1979, the 
topic largely disappeared from the central policy agenda. The issue of regional 
autonomy however continued to be debated in Scotland and to a much lesser extent 
Wales. In addition, devolution became increasingly embedded in the party system. As 
a result, the main political parties defended well-known and relatively long-standing 
positions in the run up to the 1997 referendums.   
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Table 5.5 Net change of popular opinion between the general election and announcement of the 
referendum and the referendum outcome 
 Percentage in favour of proposals Difference between polls 
and referendum  
 election announcement referendum election announcement 
 
Scotland 
1979 
 
 
66% 
 
70% 
 
52% 
 
-14 
 
-18 
 
Wales 
1979 
 
 
40% 
 
40% 
 
20% 
 
-20 
 
-20 
 
Scotland 
1997 
 
81% 
 
75% 
 
74% 
 
-7 
 
-1 
 
Wales 
1997 
 
 
48-66% 
 
59% 
 
50% 
 
+2 to -16 
 
-9 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Balsom & McAllister (1979),Broughton (1998), 
Crewe, et al. (1977a, 1977b), Heath, et al. (1999) and McCrone, et al. (1999) The 
percentages at the time of the announcement refer to polls published in December 
1976 and June 1997 respectively. For the 1997 referendum in Wales, the cell at the 
time of the election reports a range found over several polls between April and May 
1997.  
 
The differences between the relevant predictions in the polls and the ultimate 
referendum result only partially confirm this prediction. Table 5.5 reports the results of 
the election survey, an opinion poll around the time of the announcement of the 
referendum commitment and the actual results of the referendum. The final two 
columns show the net percentage point difference between the poll predictions and the 
outcome of the eventual referendum. This only provides a partial measure of the 
volatility of voting intentions as equal but opposing changes in public opinion would 
cancel each other out. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that public opinion in 
Scotland was indeed much less volatile in the run up to the 1997 referendum than it 
had been in the 1970s. In Wales, the variety of poll results at the time of the 1997 
election make a pattern more difficult to discern. If we look at the polls around the time 
of the referendum announcement, the net change in public opinion was considerably 
smaller in 1997 than in the 1970s, but still well above that recorded in Scotland at the 
time.   
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Table 5.6 Support for devolution amongst those who did have an opinion on the topic (1977-1979, 
1997) 
Scotland 
1979 1997 
Fieldwork dates  %  yes Publication dates  %  yes 
5-7 Feb 1977 77% June 1997 75% 
6-14Mar 1978 68% July 1997 76% 
16-18 May 1978 65% August 1997 77% 
26 Sept-3 Oct 1978 67% 2 Sept 1997 73% 
8-20 Jan 1979 64% 7 Sept 1997 75% 
29 Jan- 6 Feb 1979 56% 7 Sept 1997 71% 
8-11 Feb 1979 60% 8 Sept 1997 75% 
15-16 Feb 1979 59% 10 Sept 1997 75% 
18-19 Feb 1979 55% 10 Sept 1997 72% 
21-22 Feb 1979 57%   
24-25 Feb 1979 52%   
Difference between 
highest and lowest 
prediction  
25 Difference between 
highest and lowest 
prediction 
7 
Wales 
1979 1997 
Fieldwork dates  %  yes Fieldwork dates  %  yes 
18 Mar 1977 34% Jun 1997 59% 
5 May 1978 47% Aug 1997 65% 
15 Sep 1978 41% Sept 1997 51% 
1 Feb 1979 40% Sept 1997 56% 
19-20 Feb 1979 27%   
19-22 Feb 1979 25%   
21-22 Feb 1979 25%   
Difference between 
highest and lowest 
prediction 
22 Difference between 
highest and lowest 
prediction 
14 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Balsom & McAllister (1979: 408-409), Broughton, 
(1998: 205), Denver, et al. (2000:123) 
 
To get a more detailed view of these developments, Table 5.6 provides an 
overview of several polls conducted in the run up to the referendums. In the 1970s, 
public opinion proved fickle in both Scotland and Wales. In the bigger of the two 
countries, polls initially suggested that a clear majority of the electorate would support 
the government’s devolution proposals. Over the course of the campaign, the yes vote 
however started to dwindle. In the final poll only 52 percent of respondents indicated 
that they would favour devolution to Scotland. This represents a drop of 25 percentage 
points, compared with the poll held at the start of the campaign more than two year 
earlier.  
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In Wales, the case for devolution was more marginal from the outset. At the start of the 
campaign, polls already suggested that around 60 per cent of the Welsh electorate 
would reject the government’s proposals. Towards the end of the campaign, the 
slender initial support base was eroded even further. The final poll suggested that 3 out 
of 4 voters would in fact vote against the enactment of the 1978 Wales Act. In 
Scotland, the 1997 experience stands in stark contrast to that of the late 1970s. During 
the short campaign, the levels of support recorded in various polls remained 
remarkably stable, ranging from 71 to 77 percent. In Wales, poll results were much 
more volatile throughout, with the yes vote falling away sharply towards the end of the 
campaign.  
Within the existing literature on devolution, failings on the side of the Yes camp 
are widely held responsible for the significant fall in support between the 
announcement of the referendum requirement in December 1976 and the eventual 
vote on the 1st of March 1979 (Balsom & McAllister, 1979; Bochel, Denver, & 
Macartney, 1981; Foulkes, Jones, & Wilford, 1983; Jones & Wilford, 1979). In 1997, the 
argument goes that in Scotland a much more organised Yes campaign managed to 
avoid the mistakes of the past and secured the desired outcome (Denver, et al., 2000). 
In Wales, failings in the yes campaign, the  death of Princess Diana three weeks before 
the vote, and the limited amount of time between the Welsh and Scottish votes are 
widely cited as possible reasons for the tight results (Morgan & Mungham, 2000a). 
Nonetheless, some argue that even here the results “can be interpreted as a striking 
success for the Yes campaign” (Pattie, Denver, Mitchell, & Bochel, 1999: 143). Based 
on the arguments presented above, the campaign clearly had the potential to be highly 
influential in the 1970s. The explanatory power in the 1990s is however much more 
questionable, at least when it comes to Scotland.    
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In the 1970s, the recent re-emergence of the topic and the confusing ideological 
and partisan messages prior to the announcement of a referendum presented 
campaigners on both sides with a real opportunity to influence the outcome of the poll. 
As in the 1980 Quebec referendum, opponents of devolution were able to redefine the 
terms of the debate. As the topic had received little attention in the post war period, the 
Conservatives in particular were able to credibly argue that a rejection at the polls 
would result in a different type of reform, rather than the preservation of the status quo 
(Macartney, 1981). This strategy allowed the Party to overcome the discrepancy 
between its initial manifesto commitments and the subsequent voting behaviour in 
Parliament.  It also aimed to unite the Party by offering those who favoured devolution 
an opportunity to campaign against the proposed legislation, but not the principle.  
 
Table 5.7 Share intending to vote in favour of devolution by party voting intention (1977-1979) 
Scotland 
 Conservative Labour SNP All 
5-7 Feb 1977 66% 78% 87% 77% 
Apr 1978 49% 73% 88% 70% 
29 Jan- 6 Feb 
1979 
32% 58% 91% 69% 
8-11 Feb 1979 38% 65% 92% 60% 
15-16 Feb 1979 31% 68% 93% 59% 
Wales 
 Conservative Labour PC All 
18 Mar 1977 16% 36% 87% 34% 
05 May 1978 24% 64% 86% 47% 
1 Feb 1979 24% 51% 89% 40% 
19-22 Feb 1979 7% 32% 87% 25% 
Source: own elaboration based on Balsom & McAllister (1979: 408-409) 
 
Survey evidence suggests that the Conservative approach successfully swayed 
the Party’s core electorate towards voting down the government’s proposal. As Table 
5.7 shows, the share of Conservative identifiers who indicated that they intended to 
vote yes in the referendum decreased markedly during the campaign. By contrast, the 
Labour Party failed to formulate a unified position. Throughout the Commons debates 
on devolution, Labour identifiers had received mixed partisan clues on the benefits and 
drawbacks of devolution.  
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During the referendum campaign, the leadership tried to maximise support from Labour 
identifiers by arguing that a No vote would be a vote in favour of the Conservatives 
(Jones & Wilford, 1979). By mounting a highly visible Labour Vote No campaign, 
prominent rebels significantly obstructed these attempts to turn the referendum into a 
second order election. Especially in Wales, the prominent ‘gang of six’ may well have 
contributed considerably to the dwindling of Labour support for devolution during the 
final weeks of the campaign (Balsom, 1983).      
Shaped by the experiences in the 1970s, studies examining the 1997 
referendums tend to focus a significant amount of attention on the campaigning 
activities that took place in the run-up to the popular vote. Attributing the results of the 
1997 referendums to campaigning effort is however problematic. In Scotland, the 
results of the referendum were very much in line with the opinion polls around the time 
of the 1997 election. In the eighteen years that separated the two polls, the issue had 
continued to receive considerable political and popular attention. Especially the 
creation of the Scottish Constitutional Convention in the late 1980s and the subsequent 
media coverage for its proceedings ensured that the Scottish electorate was well-
versed in the various dimensions of the devolution debate. In addition the topic was 
fully absorbed in the Scottish party system. Labour and the Liberal Democrats had both 
maintained their commitment to Scottish devolution throughout the 1980s and 90s. The 
SNP also favoured devolution, although it still viewed this as a step towards 
independence. The only opposition to decentralisation came from the heavily 
marginalised Scottish Conservative Party.  As a result, most voters already had firmly 
established voting intentions before the 1997 referendum had even been called (see 
Table 5.8).  In this context, the main impact of the campaign would be through the 
influence it would have on the minority who remained undecided. Given the distribution 
of preferences amongst those who had already made up their minds, it seems safe to 
say that the influence of the campaign on the overall likelihood of change was therefore 
always going to be very limited.        
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In Wales, the story was markedly different. As discussed earlier, Welsh public 
opinion remained much more volatile. Compared to Scotland, the devolution issue had 
received relatively little attention in Wales between 1979 and 1997. Following the 
disastrous results of the first devolution referendum, the Labour Party initially dropped 
its commitment to an elected body for Wales. During the late 1980s and early 90s, the 
Party slowly changed its position. This however did not lead to the creation of any 
cross-party initiative resembling the Scottish Convention. In the absence of structured 
political debates, neither the merits nor the drawbacks of devolution received much 
media attention in Wales (Andrews, 2000; Morgan & Mungham, 2000a). Even if cross-
party discussions had been a regular occurrence, the relative dominance of English 
media within the country may still have limited public awareness (Williams, 2000).  
While only 10 per cent of morning papers read in Scotland are produced in England, 
nearly 90 per cent of papers read in Wales originate from outside the country. Similarly, 
while there is almost no broadcast overlap between Scotland and England, large parts 
of Wales receive both English and Welsh TV and radio channels. Especially when 
devolution is not discussed at the central level, these English media tend to devote little 
attention to devolution. Taken together this meant that, at the start of the campaign, 
public opinion on devolution was much less firmly rooted in Wales than in Scotland.  
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Table 5.8 Share of voters that remain undecided (1977-1979, 1997) 
Scotland 
1979 1997 
Poll fieldwork dates  % undecided Publication dates  % undecided 
5-7 Feb 1977 17% June 1997 15% 
6-14Mar 1978 19% July 1997 10% 
16-18 May 1978 1% August 1997 16% 
26 Sept-3 Oct 1978 12% 2 Sept 1997 18% 
8-20 Jan 1979 19% 7 Sept 1997 16% 
29 Jan- 6 Feb 1979 20% 7 Sept 1997 15% 
8-11 Feb 1979 17% 8 Sept 1997 11% 
15-16 Feb 1979 26% 10 Sept 1997 19% 
18-19 Feb 1979 14% 10 Sept 1997 12% 
21-22 Feb 1979 11%   
24-25 Feb 1979 17%   
Average 16% Average 15% 
Wales 
1979 1997 
Poll fieldwork dates  % undecided Publication dates  % undecided 
18 Mar 1977 21% Jun 1997 34% 
5 May 1978 27% Aug 1997 25% 
15 Sep 1978 25% Sept 1997 27% 
1 Feb 1979 31% Sept 1997 34% 
19-20 Feb 1979 25%   
19-22 Feb 1979 20%   
21-22 Feb 1979 11%   
Average 23% Average  30% 
Sources: Balsom & McAllister (1979: 408-409), Broughton (1998: 205) and Denver, et 
al. (2000:123) 
 
Opinion polls showed that a considerable part of the Welsh electorate remained 
unsure of their voting intentions throughout the campaign (see Table 5.8). Given the 
distribution of preferences at the time of the 1997 election, a swing of only a few 
percentage points could be sufficient to influence the overall outcome of the 
referendum in Wales. In this context, the campaign efforts did have the ability to 
significantly influence the overall outcome of the referendum. This time around, neither 
opponents nor the proponents of devolution however made full use of these 
opportunities. On the Yes side, attempts to form a united campaign were frustrated by 
disagreements about the exact type of devolution that was needed. In the absence of a 
Welsh equivalent to the Scottish Convention, Labour had developed its devolution 
plans in relative isolation.  
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As a result, Liberal Democrat and Plaid Cymru concerns with the proposals only 
emerged in the run-up to the referendum (McAllister, 1998). In addition, a number of 
prominent Labour MPs continued to question elements of the legislation in Wales 
(Broughton, 1998). These internal divisions in the yes camp further enhanced the 
prevailing popular insecurity about what exactly was on offer in the pre-legislative 
referendum. Given the more moderate preferences of the Welsh electorate (see Figure 
5.3), any uncertainty about the extent of devolution clearly had the potential to play in 
the hands of the No camp. Poorly organised and underfunded, the No campaign 
however failed to fully benefit from these opportunities (Jones, 2000). Barely visible 
and seemingly unable to decide whether devolution would lead to an expensive talking 
shop or the break-up of Britain, it failed to produce a coherent message. The fact that 
the majority of initially undecided voters ended up in the No camp therefore seem to 
says more about the failings of the Yes camp, than it does about the strength of the No 
campaign (Broughton, 1998).    
5.5. Conclusion 
 This chapter examined under which circumstances mainstream accommodation 
of regionalist demands is likely to lead to actual policy change. By applying a veto 
player approach, it was able to both formalise existing descriptions of decisions and 
non-decisions as well as challenge elements of the conventional wisdom. For instance, 
the failure of Edward Heath to act on his public commitments to Scottish devolution 
during his time in office is widely seen as evidence of a lack of true commitment to the 
policy. A veto player approach exposes this argument as potentially circular. Instead, 
this period of non-decision is more likely to be the result of rational action’s on the part 
of Heath, given the preference constellation within the Parliamentary Conservative 
Party at the time. When decisions are taken, a veto player approach again draws 
attention to frequently under-analysed elements of the government system. For 
example, the existing literature tends to discuss the influence of the House of Lords 
and minority parties within the House of Commons without classifying the nature of this 
influence.  
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Through a structured analysis this chapter was able to demonstrate that the House of 
Lords did not possess veto powers at any point during the decision-making moments 
under consideration here. In addition, neither the regionalist parties nor the Liberals 
possessed primary agenda setting powers at any point in time. They did however 
acquire potential veto powers during the decision-making process in the 1970s, 
creating substantial political act-based incentives for the governing party to attempt to 
salvage the devolution legislation. 
  By making the distribution of agenda-setting and veto powers explicit, this 
chapter was furthermore able to advance a new perspective on the dynamics of 
regionalist accommodation in the 1970s. During this period, the existence of strong 
anti-devolution tendencies within the Parliamentary Labour Party is widely seen as one 
of the main obstacles to change.  Although a lack of party cohesion on the substantive 
topic was indeed evident, the level of backbench rebellion was at least partially caused 
by a general decline in party discipline. Following decades of near perfect party 
discipline, backbench rebellions increased markedly under the 1970-1974 
Conservative government. This trend continued under subsequent governments of 
various persuasions. Despite its clear relevance to the case, this sudden decline in 
party discipline across the party system tends not to receive a mention in the 
devolution literature.  
Similarly, it is widely argued that the decision to make devolution dependent on 
the outcome of a post-legislative referendum was aimed at pacifying the government’s 
own backbench. From a rational choice perspective, it is however hard to explain why 
this concession in itself would sway an actor with an outcome preference for the status 
quo to support devolution legislation. This dynamic can only be understood in the 
context of a minority government with dwindling support in the polls. Given the Party’s 
need to rely on Liberal, SNP and Plaid Cymru support to survive a motion of no-
confidence, backbenchers were willing to risk a popular vote on devolution in order to 
avoid early elections.  
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If the government had still enjoyed a narrow overall majority or could count on the 
support of other, more centrist, minority parties, the referendum concession would 
probably not have restored party discipline to the same extent.    
Finally, this chapter shed new light on the role of the referendum instrument in 
both decisions. Within the existing literature, the decision-making rules governing the 
referendums and the campaigning efforts in the run-up to the popular vote are 
generally given considerable attention. Although these aspects clearly have an effect, 
this study qualifies their relative importance. In the 1970s, the so-called Cunningham 
amendment is widely blamed for the failure of Scottish devolution. The analysis in this 
chapter however showed that change was primarily prevented by the weak position of 
the government, rather than the fact that popular support for the legislation fell below 
the ‘40 per cent of the electorate’ threshold. Even if the decision-making path includes 
a post-legislative referendum, the final veto still rests with the House of Commons. The 
results of the 1979 referendum simply required the government to lay a repeal order 
before parliament. Given the fact that the majority of those who voted did favour 
devolution, the government could have legitimately asked the parliament to vote down 
the order. This course of action was not taken because informal enquiries by the whips 
showed that the Labour leadership would not be able to muster sufficient backbench 
support for such a move.     
The chapter furthermore argued that the importance of the referendum 
campaign differed considerably from period to period and country to country. In the 
1970s, the campaigning efforts on both sides of the debate are rightfully argued to 
have had a significant effect on the outcome of the referendums in both Scotland and 
Wales. The relatively recent re-emergence of the debate, combined with the less than 
perfect incorporation of the topic in the party system, gave campaigners a real 
opportunity to radically change public opinion. In both countries, the unified no camp 
proved better able to make use of these opportunities than the heavily divided yes 
camp. On the basis of this experience, the studies into of the 1997 referendums tend to 
devote a disproportionate amount of time on the referendum campaigns.  
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In Scotland, this focus is wholly unjustified. In the period that separates the two 
referendums, the devolution issue received considerable attention in the public domain. 
In addition, the topic became an integral part of the Scottish party system.  As a result, 
public opinion on the subject was firmly rooted by the time of the 1997 general election. 
Especially in the context of clear majority support for devolution, the campaigns 
therefore had little influence on the outcome. In Wales, public opinion remained more 
volatile. In addition, the initial polls suggested that the Welsh were still strongly divided 
over the need for devolution. In this context the campaign could have been influential. 
This time around, neither the opponents nor the proponents of the legislation took full 
advantage of this opportunity. Instead, uncertainty over what was on offer seems to 
have induced many undecided voters to choose the familiar foe over the big unknown. 
Having re-analysed the process that eventually led to devolution, the next chapter will 
analyse how the reality of devolution influences the likelihood of further demands for 
greater autonomy. The final chapter will examine whether it has also changed the 
mechanisms through which such demands are accommodated.   
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6. Regionalism in mainland Britain after devolution 
The empirical parts of the thesis so far have re-analysed the rather well-known 
contemporary history of regionalism and regionalist accommodation in post-war 
mainland Britain. The remaining two substantive chapters of this thesis seek to show 
that the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2 can also be fruitfully employed in 
the post-devolution era. As chronicled in chapters 3 to 5, the re-emergence of spaces 
of regionalism in Scotland and Wales eventually led to the devolution of powers to 
elected regional bodies. Together with the devolution processes in Greater London and 
Northern Ireland, this has transformed the previously highly centralised British 
government system into a distinctively asymmetric form of devolved government. This 
constitutional overhaul will no doubt be remembered as one of the key legacies of the 
1997-2001 Labour government (Hazell, 2007). Whether it will enter the history books 
as the beginning of the end for the United Kingdom, or a period of constitutional reform 
that merely reshaped the Union, remains to be seen.  
The dynamics unleashed by devolution will partially depend on the popular 
response to these developments within the devolved areas and beyond. Over the past 
decade a number of large scale research projects have sought to shed light on this 
issue (see for example the ESRC ‘Devolution and Constitutional Change’ programme 
and the Leverhulme ‘Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution’ programme). 
By applying the typology of regionalisms developed in chapter 2 to the post-devolution 
situation, this chapter seeks to place the findings emerging from this research within a 
coherent theoretical perspective. Chapter 7 will in turn examine to what extent 
devolution has altered the way in which popular demands for greater regional 
autonomy filter into the agenda-setting and decision-making processes that guide 
further changes to the distribution of powers and resources in the post devolution era.        
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6.1. Trends in popular support for decentralisation. 
The effect of devolution and federalisation on popular demand for greater 
regional autonomy is highly debated (see chapter 2). While some have argued that the 
partial accommodation of regionalist demands within the existing state can help to stem 
calls for full secession (Elazar, 1995; Gurr, 1994; Lijphart, 1977; Stepan, 2001), others 
contend that devolution is likely to increase the legitimacy of the region and with it the 
demand for greater regional autonomy (for example see Dikshit, 1975; Kymlicka, 1998; 
Lustik, et al., 2004; Roeder, 1991). Simultaneously, it has been argued that devolution 
elsewhere may lead to comparative grievances in regions that have traditionally not 
harboured strong regionalist movements (Lecours, 2004; Moreno, 2001).  The surveys 
conducted during the first decade of devolution offer us a first opportunity to gauge to 
what extent the developments in different parts of Britain conform to either of these 
predictions. 
   In Scotland and Wales, survey evidence so far suggests that devolution has 
strengthened calls for further decentralisation. This trend has perhaps been most 
pronounced in Wales. In this country, the creation of the Welsh Assembly has been 
accompanied by a marked decline in popular support for a fully centralised system. 
This trend has however not been associated with a rise in support for full 
independence. Rather, the survey evidence suggests that Welsh public increasingly 
supports more extensive forms of devolution (see Table 6.2). The results of the recent 
referendum on Welsh Assembly powers broadly concur with this proposition. In the 
popular vote, held on the 3rd of March 2011, 63.5 percent of those who voted endorsed 
the proposed devolution of primary legislative powers to the Welsh Assembly. In 
addition, popular support for further decentralisation was spatially fairly homogeneous, 
with the proposal attracting majority support in all but 1 of the 22 Welsh regions. When 
we compare these results to the outcome of the 1997 referendum, this suggests that 
support for devolution has increased markedly across Wales (see Table 6.1).  
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It does have to be noted that this result was achieved on a relatively low turnout rate; 
only 35 percent of registered voters took part in the 2011 referendum compared to 50 
percent in 1997. This may indicate that, although support for further decentralisation is 
growing, the salience currently attached to the issue remains quite limited.   
 
Table 6.1 The regional distribution of the vote in the 1997 and 2011 Welsh devolution referendums   
Region % in favour of further 
devolution 
2011 
% in favour of devolution 
1997 
Anglesey 50.9% 64.8% 
Blaenau Gwent 56.1% 68.9% 
Bridgend 54.4% 68.1% 
Caerphilly 54.7% 64.3% 
Cardiff 44.4% 61.4% 
Carmarthenshire 65.3% 70.8% 
Ceredigion 59.2% 66.2% 
Conwy 40.9% 59.7% 
Denbighshire 40.8% 61.8% 
Flintshire 38.2% 62.1% 
Gwynedd 64.1% 76.0% 
Merthyr Tydfil 58.2% 68.9% 
Monmouthshire 32.1% 49.4% 
Neath Port Talbot 66.5% 73.0% 
Newport 37.4% 54.8% 
Pembrokeshire 42.8% 55.0% 
Powys 42.7% 51.6% 
Rhondda Cynon  58.5% 70.7% 
Swansea 52.0% 63.2% 
Torfaen 49.8% 62.8% 
Vale of Glamorgan 36.7% 52.5% 
Wrexham 45.3% 64.1% 
Total yes 50.3% 63.5% 
Turnout 35.2% 50.1% 
Sources: BBC (2011a) and Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
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In Scotland, popular opinion has proved somewhat more fickle (see Table 6.2). As in 
Wales, the partial accommodation for regionalist demands was initially accompanied by 
a marked rise in the share of respondents who favoured devolution over a fully 
centralised British system or complete Scottish independence. Between 2001 and 
2005, the share of respondents who indicated that devolution was their preferred 
constitutional option however declined from 61 percent to 49 percent. Simultaneously, 
support for secession and re-centralisation both increased by six to eight percentage 
points. Recent surveys suggest that this early disenchantment with devolution has now 
been largely redressed. Support for a return to a fully centralised system seems to 
have stabilised around the 10 percent mark. Similarly there is little demand for the re-
centralisation of the fiscal powers devolved to Scotland under the 1998 Scotland Act. 
Minor shifts in the level of support for full independence and extensive devolution 
continue to occur. Nonetheless a fairly stable distribution is starting to emerge, with 
around 30 percent of the population favouring secession, while a further 50 percent 
prefers a devolved Parliament with tax-varying powers over full independence. 
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Table 6.2 Constitutional preferences in the post-devolution era (Wales, Scotland, England 1997-2009) 
Wales 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007      
Independent 13% 10% 12% 14% 9% 12%      
Parliament with law-making  
and taxation powers 
19% 37% 39% 37% 40% 42%      
Assembly with limited  
law-making powers only 
28% 35% 26% 27% 18% 29%      
No elected regional body 40% 18% 23% 22% 33% 17%      
N   637 506 1039 943 495 830      
Scotland 
 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 
Independent 36% 28% 31% 29% 31% 27% 32% 37% 32% 23% 29% 
Parliament with taxation powers 35% 54% 49% 55% 46% 52% 44% 41% 49% 59% 53% 
Parliament without taxation powers 10% 9% 8% 6% 9% 7% 5% 7% 8% 8% 9% 
No elected regional body 19% 9% 12% 9% 14% 14% 19% 15% 10% 10% 9% 
N   647 1407 1593 1538 1558 1413 1544 1417 1484 1425 1378 
England 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Devolution to region 15% 20% 23% 21% 25% 23% 21% 19% 16% 17% 16% 
Devolution to England 19% 21% 17% 19% 18% 22% 20% 24% 19% 29% 33% 
Status quo 66% 59% 60% 59% 57% 56% 59% 57% 65% 54% 52% 
N 2580 1763 2623 2681 912 2534 1651 860 767 909 914 
Sources: Clarke, Stewart, Sanders, & Whiteley (2006), Jones, Heath, & National Centre for Social Research (2004),  Jones, Heath, Seyd, 
& Curtice (2000), Jones & Phillips (2009), Jones, Trystan, & Heath (2002), Jowell, et al. (1998), National Centre for Social Research, 
(2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011),National Centre for Social Research et al. (2001) 
and Scottish Centre for Social Research (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) 
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In England, surveys have only started to systematically ask respondents about 
their views on the government of their region or country after devolution to Scotland 
and Wales became a reality. Overall, the available survey evidence suggests that the 
English public remains highly divided over the proper form of governance for the 
country in the post-devolution era (see Table 6.2). In the immediate aftermath of 
devolution, popular support for the status quo declined somewhat. Simultaneously, the 
share of respondents who favoured the creation of elected regional assemblies in 
England increased. From 2004 onwards support, the demand for regional devolution 
has however started to decline. Initially this trend seemed to be associated with a 
growing popular acceptance of the status quo. Recent surveys however suggest that 
popular discontent with the current system of government is gathering momentum once 
more. This has in turn been accompanied by a growing popular endorsement of 
devolution to a country-wide elected body.   
 Taken together, the available survey evidence thus paints a rather mixed 
picture. While devolution seems to have dampened calls for full secession in Scotland, 
it has not had a similar effect in Wales. In both countries, the partial accommodation of 
regionalist demands has however been associated with a rise in popular support for 
more extensive forms of devolution. Recently, these trends have been accompanied by 
growing popular demand for a devolved English Parliament. This chapter will seek to 
make sense of these developments by applying the typology of regionalisms developed 
in chapter 2 to the post-devolution situation. It will start by looking at the influence of 
devolution on identity, before turning to the democratic and economic sources of 
regionalism in a devolved Britain.  
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6.2. Identity-based regionalism 
New Labour’s devolution project was presented as part of the administration’s 
wider effort to construct a new, modern form of Britishness. Thatcherism, so it was 
argued, had popularised a narrow view of Britain as a nation built upon self-interested 
individualism and a mistrust of foreigners. Under the slogan ‘Cool Brittannia’, New 
Labour launched a counter campaign that was to make Britain the first multicultural, 
multiethnic and multinational state (Gordon Brown as quoted by Richards, 19 April 
1999). In line with this ambition, the 1997 Labour manifesto stated that “[t]he United 
Kingdom is a partnership enriched by distinct national identities and traditions” (Labour 
Party, 1997). By formally recognising this partnership, it was hoped that devolution 
would strengthen the loyalty to the Union in Scotland and Wales and remove the threat 
of separatism. By contrast, others have argued that the partial accommodation of 
regionalist demands is likely to have the opposite effect (for example see Dikshit, 1975; 
Kymlicka, 1998; Lustik, et al., 2004; Roeder, 1991). From this perspective, devolution 
legitimises the imagined community at the regional scale, whilst simultaneously 
undermining the sense of shared interest at the central level. This section will argue 
that the currently available evidence in Britain is broadly concurrent with this second 
proposition, although the effect of devolution on the articulation of identity has been 
fairly modest so far. As a result, it seems unlikely that devolution will spark an identity-
based regionalist revival in mainland Britain.     
As Keating (2003: 35) correctly states, feelings of identity are “neither 
determined rigidly by the past or by rooted social values, nor entirely open for invention 
and manipulation in the present”. It may therefore be too soon to tell what the long term 
effects of devolution are likely to be in this respect. Based on survey evidence collected 
during the first five years of devolution, John Curtice (2006) concludes that devolution 
has been accompanied by a moderate erosion of the British identity, particularly in 
England.  
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He however argues that this change “appears to have been a once-and-for-all step 
change that occurred in and around 1999 rather than a secular decline that might be 
expected to continue further in the future”(Curtice, 2006: 100-101). The subsequent 
trends in regional attachments broadly concur with this view.  
 
Figure 6.1 Trends in the share of respondents who identity with the country level rather than 
Britain as a whole in a forced choice question (1999-2009)  
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Heath, et al. (1999), Jones, et al. (2000), Jones & 
Phillips (2009), Jones, et al. (2002), McCrone, et al. (1999), National Centre for Social 
Research (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011), National Centre for Social Research, et al. (2001), Scottish Centre for 
Social Research (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) 
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Figure 6.1 reports the share of respondents who identify with the country level 
in a forced choice question over the period from 1999 to 2009. The 1997 figures are 
presented as a pre-devolution baseline for each country12. In line with Curtice’s (2006) 
early findings, forced choice questions do not reveal a marked decline in Britishness in 
either Scotland or Wales. The survey results for Wales suggest that the importance 
attached to each identity may be waxing and waning, but this movement may also be 
related to the relatively small sample sizes in years where a Welsh survey is not 
available. In England devolution elsewhere has been accompanied by a rise in the 
share of respondents who prioritise their country identity over the British identity in a 
forced choice question. Following the initial ‘once-and-for-all step change’ described by 
Curtice (2006), the prominence of the English identity marginally increased again 
between 2004 and 2006. The more recent surveys however suggest that this has been 
a temporary development.  
Since the 1990s, several large scale surveys have also included the so-called 
Moreno question, which asks respondents to locate themselves on a five-point scale 
ranging from ‘country identity, not British’ to’ British, not country identity’. The answers 
to this question allow us to examine the relationship between the regional and the 
central identity and any shifts in the relative importance attached to each. Table 6.3 
summarises the results of this question in the years between 1997 and 2009 for which 
data is available. The penultimate row for each country reports the share of 
respondents who indicated that they felt equally, more or only British.  
  
                                               
12 The primary aim of this exercise is to investigate whether devolution has indeed led to an 
increase in the share of respondents who prioritise the identity of the country they live in over 
the wider British polity. The samples are therefore limited to those who indicated that they felt 
either British or the identity of the country that they lived in at the time of the survey. Most 
studies instead report identity groups as a share of the whole sample (Curtice, 2006) 
(Bechhofer, McCrone, & 2007; Curtice & Heath, 2009). When examining the overall likelihood of 
identity-based regionalism, this is the correct approach (see chapter 3). However, when we try 
to isolate the effect of devolution on feelings of belonging, we need to prevent general trends in 
migration from affecting our results. Focussing our attention only on those who choose either 
the British identity or the identity of the country they live in allows us to do this.         
229 | P a g e  
 
Table 6.3 Trends in the importance attached to regional and British identities (1997-2009) 
England 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 2007 2009 
English, not British 8% 19% 16% 19% 21% 20% 
More English than 
British 
18% 15% 14% 21% 17% 17% 
Equally English and 
British 
49% 39% 45% 34% 34% 38% 
More British than 
English 
16% 12% 11% 15% 15% 11% 
British, not English 10% 14% 15% 11% 13% 14% 
Equally, more or only  
British 
74% 65% 70% 60% 62% 63% 
N 2383 2531 1683 1742 779 1756 
Scotland 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 2007 2009 
Scottish, not British 24% 34% 37% 34% 28% 31% 
More Scottish than 
British 
41% 36% 32% 34% 32% 31% 
Equally Scottish and 
British 
27% 23% 24% 23% 29% 28% 
More British than 
Scottish 
4% 4% 3% 5% 5% 6% 
British, not Scottish 4% 4% 4% 4% 7% 4% 
Equally, more or only  
British 
35% 31% 31% 32% 41%  
38% 
N 841 1423 1541 1441 1425 1325 
Wales 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 2007 2009 
Welsh, not British 14% 19% 24% 23% 23%  
More Welsh than 
British 
31% 21% 23% 18% 22%  
Equally Welsh and 
British 
27% 37% 30% 36% 33%  
More British than 
Welsh 
11% 8% 11% 7% 11%  
British, not Welsh 16% 15% 11% 17% 11%  
Equally, more or only  
British 
55% 60% 53% 60% 55%  
N 171 744 1047 1134 839  
Sources: Own elaboration based on Heath, et al. (1999), Jones, et al. (2004), Jones, et 
al. (2000), Jones & Phillips (2009), Jones, et al. (2002), McCrone, et al. (1999), 
National Centre for Social Research (2001, 2003, 2004a, 2005, 2009, 2011), National 
Centre for Social Research, et al. (2001), Scottish Centre for Social Research (2005, 
2009, 2010) 
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In 1997, only 8 percent of the respondents in England felt ‘English, not British’, 
while 74 percent felt equally, more or only British. By comparison 14 percent of the 
Welsh and 24 percent of the Scottish respondents indicated that they identified only 
with the country identity. While 55 percent of Welsh respondents felt equally, more or 
only British, only 35 percent of the respondents in Scotland fell within this category. As 
would be anticipated from the noted trends in the forced choice responses, devolution 
seems to have had the most pronounced effect on the articulation of identity in 
England. Shortly after devolution, the share of respondents that felt equally, more or 
only British declined from 74 percent to 65 percent. This shift was primarily caused by a 
sharp drop in the share of respondents who felt equally British and English. 
Simultaneously the share of respondents who identify themselves as ‘English not 
British’ doubled between 1997 and 1999. Since then, the share of respondents in each 
of the Moreno categories seems to have stabilised around the 1999 level. At present 
there is therefore no reason to anticipate that the post-devolution era will be 
characterised by a perpetual decline in Britishness amongst those living in England. 
Significant changes to the devolved arrangement or the formal secession of parts of 
Britain may however cause further shifts in the articulation of feelings of belonging.   
In Scotland and Wales, the effect of devolution on the relative importance of the 
regional and central identity has in many ways been even more modest. In both 
countries, the share of respondents who felt equally, more or only British has 
traditionally been lower than in England. There is however no indication that devolution 
has been accompanied by a further decline in this category. On the other hand, the 
share of the population that now defines itself as the regional identity only has 
consistently been above the 1997 level in both Scotland and Wales. This is again in 
line with Curtice’s (2006) early finding that devolution may have negatively affected the 
loyalty to the overarching British state felt by those who already had a relatively weak 
sense of Britishness. As this group is traditionally seen as most prone to secessionism, 
this shift may yet prove significant.     
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  So far, we can thus conclude that devolution has done little to strengthen the 
loyalty to the British state in the devolved areas, whilst it has simultaneously increased 
the relative importance attached to the regional identity in non-devolved areas. I would 
however argue that the noted changes in attachments seem too moderate to create a 
real potential for large-scale identity-based regionalism at this time. This proposition is 
supported by the fact that the majority of those who claim to be exclusively Scottish, 
Welsh or English nonetheless continue to feel very or fairly close to Britain as a whole 
(see Table 6.4). In England, this tendency is especially pronounced, with over 70 per 
cent combining an exclusive English identity with a fairly or very close attachment to 
Britain as a whole. Strong dual attachments are less common amongst those who 
indicate that they feel ‘Scottish, not British’ or ‘Welsh, not British’. Even among this 
group, the majority of respondents however did feel very or fairly close to Britain.   
 
Table 6.4 Moreno extremes and feelings of attachment to the British state (2003)  
 Scottish, not 
British 
Welsh, not British English, not 
British 
Very close to 
Britain 
11% 14% 28% 
Fairly close to 
Britain 
46% 43% 43% 
Not very close to 
Britain 
34% 37% 25% 
Not at all close to 
Britain 
9% 6% 4% 
N 484 210 324 
Sources: Jones, et al. (2004), National Centre for Social Research (2005), Scottish 
Centre for Social Research (2005) 
 
Further examination of the survey evidence reveals that feelings of attachments 
to different geographical scales may even be mutually reinforcing rather than conflicting 
(see Table 6.5). In England, respondents were asked about their attachment to their 
Government Office region, England and Britain as a whole.  Overall, 77 percent of 
respondents felt very or fairly close to their Government Office region, while 85 percent 
felt a close attachment to England as a whole.  Of those who felt very or fairly close to 
their region, 90 per cent also felt very or fairly close to England as a whole.  
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Similarly, the vast majority of those who felt close to England also felt close to Britain 
as a whole. Interestingly, those who expressed a stronger attachment to the smaller 
geographical scale were also more likely to have a strong attachment to the larger unit 
and vice-versa. Taken together, this suggests that the regional, the country and the 
British identity are nested and mutually reinforcing feelings of belonging for the majority 
of people in England.  
In Scotland and Wales, respondents were asked about their attachment to their 
country and Britain as a whole. In Wales, 89 per cent of respondents felt a fairly or very 
close attachment to their country. In Scotland, feelings of belonging were even more 
pronounced, with 95 percent of respondents indicating a very or fairly close attachment 
to the country level. In both countries, the vast majority of respondents who felt a close 
attachment to their country also indicated a fairly or very close attachment to Britain as 
a whole. As in England, those who felt more strongly attached to their country were 
also more likely to feel a strong attachment to Britain. Taken together, this suggests 
that for the vast majority of Scottish and Welsh people, country level attachments can 
and do still coincide with feelings of belonging to the wider British society as well.  
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Table 6.5 Feelings of attachment to different geographical scales (2003, column percent) 
England 
 Very close  
to region 
Fairly close to 
region 
very or fairly 
close to region 
 
Very close to England 
 
67% 
 
27% 
 
42% 
Fairly close to England 27% 60% 47% 
Very or fairly close to 
England 
93% 88% 90% 
N 560 894 1454 
 Very close  
to country 
Fairly close  
to country 
very or fairly 
close to country 
 
Very close to Britain 
 
71% 
 
8% 
 
36% 
Fairly close to Britain 25% 81% 55% 
Very or fairly close to 
Britain 
96% 88% 92% 
N 736 884 1620 
Wales 
 Very close  
to country 
Fairly close  
to country 
Very or fairly 
close to country 
 
Very close to Britain 
 
44% 
 
24% 
 
36% 
Fairly close to Britain 39% 53% 44% 
Very or fairly close to 
Britain 
83% 77% 81% 
N 536 336 872 
Scotland 
 Very close  
to country 
Fairly close  
to country 
Very or fairly 
close to country 
 
Very close to Britain 
 
33% 
 
9% 
 
25% 
Fairly close to Britain 48% 58% 51% 
Very or fairly close to 
Britain 
81% 67% 76% 
N 927 494 1421 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Jones, et al. (2004), National Centre for Social 
Research (2005) and Scottish Centre for Social Research (2005).     
 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis already argued that support for devolution in Scotland 
and Wales during the pre-devolution period could not be characterised as purely 
identity-driven. The available evidence so far suggests that this remains true in the 
post-devolution era. There are signs that the decentralisation of powers and resources 
has been accompanied by a heightened sense of belonging to a regional community.  
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These effects have however been quite moderate and there is little reason to believe 
that the growing importance attached to the regional identity has been accompanied by 
marked identity-based grievances with the centre. We will therefore need to look 
beyond identity in order to gauge the effect devolution is likely to have on popular 
demand for greater regional autonomy.  
 
6.3. Democratic regionalism 
 
Devolution and federalisation are frequently presented as institutional tools 
through which political leaders can manage territorial conflicts (Elazar, 1995; Gurr, 
1994; Lijphart, 1977; Stepan, 2001). As noted in chapter 2, this argument primarily 
rests on the assumption that the creation of opportunities of voice at the regional level 
will dampen grievances with the centre in areas that are prone to regionalism. The first 
part of this section will argue that devolution does not seem to have had this effect in 
Scotland and Wales. Despite some initial disappointments, the Welsh Assembly and 
the Scottish Parliament have established themselves as legitimate spaces of 
democratic representation. By contrast, devolution seems to have done little to improve 
popular trust in the central government. In addition, the behaviour of Scottish, and to a 
lesser extend Welsh, voters has recently started to diverge again from the British 
average. In this context, I argue that the recent change of power at the centre may well 
lead to a revival of democratic regionalism in the devolved areas. The second part of 
this section will subsequently show that devolution has also increased the potential for 
democratic regionalism in England. This shift has been primarily the result of 
grievances with the centre, rather than any increase in the perceived legitimacy of the 
regional level. The support for an English Parliament is therefore likely to evaporate if 
the democratic anomalies in the current system are addressed through central reforms.   
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6.3.1. Democratic regionalism in post-devolution Scotland and Wales 
Democratic grievances with the centre played an important role in the resurgence of 
popular support for greater regional autonomy in the 1980s and 90s (see chapter 3). 
These demands were partial accommodated in the late 1990s. Evaluating to what 
extent this change in the government system has enhanced the perceived legitimacy of 
the centre is complicated by the fact that this reform was itself triggered by a shift in 
power at the central level. In particular, the election of a Labour government in 1997 
signalled the end of the era of Conservative predominance in the UK. As was the case 
in the late 1970s, this shift was primarily caused by changes in the voting behaviour of 
the regional electorates in the East of England13, the Midlands and Greater London 
(see Table 6.6). In the East, rising support for the Labour Party temporarily resulted in 
a return to a more balanced two-party system. In the East and West Midlands and 
Greater London the swing towards Labour was more pronounced. If we apply the 
criteria set out in chapter 314, none of these three regions has displayed true Labour 
predominance in the post-devolution era. Combined with the decline in Conservative 
support in the South West of England, the overall swing towards Labour was 
nonetheless sufficient large to bring the results of the 1997, 2001 and 2005 general 
elections in line with the dominant preferences in Scotland and Wales.  
 
  
                                               
13 From 1994 onwards Standard Statistical Regions (SSR) were replaced by Government Office 
Regions (GOR) in England. The East of England GOR refers to the East Anglia SSR plus 
Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire and Essex 
14 In chapter 3, a predominant party system was defined as a system in which (i) a single party 
wins the absolute majority of the seats (ii) for at least three consecutive government periods (iii) 
on the basis of a percentage of the seats that is at least 10 percentage points higher than that of 
the second most successful party. 
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Table 6.6 Voting patterns in East Anglia/Eastern, Midlands, Greater London, Scotland and Wales 
(1997-2010)  
East of England 
 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Largest party in vote share Con Con Con Con 
Percentage points between vote share of 
largest and second largest party  
0.9% 5.0% 13.5% 23.0% 
Seats share of largest party 60.7% 71.4% 89.7% 58.9% 
East Midlands 
 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Largest party (by vote share) Lab Lab Lab Con 
Percentage points between vote share of 
largest and second largest party  
12.9% 7.8% 1.9% 11.4% 
Seats share of largest party 68.2% 63.6% 63.6% 67.4% 
West Midlands 
 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Largest party (by vote share) Lab Lab Lab Con 
Percentage points between vote share of 
largest and second largest party 
13.3% 9.8% 3.7% 8.9% 
Seats share of largest party 72.9% 72.9% 66.1% 55.9% 
Greater London 
 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Largest party (by vote share) Lab Lab Lab Lab 
Percentage points between vote share of 
largest and second largest party 
18.3% 16.9% 7.0% 2.1% 
Seats share of largest party 77.0% 74.3% 59.5% 52.1% 
Scotland 
 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Largest party (by vote share) Lab Lab Lab Lab 
Percentage points between vote share of 
largest and second largest party 
23.5% 23.2% 16.3% 23.1% 
Seats share of largest party 77.8% 76.4% 67.8% 69.5% 
Wales 
 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Largest party (by vote share) Lab Lab Lab Lab 
Percentage points between vote share of 
largest and second largest party 
35.1% 27.6% 21.3% 10.1% 
Seats share of largest party 85.0% 85.0% 72.5% 65.0% 
Sources: own elaboration based on Rallings & Thrasher (2007) and BBC (2010) 
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We would anticipate that the greater concurrence of the general election results with 
Scottish and Welsh preferences enhanced the perceived legitimacy of the centre 
between 1997 and 2010. Evidence from the 1997 Scottish and Welsh referendum 
studies lends only partial support to this proposition. In this survey, respondents were 
asked how much they would trust the UK government in general and selected political 
parties in particular to work in the interest of their country (see Table 6.7). In both 
Scotland and Wales, less than half of respondents felt that the UK government could 
be trusted to work in the interest of their country most or all of the time. Trust in 
individual central-level parties varied considerably. 
As could be anticipated, the nationalist parties were most widely trusted to look 
after the interests of the country. In both Scotland and Wales, the Labour Party was the 
second most trusted party, with the majority of respondents feeling that Labour could 
be trusted to work in the interest of the country most or all of the time. Across the 
board, trust in the Labour Party was positively correlated with trust in the UK 
government as a whole. The Conservative Party was far less favourably perceived. In 
both countries, less than 15 percent of respondents felt that this Party could be trusted 
to work in the interest of their country most or all of the time. Significantly, trust in the 
Conservative Party remained positively correlated with trust in the central government 
in general. While the election of a Labour government removed some of the immediate 
democratic grievances that had marked the 1980s and early 1990s, survey evidence 
thus suggests that anti-Conservative sentiments continued to have a negative effect on 
the democratic legitimacy of the centre.   
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Table 6.7 Trust in UK Government and central parties to work in the interest of Scotland/Wales 
(1997) 
Scotland 
 UK 
Government 
Conservative Labour LibDem SNP 
just about 
always 
4% 3% 12% 3% 28% 
most of the 
time 
32% 9% 49% 31% 37% 
only some of 
the time 
53% 31% 34% 41% 22% 
almost never 10% 57% 5% 25% 13% 
N 647 661 656 558 628 
Correlation 
with trust in 
UK 
government   
 0.262** 0.198**   
Wales 
 UK 
government 
Conservative Labour LibDem PC 
just about 
always 
8% 2% 9% 2% 24% 
most of the 
time 
38% 12% 46% 25% 35% 
only some of 
the time 
48% 41% 37% 56% 25% 
almost never 5% 45% 8% 18% 16% 
N 626 640 646 525 568 
Correlation 
with trust in 
UK 
government   
 0.226** 0.256**   
Sources: Own elaboration based on Jowell, et al. (1998), ** significant at 0.01 level, * 
significant at 0.05 level (Pearson two-tailed)  
 
Unfortunately, survey evidence does not allow us to test whether these effects have 
persisted throughout the post-devolution era. There is however little evidence that trust 
in the central government as a whole improved over the course of three consecutive 
Labour administrations (see Table 6.8). Quite on the contrary, surveys held in the 
immediate aftermath of devolution show a noticeable decline in the share of Welsh and 
Scottish respondents who trust the central government to work in the interest of their 
country. More recently, the share of respondents who feel that the centre can be 
trusted to work in the interest of their country has all but returned to the pre-devolution 
level. This suggests that popular confidence in the devolved system may gradually be 
increasing.  
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Nonetheless, the majority of Scottish and Welsh voters do not feel that the centre can 
be trusted to work in the interest of their country most or all of the time. As was the 
case prior to devolution, distrust in the central government has remained strongly 
correlated with support for independence and devolution. Particularly in Wales, this 
association has become more rather than less pronounced over time.  
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Table 6.8 Trust in UK government to work in the interest of Scotland/Wales (1997-2009)  
Scotland 
 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 
just about always 4% 3% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 
most of the time 32% 31% 17% 20% 17% 20% 19% 21% 18% 31% 23% 
only some of the 
time 
53% 51% 54% 56% 53% 56% 52% 54% 53% 48% 51% 
almost never 10% 15% 28% 22% 27% 22% 27% 23% 26% 17% 25% 
N 647 1438 1627 1572 1616 1471 1600 1492 1546 1463 1438 
Correlation with 
constitutional 
preference  
-.156** -.246** -.177** -.195** -.123** -.190** -.120** -.141** -.193** -.254**  
 
-.204** 
Wales 
 1997 1999  2001  2003    2007  
just about always 8% 6%  2%  2%    4%  
most of the time 38% 28%  22%  21%    31%  
only some of the 
time 
48% 53%  59%  59%    52%  
almost never 5% 14%  17%  18%    12%  
N 626 777  1054  973    868  
Correlation with 
constitutional 
preference  
-.082* -.104*  -.108**  -.129**    -.200**  
Sources: Own elaboration based on Jones, et al. (2004), R. Wyn  Jones, et al. (2000), Jones & Phillips (2009), Jowell, et al. (1998) 
National Centre for Social Research (2002b, 2004a, 2004b, 2009), National Centre for Social Research, et al. (2001) and Scottish Centre 
for Social Research (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010) Constitutional preferences have been coded as: 1=independent, 2=devolution with 
taxation powers, 3=devolution without taxation powers, 4=no devolution. ** significant at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level (Pearson 
two-tailed).  
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Taken together, there is thus little reason to assume that devolution has 
significantly increased the democratic legitimacy of the centre. In this context, Labour’s 
recent fall from grace in England has the potential to create a substantial regionalist 
backlash. Table 6.9 reports the voting patterns in 2010 by country and region, as well 
as the percentage point change from the 2005 results. In the UK as a whole, Labour’s 
share of the popular vote declined from 35 per cent in 2005 to 29 in 2010. This shift 
was even more pronounced in England, where the Party’s share of the vote dropped by 
7.4 percentage points. Across the board, the electorates in the English regions turned 
away from Labour in favour of the Conservative Party, and to a lesser extent the 
Liberal Democrats and other smaller parties. The only English region to partially buck 
this trend was Greater London, where Labour support declined by a relatively modest 
2.3 percentage points. Outside of England, the trends have been mixed; while the 
changes in voting patterns in Wales largely mirrored those in England, support for the 
Labour Party actually increased by 3.1 percentage points in Scotland.   
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Table 6.9 General election results 2010 by country and region 
 Labour Conservative Liberal 
Democrats 
SNP/PC 
 Share 
of the 
vote 
Change 
from 
2005 
Share 
of the 
vote 
Change 
from 
2005 
Share 
of the 
vote 
Change 
from 
2005 
Share 
of the 
vote 
Change 
from 
2005 
UK 29.0% -6.2% 36.1% 3.8% 23.0% 1.0% 2.30% 0% 
England 28.1% -7.4% 39.6% 3.9% 24.2% 1.3%   
East 
Midlands 
29.8% -9.2% 41.2% 4.1% 20.8% 2.3%   
Eastern 19.6% -10.2% 47.1% 3.8% 24.1% 2.3%   
Greater 
London 
36.6% -2.3% 34.5% 2.6% 22.1% 0.2%   
North 
East 
43.6% -9.3% 23.7% 4.2% 23.6% 0.3%   
North 
West 
39.5% -5.6% 31.7% 3.0% 21.6% 0.2%   
South 
East 
16.2% -8.2% 49.9% 4.9% 26.2% 0.8%   
South 
West 
15.4% -7.4% 42.8% 4.2% 34.7% 2.1%   
West 
Midlands 
30.6% -8.1% 39.5% 4.5% 20.5% 1.9%   
Yorkshire 
and the 
Humber 
34.7% -8.9% 32.5% 3.4% 23.0% 2.3%   
Scotland 42.0% 3.1% 16.7% 0.9% 18.9% -3.7% 19.9% 2.2% 
Wales 36.2% -6.5% 26.1% 4.7% 20.1% 1.7% 11.30% -1.30% 
Source: BBC ( 2010) 
Despite the significant decline in Labour support across England and Wales, 
the swing towards the Conservatives was not large enough to award the Party an 
overall majority in the House of Commons. Following a short period of negotiations, the 
Conservative Party entered into a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal 
democrat party leader, Nick Clegg, has argued that his Party’s participation in 
government will help to prevent a return to “the savagery of Margaret Thatcher's axe” 
(Nick Clegg as quoted by Rawnsley, 6th of June 2010). Nonetheless, substantial cuts 
in public spending are being implemented. Against the backdrop of economic recession 
and growing unemployment, these measures have already led to considerable public 
protests. As the effects of these policies become increasingly tangible, popular 
discontent is likely to increase. Especially in traditionally left-leaning regions with a 
strong dependency on the public sector, such grievances about central policies may 
lead to a revival of democratic regionalism.     
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The experiences from the 1970s suggest that discontent with central 
government and its policies may take some time to translate into support for greater 
regional autonomy. In particular, chapter 3 argued that popular demand for devolution 
only really started to rise markedly when it became clear that the existing Conservative 
predominance at the centre might be becoming a long term feature of the British party 
system. Based on this experience, it could be argued that the current shift in English 
voting patterns is unlikely to lead to an immediate rise in support for further 
decentralisation in Scotland and Wales. Rather, the potential for democratic 
regionalism would seem to depend on the extent to which the recent regionalisation of 
the British party system will persist in subsequent elections.    
On the other hand, it can be argued that the recent change of power at the 
centre occurred under very different circumstances and past experiences may 
therefore be a poor predictor for future developments in this case. Margaret Thatcher 
for example gained office in 1979 on the back of a pronounced and fairly uniform shift 
towards the Conservative Party across all British regions (see Table 6.10). In Scotland, 
popular support for Conservative candidates increased from 24.7 percent in October 
1974 to 31.4 per cent in 1979. Similarly, the Conservative Party captured 32.2 per cent 
of the Welsh vote, which constituted an increase of over 8 percentage points compared 
to the previous election. This suggests that the change of power at the centre in the 
late 1970s represented a real and profound shift in popular opinion, even in traditionally 
left-leaning regions. As noted, the swing towards the Conservatives in 2010 was 
significantly less pronounced but largely uniform across England and Wales. By 
contrast, Scottish support for the Conservative Party hardly increased at all between 
2005 and 2010 (see Table 6.9). As a result, the current prime minister, David Cameron, 
and his party only received an explicit mandate to govern from 16.7 percent of the 
Scottish electorate. 
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Table 6.10 General election results in 1979 by country and region compared to October 1974 
results 
 Labour Conservative Liberal 
Democrats 
SNP/PC 
 Share 
of the 
vote 
Change 
from 
1974 
Share 
of the 
vote 
Change 
from 
1974 
Share 
of the 
vote 
Change 
from 
1974 
Share 
of the 
vote 
Change 
from 
1974 
UK 36.9% -2.4% 43.9% 8.2% 13.8% -4.5% 2.0% -1.4% 
England 36.7% -3.4% 47.2% 8.4% 14.9% -5.3%   
East Anglia 32.6% -2.9% 50.8% 7.0% 16.0% -4.6%   
East 
Midlands 
38.6% -3.6% 46.8% 8.3% 13.7% -4.3%   
Greater 
London 
39.6% -4.3% 46.0% 8.6% 11.9% -5.1%   
Northern  50.2% -2.0% 35.9% 6.0% 12.4% -4.1%   
North West 42.6% -2.0% 43.8% 6.8% 13.0% -5.0%   
South East 26.8% -4.1% 54.7% 9.7% 17.5% -6.2%   
South West 24.4% -4.3% 51.9% 8.3% 22.4% -4.9%   
West 
Midlands 
40.1% -3.8% 47.1% 9.6% 11.5% -6.3%   
Yorkshire 
and 
Humberside 
44.5% -1.9% 39.4% 6.8% 15.1% -5.1%   
Scotland 41.5% 5.2% 31.4% 6.7% 9.0% 0.7% 17.3% -13.1% 
Wales 48.6% -0.9% 32.2% 8.3% 10.6% -4.9% 8.1% -2.70% 
Source: Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
 
Both in the late 1970s and in the recent elections, the shift towards the 
Conservatives in England and Wales was accompanied by a rise in Labour support in 
Scotland (see Table 6.9 and 6.10). This similarity presumably prompted SNP leader, 
Alex Salmond, to argue that the relatively strong showing of the Labour Party in 2010 
should be seen as part of a  “very long-term and probably bad [Scottish] habit of trying 
to prevent Tory governments taking power in England by voting Labour in Scotland” 
(Peterkin & Urquart, 7th of May 2010). These seemingly uniform trends however have 
very different origins. In the 1970s, the rise in Labour support was primarily related to 
the collapse of the SNP. Having gained considerable ground during the start of the 
1970s, SNP support declined markedly in the latter half of the decade. In this process, 
a significant number of those who had switched to the SNP in previous elections 
returned to Labour and the Conservatives. As a result, both Parties significantly 
improved their share of the Scottish vote.  
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By contrast, opinion polls suggest that the rise in Labour support in the 2010 general 
election was primarily related to a late swing from the Liberal Democrats towards 
Labour (YouGov, 2011). Coupled with the a priori likelihood of a hung Parliament and 
the absence of any notable improvement in the Conservative vote in Scotland, this 
evidence is much more consistent with the hypothesis that left-leaning Scottish voters 
flocked towards Labour with the specific intention to keep the Conservative Party out of 
office.    
Taken together, the available evidence suggests that Scottish opposition to the 
return of a Conservative-led government at the centre was significantly more 
pronounced in 2010 than it had been in 1979. While a similar trend could not be 
discerned in Wales, Conservative support in this country also falls well below the level 
recorded in 1979 (see Table 6.9 and 6.10). Simultaneously, it can be argued that the 
viability of the region as an alternative scale of democratic representation has 
increased significantly in both Scotland and Wales. As described in chapter 5, the 1979 
general elections were directly triggered by the failure of the devolution referendums. In 
these polls, the proposed devolution of powers to a directly elected regional body had 
been firmly rejected by the people in Wales, while the plans also failed to receive 
majority support in 6 of the 12 Scottish regions. In this context, convincing the Scottish 
and Welsh electorates that devolution could provide a viable solution to the mounting 
democratic grievances with the centre was always going to be an uphill struggle. By 
contrast, the 2010 Conservative-led government came to power more than 10 years 
after the 1997-2001 Labour Government had successfully secured majority support for 
its devolution proposals. The existence of fairly well-established regional opportunities 
for voice may in turn facilitate the mobilisation of democratic grievances with the centre 
along regionalist lines in the post-devolution era.  
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Table 6.11 Trust in elected regional body to work in the interest of the country (1997-2007)  
Scotland 
 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 
just about always 35% 27% 10% 13% 9% 11% 9% 10% 8% 14% 14% 
most of the time 49% 56% 45% 53% 44% 53% 42% 47% 44% 58% 49% 
only some of the 
time 
13% 15% 35% 29% 35% 32% 38% 35% 40% 25% 31% 
almost never 3% 2% 10% 5% 12% 5% 11% 8% 8% 3% 6% 
N 645 1430 1594 1564 1623 1475 792 1493 1545 1455 1443 
Correlation with 
constitutional 
preference 
.414** .151** .136** .165** .176** .149** .141** .075** .083** .111** .161** 
Wales 
 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 
just about always 24% 25% NA 12% NA 13% NA NA NA 19% NA 
most of the time 45% 45%  49%  53%    54%  
only some of the 
time 
26% 26%  32%  28%    24%  
almost never 5% 5%  7%  6%    3%  
N 621 760  1044  967    869  
Correlation with 
constitutional 
preference 
.388** .229**  .149**  .200**    .170**  
Sources: Own elaboration based on  Jones, et al. (2004), Jones, et al. (2000), Jones & Phillips (2009), Jowell, et al. (1998), National 
Centre for Social Research (2002b, 2004a, 2004b, 2009), National Centre for Social Research, et al. (2001) and Scottish Centre for 
Social Research (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010)  Constitutional preferences have been coded as: 1=independent, 2=devolution with 
taxation powers, 3=devolution without taxation powers, 4=no devolution. ** significant at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level (Pearson 
two-tailed)  
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In order for this effect to emerge, the region itself however needs to be 
perceived as a more capable representative of the people than the central level. Prior 
to devolution, the vast majority of respondents in Scotland and Wales indicated that 
they would trust an elected country-level body to work in the interest of their country 
most or all of the time (see Table 6.11). In both countries, this belief was strongly 
correlated with support for greater regional autonomy. In Scotland in particular, the 
early years of devolution seem to have produced some popular doubts regarding the 
democratic benefits of decentralisation. Simultaneously, the strength of the association 
between trust in the devolved government and support for regional autonomy declined. 
The most likely explanation for this phenomenon seems to be that popular trust in a 
hypothetical regional body was relatively strongly influenced by constitutional 
preferences prior to devolution. Once the performance of the devolved institutions 
could be judged in practice, this effect presumably became less pronounced.  
Despite this downwards adjustment in the democratic legitimacy of the region, 
the majority of voters in Scotland and Wales continue to trust the devolved institutions 
to work in the interest of their country most or all of the time and such beliefs have 
remained strongly correlated with support for greater regional autonomy. Especially 
when compared to the prevailing level of trust in the centre (see Table 6.8), this 
suggest that the regional scale does enjoy sufficient democratic legitimacy to allow 
perceived democratic deficits at the centre to translate into support for further 
decentralisation.    
6.3.2. Democratic regionalism in post-devolution England 
Based on the available evidence, I would argue that devolution has done little to 
redress the potential for democratic regionalism in Scotland and Wales. 
Simultaneously, the current asymmetric system is increasingly creating democratic 
grievances with the centre in much of England. Although Labour’s devolution 
programme for Scotland and Wales was accompanied by a commitment to 
decentralisation in England, Greater London currently remains the only English region 
represented by a directly elected regional body.  
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While this reform was presented as part of the Government’s devolution programme, 
the Greater London Authority was established to address a very different set of 
problems. Whereas the 1997 Labour manifesto explicitly linked devolution to Scotland 
and Wales to the need to suppress secessionism and maintain the Union, the 
proposals for London were contained under the header of “Good local 
government”(Labour Party, 1997). The subsequent Labour Government green paper 
argued that the existing arrangements in London had proved incapable of dealing with 
pressing local issues (Department Of The Environment Transport And Regions, 1997). 
In this context, it was argued that the creation of a directly elected strategic authority 
and Mayor would help to streamline the current arrangements and address these 
democratic deficits. 
During the debates surrounding the Greater London Authority (Referendum) 
Bill, opposition parties called for a two-question referendum separating the creation of a 
directly elected mayor from the establishment of an elected regional assembly 
(Hansard (Commons), 10th November 1997, vol. 300, cols. 668). The 1997-2001 
Labour Government however enjoyed a large enough majority in the House to fend-off 
such attempts to change the decision-making rules. A single question referendum was 
held on the 7th of May 1998. This poll returned a comfortable majority in favour of the 
Government’s original proposals for a Greater London Authority, made up of an elected 
Mayor and a separately elected assembly. The Annual London Surveys that have been 
conducted since the establishment of the Greater London Authority however suggest 
that the Conservative Party might have been right in arguing that there was no real 
demand for an elected assembly.  
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Table 6.12 Satisfaction with the work of the Greater London Assembly and the Mayor 
 Share of respondents who answered ‘Don’t Know’, when asked 
about the responsibilities of the Mayor and the Greater London 
Assembly (GLA) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 
GLA 42% 59% 54% 57% 40% 35% 37% 38% 49% 43% 
Mayor 16% 23% 18% 19% 12% 8% 9% 7% 22% 24% 
 Satisfaction with the performance of the Greater London Assembly 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 
Very 
satisfied 
2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 3% 2% 2% 1% 2% 
Fairly 
satisfied 
17% 15% 8% 11% 16% 18% 17% 21% 17% 14% 
neither 39% 35% 31% 33% 37% 31% 39% 37% 23% 32% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
4% 7% 6% 5% 6% 7% 7% 8% 7% 4% 
very 
dissatisfied 
3% 5% 4% 4% 5% 3% 5% 3% 1% 1% 
Don’t 
Know 
36% 37% 50% 47% 35% 38% 30% 29% 51% 48% 
 Satisfaction with the performance of the Mayor 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 
Very 
satisfied 
5% 6% 4% 7% 6% 7% 7% 8% 5% 5% 
Fairly 
satisfied 
25% 29% 23% 28% 33% 30% 29% 36% 25% 21% 
neither 20% 31% 29% 28% 27% 26% 28% 23% 26% 40% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
5% 9% 14% 11% 12% 13% 13% 14% 9% 8% 
very 
dissatisfied 
3% 5% 13% 10% 9% 11% 13% 8% 3% 3% 
Don’t 
Know 
23% 19% 17% 17% 14% 12% 9% 10% 32% 23% 
Source: (BMG Research, 2009, 2010; MORI Social Research Division, 2000, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) 
 
From the outset, there has been considerable confusion regarding the powers and 
responsibilities of the Greater London Assembly (GLA). Ten years on, a significant 
minority within the population remains unsure about its role and satisfaction with the 
performance of the GLA continues to be very limited (see Table 6.12). By comparison, 
popular knowledge and satisfaction with the performance of the Mayor of London has 
been more pronounced. Nonetheless, the replacement of Ken Livingstone by Boris 
Johnson in 2008 has been accompanied by a marked increase in the share of 
respondents who indicate that they are unsure of the responsibilities of the Mayor and 
unable to say whether they are satisfied with his performance.  
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As will be further elaborated in chapter 7, this may be seen as a reflection of the 
personality-driven nature of the Mayor contest and the strongly personal mandate this 
produces. 
Taken together, this suggests that the region itself enjoys a relatively limited 
degree of legitimacy as an alternative space of democratic representation. 
Simultaneously, there is little reason to assume that democratic grievances with the 
centre will be significantly more prevalent in Greater London than in the other English 
regions. Throughout the post-war period, voting patterns in Greater London have been 
relatively close to the UK average (see chapter 3). As noted, the 2010 results signify a 
partial break from this trend, as Labour support in Greater London proved more robust 
than in other English regions. Nonetheless, there has been a notable shift towards the 
Conservatives, with 35 per cent of voters supporting this Party in the recent general 
elections. This remains well above the share of the vote received by Conservative 
candidates in Scotland and Wales, or indeed the North East of England. I would 
therefore argue that devolution is unlikely to be accompanied by a marked rise in 
democratic regionalism in this area.    
    Despite efforts to extend devolution to selected English regions, elected 
regional bodies have not been established in the rest of England. There are significant 
differences in regional voting patterns, but opinion polls consistently suggest that 
demand for democratic devolution to the regional level remains very limited in England. 
Partially this may reflect the fact that the majority of English respondents trust the UK 
government to work in the interests of England as a whole most or all of the time (see 
Table 6.13). Interestingly, the survey conducted in the context of the planned 2004 
devolution referendums in the North East, Yorkshire and the Humber, and the North 
West produced very different results at the regional level. Only around 30 percent of 
the respondents in these three regions felt that the UK government could be trusted to 
work in the interest of their specific region most or all of the time (see Table 6.13). In 
addition, a substantial minority indicated that the central government could almost 
never be trusted to work in the interest of their specific region.  
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Table 6.13 Trust in UK government to work in the interest of country/region (2000-2007) 
England 
 2001 2003 2007 
just about always 9% 7% 8% 
most of the time 50% 48% 46% 
only some of the 
time 
34% 36% 36% 
almost never 7% 10% 10% 
N 2644 934 811 
Correlation with 
support devolution 
to English 
Parliament 
-.144** -.144** -.200** 
Selected English regions (2004) 
 North East Yorkshire North west 
just about always 3% 2% 2% 
most of the time 27% 26% 24% 
only some of the 
time 
51% 54% 54% 
almost never 20% 17% 21% 
N 729 378 344 
Correlation with 
attitude to 
devolution 
.160** .109* .206** 
Sources: own elaboration based on National Centre for Social Research (2003, 2005, 
2009) and Rallings (2006). Constitutional preferences have been coded as: in favour 
an English parliament=1, in favour of regional devolution or centralised system=2. The 
second correlation is based on the coding: strongly favour of regional devolution=1, 
generally favour=2, no preference=3, generally against=4, strongly against regional 
devolution=5. ** significant at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level (Pearson two-tailed) 
 
Paradoxically, mistrust in the central government was associated with less, 
rather than more, favourable attitudes towards elected regional assemblies in the North 
East, Yorkshire and the Humber, and the North West. This finding stands in stark 
contrast with the results in Scotland, Wales, and England. The available survey 
evidence suggests that this result is not driven by a general lack in trust in government 
at any scale (see Table 6.14). Although the share of the population that would trust an 
elected regional assembly to act in the interest of the region all or most of the time was 
below the level recorded in Scotland and Wales at the time of the 1997 devolution 
referendums, the level of trust in the regional scale was very similar to that recorded in 
the 2004 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (see Table 6.11). Trust in the regional scale 
was in turn positively correlated with support for devolution across all three regions.  
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In this context, the most probable explanation for the positive correlation between trust 
in the UK government and support for devolution seem to be that the perception that 
the centre cannot be trusted to work in the interest of the region negatively affected 
people’s opinion regarding the rationale behind and ultimate effect of the government’s 
proposals. 
Table 6.14 Trust in elected regional assembly to work in the interest of the region  
Selected English regions (2004) 
 North East Yorkshire North West 
just about always 9% 12% 11% 
most of the time 38% 45% 42% 
only some of the 
time 
38% 31% 38% 
almost never 14% 11% 9% 
N 626 318 254 
Correlation with 
attitude to 
devolution 
.422** .274** .198** 
Source: own elaboration based on Rallings (2006). Constitutional preferences have 
been coded as: strongly favour of regional devolution=1, generally favour=2, no 
preference=3, generally against=4, strongly against regional devolution=5. ** significant 
at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level (Pearson two-tailed) 
 
Unfortunately, similar surveys have not been conducted in other English regions. The 
remainder of this section will therefore have to focus on England as a whole.  The 
available survey evidence consistently shows that the vast majority of English voters 
believe that devolution to Scotland and Wales has made little or no difference to the 
way Britain is governed (see Table 6.15). Interestingly the relationship between the 
perceived effects of devolution elsewhere on the way Britain is governed and the 
constitutional preference for England itself seems to have change over time. At the 
start of the period, those who felt that devolution improved the way Britain was 
governed were significantly more likely to favour some form of devolution for England 
than those who felt that it had made the government of Britain worse. The 2007 results 
suggest that this linear relationship has recently disappeared.  
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Table 6.15 English views on impact of devolution to Scotland and Wales on the government of 
Britain as a whole (2000-2007)  
 Has creating the Welsh Assembly improved the way Britain as a 
whole is governed, made it worse, or made no difference? 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2007 
Improved a 
lot 
2% 1% NA 1% 1% 
Improved a 
little  
14% 12%  9% 11% 
No difference 65% 76%  81% 70% 
A little worse 10% 6%  5% 10% 
A lot worse 5% 2%  2% 5% 
Too early to 
tell 
4% 2%  2% 3% 
N 1674 2355  1552 716 
Pearson 
Correlation 
with support 
for devolution 
to region or 
England 
.106** .087**  .087** -.009 
 Has creating the Scottish parliament improved the way Britain as 
a whole is governed, made it worse, or made no difference? 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2007 
Improved a 
lot 
3% 2% 3% 2% 2% 
Improved a 
little  
17% 15% 18% 12% 11% 
No difference 61% 71% 63% 77% 65% 
A little worse 10% 7% 8% 5% 12% 
A lot worse 5% 3% 4% 2% 7% 
Too early to 
tell 
4% 2% 3% 2% 3% 
N 1693 2422 1654 1601 728 
Correlation 
with support 
for devolution 
to region or 
England 
.123** .089** .090** .102** .015 
Sources: own elaboration based on (National Centre for Social Research, 2002a, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2009). Constitutional preferences have been coded as: In favour of 
English parliament or regional devolution=1, In favour of a centralised system=2. ** 
significant at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level (Pearson two-tailed) 
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Closer inspection reveals that a U-shaped relationship might be emerging, with 
support for devolution highest amongst those who feel that devolution has made the 
government system either a lot worse or a lot better(see Figure 6.2 ). In addition, those 
who feel that devolution has made the way Britain is governed a lot worse are likely to 
favour devolution to the country level rather than the region. By contrast, those who 
feel that devolution has been an improvement remain relatively evenly split across the 
two options. This suggests that democratic deficits at the centre, rather than an 
increase in the perceived legitimacy of the region or the country, may be driving the 
rise in support for devolution in England. 
 
Figure 6.2 Support for devolution according to the perceived effect of the creation of a Scottish 
Parliament on the way Britain is governed (2007) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on National Centre for Social Research (2009) 
 
The primary democratic grievance associated with asymmetric devolution is the 
so-called West Lothian question (Curtice, 2006; Curtice, 2010; Sandford, 2002;  
Tomaney, 1999). This refers to the anomaly that MPs representing constituencies in 
the devolved areas can vote on matters that will never directly affect their constituents 
in the House of Commons.  
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Surveys evidence suggests that the majority of the people in England indeed perceive 
the current system as unfair (see Table 6.16). Respondents who felt more strongly that 
Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on laws that only affect England were also 
more likely to favour devolution to England over the status quo or devolution to the 
regions. Over time, this association has increased in strength. This would suggest that 
the reluctance to address the West-Lothian question is gradually creating support for 
an English Parliament.  
 
Table 6.16 The West-Lothian question in English public opinion  
 Now that Scotland has its own parliament, Scottish MPs should 
no longer be allowed to vote in the House of Commons on laws 
that only affect England 
 2000 2001 2003 2007 
Agree Strongly 20% 22% 25% 29% 
Agree 50% 44% 44% 42% 
Neither 20% 20% 19% 18% 
Disagree 9% 12% 10% 10% 
Disagree 
strongly 
1% 1% 2% 1% 
N 1551 2040 1347 641 
Correlation with 
support for 
Devolution to 
England 
.090** .095** .127** .228** 
Correlation with 
support for 
devolution to 
region or England  
.053* .025 .047 .114** 
Sources: own elaboration based on National Centre for Social Research (2002a, 2003, 
2005, 2009) In the first correlation, constitutional preferences have been coded as: In 
favour of English parliament =1, In favour of regional devolution or a centralised 
system=2. In the second, constitutional preferences have been coded as: In favour of 
English parliament or regional devolution=1, In favour of a centralised system=2. ** 
significant at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level (Pearson two-tailed) 
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The shift in power at the centre is likely to strengthen popular calls to adjust the 
procedures in the House of Commons to the realities of asymmetric devolution in the 
coming years. During the first decade of devolution, the party that secured the majority 
of Scottish and Welsh Westminster seats has also been dominant in much of England. 
As a result, Scottish and Welsh MPs have rarely been pivotal to the outcome of the 
decision-making process.  Notable exceptions to this trend have been the creation of 
NHS foundation hospitals in England and the so-called ‘top-up’ fees paid by English 
students in English universities (Russell & Lodge, 2006). These policies were highly 
controversial within the Labour Party and both attracted considerable backbench 
rebellions. Under these circumstances, the historically high degree of party loyalty 
amongst Scottish and Welsh Labour MPs proved instrumental to the passing of the 
legislation.  
While these two incidents did focus public attention on the West-Lothian 
question, the relative infrequent occurrence of such clashes of English, Scottish and 
Welsh preferences has until recently limited the salience of the issue. The results of the 
2010 general elections however emphasised that the voting powers of Scottish and 
Welsh MPs can have a very profound effect on policy making at the centre. While the 
Labour Party has remained the dominant party in Scotland and Wales, the 
Conservatives now control 56 per cent of the English seats at Westminster. If the West-
Lothian question had been resolved through the creation of an English Parliament or 
an system of ‘English votes on English Laws’, the Party would therefore have had the 
power to unilaterally effectuate policy changes across the range of policy areas 
currently devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.  Under the 
present system, Conservative policies that are carried by a majority of English MPs can 
however be defeated due to the voting behaviour of MPs from devolved areas that will 
never be directly affect by the proposed changes. This may in turn strengthen English 
support for reform.   
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6.4. Economic regionalism 
Traditionally, devolution has primarily been presented as a way to recognise 
and protect the rights of minority identity groups, as well as improve the democratic 
representation of regional electorates. More recently, it has been argued that 
decentralisation may also create an economic dividend (Keating, 1998a; Rodríguez-
Pose & Gill, 2005). The fiscal federalism literature has long suggested that 
decentralisation could enhance government efficiency (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; 
Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956). More recently, economic geographers 
have argued that economic competitiveness has increasingly become dependent on 
local and regional factors during the present age of economic globalisation (Amin & 
Thrift, 1994; Scott, 1998; Storper, 1997). Taken together, this has encouraged 
academics and policy makers alike to argue that devolution may help to promote 
regional growth and prosperity, by empowering regional communities to tailor public 
goods and services to local needs. The extent to which devolution indeed produces an 
economic dividend in practice has however been widely questioned; while some 
empirical studies find a positive relationship between decentralisation and economic 
growth (Akai & Sakata, 2002; Iimi, 2005; Lin & Liu, 2000), others find a negative 
correlation(Zhang & Zou, 1998; Zhang & Zou, 2001), or no significant relationship at all 
(Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Woller & Phillips, 1998) .  
Despite the mixed empirical evidence, the New Regionalism discourse has had 
a clear impact on policy-making. As a result, centrally-led policies aimed at promoting 
prosperity and regional equality are increasingly being replaced by programmes that 
seek to encourage economic efficiency and growth through regional empowerment  
(Keating, 1998a; Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2004). New Labour’s decentralisation agenda 
was very much part of this general trend. While the devolution of powers and resources 
to Scotland and Wales was primarily aimed at removing the threat of secessionism, it 
was argued that the reform was likely to also benefit the two countries economically 
(Goodwin, Jones, & Jones, 2005; Raco, 2003).  
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Similarly, both the early plans to create an elected Greater London Authority and the 
policy document setting out Labour’s decentralisation agenda for the rest of England 
suggest that devolution is likely to encourage the emergence of more competitive and 
resilient regional economies (Labour Party, 1996a, 1996b).  
When the Labour Party came to power in 1997, it swiftly followed through on its 
commitments to economic decentralisation. In Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Greater London, elected regional bodies assumed responsibility for most areas of 
economic development. In the rest of the country, Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) were created. Partially this decentralisation of powers to the English Regions 
aimed to counter the perception of a so-called ‘Celtic Advantage’ (Morgan, 2006). 
Particularly in the poorer regions in the North of England, there has been a 
longstanding suspicion that Scotland and Wales have been able to derive economic 
benefits from their exceptional position within the central system. By coupling its 
devolution agenda elsewhere with a decentralisation of regional policy in the remaining 
English regions, the Labour government no doubt aimed to placate these grievances. 
This section will argue that it actually succeeded in this goal to some extent, not 
because decentralisation has indeed yielded observable economic benefits, but rather 
because the reality of devolution seems to have weakened popular belief in the so-
called economic dividend of decentralisation. Instead, popular discontent has been 
focussed around the distribution of public expenditure across different areas.    
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6.4.1. The economic dividend of devolution 
Prior to devolution, the majority of Scottish respondents and a substantial share 
of those in Wales anticipated that the proposed decentralisation of powers and 
resources would improve the economic situation of their respective countries. This 
perception was in turn strongly correlated with support for greater regional autonomy. 
While popular opinion in Wales has remained relatively stable, the reality of devolution 
seems to have made Scottish respondents considerably less optimistic regarding the 
economic benefits of devolution. While the perceived economic effects of devolution 
continue to be correlated with support for regional autonomy, the correlation coefficient 
has decreased following devolution (see Table 6.17). As was argued in the section on 
democratic regionalism, the most likely explanation for this trend would seem to be that 
constitutional preferences were quite strongly influencing popular perceptions of the 
likely effects of decentralisation prior to devolution. The partial decoupling of the 
perceived economic effects of devolution from support for further decentralisation and 
secession, together with the emerging consensus that devolution has made little to no 
difference to the economic situation, suggest that changes in support for greater 
autonomy will not be primarily driven by economic factors in the post devolution era. In 
Wales in particular, the realisation that devolution is unlikely to harm the Welsh 
economy may however facilitate the mobilisation of other grievances in a regionalist 
way.  
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Table 6.17 Perceived effects of devolution on the local economy (Scotland, Wales and selected 
English regions) 
 Scotland 
 1997 1999 2000 2001 2003 
a lot better 17% 7% 5% 6% 5% 
a little better 46% 40% 33% 39% 32% 
no difference 26% 40% 49% 46% 50% 
a little worse 10% 11% 11% 8% 9% 
a lot worse 2% 3% 3% 2% 4% 
N 652 1366 1547 1525 1407 
Correlation 
with 
constitutional 
preference 
.601** .335** .294** .299** .377** 
Wales 
 1997 1999 2000 2001 2003 
a lot better 8% N/A N/A 4% 5% 
a little better 33%   31% 32% 
no difference 44%   57% 56% 
a little worse 13%   6% 5% 
a lot worse 3%   2% 2% 
N 618   1026 921 
Correlation 
with 
constitutional 
preference 
.491**   .247** .304** 
Selected English regions (2004) 
 North East Yorkshire 
and the 
Humber 
North West   
a lot better 5% 4% 1%   
a little better 25% 38% 36%   
no difference 45% 44% 46%   
a little worse 17% 12% 13%   
a lot worse 8% 3% 3%   
N 648 336 275   
Correlation 
with 
constitutional 
preference 
.574** .418** .393**   
Sources: Own elaboration based on Jones, et al. (2004), Jones, et al., (2002), Jowell, 
et al. (1998), National Centre for Social Research (2002b, 2004a, 2005), National 
Centre for Social Research, et al. (2001) ,and Rallings (2006). Constitutional 
preferences have been coded as: 1=independent, 2=devolution with taxation powers, 
3=devolution without taxation powers, 4=no devolution. ** significant at 0.01 level, * 
significant at 0.05 level (Pearson two-tailed) 
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In England there is similarly little evidence that the work of the RDAs or the 
reality of devolution elsewhere has convinced the general public of the economic need 
for further decentralisation. In the three English regions pre-selected for a referendum 
in 2004, the vast majority anticipated that devolution would make little or no difference 
to the state of the regional economy (see Table 6.17). Across the board, those who 
were more sceptical about the economic benefits of decentralisation were also less 
inclined to support devolution to their region.  The direction of causality between these 
two variables is however difficult to determine. Evidence from the Scottish and Welsh 
case suggests that, in the absence of actual devolution, constitutional preference may 
to a large extent be driving the perceived economic effects of greater regional 
autonomy. Whether this effect was indeed equally strong in the English regions is 
however debatable. Unlike their Scottish and Welsh counterparts in the 1990s, the 
respondents in the 2004 regional referendum study had been able to evaluate the 
effects of devolution in other regions for several years. Apparently the developments in 
Scotland and Wales did not convince the majority of the population that the economic 
dividend of devolution would be sufficiently large to justify the creation of an elected 
regional assembly.  
6.4.2. The fiscal dividend of devolution 
Even if devolution does not create a more vibrant and prosperous regional 
economy, it may still produce a dividend for devolved areas in the form of additional 
public spending. As will be shown in chapter 7, the establishment of an elected 
assembly or parliament provides regional elites with a highly legitimate platform 
through which to engage in negotiations with the centre. This may in turn enable 
devolved areas to extract additional resources from the centre (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 
2003). This may be perceived as unfair in areas that do not currently have the 
institutional capacity or bargaining power to pursue similar strategies. If devolution is 
indeed found to produce a fiscal dividend, this may therefore enhance popular support 
for elected regional bodies in devolved and non-devolved areas alike. 
262 | P a g e  
 
Within the current system, the ability of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh 
Assembly to use their newfound powers to extract additional rents from the central 
government is formally limited by a formula-based funding system. Since 1978, most 
changes in the public spending allocation to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are 
directly linked to changes in spending on comparable services in England through a 
population-based system often referred to as the Barnett formula (for more information 
on the mechanics of the Barnett formula see H. M. Treasury, 1999). As a result, the 
share of the devolved budget formally subjected to intergovernmental bargaining is 
relatively limited. In addition, the link of the formula-based element of the budget to 
changes in English spending levels, rather than absolute expenditure, should over time 
lead to a convergence of public expenditure per head across the four countries. As a 
result, this system should theoretically limit both the fiscal dividend of devolution in the 
devolved areas and the potential for economic grievances in England. 
Evidence from the pre-devolution period however suggests that the effect of this 
formula-based system has been less than uniform. While there have been some signs 
that public expenditure in Wales is slowly converging towards the English average, no 
such trend can be discerned in Scotland. This has been taken as evidence that areas 
with stronger bargaining powers can extract additional resources from the centre, even 
if the bulk of the resource allocation is officially governed by a transparent formula 
(McLean & McMillan, 2003). In this view, a credible threat of secession, alongside a 
long history of administrative devolution, gave Scottish elites both the institutional 
capacity and the legitimacy to protect the country from the brunt of the so-called 
Barnett squeeze. While identifiable need may arguably be greater in Wales than in 
Scotland, less well-developed institutions and more limited popular support for 
independence put this country in a considerably weaker bargaining position. As a 
result, the country was not able to avoid a decline in its relative public expenditure 
position to the same extent as its Scottish counterpart. 
 
263 | P a g e  
 
Although small adjustments were made to the funding system following 
devolution, the Barnett formula continues to formally govern the majority of changes to 
the block grant in Scotland and Wales. In Greater London, the creation of a devolved 
administration has not been accompanied by a shift to a similarly formula-based 
funding system. Instead, resources are allocated through a mixture of ad hoc grants 
and assessments. Theoretically this should give the Greater London Authority more 
opportunities to use its bargaining power to extract rents from the central government 
than its Scottish and Welsh counterparts. Recent trends in public spending seem to 
concur with this perspective (see Figure 6.3). Over the last decade, London’s relative 
expenditure position has improved markedly. By contrast, per capita expenditure levels 
in Wales have continued to marginally converge to the English average. In Scotland, 
trends are more mixed, but overall the country’s relative position has declined between 
1999/2000 and 2008/2009. This would suggest that, although the system may provide 
some room for bargaining, the Barnett formula does considerably reduce the potential 
for regional elites to use the devolved institutions in order to extract additional 
resources.  
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Figure 6.3 Trends in identifiable public expenditure on services per head in the post-devolution 
period (Indices, UK=100)  
 
Sources: (H. M. Treasury, 2005, 2009) 
The fact that the establishment of the Greater London Authority has been 
accompanied by a notable improvement in the relative public expenditure position of 
Greater London has not received much popular attention in the post-devolution era. 
Rather the public debate has been centred on the appropriate levels of public spending 
for Scotland and to a lesser extent Wales. Public spending per head has traditionally 
been higher than the English average in both of these countries. The benign 
explanation of this difference would be that this reflects a relatively high level of 
identifiable need, as well as the fact that public goods and services may be more costly 
to provide in some areas. On the other hand, there has been a longstanding suspicion 
in parts of England that the relatively favourable expenditure position of Scotland in 
particular reflects preferential treatment (see chapter 3).  
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Due to data limitations and measurement issues, it is impossible to directly test 
whether the current allocation of resources accurately reflects the needs of the different 
regions and countries within the UK. In order to gain some insight into the relationship 
between relative need and public spending, I will follow McLean and McMillan’s (2003) 
suggestion to use residency-based gross value added (GVA) per capita levels as a 
crude proxy for need. This approach is based on the assumptions that a lower GVA per 
capita is associated with higher incidences of poverty and therefore greater need for 
government spending. If the allocation of resources indeed accounts for the relative 
needs of each region, relative identifiable public spending per capita should be 
negative correlated with residency-based GVA per capita under these assumptions.  
 
Table 6.18 Pearson correlations between relative identifiable public expenditure on services per 
capita and residency-based GVA per capita.  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
All -.265 -.308 -.327 -.227 -.141 -.083 -.050 -.026 .023 .042 
Excluding 
Greater 
London, 
Scotland 
and 
Northern 
Ireland 
-
.863** 
-
.869** 
-
.893** 
-
.850** 
-
.874** 
-
.873** 
-
.877** 
-
.849** 
-
.852** 
-
.850** 
Source: own elaboration based on (H. M. Treasury, 2005, 2009; Office for National 
Statistics, 2009b) ** significant at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level (Pearson two-
tailed) 
 
 
Table 6.18 reports the correlation coefficient between relative GVA per capita 
levels and relative public spending from 1999 until 2008. If we include all Government 
Office regions in the analysis, the relationship between GVA and public expenditure is 
not significant in any of these years. Towards the end of the period, the correlation 
coefficient even acquires the opposite sign. As Figure 6.4 shows, this finding is 
primarily driven by three outliers; Greater London, Scotland and Northern Ireland. If we 
exclude these three regions from the analysis, we do consistently find a significant 
negative correlation. This suggests that, contrary to public perception, the current level 
of public expenditure in Wales is largely in line with its relative needs.  
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Scotland and Greater London however each receive a share of public spending that is 
considerably more substantial than would be anticipated on the basis of their relative 
position in terms of GVA per capita. 
   
Figure 6.4 Residency-based GVA per capita and public expenditure per capita (2008) 
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on H. M. Treasury (2009) and Office for National 
Statistics (2009b)  
  
 
 
 
 
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
60 80 100 120 140 160
Id
e
n
ti
fi
a
b
le
 p
u
b
li
c 
e
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
 i
n
d
e
x
 (
U
K
=
1
0
0
)
Residency-based GVA per capita index (UK=100)
North East North West
Yorkshire and the Humber East Midlands
West Midlands South West
East of England London
South East Scotland
Wales Northern Ireland
Linear (All regions) Linear (Excluding London, Scotland, and NI)
267 | P a g e  
 
Despite these findings, the perception that the country remains relatively 
underfunded continues to be a source of discontent in Wales. In 2007, the Labour-Plaid 
Cymru coalition government tried to address this issue by establishing an independent 
Commission into the current system of funding and finance for Wales. In its first report, 
this Commission sought to demonstrate that Wales had indeed been subjected to the 
so-called Barnett squeeze. In order to make this point, it argued that a focus on 
identifiable regional expenditure underestimates the extent to which Wales has been 
negatively affected by the Barnett formula. By restricting the analysis to those functions 
that are funded via the Welsh Assembly, the Commission produced a much more 
dramatic picture of Welsh public spending converging towards the English average 
(Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales, 2009: 23). Applying the 
funding criteria used in English regions to Wales, it further argued that Wales remains 
moderately underfunded compared to similar English regions.  
In its final report, published in July 2010, the Commission concluded that the 
funding arrangements for Wales were in urgent need of reform (Independent 
Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales, 2010). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
recommendations of the Commission centred on the need to replace the Barnett 
formula with a needs-based funding system. In addition, the report argued that the 
Welsh Assembly should acquire limited taxation powers and the right to borrow in order 
to finance capital expenditures. So far there has been little suggestion that the central 
government intends to accommodate any of these demands in the near future (see 
chapter 7 for a full discussion). Especially at a time when the legitimacy of the centre is 
already challenged by unpopular spending cuts, the reluctance to address this 
longstanding concern may result in considerable economic grievances. To what extent 
this is likely to create support for greater decentralisation however remains to be seen. 
As in the pre-devolution period, public expenditure in Wales continues to outstrip tax 
revenue (Oxford Economics, 2007). As a result, fiscal devolution would not necessarily 
be beneficial to the country.     
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In Scotland by contrast the effect of greater fiscal autonomy on the country’s 
finances remain a point of contention. If we adopt the same approach to tax allocation 
across all British regions, Scotland continues to be subsidised by the rest of the UK 
(Oxford Economics, 2007). However, if one accepts that the revenues related to the 
North Sea operations should predominantly be allocated to Scotland, relative tax 
revenue per head may in fact exceed relative public expenditure per head. Whether or 
not fiscal autonomy is beneficial to Scotland therefore greatly depends on the 
delineation of the tax base. This may in turn explain why surveys find that English and 
Scottish respondents have very different views on the fairness of the current levels of 
expenditure in Scotland (see Table 6.19).  
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Table 6.19 Perceived fairness of public spending in Scotland (Scotland and England, 2000-2009)  
Scotland 
 2000  2001  2003  2005 2007 2009  
much more 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 3%  
a little more 8% 8% 9% 8% 14% 12%  
pretty much 
fair 
29% 39% 36% 35% 42% 43%  
a little less 36% 34% 37% 35% 29% 32%  
much less 25% 16% 15% 19% 11% 10%  
N 1584 1504 1398 1409 1353 1344  
Correlation 
with 
constitutional 
preference 
-.230** -.244** -.287** -.151** -.248** -.253**  
England 
 2000 2001  2002  2003  2007 2008 2009 
much more 11% 12% 12% 12% 21% 28% 26% 
a little more 17% 19% 19% 18% 22% 26% 29% 
pretty much 
fair 
57% 58% 57% 59% 49% 42% 41% 
a little less 13% 10% 10% 10% 7% 3% 4% 
much less 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 
N 1412 2102 2220 1403 658 753 727 
Correlation 
with support 
for English 
Parliament  
.055* .042 .051* .057 .124** .139** .171** 
Correlation 
with support 
for 
devolution to 
region or 
country 
-.013 -.007 -.026 .058 .047 .104** .074 
 Sources: own elaboration based on National Centre for Social Research (2002a, 
2002b, 2003, 2004, 2004a, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011), Scottish Centre for Social 
Research (2005, 2009, 2010) For Scotland, constitutional preferences have been 
coded as: 1=independent, 2=devolution with taxation powers, 3=devolution without 
taxation powers, 4=no devolution. In the first correlation for England, constitutional 
preferences have been coded as: In favour of English parliament =1, In favour of 
regional devolution or a centralised system=2. In the second, constitutional preferences 
have been coded as: In favour of English parliament or regional devolution=1, In favour 
of a centralised system=2. 
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In Scotland, the perception that the country is receiving less than its fair share 
of public spending has consistently been associated with greater support for 
independence and devolution. Between 2000 and 2009, the share of Scottish 
respondents who felt that their country received less than its fair share of public 
spending has however declined from 61 to 42 percent. This suggests that devolution 
has helped to redress Scottish grievances in this respect. In England, the opposite 
trend can be discerned. In 2000, 28 percent of respondents in England felt that 
Scotland received more than its fair share of public spending. By 2009, this had 
increased to 55 percent. In addition, discontent with Scotland’s relative public spending 
position has become increasingly associated with support for devolution in England. As 
was the case with the democratic deficits caused by devolution, the mounting 
grievances with the regional distribution of public spending seem to be primarily leading 
to support for the establishment of an English Parliament, rather than elected regional 
assemblies. As this support for English devolution seems to be primarily related to 
comparative grievances, a reform of the funding system for Scotland could well prove 
sufficient to placate these demands.     
At the time of writing, such a proposal has been put before parliament in the 
form of the 2010-2011 Scotland Bill. Introduced on St. Andrew’s day 2010, the Bill is 
primarily a response to the recommendations produced by the independent 
Commission on Scottish Devolution (Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2009). As 
such it has been primarily designed to address Scottish concerns with the initial 
devolution settlement (see chapter 7 for details). Nonetheless, former Scottish Labour 
Leader, Wendy Alexander, has argued that the reform will also help to partially address 
English grievances by increasing the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament 
(Alexander, 16 June 2010 : 13). To what extent this will indeed be the case remains to 
be seen. Especially since the 2011 Scottish Parliament election returned a majority 
SNP government, it seems unlikely that the fiscal provisions under the eventual 
Scotland Act will redress Scotland’s relatively favourable public spending position (see 
chapter 7 for further discussion).  
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As a result, there is little reason to believe that the proposed increase in fiscal 
autonomy for Scotland will have any notable impact on discontent in England. 
Simultaneously, the accommodation of Scottish demands may lead to comparative 
grievances in Wales. Taken together, this suggests that the proposed reform may help 
to stem support for full independence in Scotland, but will do little to redress calls for 
further decentralisation in England and Wales.       
6.5. Conclusion 
 Following two decades of Conservative government, the return to power of the 
Labour Party in 1997 heralded a period of rapid policy change. While the devolution 
project will undoubtedly be remembered as one of the main legacies of the 1997-2001 
Labour government, the ultimate effect of this change in the government system on the 
future of the Union remains to be seen. Ten years on, the available survey evidence 
suggests that decentralisation has so far been accompanied by a strengthening of 
popular support for further devolution in both Scotland and Wales. By contrast there is 
little to suggest that this trend has been accompanied by a rise in secessionism. In 
England, popular support for regional autonomy has historically been limited. Opinion 
polls suggest that the experience of devolution elsewhere initially produced a modest 
rise in support for devolution to the English regions. This shift in popular opinion 
however did not prove robust. Following a brief return to the pre-devolution 
constellation of preferences, more recent surveys suggest that support for an English 
Parliament is on the rise. Interesting as these trends are, they tell us little about the 
dynamics of devolution and how this influences popular opinion on decentralisation and 
secession. In order to gain a better insight into these developments, this chapter 
examined how devolution has affected the perceived legitimacy of the central and 
regional level in terms of identity, democratic representation and economic growth and 
equity. Trends in these areas in turn allow us to identify the mechanisms through which 
devolution is influencing support for greater autonomy. 
New Labour’s devolution project was presented as part of the administration’s 
efforts to construct a new, modern form of Britishness. It was hoped that formally 
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acknowledging the multinational nature of the UK through devolution would stem calls 
for full independence and induce a stronger sense of loyalty towards the British state. 
Survey evidence however suggests that devolution has done little to strengthen the 
underlying sense of Britishness in Scotland and Wales. Simultaneously, the change in 
the government system has encouraged a stronger focus on the country identity in 
England. At face value, these findings seem broadly in line with the literature that 
argues that devolution tends to strengthen regional identities, while undermining 
loyalties to the central level (Dikshit, 1975; Kymlicka, 1998; Lustik, et al., 2004; Roeder, 
1991). It however needs to be noted that devolution has been associated with an 
immediate step change in Britishness, rather than a perpetual decline of the 
overarching identity (Curtice, 2006). In addition, survey evidence suggests that the 
regional and the British identity remain nested feelings of belonging for most 
respondents across England, Scotland and Wales. I would therefore argue that the re-
articulation of feelings of belonging shortly after the establishment of the Welsh 
Assembly and the Scottish Parliament has not created real opportunities for purely 
identity-driven regionalism.  
As argued in chapter 3, the regionalist revival the 1980s and 90s was also not 
driven primarily by identity factors. Instead the emergence of Conservative pre-
dominance on the back of English votes, and the related feelings of non-representation 
in Scotland and Wales, lay at the heart of popular demands for greater autonomy. The 
eventual accommodation of these demands coincided with a shift of power at the 
centre. Despite the continuous dominance of the Labour Party at the central level, trust 
in the central government has not improved during the first decade of devolution. 
Moreover distrust in the central government has continued to be strongly correlated 
with preferences for stronger regional autonomy.  
 
In this context, the recent return of a Conservative-led government at the centre is 
likely to re-ignite old grievances. Simultaneously, devolution has created well-
established regional bodies of democratic representation in the form of the Scottish 
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Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. In this context, I would argue that the perceived 
democratic deficits at the centre may well translate into support for further 
decentralisation more easily and rapidly than was the case in the 1980s.  
In England, devolution seems to have had little impact on trust in the central 
government. Perhaps reflecting England’s dominance within the House of Commons, 
surveys suggest that the majority of English people have remained confident that the 
central government will work in the interest of their country most or all of the time. Few 
feel that devolution has made a significant difference to the government system. 
Initially, the minority who felt that devolution had improved the way the UK is governed 
was also more likely to favour devolution in England. Similarly those who felt that it had 
made the system of government worse were found to be less likely to support 
devolution to an English Parliament or the English regions. Recently this linear 
association has been replaced by a U-shaped relationship, where support for English 
devolution is highest amongst those who feel most strongly that devolution has either 
improved or worsened the government system.  
Interestingly, those who believe devolution has made it worse tend to favour 
devolution to an English Parliament over regional devolution. This suggests that the 
recent rise in support for English devolution may be the result of grievances with the 
central system, rather than a significant rise in the perceived legitimacy of the region. 
Attitudes to the so-called West-Lothian question seem to confirm this perspective. 
While a large majority feels aggrieved with the anomalies in the current system, most 
would prefer to find a central solution to this problem by barring MPs from devolved 
areas from voting on issues that will not affect their constituencies. As the centre has 
proved reluctant to commit to such reforms, these grievances are however increasingly 
associated with support for an English Parliament.   
In addition to strengthening the British identity and addressing democratic 
grievances, the 1997-2001 Labour government also claimed that devolution would 
benefit Scotland and Wales economically. Surveys however find that the public has 
been less than convinced that devolution indeed creates an economic dividend. 
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Instead the debate has been focussed on what we may call the fiscal dividend of 
devolution; the extent to which devolved areas are able to use their institutional powers 
in order to extract additional rents from the centre. Ever since a Treasury study in the 
late 1970s showed that public spending outstripped identifiable need in Scotland, while 
Wales was relatively underfunded, the allocation of resources across the different 
countries in the UK has been a bone of contention. With devolution, this debate has 
gained renewed salience. Although the system of resource allocation to Scotland and 
Wales formally leaves little room for bargaining, it seems that Scotland in particular has 
been able to use the credible threat of secession to defend its relatively favourable 
resource position. As a result, comparative grievances have emerged in both England 
and Wales. Especially in England, there is evidence that this fiscal grievance is 
increasingly associated with higher levels of support for the establishment of an English 
Parliament.  
Taken together, this chapter has shown that devolution has had a mixed effect 
on demand for further decentralisation. While the partial accommodation of regionalist 
demands seems to have stemmed calls for full independence, it has done little to 
redress the potential for democratic grievances with the centre. Simultaneously, the 
devolved arrangements have created democratic grievances in England and are 
increasingly leading to debates regarding the allocation of public funds across devolved 
and non-devolved areas. As a result, devolution has been associated with a rise in 
support for further decentralisation across mainland Britain. The next chapter will 
examine how devolution has affected the way these popular preferences affect 
decision-making processes and policy outcomes.  
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7. The accommodation of regionalist demands after devolution  
 The previous chapter has shown that the devolution of powers and resources to 
Scotland and Wales has been accompanied by calls for further decentralisation, if not 
full secession. In addition, the asymmetric system of devolution currently in place has 
produced comparative democratic and fiscal grievances in areas that have traditionally 
not harboured strong regionalist movements. Increasingly these sources of discontent 
with the existing government system are associated with support for the establishment 
of an elected English Parliament with powers and resources that are similar to those of 
its Scottish counterpart. This chapter will examine how these shifts in popular opinion 
influence policy making in the post-devolution era.  
Ron Davies famously noted that “[d]evolution is a process. It is not an event and 
neither is it a journey with a fixed end-point” (R. Davies, 1999: 15). In this view, an 
initial decentralisation of powers and resources is likely to unleash further waves of 
constitutional reform (Hazell, 2007). This pattern can certainly be discerned in 
contemporary Spain and Belgium (Agranoff & Gallarin, 1997; Hooghe, 2004; Moreno, 
2001; Swenden & Jans, 2006). In Britain, the experiences have so far been more 
mixed. On the one hand, there have already been modest adjustments to the original 
‘settlements’ in Wales and Greater London. In addition, reforms to the 1998 Scotland 
Act are currently under consideration at Westminster. On the other hand, the 
government system in much of England has remained unchanged, despite the 
anomalies created by asymmetric devolution to other parts of Britain.   
On the basis of these developments, some have argued that devolution has 
unleashed a dynamic of continuous incremental adjustments to the distribution of 
powers and resources across different tiers of government (Hazell, 2007; Keating, 
2009). While this general assertion may fit the currently available evidence in the 
devolved areas, there is a clear need to explore the origins of such developments in 
more detail. This is particularly true as the brief history of asymmetric devolution in 
mainland Britain suggests that it may be prudent to speak of the dynamics unleashed 
by devolution in plural rather than singular form.  
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In order to gain a better understanding of the contemporary developments, this chapter 
will firstly examine to what extent devolution has affected the distribution of agenda-
setting and decision-making powers and the incentives towards regionalist 
accommodation. The remainder of the chapter will use these insights to make sense of 
developments in each of the devolved areas, before turning to the infamous ‘English 
Question’.  
7.1. The distribution of veto powers in post-devolution Britain 
Prior to devolution, the agenda-setting and decision-making powers within the 
British government system were strongly concentrated in the hands of a single 
institutional player; the House of Commons. This institution in turn tended to be 
dominated by a single political party. As a result, regionally-concentrated demands for 
greater autonomy only led to actual policy change when the party in office was willing 
to accommodate such demands (see chapters 4 and 5). Although the nature of the 
government system has been profoundly changed by the establishment of directly 
elected devolved bodies in Scotland, Wales and Greater London, devolution has not 
altered the formal distribution of veto powers over issues of constitutional importance.  
As in the pre-devolution period, most changes to the devolved settlements still 
require a bill to this effect to be introduced in the House of Commons and passed by 
both Houses of Parliament. The only exception to this rule is the devolution of further 
legislative powers from the centre to the Scottish Parliament or the Northern Irish 
Assembly. As the 1998 Scotland and Northern Ireland Acts stipulate, modifications to 
the legislative competencies of these devolved bodies can also be made by Order in 
Council.  Such an Order will however not be considered at a Privy Council without prior 
affirmation by the House of Commons. As a result, devolved administrations cannot 
use this instrument to force legislative devolution on an unwilling centre.  
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Similarly, the regions do not formally have the power to veto any changes to the 
devolved settlements proposed by the centre. As the devolved institutions were 
established on the basis of regional referendums, it would however be difficult for the 
centre to legitimately abolish the devolved institutions without strong proof of 
exceptional circumstances or a clear popular mandate to this effect. While exceptional 
circumstances clearly did occur in Northern Ireland (McCrudden, 2007), a similarly 
extreme situation seems unlikely to arise in Scotland, Wales and Greater London. As a 
result, the regional electorate effectively hold a veto over re-centralisation in the 
devolved areas. The centre’s ability to unilaterally effectuate more moderate changes 
to the existing devolved arrangements is furthermore limited by the so-called Sewel 
convention. Named after Lord Sewel, who introduced it the context of the 1998 
Scotland Act (Hansard (Lords), 21st of July 1998, vol. 592, cols. 791), this convention 
stipulates that the central government will not normally legislate with regard to devolved 
matters without the consent of the elected regional body. As any proposal that would 
change the powers and resources devolved to the regional level would fall under this 
convention, the devolved institutions could use this provision to put pressure on the 
centre to alter its proposals. 
Taken together, it can therefore be argued that the regional electorates within the 
devolved areas and the directly-elected regional bodies representing them do enjoy 
some limited informal decision-making powers. They have however not gained any 
formal decision-making or agenda-setting powers. The logical consequence of this 
finding is that the effect of devolution on the dynamics of regionalist accommodation 
must operate primarily through the ability of regional elites to use their new-found 
powers in order to change the act- and outcome-based incentives faced by veto 
players at the central level.  
Most directly, devolution can alter the outcome-based incentives towards 
regionalist accommodation by increasing the credibility of the threat of secession. At 
the central level, the number of seats assigned to each region places a natural limit on 
the power and influence of regionalist parties.  
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This inability to gain agenda-setting and decision-making powers may in turn negatively 
affect the electoral appeal of such parties in general elections (Duverger, 1951; Sartori 
& Mair, 2005). As a result, the share of the vote received by regionalist parties at 
general elections may not adequately reflect the true electoral appeal of their policy 
position. By creating regional spaces of representation, devolution provides a platform 
through which voters with a preference for further devolution can express their views 
without wasting their vote (Brancati, 2006). This may in turn expose the true level of 
support for devolution and secession.   
In Britain, this dynamic is further heightened by the use of a more proportional 
electoral system at the regional level. As discussed in Chapter 4, the general elections 
in Britain operate under the single member plurality system commonly known as the 
first-past-the-post system. By contrast, the Additional Member System (AMS) used in 
the devolved elections allows voters to cast two votes; a constituency level vote and a 
regional list vote. At the constituency level, members are elected under the first-past-
the-post system also employed at the central level. The regional list seats are 
subsequently allocated using the d'Hondt formula. As a consequence of this system, 
voters in areas where the regionalist constituency candidate is unlikely to win the seat 
can still express their opinion without wasting their vote by supporting the regionalist 
party through the regional list vote.  
If these combined dynamics enable regionalist parties to gain agenda-setting and 
decision-making powers at the regional level, they can in turn use these powers to 
heighten the threat of secession. The primary tool available to regionalist groups in this 
respect is the ability to call a popular referendum on independence. Regionalist groups 
in Quebec have employed this tactic on numerous occasions. In 1980, the proposals of 
the Provincial government were firmly rejected at the polls. However, the process did 
trigger a federal response in the form of a debate on the need to reform the existing 
federal arrangements (Careless & Stevenson, 1982; Romanow, Whyte, & Leeson, 
1984).  For various reasons this process did not result in the anticipated change (for an 
analysis of the institutional factors, see Kilgour, 1983).  
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In 1995 the Provincial government attempted the same strategy again. This time 
around, it was defeated by the narrowest of margins (Watts, 1996). In response, the 
federal government asked the Supreme Court to look into the legality of these actions. 
It ruled that unilateral secession on the basis of a popular referendum was not legal 
under either domestic or international law. However, if a provincial referendum with an 
unambiguous question did return a clear majority in favour of independence, 
intergovernmental negotiations would have to result (Leslie, 1999). These provisions 
were formalised in the 2000 Clarity Act.  
Although similar arrangements do not exist in the UK15, the centre would clearly be 
under considerable pressure to start intergovernmental negotiations if a consultative 
regional referendum returned a strong majority in favour of independence. By providing 
a legitimate platform through which to launch such a popular poll, devolution has 
considerably strengthened the mobilising structures available to regionalist elites in 
devolved areas. In order to be able to use these powers effectively, public opinion 
however needs to be sufficiently susceptible to this option. In other words, the extent to 
which the threat of a consultative regional referendum can be used to extract 
concessions from the centre will to a large extent depend on the legitimacy of the 
region relative to the central or federal level. The referendum option therefore primarily 
heightens the bargaining powers of regions with more pronounced support for full 
independence and extensive devolution.  
   Even in the absence of a credible threat of secession, the establishment of a 
directly elected regional body may still change the dynamics of regionalist 
accommodation by altering the act-based incentives faced by central players.  
 
                                               
15 The Northern Ireland Act does specifically state that, if the majority of those voting in a 
regional referendum feel that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom 
and form part of a united Ireland, “the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such 
proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s Government in 
the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.”. However, under the provisions in 
Schedule 1, the power to trigger the referendum and set the question still formally rests with the 
Secretary of State.   
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Although many powers and resources formally remain the exclusive prerogative of the 
central level, it can still be beneficial for the party in office at the centre to be formally 
affiliated with one of the main veto players at the regional level. Especially if the party 
structures have remained relatively centralised, such affiliations provide the central 
party leadership with opportunities to secure a degree of regional policy coherence. In 
addition, partisan connections may allow the central government to avoid potentially 
damaging public confrontations by resolving intergovernmental conflicts through 
internal means. As a result, the main contenders for office at the central level have a 
clear stake in maximising the power and influence of their regional affiliates.  
Under such circumstances, even a traditionally strongly centralised party may allow 
the regional branch to make electoral and political concessions in order to gain or 
retain office at the regional level (van Houten, 2009). As a result of this strategy, 
bottom-up demands for further decentralisation may at times be initiated by the 
regional branch of a central party with an outcome-based preference for the status quo. 
Under such circumstances, I would argue that the central party leadership faces 
considerable act-based incentives to at least pay lip service to such demands. 
Especially if the regional branch has an outcome-based preference for devolution, an 
outright refusal to respond to regional demands is likely to provoke considerable 
conflicts. Such a display of disunity can in turn damage the electoral appeal of the 
party, both at the regional and the central level.  As a result of this dynamic, the political 
and electoral incentive structure at the regional level may indirectly affect the formal 
policy positions of the main contenders for office at the centre. This will however only 
heighten the likelihood of further decentralisation if the party in power at the centre also 
stands a good chance of gaining office at the regional level.  
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7.2. The dynamics of devolution in Scotland 
 The insights presented above can help us to develop a better understanding of 
the emerging dynamics of devolution in Scotland. Of the three devolved institutions 
created under the 1997-2000 Labour Government, the Scottish Parliament is the only 
one still operating under the original provisions. It has been suggested that this initial 
stability reflects the nature of the 1998 settlement in Scotland (Hazell, 2007; Keating, 
2009). From within the perspective, the provisions under the 1998 Government of 
Wales Act created an unworkable half-way house. As a result, the Welsh Assembly 
faced strong incentives to try to renegotiate these arrangements at the earliest possible 
opportunity. By comparison, Scotland was offered a relatively extensive and coherent 
set of powers and resources from the outset. The newly-created Scottish Parliament 
therefore faced less immediate incentives to devote valuable time and resources to 
renegotiating the provisions under the 1998 Scotland Act.  
While the more comprehensive nature of the initial settlement may indeed have 
limited calls for further decentralisation during the early years of Scottish devolution, 
the explanation presented above too readily glosses over the distribution of powers 
within the devolved institution itself. As noted in chapter 5, the institutional shape of the 
Scottish Parliament was strongly influenced by the intra-party agreements reached in 
the 1980s and 90s. In line with these agreements, the devolved elections operate 
under a form of proportional representation known as the Additional Member System. 
Under this system, 73 constituency members are elected under the first-past-the-post 
system and a further 56 regional members are appointed on the basis of regional party 
lists. As a result, the final distribution of the seats in the Scottish Parliament more 
closely resembles the distribution of the vote than would have been the case under the 
single member plurality system alone. This in turn decreases the probability of one 
party enjoying an absolute majority of the seats at the regional level.  
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A number of indices have been developed to measure the proportionality of the 
results produced by a given electoral system, each with their own merits and 
drawbacks (for a detailed discussion, see Dunleavy & Margetts, 2004 ). Two of the 
most frequently used measures are the Loosemore-Hanby Index and the Least 
Squares Index16. These indices are calculated as follows: 
 
Loosemore-Hanby Index: D = ½ Σ |vi-si| 
 
Least Squares Index: LSq = √½ (vi-si)
2 
 
where vi and si refer to ith party’s percentage of the votes and seats.  
 
Table 7.1 reports the Loosemore-Hanby and Least Squares indices for the devolved 
elections in Scotland since 1999. For each year, the first column reports the indices 
based on the constituency level vote and seat shares. The second column reports the 
indices based on the final seat shares under AMS and the share of the vote received 
by each party if the constituency and list votes are combined. The third column reports 
the difference between the constituency level and AMS results. For each of the 
devolved elections both indices clearly show that the regional seats do indeed 
significantly increase the proportionality of the results. The magnitude of this effect 
decreased notably in 2007 only to rise again in 2011.   
 
  
                                               
16 The main difference between the Loosemore-Hanby Index and the Least Square Index is that 
the former is largely insensitive to the number of parties competing. As a result, a system with a 
large number of parties each displaying small vote-seat differences can return the same 
Loosemore-Hanby Index as a system with two competing parties encountering much more 
substantial vote-seat differences. By squaring the vote-seat difference, dividing the sum of all 
such differences by 2 and taking the square root of this sum, the Least Square Index responds 
more strongly to a limited number of large discrepancies than a great number of small ones 
(Gallagher, 1991). As a result, the Least Squares Index may more accurately reflect the type of 
disproportionality that the AMS was designed to address. In order to further reduce the 
emphasis put on very small parties and independent candidates, the indices have been 
calculated on the basis of the vote for the four largest parties in the system combined with a 
fictitious fifth party representing all others.  
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Table 7.1 The proportionality of the constituency and final results of the devolved elections in 
Scotland (1999-2011)  
 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 Con AMS Diff Con AMS Dif. Con AMS Diff Con AMS Diff 
Loosemore-
Hanby   
36.0 7.2 28.8 31.0 6.8 24.2 18.6 9.4 9.2 27.2 8.8 18.4 
Least 
Squares 
29.6 6.2 23.4 24.0 5.5 18.5 15.7 6.6 9.1 22.2 7.2 15.0 
Effective 
number of 
parties NS 
1.8 3.3 1.6 
 
 
2.2 4.0 1.8 
 
 
2.7 3.4 0.7 
 
 
1.7 2.6 0.9 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Tetteh (2008) and BBC (2011b).  
 
As could be anticipated, the fact that the seats distribution under the AMS more 
accurately reflects the share of the popular vote received by each party has in turn 
decreased the concentration of powers within the Scottish Parliament. Laakso and 
Taagepera’s (1979) effective number of parties index offers an opportunity to roughly 
quantify this effect. This index is calculated as follows:  
 
Effective number of parties NS= 1/ Σsi
2 
 
where si refers to ith party’s  share of the seats.  
 
The final row of Table 7.1  reports the effective number of parties in the Scotland 
Parliament under AMS as well as the results based on the distribution of the 
constituency seats only. Again the results show that the mechanics of the AMS have 
had the anticipated effect on the distribution of power within the Scottish Parliament. 
The magnitude of this effect has however been markedly less pronounced in the last 
two devolved elections than it had been during the early years of Scottish devolution.  
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Table 7.2 Constituency, regional and overall seats distribution in the Scottish Parliament (1999-
2011)  
 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 Con Reg All Con Reg All Con Reg All Con Reg. All 
Labour 53 3 56 46 4 50 37 9 46 15 22 37 
SNP 7 28 35 9 18 27 21 26 47 53 16 69 
Conservative 0 18 18 3 15 18 4 13 17 3 12 15 
Lib-Dem 12 5 17 13 4 17 11 5 16 2 3 5 
Other 1 2 3 2 15 17 0 3 3 0 3 3 
Sources: Tetteh (2008) and BBC (2011b) 
 
 Taken together, this shows that the mechanics of the AMS played a particularly 
significant part in creating the balance of power that has characterised the Scottish 
Parliament between 1999 and 2007. As Table 7.2  shows, the Labour Party was able to 
capture the clear majority of the constituency seats in the first two devolved elections. 
The mechanism through which the regional seats are allocated however ensured that 
several other parties also acquired potential veto powers. In order to gain control over 
the political agenda, the Labour Party entered into a formal coalition agreement with 
the Liberal Democrats. The resulting coalition governments enjoyed an absolute 
majority within the Parliament, thereby effectively rendering the other parties in the 
system powerless to change the status quo against the government’s wishes. The 
policy preference of the two coalition partners therefore guided the behaviour of the 
Scottish Parliament as a whole during the first eight years of its existence.    
As the regional branch of the central party that devised the initial legislation, the 
regional branches of the Labour Party initially displayed little interest in renegotiating 
the settlements for either Wales or Scotland. By contrast, the position of the Liberal 
Democrats was more strongly regionally differentiated. Faced with limited prospects of 
gaining office at the central level, Liberal Democrats at the central and regional level 
alike faced outcome-based incentives to favour devolution as a way to increase the 
Party’s power and influence (Hopkin & Bradbury, 2006).  While this led to clear 
commitments for further decentralisation in Wales, the Liberal Democrats initially 
seemed more willing to accept the existing arrangements in Scotland.  
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This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the initial inertia in Scotland was at 
least partially linked to the relatively comprehensive nature of the 1998 Scotland Act.  
It is however important to acknowledge that the differences in regional 
assertiveness during the early years of devolution are also the product of the 
distribution of potential veto powers within the devolved administrations at that time. If 
Labour’s position in Wales has been less strongly compromised during the first 
devolved election, the centre would not have faced the same pressures to address the 
weaknesses in the initial settlement (see section on Wales for a full discussion). 
Similarly, developments since 2007 suggest that the Scottish Parliament would have 
behaved very differently if the SNP had captured the largest share of the seats in 1999 
or 2003. As a result I would argue that it was Labour’s ability to acquire the plurality of 
the seats, combined with the policy preferences of the other potential veto players in 
the Scottish and Welsh system, that lay at the heart of the early dynamics of 
devolution.  
The 2007 Scottish Parliament election marked a sharp change in the dynamics 
of Scottish devolution. This trend was primarily the result of a marked rise in SNP 
support. Between 2003 and 2007, the SNP increased its share of the regional list vote 
by 10 percentage points, while the Party’s share of the constituency level vote rose 
from 24 to 33 percent. As a result, the distribution of the constituency seats was 
significantly more proportional to the share of the constituency vote captured by each 
party in 2007 than it had been in the previous two devolved elections (see Table 7.1). 
This shift in the balance of power at the constituency level in turn enabled the SNP to 
narrowly capture the plurality of the seats in the Scottish Parliament (see Table 7.2). 
The stronger position of the SNP resulted in a notable change in the assertiveness of 
the Scottish Parliament, although perhaps not in the anticipated manner. While Plaid 
Cymru proved able to initiate credible coalition negotiations with a range of parties (see 
section on Wales), the SNP’s uncompromising position on the constitutional issue left it 
relatively isolated. After failing to secure the support of the Liberal Democrats, the Party 
was forced to form a minority government.  
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From the start, this government faced unusually strong opposition from the rest 
of the Parliament. As McLean (2005) has shown with relation of to Westminster, the 
lack of an overall government majority tends to award potential veto powers to several 
actors at the same time. As a result, a wide range of players with different policy 
priorities would need to reach an agreement in order to force through a policy change 
against the wishes of the minority government. Since such grand coalition is difficult to 
assemble, the Party with the plurality of the seats generally retains its position as the 
main agenda-setter in the system. The situation in Scotland was different in two 
respects. First of all, under the AMS powers are more dispersed than generally the 
case under the FPTP system employed at the central level. As a result, the SNP 
government controlled a much smaller share of the seats than is generally the case 
with minority governments at the centre. In addition, the other potential veto players in 
the Scottish system were largely united in their opposition to the SNP’s stance on 
independence. Taken together, this allowed an unlikely partnership between the 
Labour Party, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats to foist policy changes on 
the minority SNP government. 
The first act of regional assertiveness by the Scottish Parliament was therefore 
formally initiated by a grand coalition of opposition parties, rather than the minority SNP 
government. Nonetheless, the rise in SNP support played a significant role in creating 
this dynamic. While it was still able to capture the plurality of the seats with relative 
ease, the Scottish Labour Party showed little interest in accommodating popular 
demands for further decentralisation in Scotland. As Chhibber and Kollman (2004) 
argue, the emergence of stronger regional competitors however makes it more difficult 
for regional branches of central parties to successfully compete in devolved elections 
without adjusting their platforms more strongly to local preferences. In addition, the 
SNP’s manifesto commitment to a popular referendum on Scottish independence 
heightened the credibility of the threat of exit.  
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As a result, partisan veto players with an outcome preference for maintaining the Union 
faced incentives to partially accommodate regionalist demands in an attempt to halt the 
advance of the SNP and stem popular support for full independence. In this context, 
both Labour and the Conservatives proved willing to make concessions.  
Although officially initiated by the regional level, the centre has from the outset 
been keen to incorporate the resulting independent Commission into Scottish 
Devolution in the central state apparatus. In this context, the Calman Commission 
received central funding as well as secretarial support. When it produced its final report 
in June 2009, the centre was again keen to confirm its intention to follow-through on a 
number of key recommendations. Once it had stated this intention, the 2005-2010 
Labour Government however seemed less inclined to pursue the agenda with any 
sense of urgency. Instead the Secretary of State, Jim Murphy, announced that a cross-
party steering group would be formed to implement the plan and that any changes 
would need to be carefully phased in (Johnson, 15 Jun 2009). Despite the fact that the 
Calman report included a number of discrete changes that could have been 
implemented independently, the Labour government insisted that the recommendations 
needed to be treated as a comprehensive package (Gordon, 26 Jul 2009). Taken 
together, these actions ensured that little progress was made ahead of the 2010 
general election. Given the likelihood of a Labour defeat at this election, this leisurely 
timetable clearly had the potential to prevent actual change from occurring. This 
suggests that the central government felt that it had to respond to the development in 
Scotland, but was actively trying to delay and minimise any actual changes to the 
status quo.   
The exceptionally tight electoral competition at the centre meant that the 2010 
general election resulted in the first hung Parliament since 1974. While the 
Conservative Party did acquire the plurality of the seats, it fell well short of an overall 
majority. Following a short period of negotiations, the Conservatives entered into a 
coalition government with the Liberal Democrats.  
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The resulting coalition agreement reaffirmed that the government would seek to 
implement the proposals of the Calman Commission (HM Government, 2010). A Bill to 
this effect was introduced in the House of Commons on St Andrew’s Day 2010 
(Hansard (Commons), 10th of November 2010, vol. 519, cols.69-71WS). While these 
actions are in line with the commitments made within during the election campaign 
(Conservative Party, 2010a), it is debatable whether a majority Conservative 
government would have felt compelled to take equally swift action on this matter. 
Nonetheless, the willingness of the Conservative Party to accommodate Scottish 
demands for further decentralisation, despite the limited electoral and political benefits 
associated with this strategy at the regional or central level, does suggest that 
devolution has altered the outcome-based incentives towards regionalist 
accommodation in Scotland.  
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Table 7.3 The constituency vote and seats distribution compared to general election results (1997-2011)   
Share of the vote at the constituency-level compared to the share of the Scottish vote received in the preceding general election 
 1997 1999 Diff. 2001 2003 Diff. 2005 2007 Diff. 2010 2011 Diff. 
SNP 22% 29% 7 20% 24% 4 18% 33% 15 20% 45% 26 
Labour 46% 39% -7 43% 35% -9 39% 32% -7 42% 32% -10 
LD 13% 14% 1 16% 15% -1 23% 16% -6 19% 8% -11 
Con. 18% 16% -2 16% 17% 1 16% 17% 1 17% 14% -3 
Share of the constituency-level seats compared to the share of the Scottish seats in the preceding general election 
 1997 1999 Diff. 2001 2003 Diff. 2005 2007 Diff. 2010 2011 Diff. 
SNP 8% 10% 2 7% 12% 5 10% 29% 19 10% 73% 62 
Labour 78% 73% -5 76% 63% -13 68% 51% -17 69% 21% -49 
LD 14% 16% 2 14% 18% 4 19% 15% -4 19% 3% -16 
Con. 0% 0% 0 1% 4% 3 2% 5% 3 2% 4% 2 
Sources: Own elaboration based on BBC (2010, 2011b) and Tetteh (2008)   
 
 
290 | P a g e  
 
In order to evaluate to what extent this recent shift in the dynamics of devolution 
represents a popular demand for greater autonomy, rather than an elite-driven process 
of decentralisation, we need to gain a better understanding of what motivated the rise 
in SNP support. In order to do this, Table 7.3 compares the distribution of the 
constituency votes and seats during the devolved elections with those in the preceding 
general elections. This comparison shows that the constituency level results of the first 
devolved election were largely in line with the outcome of the preceding general 
election. Scottish Labour candidates performed slightly less strongly in the constituency 
contests than their counterparts did in the 1997 general election. The Party 
nonetheless managed to capture over 70 per cent of the constituency seats in the 
Scottish Parliament. Similarly, the share of the constituency votes and seats captured 
by the SNP only marginally outweighed the Party’s performance in the general election. 
Taken in isolation, the results of the second devolved election suggest a continuation of 
this trend. With the benefit of hindsight, the increasing discrepancy between Labour’s 
share of the constituency votes and seats and its performance in preceding general 
elections may however be seen as an early indication of a shift in voting behaviour.  
Regardless of one’s interpretation of the results of the second devolved election, 
the 2007 and 2011 Scottish Parliament elections results clearly show that Scottish 
voters no longer behave in the same way in the devolved elections as they do in the 
general elections. The share of the constituency vote attracted by Labour and Lib-Dem 
candidates in 2007 was significantly lower than that attracted by their central 
counterparts in the 2005 and 2010 general elections. As a result, Labour in particular 
lost a considerable number of constituency seats in the Scottish Parliament. 
Simultaneously, the share of the constituency vote captured by SNP candidates started 
to approach the threshold at which the First-Past-The-Post system employed at the 
constituency level will start to work in the Party’s favour. In 2011, support for the SNP 
in the devolved elections increased further, allowing the Party to more than double its 
share of the constituency seats. As in 2007, these gains were not preceded by a similar 
rise in SNP support in the 2010 general election.  
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Conversely, the Labour Party increased its share of the Scottish vote in the 2010 
general election, while its Scottish counterpart made no substantial gains in the 2011 
Scottish Parliament election.  As a result, the Party lost over half of its constituency 
seats in the Scottish Parliament.     
The divergence of the voting patterns in devolved and general elections can be 
seen as an indication that Scottish voters are increasingly basing their voting behaviour 
in the devolved elections on Scottish issues and realities, rather than British concerns. 
The prominent role of the SNP in this dynamic invites us to conceptualise these 
changes as evidence that the establishment of a directly elected regional body is 
enabling those in favour of greater regional autonomy to express their opinion through 
devolved elections. From within this perspective, the number of seats assigned to each 
region at the central level places a natural limit on the political potential of regionalist 
parties (Brancati, 2006). Especially in smaller regions, the resulting inability of 
regionalist parties to play a significant role at the central level may in turn limit the 
electoral appeal of such groups, even if popular support for decentralisation is high. As 
votes for regionalist groups are less likely to be ‘wasted’ in devolved elections, the 
establishment of a directly elected regional body may reveal the true level of popular 
support for devolution and secession.  
The relatively strong performance of both the SNP and Plaid Cymru in the devolved 
elections broadly supports this hypothesis (see Table 7.3 and Table 7.7). The 2007 
Scottish Election Survey (Johns, Mitchell, Denver, & Pattie, 2008) however strongly 
suggests that the rapid rise in SNP support between 2003 and 2007 does not primarily 
reflect a change in popular preferences along the constitutional dimension. As Johns et 
al (2009) show, voters with a preference for full independence still represent the hard 
core of SNP support. On the other hand, a similarly determined set of voters continue 
to vote against the SNP for the same reason. Neither of these groups has changed 
much in size between 2003 and 2007.  
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Instead the rise in support for the SNP seem to be primarily related to the overall 
negative evaluations of the Labour Party’s performance at Holyrood, coupled with the 
perceived ability of the SNP to produce more favourable results. In particular, it seems 
that there is a relatively strong consensus amongst Scottish voters regarding the 
desired outcomes of government action. In this context, the voting patterns in the 
devolved elections primarily reflect which contender for office is perceived as most able 
to achieve those objectives. Following Stokes’ (1963) famous paper, Johns et al (2009) 
referred to this type of party competition as valence politics.  
At the time of writing, it is not possible to empirically verify whether a similar 
dynamic was at play in the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections. The available evidence 
regarding the distribution of popular preferences along the constitutional dimension 
however suggest that the recent changes in the behaviour of Scottish voters in 
devolved elections are not primarily caused by the type of position politics that underpin 
spatial models of party competition. Table 7.4 compares the results of a recent poll into 
voting intentions in the case of a referendum on Scottish independence with the 
responses in the post-election sample of the 2007 Scottish Election Survey. This 
reveals that the share of all respondents who intend to vote in favour of full 
independence has remained relatively stable at around 30 percent. In both samples, 
the majority of those who indicated that they had or would vote for the SNP did intend 
to vote yes in the case of a referendum. It is however noticeable that the share of SNP 
voters who indicated that they would vote in favour of independence is considerably 
lower in 2011 than in 2007.  
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Table 7.4 Voting intention in case of a referendum on Scottish independence (2007, 2011) 
 2007 2011 
 All SNP voters All SNP voters (intentional) 
  Con. Reg. UK  Con. Reg. UK 
Yes 31% 67% 73% 75% 28% 58% 60% 68% 
No 57% 20% 15% 14% 57% 28% 28% 18% 
Would 
not  
vote 
1% 0% 0% 1% 3% 0% 1% 0% 
Do not 
Know 
11% 12% 12% 11% 12% 14% 13% 13% 
Sources: R. Johns, et al. (2008) and YouGov/ The Scotsman (2011c) 
 
Simultaneously, there are clear indications that the SNP’s ability to govern was 
perceived relatively favourable at the time of the 2011 election. In the lead up to 
elections, several YouGov polls for example asked who would make the best First 
Minister of Scotland. In response to this question, 42 and 52 percent of respondents 
choose SNP leader Alex Salmond, while only 27 to 29 percent favoured Scottish 
Labour leader Iain Gray (YouGov, 2011a; YouGov / Scotland on Sunday, 2011b). 
Simultaneously, the election campaign strategy of the Scottish Labour has been widely 
criticised. Having achieved considerable success with a similar strategy at the 2010 
general election, Labour’s campaign at the devolved level initially attempted to draw 
primarily on anti-Conservative sentiments (see Figure 7.1). Since Labour’s main rivals 
at the regional level are the SNP rather than the Conservatives, this could be seen as 
evidence that the Party continues to perceive the devolved elections as second order 
contests through which central level battles can be fought out. In this context, it would 
perhaps be unsurprising if many Scottish voters felt that the SNP would be better 
placed to protect Scotland from the dreaded ‘Tory cuts’ than the regional branch of the 
Labour Party.       
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Figure 7.1 Scottish Labour’s campaign message in the 2011 Scottish Parliament Election 
                           
Source: (Scottish Labour Party, 2011) 
Taken together, the available evidence thus broadly concurs with the view that the 
most recent surge of SNP support was again primarily motivated by valence issues, 
rather than shifts in popular preferences along the constitutional dimension. As Johns 
et al (2009) rightfully acknowledge, accepting the importance of valence politics in 
producing the recent shift in the dynamics of Scottish devolution does not preclude 
popular views on devolution from playing an important facilitating role. In fact it can be 
argued that devolution has become a valence issue in the eyes of many Scottish 
voters, as surveys consistently find that the majority of respondents would favour 
further decentralisation (see chapter 6 for more details). The widespread support for 
the referendum on independence proposed by the SNP furthermore suggests that 
many Scots would like the Scottish Parliament to take more decisive action towards 
resolving this issue (see Table 7.5). Despite the magnitude of the potential effect of 
such a poll on the future of Scotland, the plurality of respondents in 2007 however 
indicated that the SNP’s campaign pledge made them neither more nor less likely to 
vote for the Party.  
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Table 7.5 Popular views on the SNP’s pledge to a referendum on independence (Scottish Election 
Study 2007, post-election results)  
Would you support or oppose a 
referendum on independence? 
Did the campaign pledge to a 
referendum on independence make you 
more or less likely to vote for the SNP? 
Support 57% More likely  21% 
Oppose 33% Less likely  22% 
DK 10% No difference 49% 
  DK 8% 
N 1553 N 1553 
If there was a referendum, how would you vote if there was an additional option 
of more powers?  
 All Support referendum Oppose referendum 
Full independence 22% 37% 1% 
Further devolution 37% 41% 33% 
Status quo 28% 15% 58% 
DK 13% 7% 8% 
N 1553 888 507 
Source: Johns, et al. (2008) 
     When asked how they would vote in the event of a multi-option referendum on 
independence, the majority of respondents indicated that they would favour further 
devolution or full independence over the status quo (see Table 7.5). As to be 
anticipated, those who supported the referendum tended to have more favourable 
attitudes towards greater autonomy that those who opposed it. Even amongst those 
who favoured a popular poll, the plurality of respondents however indicated that they 
would vote in favour of further devolution rather than full independence. This suggests 
that the referendum instrument is widely seen as a way to renegotiate elements of the 
existing settlement, rather than a route to full independence. Nonetheless, the majority 
of Scottish voters do not seem fazed by the possible consequences of such a popular 
poll. In this context, it seems hardly surprising that Labour’s attempts to turn around the 
disastrous 2011 election campaign by emphasising the SNP’s nationalist agenda and 
the negative consequences of full independence for Scotland seem to have fallen on 
deaf ears.    
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Whatever the origins of the 2011 Scottish Parliament election results, the election 
of a majority SNP government at Holyrood seems to have created a considerable 
anxiety at the centre. Shortly after the elections, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
stated that the central government would not stand in the way of a regional referendum 
but added: ““If they want to hold a referendum, I will campaign to keep our United 
Kingdom together with every single fibre that I have” (PM David Cameron as quoted by 
Kirkup, 7th of May 2011). The following day it was announced the Scottish Parliament 
would be given the immediate authority to borrow up to £300 million from the Treasury 
(Brady, 8th of May 2011). At the time of writing intergovernmental negotiations are 
ongoing, but it is anticipated that further concessions will be made in the context of the 
Scotland Bill (2010-11) currently before parliament.  
The bargaining power of the majority SNP government in this process is further 
heightened by the so-called Sewel convention, which stipulated that “Westminster 
would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the 
consent of the Scottish parliament” (Hansard (Lords), 21st of July 1998, vol. 592, cols. 
791). As the Scotland Bill would alter the powers and resources devolved to the 
Scottish Parliament, it falls under this convention. As a result, a legislative consent or 
Sewel motion will be put to the Scottish Parliament before the bill completes its 
passage through the House of Lords. Although the central government formally has the 
power to enact the Scotland Bill without the consent of the Scottish Parliament, the 
ability of the SNP to unilaterally vote down the legislative consent motion puts the Party 
in a strong position to demand further changes.            
Taken together, the history of Scottish devolution so far suggests that the creation 
of an elected regional body has considerably decreased the ability of the centre to 
ignore regional demands for greater autonomy. This effect has however been 
heightened by the ability of the SNP to position itself as a viable candidate for office on 
a range of valence issues.  
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If the nationalist party had proved less successful in securing the support of voters with 
more moderate constitutional preferences, the regional branches of parties competing 
at the central level would have been able to use their agenda-setting and decision-
making powers to moderate popular demands. Under such circumstances, the effect of 
devolution on the outcome-based incentives towards regionalist accommodation would 
have been much less pronounced.      
7.3. The dynamics of devolution in Wales 
Although the National Assembly for Wales was established as part of the same 
drive to acknowledge the multinational nature of the British state, the initial Welsh 
devolution settlement differs markedly from its Scottish counterpart. While the Scottish 
Parliament enjoyed primary legislative powers and tax-varying powers from the outset, 
Wales was offered a much more limited form of executive devolution, delivered through 
a 60-member Assembly rather than a fully-fledged Parliament. As noted in the Scottish 
section, it has been argued that these discrepancies in the initial settlements caused 
the early differences in regional assertiveness (Hazell, 2007; Keating, 2009). While it 
may be true that the 1998 Government of Wales Act created an unworkable half-way 
house, I would argue that the power distribution within the Welsh Assembly played an 
equally significant role in the emergence of bottom-up demands for reform.  
The Welsh Assembly currently consists of 40 constituency members elected under the 
First-Past-The-Post system and a further 20 regional members elected on the basis of 
party lists. As anticipated, the AMS substantially increased both the proportionality of 
the results and the effective number of parties within the system (see Table 7.6). In 
addition, voting patterns in the devolved elections have differed markedly from the 
results recorded in the general elections (see Table 7.7). The combination of these two 
trends has meant that the Labour Party has been far less dominant within the Welsh 
Assembly than most had anticipated prior to devolution.      
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While it was clear from the outset that the mechanics of the AMS would be 
likely to deprive the Labour Party of an overall majority in Scotland, the results of the 
first Welsh Assembly elections took most by surprise. Plaid Cymru was widely 
expected to benefit from the regional list system, but few had anticipated that the Party 
would make significant gains in the constituency contests (see Table 7.7). This “quiet 
earthquake” (Plaid Cymru leader, Dafydd Wigley, as quoted by Trystan, Scully, & Wyn 
Jones, 2003: 636) in Welsh politics however took place in the context of some highly 
unusual circumstances.  
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Table 7.6 The results of the devolved elections in Wales (1999-2011)  
Proportionality of the Constitutional and AMS results of the devolved elections 
 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 Con AMS Diff. Con AMS Diff. Con AMS Diff. Con AMS Diff. 
Loosemore-Hanby 29.9 10.2 19.7 35.0 11.7 23.3 27.9 15.7 12.2 27.7 10.4 17.2 
Least Squares 24.1 8.3 15.8 28.7 9.9 18.8 22.2 12.1 10.1 22.2 9.7 12.5 
Effective number of parties NS 2.0 3.0 1.1 1.7 3.0 1.3 2.4 3.3 0.9 1.9 2.9 1.0 
Constituency, regional and total number of seats won by each party 
 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 Con Reg AMS Con Reg AMS Con Reg AMS Con Reg AMS 
Labour 27 1 28 30 0 30 24 2 26 28 2 30 
PC 9 8 17 5 7 12 7 8 15 5 6 11 
Conservative 1 8 9 1 10 11 5 7 12 6 8 14 
LD 3 3 6 3 3 6 3 3 6 1 4 5 
Other 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Sources: Own elaboration based on BBC (2010, 2011c) and Tetteh (2008) 
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Table 7.7 The constituency vote and seats distribution compared to general election results (1997-2011) 
Share of the vote at the constituency-level compared to the share of the Welsh vote received in the preceding general election 
 1997 1999 Diff. 2001 2003 Diff. 2005 2007 Diff. 2010 2011 Diff. 
PC 10% 28% 19 14% 21% 7 13% 22% 10 11% 19% 8 
Lab. 55% 38% -17 49% 40% -9 43% 32% -11 36% 42% 6 
LD 12% 14% 1 14% 14% 0 18% 15% -4 20% 11% -10 
Con. 20% 16% -4 21% 20% -1 21% 22% 1 26% 25% -1 
Share of the constituency-level seats compared to the share of the Welsh seats in the preceding general election 
 1997 1999 Diff. 2001 2003 Diff. 2005 2007 Diff. 2010 2011 Diff. 
PC 10% 23% 13 10% 13% 3 8% 18% 10 8% 13% 5 
Lab. 85% 68% -17 85% 75% -10 73% 60% -13 65% 70% 5 
LD 5% 8% 3 5% 8% 3 10% 8% -2 8% 3% -5 
Con. 0% 3% 3 0% 3% 3 8% 13% 5 20% 15% -5 
Sources: own elaboration based on BBC (2010, 2011c) and Tetteh (2008) 
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In the autumn of 1998, the Welsh Labour Party Leader, Ron Davies, had been 
forced to resign following a personal scandal. In the divisive Welsh leadership contest that 
followed, the central party leadership used its influence to ensure the victory of Alun 
Michael over the locally preferred candidate, Rhodri Morgan (Bradbury, Denver, Mitchell, & 
Bennie, 2000; Hopkin & Bradbury, 2006).This was widely perceived as an attempt by the 
centre to exert undue influence, leading to internal disputes and substantial negative 
publicity. Under these circumstances, Plaid Cymru was able to make substantial gains 
right across Wales (Jones, 1999b).  
The results of the 2003 Assembly election suggest that the very strong 
performance of Plaid Cymru in 1999 was at least partially linked to internal problems within 
the Labour Party. Nonetheless, the nationalists have continued to capture a substantially 
larger share of the votes and seats in devolved elections than had traditionally been the 
case at the central level (see Table 7.7). Combined with the improving performance of the 
Conservative Party, these trends have significantly eroded Labour’s traditionally strong 
position in Wales. While the Party secured a narrow working majority in 2003 and 201117, it 
failed to surpass this threshold in 1999 and 2007. As a result, the Party has periodically 
faced strong political act-based incentives to increase its agenda-setting and decision-
making powers by entering into a formal coalition with another party.  
The history of Welsh devolution so far suggests that bottom-up attempts to 
renegotiate the existing provisions originate from such periods of coalition government at 
the regional level. In 1999, the desire to form a governing coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats induced the Welsh Labour Party to support the establishment of a Commission 
into the existing legislative and electoral arrangements as part of the coalition agreement 
(Welsh Assembly Government, 2000).  
                                               
17 Formally a party would need to win 31 of the 60 seats in order to acquire an absolute majority in 
the Welsh Assembly. Once the usual party affiliations of the Presiding Officer and the Deputy 
Presiding Officer have been taken into account, any party controlling half of the seats does however 
effectively hold the majority of the votes within the Assembly.  
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The resulting Commission, chaired by Labour peer Lord Ivor Richard, published its final 
report in March 2004 (Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the 
National Assembly for Wales, 2004). If adopted in full, the recommendations of the 
Richard Commission would have considerably enhanced the legislative powers and fiscal 
autonomy of the Welsh Assembly. The subsequent devolved election however returned a 
majority Labour Government, albeit with the narrowest of margins (see Table 7.6). 
Released from the need to form alliances, Welsh Labour showed little interest in pursuing 
these policy changes. This is most clearly demonstrated by the White Paper it produced in 
response to the final report of the Richard commission (Welsh Labour, 2004). Although 
this document did include a watered-down commitment to increasing the legislative power 
of the Assembly, it barely paid lip service to the more radical recommendations in the 
report. Although the process did eventually result in a modest decentralisation of powers in 
the form of the 2006 Government of Wales Act, the 2003-2007 Welsh Assembly 
government clearly used its powers to weaken rather than strengthen calls for further 
decentralisation.    
Bottom-up pressures towards further decentralisation re-emerged when the Welsh 
Labour Party failed to retain its narrow working majority in the 2007 Welsh Assembly 
elections (see table 7.6). This time around, a rift between Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats created an opportunity for the nationalists to advance their agenda. Initially 
Welsh Labour proved reluctant to enter in a full coalition with Plaid Cymru. Instead it 
proposed a Stability Pact that gave the regionalist party a very limited degree of policy 
influence. Plaid Cymru however managed to significantly enhance its bargaining power by 
engaging in coalition discussions with the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. The 
threat of finding itself in opposition for the first time since the establishment of the Welsh 
Assembly proved sufficient to entice Welsh Labour to improve its offer to a formal coalition 
agreement.  
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The resulting “One Wales” agreement included a commitment to set up a second 
Commission into the devolution settlement (Welsh Assembly Government, 2007). Chaired 
by Gerald Holtham, this Commission was asked to examine the effects of the present 
formula-based approach and identifying viable alternative funding mechanisms 
(Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales, 2009). Its remit explicitly 
included the request to consider the desirability of greater tax-varying and borrowing 
powers. In its final report, published in July 2010, the Holtham Commission recommends 
that the Barnett formula should be replaced by a needs-based funding regime 
(Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales, 2010). In addition it made a 
case for the devolution of tax-varying and borrowing powers to the Welsh Assembly 
(Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales, 2010). The regionalist 
influence within the governing coalition was further exemplified by its commitment to use 
the Assembly’s existing legislative competences to the full and work towards a successful 
referendum on full law-making powers as soon as practicable (Welsh Assembly 
Government, 2007). This poll took place on the 3rd of March 2011 and returned a majority 
in favour of legislative devolution (BBC, 2011a). 
The most recent Assembly elections have once more returned a Welsh Labour 
Government with a narrow working majority (see Table 7.6). At the time of writing, it is too 
soon to tell how this will affected the assertiveness of the Welsh Assembly. The 
experiences during the first decade of devolution suggest that the Welsh Labour Party is 
significantly less inclined to put pressure on the centre to reform the existing arrangements 
when it does not have to rely on the support of others in order to remain in office. From a 
rational choice perspective, there are two potential explanations for this pattern of 
behaviour. First of all, it could be that the Welsh Labour Party has an outcome-based 
preference for maintaining the status-quo and only accommodates demands for further 
decentralisation when it faces strong act-based incentives to do so.  
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Alternatively, the regional branch may have an outcome preference for further 
decentralisation but lack the autonomy to challenge the existing arrangements against the 
wishes of the central party leadership. In my view, the available evidence largely supports 
the second hypothesis.  
The Labour Party has traditionally been highly centralised. Initially, the central party 
leadership aimed to preserve a high degree of internal cohesion by maintaining a strong 
say in the regional leadership selection process and insisting that regional campaign 
messages should be attuned to central policies (Bradbury, et al., 2000; Hopkin & 
Bradbury, 2006; Shaw, 2001). In Wales in particular, such practices attracted considerable 
criticism. Following the disappointing 1999 election results, the regional party forced the 
party leader, Alun Michael, to resign. He was subsequently replaced by Rhodri Morgan in 
a local contest. The fact that the central party leadership made little sustained attempt to 
enforce the existing leadership selection criteria suggest that devolution has enhanced the 
autonomy of the regional branch in this respect. As discussed, the relatively poor 
performance of the Welsh Party in the first devolved elections, combined with the resulting 
need to enter into a coalition with other parties, also created substantial pressures towards 
programmatic changes. In the absence of such political act-based incentives, both the 
Scottish and the Welsh arm of the Labour Party have however been very reluctant to stand 
on a regionalist platform in devolved elections. Especially given the known regionalist 
sympathies of Rhodri Morgan, this suggests that the regional branches remain keen to 
avoid direct confrontations with the central party leadership. As a result, van Houten 
(2009) is in my view right in arguing that the external devolution of powers to a directly 
elected regional body has so far been associated with an internal delegation, rather than a 
true transfer, of power from the central party to the regional branch.   
If this is indeed the correct interpretation of the past behaviour of the Welsh Labour 
Party, the recent shift in power at the centre may increase the assertiveness of the Welsh 
Assembly under a majority Labour government.  
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For the first decade of devolution, the Welsh Assembly has been dominated by the 
regional branch of the party that was in government at the centre. In this context, the 
central party leadership could manage regional demands for reform by putting internal 
pressure on the regional branch to moderate demands. Now that the Party is in opposition 
at Westminster, the central Labour leadership arguably faces fewer incentives to reign in 
the ambitions of the Welsh Labour Party in order to avoid public clashes between the 
central government and the devolved body. Simultaneously, the dynamics of Welsh 
devolution so far suggest that the absence of any formal party affiliation between the 
central government and the Welsh administration will significantly reduce the willingness of 
the central government to accommodate bottom-up demands for further decentralisation.  
Despite growing popular support for devolution, the demand for independence has 
remained very limited in Wales (see chapter 6). In addition, Plaid Cymru support seems to 
have stabilised at around 20 per cent of the vote in the devolved elections. As a result, 
Welsh elites have not been able to draw on a credible threat of secession in order to 
extract further concession from the centre. In this context, the response of the central 
Labour Government to the findings of the Richard Commission can at best be described 
as a very partial accommodation of regionalist demands. As noted, there are reasons to 
believe that the central party leadership used its influence on the Welsh Party in order to 
remove some of the more radical demands in the original report from the political agenda. 
While the central government did respond to the subsequent White Paper produced by the 
Welsh Assembly government by introducing new legislation, the gradual approach to 
legislative devolution set out in the 2006 Government of Wales Act seem to serve little 
purpose other than to prevent or delay major changes to the existing settlement. Crucially, 
the Act made the full transfer of primary legislative powers dependent on the outcome of a 
popular referendum. Given the public mood in Wales at that time, this inclusion of a 
popular veto had the real potential to prevent the proposed transfer of legislative powers 
from occurring.  
306 | P a g e  
 
While the Labour Party may have been reluctant to accommodate bottom-up 
demands to change the initial devolution settlement for Wales, the behaviour of the 2010 
Conservative-led administration suggests that this Party would have been even less 
inclined to devolve further power and resources to Wales. Bound by the provisions under 
the 2006 Government of Wales Act, the Conservative Party had little choice but to 
concede that it would not stand in the way of a popular referendum on legislative 
devolution (Conservative Party, 2010a). Both the coalition agreement (HM Government, 
2010) and the 2010 Queen’s speech reaffirmed this commitment. The day after the 
Queen’s speech, the new Prime Minister, David Cameron, however announced that he 
believed that this poll should not take place until 2011. In previous communications with 
the central government, the Welsh Assembly had made it clear that it would favour a 
referendum in October of 2010. The government’s suggestion that this date was not 
attainable was widely seen as a poorly masked attempt to delay the process, especially 
since the Welsh Assembly was not notified of the Prime Minister’s announcement in 
advance (Shipton, 26 May 2010).  
The centre was however not able to delay the poll indefinitely. As the eventual 
referendum returned a clear majority in favour of legislative devolution (BBC, 2011a), the 
central government had little choice but to concede defeat on this occasion.  The 
government’s handling of the findings of the Independent Commission on Funding and 
Finance for Wales however suggests that it is not willing to make any further concessions 
to Welsh demands. Despite recognising the concerns raised by the Commission, the 
coalition agreement states that any changes in the funding position of Wales “must await 
the stabilisation of the public finances” (HM Government, 2010: 28). The reluctance to 
decentralise additional resources to Wales is further evident from the suggestion that any 
future change would have to be preceded by a Calman-style Commission process.  
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This Commission would in turn only be established once a referendum on the devolution of 
legislative powers had proved successful. At the time of writing, no steps have been taken 
to create such a Commission.    
Taken together this suggests that intergovernmental relations between the Welsh 
Assembly and the central government may be set to become increasingly conflictual over 
the coming years. In the absence of strong popular demand for full independence or a 
sharp rise in the share of the vote attracted by Plaid Cymru, it is difficult to see what would 
entice a Conservative-led central administration to look favourably upon demands to 
increase the powers and resources of the Welsh Assembly. Simultaneously, Labour’s fall 
from grace at the centre is likely to increase the ability of the Welsh Labour Party to voice 
its concerns with the existing government system in a more assertive way.       
 
7.4. The dynamic of devolution in London 
The experiences in Greater London stand out from those in Scotland and Wales in the 
sense that devolution has created a fairly constant bottom-up demand for further 
decentralisation regardless of the balance of power within the Greater London Authority. 
To some extent, it can be argued that this trend is a direct consequence of the institutional 
design of the devolved body. The GLA consists of a directly-elected mayor and a 25 
member Assembly. Formally, the mayor proposes the budget and policies of the GLA, 
while the Assembly scrutinises the executive.  In practice the powers of the Assembly are 
however very limited. The Assembly can only amend the budget proposed by the Mayor 
with a two-thirds majority. The Greater London Authority Act 1999 furthermore stipulates 
that the mayor is required to inform and consult the Assembly when preparing or revising 
the mayoral strategies, but it does not award any formal veto powers to the Assembly. As 
a result, the agenda-setting and decision-making powers are strongly concentrated in the 
hands of one individual.  
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Especially since the initial settlement only devolved a very limited set of powers and 
resources, this individual in turn faces strong incentives to use the economic and political 
resources available to her in order to put pressure on the centre to expand the mayoral 
remit.  
The likelihood of bottom-up pressures towards greater decentralisation has been 
further enhanced by the fact that the mayoral elections have so far been dominated by 
personality politics, rather than party political concerns (Rallings & Thrasher, 2000 ). The 
Mayor of London enjoys the largest personal mandate of any politician in the British 
system. Even if the mayoral candidate is formally affiliated to a political party, this personal 
mandate is likely to award her a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the party leadership. The 
ability of the mayor to pursue her own preferences is however likely to vary depending on 
the extent to which she relies on the formal affiliation with and patronage of a wider party 
in order to gain office. In this context, the victory of Ken Livingstone as an independent 
mayoral candidate has played a crucial role in shaping the dynamics of devolution in 
Greater London.          
Prior to devolution, it was widely anticipated that the Labour Party would field the last 
leader of the Greater London Council, Ken Livingstone, as its official candidate in the first 
Mayoral election. Important parts of the parliamentary Labour Party in particular however 
favoured the candidacy of the more moderate cabinet minister, Frank Dobson. In the 
selection process that followed, Livingstone was narrowly defeated by Dobson (White & 
Milne, 21st of February 2000).  Running as an independent candidate, Livingstone 
nonetheless managed to capture the largest share of the popular vote by a considerable 
margin. During his first term in office, Livingstone used the resulting autonomy to publicly 
challenge the Labour Government in office at centre (Sweeting, 2003). Most famously, he 
refused to adopt the government’s preferred method for financing the upgrading of 
London’s ailing underground transportation system. 
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 In the resulting legal proceedings, the court ruled that the Greater London Authority Act 
gives the Secretary of State the right to intervene if mayoral strategies are seen to conflict 
with national policies (Waugh & Clement, 31 July 2001). The episode nonetheless 
forcefully demonstrated the ability of an independently elected mayor to use his personal 
mandate in order to challenge the distribution of powers under the existing settlement. 
While his independent status enabled him to take a more radical stance on certain 
topics, Livingstone was increasingly aware that it simultaneously limited his ability to 
successfully extract further concessions from the centre (Sweeting, 2003). In an attempt to 
increase his influence, Livingstone repeatedly tried to rejoin the Labour Party (Wintour, 
24th of  July 2002). The central Labour leadership was initially reluctant to reinstate him. 
Public approval of Livingstone’s performance as mayor however continued to grow during 
his first period in office (for details, see chapter 6).  In the run-up to the 2004 Mayoral 
elections, it became increasingly clear that Livingstone was likely to be re-elected as an 
independent candidate.  
The prospect of another humiliating defeat at the polls proved sufficient to cause a 
change of heart at the top of the party. In the political shuffle that followed, Labour’s official 
mayoral candidate, Nicky Gravon, was forced to step aside for Livingstone just ahead of 
the 2004 elections (van der Kolk, Rallings, & Thrasher, 2006). As anticipated, Livingstone 
comfortable retained his position. The Labour Party’s inability to dethrone Livingstone, 
coupled with his formal re-affiliation with the Party, put the Mayor in a strong bargaining 
position. The timing of the decision to substantially increase the Mayor’s powers, proposed 
in 2006 and formalised in the 2007 Greater London Authority Act, suggest that this allowed 
him to successfully extract additional powers despite a lack of popular demand for greater 
autonomy. Significantly, the Labour Party has made no further commitments to increase 
the powers of the Mayor of London or the GLA since Ken Livingstone was defeated by the 
Conservative Mayoral candidate, Boris Johnson in the 2008 Mayoral election.  
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Like his predecessor, Johnson was both a maverick within his own Party and 
hugely popular with the general public at the time of his election. Empirical evidence of 
intra-party bargaining practices is difficult to obtain. The change in the official position of 
the Conservative Party shortly after the 2008 elections however strongly suggests that 
Johnson’s success in the Mayoral elections awarded him considerable bargaining powers 
within the Party. In the late 1990s, the Conservative Party had strongly opposed Labour’s 
plans to create an elected mayor and Assembly for Greater London. During the debates 
surrounding the 2006-2007 Greater London Authority Bill, the Party again spoke out 
strongly against any further devolution of powers to Greater London in general and the 
mayor in particular (Hansard (Commons), 12th of December 2006, vol. 454, cols.751-836, 
Hansard (Commons), 27th of February 2007, vol. 457, cols.845-891).The Conservative 
opposition to further decentralisation however swiftly evaporated after the election of Boris 
Johnson. Following extensive negotiations with the mayor’s office, the Conservative Party 
formally announced its intention to transfer additional powers to the Mayor of London in 
April 2010 (Clift, 30th of April 2010; Conservative Party, 2010b). This commitment was 
reiterated in the 2010 election manifesto (Conservative Party, 2010a). 
 As noted, the 2010 general election returned the Conservative Party to power, 
albeit in a formal coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Upon taking office, the Prime 
Minister has been swift to prepare the ground for further devolution by announcing that the 
Government Office for London is to be abolished and the post of Minister of London will 
not be maintained (Waugh, 4 June 2010 ). More recently, the Localism Bill (2010-11) has 
been introduced. Under the provisions of this Bill, the London Development Agency will be 
abolished, while the Greater London Authority in general and the Mayor in particular will 
receive additional powers in the areas of housing and regeneration. Past experiences 
suggest that the central government’s willingness to make further concessions will depend 
strongly on the outcome of the Mayoral election scheduled to be held on the 3rd of May 
2012.  
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An opinion poll conducted in March 2011 suggests that this election is likely to be a tight 
run race between the incumbent Conservative Mayor and Labour candidate Ken 
Livingstone. If Livingstone regains office, this may well result in a policy U-turn by the 
Conservative Party.        
7.5. The English question and the elusive search for symmetry 
As demonstrated in the previous sections, democratic devolution has supplied 
regional elites in devolved areas with highly legitimate platforms through which to pursue 
their objectives. Simultaneously, the analysis in chapter 6 suggests that the potential 
electoral costs associated with accommodating the resulting demands for further 
autonomy may be increasing. Prior to devolution, offering greater powers and resources to 
Scotland and Wales in particular had the potential to create electoral gains amongst the 
regionally-concentrated pro-devolution minority, without significantly influencing the voting 
behaviour of the majority of voters in the rest of the country. As the previous chapter has 
shown, the reality of asymmetric devolution has however raised public awareness of 
regional inequalities in funding positions and systemic anomalies in terms of democratic 
representation. This has in turn created increasingly prominent comparative grievances, 
particularly in respect to Scotland’s relatively favourable position. In this context, granting 
further powers and resources in response to regionalist pressures risk aggravating English 
sensitivities. If such grievances become sufficiently salient, this may in turn create a 
substantial electoral backlash.  
Initially Labour’s response to the so-called English Question was focussed on the 
decentralisation of powers and resources to the English Government Office Regions. The 
essence of this policy was developed while the Party was still in opposition (Labour Party, 
1995, 1996a; Regional Policy Commission, 1996). It was designed to reverse what was 
seen as a tide of centralisation that had engulfed Britain under three consecutive 
Conservative Governments (John, Musson, & Tickell, 2002).  
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Once in office, the Labour government swiftly set about implementing the economic 
elements of its decentralisation agenda through the establishment of Regional 
Development Agencies. The centre however proved far less inclined to actively pursue its 
manifesto commitment to “introduce legislation to allow the people, region by region, to 
decide in a referendum whether they want directly elected regional government” (Labour 
Party, 1997). Partially this reluctance may reflect the fact that opinion polls consistently 
found that there was no real popular demand for democratic devolution to the English 
regions (see chapter 6).  Labour’s initial inertia can however also be related to the 
constellation of preferences within the Labour Party itself. While the responsible Secretary 
of State, John Prescott, strongly favoured the idea, many within the Party remained 
unconvinced of the benefits of elected regional assemblies in England (Tomaney, 2002). 
Crucial, it seems that the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was amongst those who were less 
inclined to support the policy. 
The fact that the commitment to elected regional assemblies was explicitly 
reaffirmed in the 2001 election manifesto (Labour Party, 2001) is in part a testament to 
Prescott’s personal perseverance and influence. However, the emergence of elite 
pressures from within the Northern regions in particular also made it more difficult for the 
central government to completely abandon the cause of regional devolution in England. 
From the early 1990s, the Campaign for a Northern Assembly had proved influential in 
shaping Labour thinking on the English question. When Labour came to power in 1997, 
the government’s formal commitment to elected regional assemblies sparked the 
establishment of Constitutional Conventions in several other English regions (Sandford, 
2009a). Although these Conventions yielded only informal influence, their very existence 
made it impossible for the government to silently retreat on its 1997 manifesto 
commitments.   
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Following Labour’s convincing re-election in 2001, progress on English devolution 
remained slow. The publication of a White Paper in May 2002 was followed by the 
necessary legislation a year later. After consulting with key stakeholders, the government 
announced that referendums would be held on the 4th of November 2004 in the North East, 
the North West and Yorkshire and the Humber only. Amidst reports that public support for 
the government’s proposals was dwindling, the referendums in the North West and 
Yorkshire and the Humber were officially postponed for technical reasons. The only 
remaining poll in the North East resulted in a decisive defeat (Sandford, 2009b). On a 
turnout of almost 48 per cent, 78 per cent of those who voted rejected the government’s 
proposals. Following this rejection, the government announced that it no longer had any 
immediate plans for democratic devolution to the English regions. 
Apart from the failed regional devolution project, the Labour Party has made few 
attempts to address the anomalies produced by asymmetric devolution during its time in 
office at the centre. Despite increasing popular discontent with the existing funding regime 
in England and Wales (see chapter 6 and Table 7.8), the Party has not sought to address 
these concerns in a systematic way. In addition, three consecutive Labour Governments 
have shown little willingness to resolve the mounting democratic grievances amongst 
English voters. While the 2005 Parliamentary Constituencies (Scotland) Order brought 
Scotland’s seat share at Westminster in line with its population size, the government did 
not choose to use this opportunity to do the same for Wales. Similarly, no attempt was 
made to redress the systemic anomaly that allows MPs from devolved areas to vote on 
issues that will never affect their constituencies.  
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Table 7.8 Views on the share of public spending received by Scotland (Column percent)  
Views in England 
 2000 2003 2007 2009 
 All Lab Con All Lab Con All Lab Con All Lab Con 
Much 
more 
11% 10% 16% 12% 10% 14% 21% 17% 31% 26% 24% 31% 
A little 
more 
17% 16% 19% 18% 18% 22% 22% 24% 23% 29% 31% 36% 
Fair 57% 55% 55% 59% 61% 55% 49% 50% 41% 41% 41% 30% 
A little 
less 
13% 16% 9% 10% 10% 7% 7% 7% 4% 4% 3% 4% 
A lot 
less 
2% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
N 1412 589 433 1403 539 409 658 232 217 727 191 239 
Views in Scotland 
 2000 2003 2007 2009 
 All Lab SNP All Lab SNP All Lab SNP All Lab SNP 
Much 
more 
2% 2% 1% 3% 2% 2% 4% 5% 2% 3% 4% 3% 
A little 
more 
8% 8% 4% 9% 7% 3% 14% 14% 9% 12% 13% 7% 
Fair 29% 33% 15% 36% 43% 26% 42% 46% 31% 43% 44% 34% 
A little 
less 
36% 36% 44% 37% 34% 46% 29% 25% 41% 32% 30% 40% 
A lot 
less 
25% 23% 37% 15% 14% 23% 11% 10% 17% 10% 9% 16% 
N 1584 593 312 1398 456 245 1353 455 330 1344 373 307 
Sources: Own elaboration based on National Centre for Social Research (2002a, 2002b, 
2005, 2009, 2011) and Scottish Centre for Social Research (2005, 2009, 2010) 
 
In the area of public spending, this inertia may reflect the consequences likely to be 
associated with accommodating English preferences. As noted in chapter 6, English voters 
are increasingly feeling aggrieved by Scotland’s relatively favourable public spending 
position. While this discontent seems most pronounced amongst Conservative identifiers 
(see Table 7.8), survey evidence suggest that the majority of Labour identifiers now also 
feels that Scotland is receiving more than its fair share of public spending. Although the 
share of Scottish respondents who feel that their country receives less than its fair share of 
public expenditure has declined in the post-devolution period, few are willing to accept that 
Scotland is currently receiving more than its fair share. In addition, the majority of SNP 
supporters and around 40 percent of Labour identifiers continue to feel that their country is 
already short-changed under the existing system (see Table 7.8).   
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In this context, any electoral gains associated with accommodating English 
grievances are likely to be outweighed by the backlash such a policy is likely to create in 
Scotland. Although discontent with the current allocation of resources is increasingly 
associated with support for devolution in England (see chapter 6), the issue is likely to 
carry much greater salience in Scotland. If the Barnett formula would be replaced by an 
objective needs-based system, this would have a very immediate and negative effect on 
public spending in Scotland. By contrast such a move would in itself have no direct impact 
on the resources allocated to English public services. Given Labour’s continued reliance 
on Scottish seats, this difference in issue salience means that ignoring the demands of the 
English majority may well be less damaging electorally than flouting Scottish preferences. 
In addition, any central effort to reduce public spending in Scotland is likely to increase 
popular support for greater fiscal autonomy. This may in turn benefit the SNP in the 
devolved and general elections alike and put further pressure on the centre to devolve 
additional powers. In this context, maintaining the status quo in terms of resource 
allocation can be seen as an important part of the centre’s attempts to control the 
secessionist threat in Scotland and safeguard the Union.   
By contrast, the Labour Party’s refusal to address the so-called West-Lothian 
question seems more strongly motivated by self-interested outcome-based incentives. As  
Table 7.9 shows, the vast majority of English voters support the statement that 
Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on English issues in the House of Commons. 
Although Conservative voters tend to feel more strongly about this issue than Labour 
identifiers, addressing the West-Lothian question clearly has the potential to create 
electoral gains in England.  Although a substantial minority of Scottish voters disagrees 
with the idea that the voting right of Scottish MPs should be restricted, surveys suggest 
that few feel very strongly about this issue.  
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Taken together, this suggests that accommodating English grievances by curbing the 
voting rights of Scottish MPs at Westminster could be a vote-maximising strategy. In the 
long term however, the negative consequences of this option in terms of the power and 
influence of the Labour Party at the central level would be substantial.  
 
Table 7.9 Views on the West-Lothian question in England and Scotland (Column percent)  
Scottish MPs should not vote on English issues in the House of Commons 
Views in England 
 2000 2003 2007    
 All Lab Con All Lab Con All Lab Con    
agree 
strongly 
20% 14% 31% 25% 21% 35% 29% 26% 43%    
agree  50% 52% 51% 44% 44% 40% 42% 42% 37%    
neither  20% 22% 12% 19% 21% 14% 18% 18% 10%    
disagree 9% 11% 5% 10% 12% 10% 10% 14% 9%    
disagree 
strongly 
1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 0% 1%    
N 1551 618 473 1347 481 410 641 226 202    
Views in Scotland 
 2000 2003 2007 2009 
 All Lab SNP All Lab SNP All Lab SNP All Lab SNP 
agree 
strongly 
15% 13% 14% 14% 14% 12% 14% 11% 15% 16% 11% 23% 
agree  44% 43% 46% 36% 35% 42% 39% 38% 43% 33% 34% 36% 
neither  18% 18% 18% 28% 30% 27% 26% 27% 23% 29% 27% 21% 
disagree 20% 22% 15% 17% 17% 15% 18% 21% 15% 17% 22% 16% 
disagree 
strongly 
4% 4% 7% 5% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 7% 4% 
N 1376 515 276 1301 424 226 1283 439 294 1284 348 280 
Sources: Own elaboration based on National Centre for Social Research (2002a, 2002b, 
2005, 2009) and Scottish Centre for Social Research (2005, 2009, 2010) 
 
 
Labour has traditionally been disproportionally dependent on Welsh and Scottish 
seats (see chapter 4). In the post-devolution era, Scottish and Welsh MPs have continued 
to account for between 19 and 26 percent of the Parliamentary Labour Party (see Table 
7.10). By contrast, less than 3 percent of the Conservative MPs represent constituencies 
in either of these two countries. As a result, the Conservative’s share of the English seats 
has been consistently higher than the Party’s overall share of Westminster seats.  
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Conversely, Labour’s share of the English seat has been similar to or below the Party’s 
seat share in the UK as a whole. In addition, party discipline amongst Scottish and Welsh 
Labour MPs has traditionally been relatively high (Russell & Lodge, 2006). In this context, 
accommodating English grievances by offering ‘English votes on English Laws’ would 
mean stripping a relatively loyal part of the Parliamentary Labour Party of its voting rights 
in devolved matters while simultaneously increasing the relative voting power of the 
Conservative Party. These outcome-based incentives to ignore English calls for reform are 
further enhanced by the fact that many prominent Labour politicians, including the former 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown, represent Scottish or Welsh constituencies. From this 
perspective, it is hardly surprising that Gordon Brown argued against the policy, which he 
claimed would create two classes of MPs (Hansard (Commons), 3rd of July 2007, vol. 462, 
col. 818).    
 
Table 7.10 Differences in reliance on Scottish and Welsh seats (1997-2010) 
 Scottish and Welsh 
seats as % of the 
Parliamentary Party 
Share of the UK-wide and English seats at 
Westminster 
 Labour Conservative Labour Conservative 
   UK England UK  England 
1997 22% 0% 63% 62% 25% 31% 
2001 22% 1% 63% 61% 25% 31% 
2005 19% 2% 55% 54% 31% 37% 
2010 26% 3% 40% 36% 47% 56% 
Sources: own elaboration based on BBC (2010) and Rallings & Thrasher (2007) 
  
Since coming to power following the 2010 general election, the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition has proved more inclined to address the West-Lothian question. 
Throughout the post-devolution era, the Conservative Party has argued that MPs 
representing constituencies in devolved areas should not be allowed to vote on issues that 
will not directly affect their constituents (Conservative Party, 2001) (Conservative Party, 
2005: 22; 2010a).  
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As the discussion above shows, this policy would enhance the Party’s power at the centre. 
The results of the 2010 general election most clearly illustrate this. Although the 
Conservatives failed to win an overall majority, they do command 56 per cent of the 
English seats (see Table 7.10). The Conservative’s current coalition partner is however 
relatively reliant on Scottish and Welsh seats. As a result, the Liberal Democrats face few 
outcome-based incentives to support the solution proposed by the Conservatives. In their 
2010 manifesto, the Liberal Democrats instead reiterated the intention to deal with the 
English question in the context of a federal Britain (Liberal Democrats, 2010: 92). As a 
compromise, the resulting coalition agreement states that the government “will establish a 
commission to consider the ‘West Lothian question’” (HM Government, 2010: 27). When 
this commission stage will take place and whether it will indeed lead to any change in the 
status quo remains to be seen. The prominence of the issue in the previous election 
manifestos of both parties, as well as its inclusion in the coalition agreement, however 
suggests that the government does have a genuine interest in trying to resolve this issue.  
By contrast, there has been little suggestion that the administration intends to 
redress Scotland’s relatively favourable expenditure position when it implements the 
Calman proposals. Instead the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland have been given the opportunity to delay their shares of the UK spending cuts until 
the next budget year. This option is not open to any of the English regions. Especially in 
the current climate of deep and painful cuts in public spending, these actions are likely to 
increase comparative grievances in England. The fact that a central government 
dominated by the Conservative Party would be willing to risk an English backlash in order 
to appease Scotland is the strongest demonstration to date that the devolution process 
has increased the bargaining power of this country vis-à-vis the centre. In this context the 
salience of English grievances would have to increase considerably before decisive action 
is likely to be taken to address this aspect of the English Question.   
 
319 | P a g e  
 
7.6. Conclusion 
The post-devolution period has been marked by a number of further adjustments to the 
original devolution ‘settlements’. While these constitutional developments have been duly 
noted in the academic literature, there have so far been few attempts to analyse the 
origins of the emerging patterns of regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation. 
This chapter has sought to show that the approach developed in chapter 2 can help us to 
develop a better understanding of these dynamics. In particular, it was argued that a 
formal veto player analysis reveals that the creation of directly elected regional bodies for 
Scotland and Wales has not changed the formal distribution of agenda-setting and 
decision-making powers over matters of constitutional importance. Instead, devolution has 
altered the act- and outcome-based incentives faced by parties competing for office at the 
central level.  
 The experiences in Scotland so far broadly concur with the hypothesis that devolution 
tends to increase bottom-up pressures towards further decentralisation by providing 
regional parties with opportunities to gain office at the regional level. The mechanisms 
through which this effect occurs are however different from those suggested by authors 
like Chhibber and Kollman (2004) and Brancati (2006) (2008). While the SNP has made 
considerable advances in devolved elections, its share of the vote during general elections 
has remained fairly stable. Regional pressures towards further decentralisation therefore 
have not emerged as a consequence of a devolution-driven regionalisation of the British 
party system. Rather, the SNP has been able to use its strong position at the regional level 
to increase the credibility of the threat of secession. This has in turn strengthened the 
incentives to accommodating Scottish preferences faced by central level veto players with 
an outcome-based preference for maintaining the Union.   
The ability of the SNP to significantly enhance its performance at the regional level was 
in turn only partially related to the distribution of preferences along the territorial 
dimension.   
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There are strong indications that the behaviour of Scottish voters during devolved 
elections is increasingly driven by valence politics, rather than the positional issues upon 
which spatial models of party competition are based. The existence of a fairly strong 
popular consensus regarding the goals of government at the regional level, couple with the 
perceived ability of the SNP to deliver these social and economic objectives, allowed the 
Party to capture the support of voters with more moderate preferences along the 
constitutional dimension. As a result, the behaviour of the SNP does not conform to van 
Houten’s (2007: 563) prediction that “the inclusive voter support that a regional party 
strives to mobilize can put constraints on the type of competencies it claims for the region 
and, thus, on the challenge it poses for the centre”. Instead the SNP was able to present 
itself as the primary representative of the region’s interests along a range of valence 
issues, including but by no means limited to the constitutional question.  
By contrast, Plaid Cymru has proved less able to capitalise on the strengthening of 
regional mobilisation structures. While the Party has consistently performed better at the 
regional scale than it traditionally does at the central level, it has not been able to capture 
the plurality of the seats within the Welsh Assembly. Together with the much more modest 
level of popular support for full independence, this has severely limited the credibility of the 
threat of exit. In this context, central concessions to regional demands for further powers 
seem to be primarily driven by act-based incentives. The emergence of distinct voting 
patterns at the devolved level, combined with the mechanics of the AMS, have meant that 
the Welsh Labour Party has at times been forced to form a coalition with another party in 
order to remain in office at the regional level. Given the preference constellation of the 
other parties within the Welsh party system, this has produced strong political act-based 
incentives to make concessions along the constitutional dimension at the regional level. 
Under such circumstances, the central Labour leadership has proved willing to allow the 
Welsh Party to adopt a more regionalist stance.  
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When faced with the regional pressures towards further regionalisation this invariably 
produced, the central Labour Party in turn proved willing to at least pay lip service to such 
demands.  
  Given the importance of intra-party dynamics in the accommodation of Welsh 
demands for greater autonomy, it is perhaps unsurprising that the change of power at the 
central level has resulted in a hardening of the centre’s line vis-à-vis the region’s demands 
for further powers and resources.  As was the case in the pre-devolution period, the 
central Conservative Party leadership faced few internal or external act-based incentives 
to accommodate Welsh demands for further decentralisation. In the absence of a credible 
threat of secession, it is therefore able to largely ignore Welsh preferences for further 
decentralisation. Taken together this suggests that devolution has somewhat increased 
the bargaining power regionalist groups in Wales have at times when the central and the 
regional level are both Labour-dominated but the Welsh Labour Party does not enjoy a 
working majority. During other periods, the establishment of a directly elected regional 
body merely allows regionalist groups to more strongly voice their concerns with the 
existing government system. While this may help to mobilise popular support for further 
decentralisation, it seems unlikely that this will lead to rapid and far-reaching changes in 
the devolved settlement.  
A similar dynamic of devolution has emerged in Greater London, albeit for very 
different reasons. Given the limited powers of the Assembly and the absence of a credible 
threat of public disorder, the personal clout of the Mayor is the only real instrument of 
influence available to the Greater London Authority. By concentrating the agenda-setting 
and decision-making powers in the hands of one directly elected individual, the 1999 
Greater London Authority Act encouraged the emergence of a highly visible figurehead of 
devolution with a strong incentive to expand his or her personal power and prestige.  
 
322 | P a g e  
 
The personality-driven nature of the Mayoral elections enhanced both the autonomy of the 
Mayor and the bargaining powers vis-à-vis the central leadership of the party to which he 
or she is formally affiliated. This combination of factors has meant that (a) bottom-up 
demands for further devolution have been strongly concentrated on the Mayoral remit and 
(b) such demands only tend to be accommodated when the Mayor is both highly popular 
and formally affiliated with the party in government at the centre. These dynamics seem 
unlikely to change in the near future unless the centre decided to notably increase the 
powers of the Assembly and/or the Mayoral politics become more strongly influenced by 
party-political concerns.     
The devolution of powers and resources to Scotland, Wales and Greater London has 
thus produced regional institutions with very different degrees and types of bargaining 
power. Simultaneously, the lack of devolution to the rest of England has meant that the 
majority of the electorate in mainland Britain does not enjoy any form of regional 
representation. As the previous chapter showed, democratic anomalies within the current 
government system and disputes regarding the allocation of public resources across 
regions are increasingly leading to grievances in the non-devolved areas. In the absence 
of elected regional bodies, these sources of discontent are however scarcely finding 
political expression. This in turn gives political elites at the central level the opportunity to 
ignore those demands that would be electorally damaging in devolved areas or 
disadvantageous for the Party itself. This situation seems unlikely to change unless 
grievances with the asymmetric system of devolution become salient enough to 
significantly affect the behaviour of English voters in general elections. 
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8.   Conclusion 
  
This study set out to examine both the origins of regionalism and the conditions under 
which such spatially-concentrated demands for greater regional autonomy are likely to 
lead to change in the government system. While the contemporary revival of regional 
autonomy movements and the simultaneous tendency towards greater government 
decentralisation have received considerable academic attention, these literatures did not 
produce a coherent theoretical account of these two interrelated but distinctive trends. In 
this context, this study has aimed to make a contribution to the literature by combining the 
tentative inductive hypotheses emerging from empirical case studies with insights from the 
largely theoretical literatures on political legitimacy and policy change. The usefulness of 
the resulting framework was demonstrated by applying it to post-war mainland Britain. To 
an extent this re-examination of the contemporary history of regionalism and devolution 
summarised a range of rather well-known historic facts and trends. The primary goal of the 
empirical chapters was however to show that the theoretical explanations developed in 
chapter 2 can indeed help us to qualify and challenge the conventional wisdom in 
important ways. 
 The first part of this chapter will briefly summarise the main theoretical and 
empirical contributions of this study. The second part identifies a number of interesting 
areas for future research.       
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8.1. Main contributions 
8.1.1. The importance of legitimacy grievances with the territorial state  
 Despite Rokkan and Urwin’s (1982) early insistence on the importance of devoting 
equal attention to central factors, much of the literature on regionalism has remained 
strongly focussed on regional trends and realities. Contemporary challenges to this 
approach have in turn been largely preoccupied with the influence of globalisation and 
European integration on the potential for regionalist mobilisation (Dardanelli, 2005; Jolly, 
2007; Keating, 1995). While this research focus may well represent a long-overdue move 
away from the state-centric approaches that still characterise much of the social sciences 
(Agnew, 1994; Taylor, 1996), it risks drawing our attention away from the legitimacy 
deficits at the centre that have created the opportunities for regionalism in the first place. 
This study has sought to bring the territorial state back into the analysis by explicitly 
conceptualising regionalism as the partial rescaling of legitimacy from the central or federal 
level to the regional scale.   
The literature on social movements has long argued that, in order for successful 
mobilisation to occur, “people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives 
and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem” (McAdam, et al., 
1996: 5). If we apply this insight to regionalist mobilisation, popular support for greater 
regional autonomy can only emerge when (1) the legitimacy of the centre is challenged in 
some way and (2) the regional scale is seen as a more legitimate or capable 
representative of the people in this respect. From this perspective, the regionalist revival in 
the post-war period can theoretically be based on two rationales. First of all, new 
challenges to the legitimacy of the territorial state may have encouraged a regionalist 
revival in areas that have traditionally enjoyed a high degree of regional legitimacy. 
Secondly, an increase in the legitimacy of the region as an alternative scale of government 
may have created support for decentralisation in areas where the legitimacy of the state 
has traditionally been compromised.  
325 | P a g e  
 
While these two dynamics need not be mutually exclusive, drawing this distinction 
provides us with theoretically-grounded ideal types through which to re-examine the 
origins of popular demands for greater autonomy in different regions and time periods. In 
order to empirically apply this perspective, the concept of political legitimacy however 
needs to be operationalised.  
8.1.2. The role of economic, democratic and identity-based factors  
 While the literature on regionalism and devolution frequently draws on the concept 
of political legitimacy, what makes the exercise of power at different geographical scales 
legitimate is seldom discussed in great detail. This study has sought to address this gap in 
the literature. Approaching the issue from a descriptive rather than a prescriptive point of 
view, Max Weber’s (1978) definition of legitimacy as the belief in legitimacy is taken as a 
starting point. In line with Beetham’s argument, I however contend that the exercise of 
power at a particular geographical scale “is not legitimate because people believe in its 
legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs” (Beetham, 1991: 11). 
Drawing primarily on the work of Easton (1965) and Scharpf (1999), Chapter 2 in turn 
identifies three main sources of beliefs in legitimacy within established democratic 
societies; output-oriented or specific support, input-oriented or democratic legitimacy, and 
a sense of community or shared identity.  
Together with the proposition that regionalism constitutes a response to a 
perceived central legitimacy deficit which could be redressed through collective action at 
the regional scale, this multi-faceted concept of legitimacy in turn allowed us to identify 
three ideal types of regionalism. Within this tripartite typology, the term identity-based 
regionalism was reserved for calls for autonomy that originated from the perception that 
the state identity is irreconcilable, or in some way at odds, with the imagined community at 
the regional level. In addition, calls for decentralisation may also emerge when the central 
government system is seen as inadequately responsive to the needs and wants of the 
population and decentralisation is perceived as a viable solution to this democratic deficit.  
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I have chosen to refer this type of support for devolution as democratic regionalism. 
Finally, it was argued that grievances with the outputs produced by the centre, coupled 
with the perception that decentralisation would improve the economic situation of the 
region and/or allow residents to enjoy the same public goods and services at a lower cost, 
can give rise to economic forms of regionalism.  
 By applying this typology to post-war Britain, this study has shown that this 
approach not only encourages us to devote equal attention to regional and central 
developments but also helps us to distinguish the root causes of regionalism from the 
wider range of enabling factors. Chapter 3 for example drew attention to the role played by 
the weakening of some for the main markers of the British identity during the 1950s and 
60s within the subsequent change in the relative importance attached to state-wide and 
regional feelings of belonging in Scotland and Wales. Simultaneously, it was argued that 
the perceived conflicts between the regional ‘us’ and the British ‘other’ were too limited and 
stable over time to explain the subsequent waxing and waning of support for greater 
regional autonomy. Instead a structured comparison with the developments in various 
English regions revealed that the existence of an imagined regional community, and the 
formal and informal regional mobilisation structures that tend to accompany historically-
grounded spatial identities, facilitated the mobilisation of other grievances along territorial 
lines in Scotland and Wales.  
 The first regionalist revival in the 1960s and 70s coincided with the worsening of 
the relative and absolute economic position of Britain and the re-emergence of the North-
South divide. Across the UK, these economic woes were accompanied by a growing 
discontent with the performance of the main contenders for office at the central level. In 
Scotland, these grievances were associated with a marked rise in popular support for 
greater regional autonomy. By contrast, English and Welsh voters predominantly 
expressed their discontent by shunning the Labour Party and the Conservatives in favour 
of the Liberals.  
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Chapter 3 argued that this regional variety in the popular response to very similar central 
grievances reflected both the differences in the perceived economic legitimacy of the 
region and the strength of regional mobilisation structures. In Scotland, the rise in the 
economic legitimacy of the region following the discovery of North Sea oil enabled pre-
existing regionalist groups to mobilise economic sources of discontent and the related 
democratic grievances along territorial lines. In Wales, the lack of a similar boost to the 
fiscal position of the region, coupled with the greater economic dependence on England, 
made it more difficult to pursue a similar strategy. In the North of England, the potential for 
economic regionalism was further reduced by the relative weakness of the formal and 
informal mobilisation structures at the regional level.  
By contrast, I have argued that the second regionalist revival primarily occurred as 
a consequence of new challenges to the democratic legitimacy of the central state. 
Despite the fact that some regions did display fairly distinctive voting patterns throughout 
the post-war period, the existence of a relatively balanced two-party system at the central 
level and the related periodic alternation of power long limited the potential for democratic 
regionalism. In the late 1970s, a prominent shift in the voting behaviour of some English 
regions however produced a lengthy period of Conservative predominance. While this 
created substantial grievances across much of the North of England, mobilising these 
democratic grievances along territorial lines again proved difficult. By contrast, the pre-
existence of characteristic regional voting patterns in Wales and the increasingly distinctive 
behaviour of Scottish voters proved conducive to democratic regionalism in these identity-
rich regions.    
By applying the same typology to the post-devolution situation, chapter 6 in turn 
demonstrated that the proposed typology not only enables us to gain a better 
understanding of the contemporary history of regionalism, but also allows us to explore the 
relationship between the partial accommodation for regionalist demands and future calls 
for further decentralisation and secession in more detail.  
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In particular, I argued that the potential for purely identity-based regionalism remains 
limited in mainland Britain. By contrast, the devolution of powers and resources to 
Scotland and Wales seems to have done little to remove the democratic grievances with 
the centre that lay at the heart of the regionalist revival in the 1980s and 90s. 
Simultaneously anomalies in the current system of representation under asymmetric 
devolution have created new sources of democratic grievances in England. Survey 
evidence in turn suggests that the reluctance of the centre to deal with these issues 
through central reforms is gradually increasing the perceived desirability of more 
symmetric devolved arrangements. Economically, the reality of devolution seems to have 
dampened hopes that decentralisation can help to promote economic growth and 
prosperity. The perceived fiscal dividend of devolution may however prove a potent source 
of economic regionalism in the post-devolution period.    
8.1.3. The usefulness of a veto player approach 
 This study not only examined the origins of regionalism, but also explored under 
which circumstances such popular demands for greater regional autonomy were likely to 
lead to an actual rescaling of powers and resources from the central or federal level to the 
regional scale. In this context, it was argued that a careful analysis of the formal 
distribution of veto powers represents a useful first step in analysing the patterns of policy 
stability and change. While many of the existing studies into regionalist accommodation 
and non-accommodation implicitly develop veto player arguments, the reluctance to 
explicitly state and justify the proposed distribution of veto powers that underpins these 
analytical narratives both obscures the argument and make them more difficult to test and 
challenge empirically. Using the British case as an example, this study has sought to 
demonstrate that a more formal approach can help us to further our understanding of 
these processes, even in a context where veto powers tend to be strongly concentrated in 
the hands of a single partisan veto player. 
329 | P a g e  
 
 It can be argued that the usefulness of the veto player approach in explaining the 
patterns of regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation in Britain is at least 
partially accidental, as one of the main decision-making moments took place during an 
exceptional period of minority government at the centre. Even if we exclude this period 
from the analyses, I would argue that the veto player approach is useful as it forces us to 
re-evaluate the role of a range of influential groups and institutions within the agenda-
setting and decision-making process. In particular, this study has shown that the 
leadership of the party that wins the plurality of the seats at the central level can usually be 
identified as the only veto player within the system. Crucially, devolution has not 
significantly changed the formal distribution of veto powers in areas of constitutional 
importance. As a result, I argue that the patterns of regionalist accommodation in Britain 
are primarily guided by the act- and outcome-based incentives towards regionalist 
accommodation faced by the two main contenders for office at the central level. This in 
turn shifts the research focus from the developments in the House of Commons and the 
outcome of regional referendums to the origins of the formal policy positions of the Labour 
Party and the Conservatives and how these shaped their subsequent behaviour within the 
legislative arena.   
8.1.4. The role of act- and outcome-based incentives  
 
 One of the primary problems we face when trying to uncover the origins of 
patterns of regionalist accommodation and non-accommodation is that we cannot directly 
measure the preferences of the main actors within this system. Instead, the beliefs that 
underpin their actions will have to be at least partially inferred from the very behaviours 
that we are trying to explain. As a result, the validity of our arguments will hinge strongly 
on our ability to justify the preferences we attribute to those with agenda-setting and 
decision-making powers. In my view, much of the contemporary literature on devolution 
devotes too little attention to this important aspect of validation.  
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This study has sought to show that devoting greater attention to the origins of the formal 
policy positions of partisan veto players can significantly enhance our understanding of the 
mechanisms through which popular demands for greater regional autonomy can lead to 
actual policy change.     
Loosely based on the work of Blau (2008), chapter 2 developed a typology of the 
outcome and act-based incentives to support or oppose devolution faced by instrumentally 
rational political elites. In line with the conventional wisdom, it was argued that the 
outcome-based incentives faced by partisan veto players are shaped by the level at which 
they compete for office. This relationship is however not as straightforward as is often 
assumed. Central players with an ideological or self-interested preference for maintaining 
the unity of the existing state may for example support devolution because they believe 
that the partial accommodation of regionalist demands will reduce calls for full secession. 
Similarly, devolution can be seen as a viable strategy to increase the power and influence 
of a player currently competing at the central level if the party he or she represents 
persistently attracts a large share of the regional vote, whilst simultaneously having 
relatively poor prospects of forming part of the state-wide government (O’Neill, 2003).  
Applying these insights to the British case challenges the conventional perspective 
on the period of non-decision between 1970 and 1974. The lack of decision-making, 
despite the fact that the governing party made a clear manifesto commitment to 
devolution, is often taken as evidence that the formal policy position of the Conservative 
Party was purely based on electoral incentives (Gamble, 2006; Mitchell, 1990).The 
available evidence however suggests that the Declaration of Perth was strongly guided by 
the ideological beliefs of the then party leader, Edward Heath, who saw devolution as a 
way to deal with the rising nationalist threat in Scotland. If we accept this perspective, the 
decision not to place the devolution issue on the parliamentary agenda may well have 
been guided by the preference constellation within the Parliamentary Conservative Party, 
rather than the feebleness of the origins of the original policy commitment.       
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Alongside the outcome-based incentives towards regionalist accommodation and 
non-accommodation, political elites will also face a distinctive set of act-based incentives 
to formally support or oppose change. First of all, it was argued that the formal policy 
position of a partisan veto player is likely to be shaped by electoral considerations. As 
popular demands for greater regional autonomy tend to be spatially concentrated (Sorens, 
2009), the direction and size of the electoral incentives faced by partisan veto players will 
to an extent depend on the geographical context in which they compete and the 
regionalisation of the vote. Paradoxically, differences in issue salience may however mean 
that central or federal players competing within a relatively nationalised party system do at 
times face electoral incentives to accommodate the preferences of a regionalist minority 
against the wishes of the majority of the voters in the rest of the country.   
This more elaborate examination of the structure of electoral incentives in turn 
changes our perspective on the period of decision-making in the late 1970s. The available 
evidence suggests that the commitments to Scottish and Welsh devolution within the 
October 1974 Labour manifesto were strongly motivated by electoral incentives. On the 
other hand, the spatial concentration of popular demands for greater regional autonomy in 
Scotland and parts of Wales, coupled with the popular opposition to the policy in the rest of 
Britain, meant that the proposed form of asymmetric devolution represented a minority 
preference even amongst Labour voters. While the existing literature primarily links this 
trend to the electoral threat posed by the SNP and to a lesser extent Plaid Cymru, this 
study qualifies this perspective by arguing that differences in issue salience played a 
crucial role in shaping this dynamic. Specifically, it was argued that the Labour leadership 
sought to accommodate the views of those Scottish and Welsh voters for whom the 
territorial dimension had become salient to influence their voting behaviour in general 
elections.  
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This in turn presents a new and in my view very plausible explanation for the inclusion of a 
manifesto commitment on Welsh devolution, despite the fact that survey evidence 
suggested that this option might not be preferred to the status quo by a majority of the 
Welsh electorate.  
Once elected, a partisan actor may in turn face political act-based incentives to 
adjust her formal policy position in order to secure the support of a crucial coalition partner 
and thereby gain or retain office at the regional or central level. As the veto powers within 
the British system tend to be strongly concentrated in the hands of a single partisan veto 
player, these incentives have been less crucial in shaping the dynamics of regionalist 
accommodation then for example in Belgium or Italy.  In the 1970s, the tight electoral 
competition at the central level, coupled with the divisiveness of the devolution issue within 
the Parliamentary Labour Party and the general decline in party discipline, however did 
produce additional veto players within the system. Cabinet papers from the late 1970s 
suggest that the introduction of regional referendums was primarily motivated by the desire 
of the minority Labour government to resolve the emerging legislative deadlock in a way 
that would allow it to continue to draw on the support of the regionalist parties in the case 
of a no-confidence motion.  
As the issue of ‘home rule’ had only recently re-emerged, popular opinion however 
proved relatively susceptible to campaigning efforts. Together with the fact that the 
elections campaign commitments had been primarily guided by the preferences of a 
minority for whom the issue was highly salient, this proved sufficient to allow the No 
campaign to prevent change in Wales. In Scotland, the so-called Cunningham amendment 
is widely blamed for the failure of the devolution legislation. By formally identifying the 
various veto points within the decision-making path, this study was however able to show 
that the House of Commons retained the final veto position. The results of the 1979 
referendum simply required the government to lay a repeal order before parliament.  
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Given the fact that the majority of those who voted did favour devolution, the government 
could have legitimately asked the parliament to vote down this order. This course of action 
was not taken because informal enquiries by the whips showed that the Labour leadership 
would not be able to muster sufficient backbench support for such a move to succeed.   
Finally, this study has argued that the external outcome and act-based incentives 
outlined above are accompanied by a distinctive set of internal considerations. In line with 
Grofman’s (2004) argument, it was argued that policy autonomy of political elites is 
constrained to some extent by the constellation of preferences within the party to which 
they formally belong. As in the electoral arena, it was argued that the strength of the 
internal act-based incentives to support or oppose devolution are shaped both by the size 
of the pro- and anti-devolution factions within the party and the salience attached to the 
issue by each group. Based on these propositions, I argue that a lack of internal cohesion 
on the devolution issue allows political elites to respond quite strongly to changes in the 
external act- and outcome-based incentives to oppose or support devolution. As the issue 
is increasingly absorbed within the party system, the ability of the leadership to go against 
the dominant view within the party will decline.  
In Britain, the influence of internal incentive structures on the patterns of regionalist 
accommodation is most strongly illustrated by the difference in policy autonomy of the 
Labour leadership during the main decision-making periods within the post-war, pre-
devolution period. In the 1970s, the relatively recent re-emergence of the devolution issue, 
coupled with the lack of internal consensus regarding the appropriate policy response to 
this trend, allowed Harold Wilson to dictate the terms of the debate. As argued the party 
leader used this autonomy to secure the vote of the regionalist minority in the context of 
tight electoral competition at the central level. By contrast, Tony Blair was personally 
unconvinced that the external act- and outcome-based incentives were persuasive enough 
to maintain the Party’s longstanding commitments to Scottish and Welsh devolution.  
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The emergence of a more cohesive internal party position, coupled with the salience 
attached to the issue by a relatively powerful pro-devolution lobby, however strongly 
constrained the ability of the party leader to adjust the formal policy platform to these 
personal beliefs and preferences. Faced with these conflicting external and internal 
incentives, it would seem that Blair devised a mixed policy strategy which allowed him to 
enjoy the act-based internal benefits, whilst simultaneously minimising the likelihood and 
extent of policy change by insisting on explicit manifesto commitments to include pre-
legislative referendums within the decision-making path. While the Labour leader may 
have underestimated the appetite for fiscal devolution in Scotland, weaker popular support 
for decentralisation meant that this strategy nearly achieved the desired effect in Wales.  
Taken together, this re-examination of the contemporary history of regionalist 
accommodation in Britain demonstrated that a more intricate understanding of the 
incentives faced by partisan veto players can help us to qualify and challenge elements of 
the conventional wisdom. As was the case with the typology of regionalisms, the approach 
also enabled us to explore how the establishment of elected regional bodies is likely to 
influence the dynamics of regionalist accommodation in the future. Most directly, 
decentralisation can change the pattern of policy change by awarding veto powers to 
regional actors. The British case however demonstrates that devolution can also unleash 
further changes of constitutional importance by changing the act- and outcome-based 
incentives faced by the existing veto players.  
Drawing on the contemporary developments in Scotland, Wales and Greater London, I 
have shown that this effect is however far from uniform. In particular, it was argued the 
effect of devolution on the credibility of the threat of secession primarily works through the 
ability of a regional body to call a consultative popular referendum on independence.  
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As a result, the outcome-based incentives faced by partisan players with a preference for 
maintaining the unity of the existing state will only be significantly affected by devolution if 
popular support for extensive devolution and independence is substantial and regionalist 
groups are the primary agenda-setters and decision-makers at the regional level. While 
this dynamic has not emerged in Wales and Greater London, the recent developments in 
Scotland suggest that the threat of a referendum does allow regional elites to extract 
additional powers and resources from the centre. Crucially, the greater overlap of the 
formal policy positions of the main contenders for office at the centre suggests that this 
has dampened the influence of the electoral geography of the UK on central party 
positions.  
In the absence of a credible threat of exit, it was argued that devolution primarily 
affects the incentives faced by central veto players through the benefits derived from 
simultaneous office holding at the regional level and the internal bargaining power enjoyed 
by regional elites as a result of this dynamic. Drawing on the developments in post-
devolution Wales and Greater London, it was shown that this logic encourages the central 
government to at least play lip service to bottom-up demands for further decentralisation 
originating from a devolved administration that is led by its regional subsidiary. At times 
when there is no formal partisan connection between the regional and the central 
government, the incentives towards regionalist accommodation faced by the centre 
however remain similar to the pre-devolution situation.  
Difference in popular preference structures, institutional arrangements and 
electoral dynamics have thus meant that the asymmetric devolution of powers and 
resources to Scotland, Wales and Greater London has produced regional institutions with 
very different degrees and types of bargaining power vis-à-vis the centre. Simultaneously, 
it was argued that the lack of devolution to the rest of England has meant that the English 
sources of discontent with the current system of asymmetric devolution do not find political 
expression easily.  
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This in turn allowed political elites at the central level to prioritise party-interests and 
demands from devolved areas over the preferences of the English voters. As a result, it 
seems unlikely that the main contenders for office at the centre will be inclined to propose 
a comprehensive solution to the English question in the near future.   
8.2. Areas for future research 
 
The primary aim of this study was to develop a theoretically-grounded approach to 
regionalism and regionalist accommodation that could be applied to a variety of contexts. 
The logical extension of this work would therefore be to demonstrate that this approach 
can also helps us to make sense of contemporary developments in other democratic 
countries. The typology of regionalisms proposed in this study helped to re-examine the 
contemporary history of regionalism in Britain. This analysis revealed that, although 
regional factors were important in shaping the popular response to general sources of 
discontent, the regionalist revivals during the post-war period have been primarily caused 
by the emergence of new and the deepening of pre-existing grievances with the centre. It 
would be interesting to see to what extent this pattern is mirrored within other advanced 
democratic societies. The British case suggests that our understanding of ‘traditional’ 
cases of regionalism in identity-rich regions, such as Flanders in Belgium and Quebec in 
Canada, can be great enhanced by a stronger focus on state-wide trends and factors. In 
addition, it would be fascinating to re-examine seemingly defiant cases, such as the 
Northern League in Italy, through this perspective.  
Extending the analysis to countries like Italy, Belgium and Canada would in turn 
introduce a range of new electoral and institutional settings. The actor-based rational 
choice approach to regionalist accommodation proposed in this thesis was deliberately 
developed to cope with this variety in a structured way. From a veto player perspective, 
more proportional electoral systems and federal arrangements tend to increase the 
number of veto players within the system (Tsebelis, 2002).  
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Drawing on lessons from German federalism and European integration, Scharpf (1988) 
has famously argued that the direct involvement of member governments in constitutional 
reform decisions can lead to a ‘joint-decision trap’ within which self-interested bargaining 
practices either prevent change from occurring or leads to sub-optimal compromises. The 
recent difficulties in the government formation process in Belgium in turn suggest that 
more proportional electoral systems may produce a similar type of legislative paralysis 
under certain circumstances.  
These legislative dynamics are however not just a function of the formal distribution of 
agenda-setting and decision-making powers. Rather, I would argue that it is the 
incongruence, or difference, in the preferences of the various veto players within the 
system that shapes the likelihood of constitutional change. As in the British context, 
examining the act- and outcome-based incentives to support or oppose further 
decentralisation faced by different types of veto players is therefore likely to produce 
interesting insights. In addition, the existence of more frequent and readily visible 
bargaining processes opens up new routes for enquiry. Within European integration 
studies, it has for example been argued that political elites can increase their bargaining 
powers within treaty negotiations by arguing that their hands are tied by the constellation 
of preferences within their home Parliament and/or the views of the voters within their 
country (Hug & König, 2002; König & Finke, 2007; Milner, 1997; Pahre, 1997). Similarly, it 
has been suggested that heads of state have used the ‘constraints’ they face at the 
European level to silence domestic objections to further integration at times (Moravcsik, 
1998). Extending this study to countries like Canada, Belgium and Italy would allow us to 
test to what extent Schelling’s (1960) paradox of weakness indeed has an influence on 
policy stability and change within systems that also include veto players who primarily 
represent one particular region.     
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With a few adjustments, the framework presented in this study could also be used to 
shed new light on processes of globalisation and international integration. As noted in the 
introduction, regionalism and decentralisation are often seen as part of a wider process of 
rescaling from the territorial state to geographical entities “below, above, beyond, or 
between entrenched geopolitical boundaries” (Brenner, 1999:40). Particularly in the 
European context, the transfer of powers and resources to regional institutions above the 
state has received extensive attention across a range of academic disciplines. This thesis 
has drawn quite extensively on these literatures. In particular, the multifaceted concept of 
legitimacy proposed in this study was strongly influenced by the research into the political 
legitimacy of the European Union (EU) (Beetham & Lord, 1998; Scharpf, 1999). Similarly, 
the decision to examine regionalist accommodation through a veto player perspective was 
partially inspired by the use of this method within the literature on European integration (for 
example see  Tsebelis, 1994; Tsebelis & Yataganas, 2002).  
Although our knowledge of European integration is in many ways much more 
advanced that our understanding of the related process of decentralisation to regions 
below the territorial state, I still feel that the framework of regionalism developed in this 
study could make a contribution in this field. In particular, I would like to join Mansfield 
(2005) in arguing that much of the literature on globalisation and European integration still 
seems to be locked in an either/or debate. From within this perspective, these processes 
are either profoundly and relentlessly reducing the importance of the territorial state as an 
economic actor, locus of identity, and scale of representation (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; 
Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996), or the state remains the primary level through which the 
exercise of power is legitimised and international structures like the EU merely represent 
vehicles through which the state fulfils some of its roles (Moravcsik, 1998). By stressing 
that popular support for the rescaling of government results from the interaction between 
the perceived legitimacy of the territorial state and an alternative scale of representation, 
the framework proposed in this study could partially redress this false dichotomy.  
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